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KAZAN SWING: BAKU AND YEREVAN ACCUSE EACH OTHER OF STYMIEING THE SIGNING OF AN AGREEMENT
By Sokhbet Mamedov, Viktoriya Panfilova
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
June 27 2011
Russia
[translated from Russian]
A road map in a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement will be the subject of
future meetings of the presidents of Armenia, Russia, and Azerbaijan
Baku--The meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Ilham
Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan, with the mediation of Dmitriy Medvedev,
leader of Russia, in Kazan was not, contrary to expectations,
crowned with the signing of the basic principles of a settlement of
the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. The parties confined themselves to a
joint statement, which affirmed the achievement of mutual understanding
on a number of issues, a settlement of which would contribute to the
creation of the conditions for approval of the basic principles of
a settlement of the conflict.
Against the background of the highly promising appeals and statements
of the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group, the meeting in Kazan,
despite the active diplomatic pressure and speculative optimistic
expectations, did not produce a tangible result. The tone of
the statements, which were made by the leaders of the parties
to the conflict in an interview for the Euronews television
channel the day before the meeting in Kazan, testified to the
serious contradictions between Baku and Yerevan. Specifically, the
president of Azerbaijan said that "Baku has no intention of offering
anything in exchange for the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the
territories adjacent to Nagornyy Karabakh since Nagornyy Karabakh
has down the ages belonged to Azerbaijan, this is internationally
recognized Azerbaijani territory. Nonetheless, Baku is prepared to
grant Karabakh the broadest autonomy which is alone possible in the
world," Ilham Aliyev said, noting that there is the positive example
of such autonomies--specifically, Italy and the Tyrol. In turn,
Serzh Sargsyan adduced a number of demands, which Azerbaijan could
not accept in principle. The presidents' statements were effectually
the precursors of the failure of the Kazan meeting.
As was to have been expected, Eduard Nalbandian and Elmar Mammadyarov,
heads of the foreign ministries of Armenia and Azerbaijan, issued
contrasting statements after the summit, placing the responsibility
for the breakdown of the negotiations on the other side. Nalbandyan
said that Azerbaijan was not prepared to accept the version of the
core principles of a Karabakh settlement presented by the co-chairmen,
offering too many amendments. In response, Mammadyarov counseled his
Armenian counterpart not to "indulge in PR but to work intensively
on changing the current negative status quo, for which the leaders
of the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group are calling."
This exchange of "courtesies" of the two ministers and also the
strictest confidentiality of the negotiations of the presidents gave
rise to ambiguous expert assessments of the results of the Kazan
summit. For example, the diplomat Vafa Guluzade, who is well versed in
the nuances of the negotiating process, considers the mediators, who
are not demanding that Yerevan withdraw its troops from the occupied
Azerbaijani territories, to blame for the delay in a resolution of
the problem. "Armenia, on the other hand, seeing such tacit support,
is increasingly stiffening its position," Guluzade said. He called
attention here to the fact that Moscow intends to transfer some of
the arms from the Russian base in Gyumri to Armenia, the second
co-chairman--the United States--continues to fund this republic,
and the third--France--already calls Armenia its sister. All this
is undoubtedly instilling in Armenia confidence. In response to a
question as to whether after this war were possible, Guluzade observed:
"We cannot oppose world powers. We need, therefore, to wait for a
suitable geopolitical situation, and this will necessarily come,
and to continue to arm in parallel."
Armenia had no particular expectations of the Kazan meeting, as
a matter of fact. The critics of President Serzh Sargsyan and of
his policy were probably the most upset. Even before the meeting
they attacked the Armenian leader and his team in advance for their
willingness to make impermissible concessions. Sargsyan's speech in
Strasbourg at a regular session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Cou ncil of Europe on 21 June, in which he acted the part of a kind of
peacemaker prepared to constructively settle all contradictions--both
domestic, and foreign, policy--lent substance to such criticism to
some extent. But the unprecedentedly vague (even for the traditionally
unproductive Karabakh settlement negotiations) wording deprived the
critics of reasons for an escalation of the attacks on the present
authorities' foreign policy. Except, perhaps, for the opposition
Armenian National Congress (ANC) led by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the
Republic of Armenia's first president, which attempted to voice
unhappiness with the results of the Kazan meeting.
It would appear that, as before, it was important for Baku and Yerevan
not so much to achieve a breakthrough in Kazan as to create a platform
for accusing their partners of a lack of constructiveness.
"All this is reminiscent of a swing. At each such meeting one party is
to a greater extent agreeable to the latest updated wording proposed
by the mediators, the other, accordingly, objects. The mediators
will once again sit down to edit with regard to the unhappiness
that was expressed, and the next time the wording will be vouchsafed
objections from the other party. Based on the reactions, it may be
assumed that the involuntary [as published] participant in Kazan was
Azerbaijan, and Armenia had more grounds for accusing its partner of an
unwillingness to compromise. Whether a balance will ever be achieved
is not known but it is hard to expect this in the immediate future,"
Boris Navasardyan, chairman of the Yerevan Press Club, told NG.
Amanda Paul, analyst for the South Caucasus and Turkey and Energy
Security of the European Policy Center, believes that "although the
problem of the security of the Armenia ns of Nagornyy Karabakh is
important, it cannot, nonetheless, be used endlessly to justify the
occupation of seven other areas of Azerbaijan and the continuing
resettlement of the population." Amanda Paul doubts that the lack
of progress in Kazan will necessarily increase tension on the line
of contact.
By Sokhbet Mamedov, Viktoriya Panfilova
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
June 27 2011
Russia
[translated from Russian]
A road map in a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement will be the subject of
future meetings of the presidents of Armenia, Russia, and Azerbaijan
Baku--The meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Ilham
Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan, with the mediation of Dmitriy Medvedev,
leader of Russia, in Kazan was not, contrary to expectations,
crowned with the signing of the basic principles of a settlement of
the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. The parties confined themselves to a
joint statement, which affirmed the achievement of mutual understanding
on a number of issues, a settlement of which would contribute to the
creation of the conditions for approval of the basic principles of
a settlement of the conflict.
Against the background of the highly promising appeals and statements
of the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group, the meeting in Kazan,
despite the active diplomatic pressure and speculative optimistic
expectations, did not produce a tangible result. The tone of
the statements, which were made by the leaders of the parties
to the conflict in an interview for the Euronews television
channel the day before the meeting in Kazan, testified to the
serious contradictions between Baku and Yerevan. Specifically, the
president of Azerbaijan said that "Baku has no intention of offering
anything in exchange for the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the
territories adjacent to Nagornyy Karabakh since Nagornyy Karabakh
has down the ages belonged to Azerbaijan, this is internationally
recognized Azerbaijani territory. Nonetheless, Baku is prepared to
grant Karabakh the broadest autonomy which is alone possible in the
world," Ilham Aliyev said, noting that there is the positive example
of such autonomies--specifically, Italy and the Tyrol. In turn,
Serzh Sargsyan adduced a number of demands, which Azerbaijan could
not accept in principle. The presidents' statements were effectually
the precursors of the failure of the Kazan meeting.
As was to have been expected, Eduard Nalbandian and Elmar Mammadyarov,
heads of the foreign ministries of Armenia and Azerbaijan, issued
contrasting statements after the summit, placing the responsibility
for the breakdown of the negotiations on the other side. Nalbandyan
said that Azerbaijan was not prepared to accept the version of the
core principles of a Karabakh settlement presented by the co-chairmen,
offering too many amendments. In response, Mammadyarov counseled his
Armenian counterpart not to "indulge in PR but to work intensively
on changing the current negative status quo, for which the leaders
of the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group are calling."
This exchange of "courtesies" of the two ministers and also the
strictest confidentiality of the negotiations of the presidents gave
rise to ambiguous expert assessments of the results of the Kazan
summit. For example, the diplomat Vafa Guluzade, who is well versed in
the nuances of the negotiating process, considers the mediators, who
are not demanding that Yerevan withdraw its troops from the occupied
Azerbaijani territories, to blame for the delay in a resolution of
the problem. "Armenia, on the other hand, seeing such tacit support,
is increasingly stiffening its position," Guluzade said. He called
attention here to the fact that Moscow intends to transfer some of
the arms from the Russian base in Gyumri to Armenia, the second
co-chairman--the United States--continues to fund this republic,
and the third--France--already calls Armenia its sister. All this
is undoubtedly instilling in Armenia confidence. In response to a
question as to whether after this war were possible, Guluzade observed:
"We cannot oppose world powers. We need, therefore, to wait for a
suitable geopolitical situation, and this will necessarily come,
and to continue to arm in parallel."
Armenia had no particular expectations of the Kazan meeting, as
a matter of fact. The critics of President Serzh Sargsyan and of
his policy were probably the most upset. Even before the meeting
they attacked the Armenian leader and his team in advance for their
willingness to make impermissible concessions. Sargsyan's speech in
Strasbourg at a regular session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Cou ncil of Europe on 21 June, in which he acted the part of a kind of
peacemaker prepared to constructively settle all contradictions--both
domestic, and foreign, policy--lent substance to such criticism to
some extent. But the unprecedentedly vague (even for the traditionally
unproductive Karabakh settlement negotiations) wording deprived the
critics of reasons for an escalation of the attacks on the present
authorities' foreign policy. Except, perhaps, for the opposition
Armenian National Congress (ANC) led by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the
Republic of Armenia's first president, which attempted to voice
unhappiness with the results of the Kazan meeting.
It would appear that, as before, it was important for Baku and Yerevan
not so much to achieve a breakthrough in Kazan as to create a platform
for accusing their partners of a lack of constructiveness.
"All this is reminiscent of a swing. At each such meeting one party is
to a greater extent agreeable to the latest updated wording proposed
by the mediators, the other, accordingly, objects. The mediators
will once again sit down to edit with regard to the unhappiness
that was expressed, and the next time the wording will be vouchsafed
objections from the other party. Based on the reactions, it may be
assumed that the involuntary [as published] participant in Kazan was
Azerbaijan, and Armenia had more grounds for accusing its partner of an
unwillingness to compromise. Whether a balance will ever be achieved
is not known but it is hard to expect this in the immediate future,"
Boris Navasardyan, chairman of the Yerevan Press Club, told NG.
Amanda Paul, analyst for the South Caucasus and Turkey and Energy
Security of the European Policy Center, believes that "although the
problem of the security of the Armenia ns of Nagornyy Karabakh is
important, it cannot, nonetheless, be used endlessly to justify the
occupation of seven other areas of Azerbaijan and the continuing
resettlement of the population." Amanda Paul doubts that the lack
of progress in Kazan will necessarily increase tension on the line
of contact.