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Georgian Daily, Georgia
July 23 2011
`Reset' Regret - Russian `Sphere of Privileged Interests' in Eurasia
Undermines U.S. Foreign Policy
July 23, 2011
By Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. and Stephen Blank
For many years, Russian diplomats have openly proclaimed that the
former Soviet republics that make up the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) are not truly sovereign states. Russian analysts have
stated that Russia regards the Obama Administration's `reset' policy
as a U.S. admission that the CIS is within Russia's sphere of
influence.
The reset policy has hitherto conspicuously failed to address
important U.S. interests in Eurasia, including preventing the
emergence of a hegemonic power in Eurasia, maintaining a level playing
field in access to markets and natural resources, and developing
democracy and free markets based on the rule of law. Since the
`reset,' President Obama has downgraded his meetings with post-Soviet
heads of state, signaling a lesser U.S. involvement and interest. Some
senior U.S. officials have even told their subordinates not to bother
them with the problems of the Caucasus.
It is clear that Washington needs a new approach to Eurasian foreign
policy to prevent an emergence of a Russian sphere of influence or
another regional hegemony. The United States should boost its
diplomatic support of sovereign states, such as Ukraine and Georgia,
and expand a real commitment to the region. Specifically, Washington
should provide political support to East-West energy pipelines and
uphold sovereignty and territorial integrity under international
law - even if this upsets Russia - while at the same time becoming an
active mediator in the Transnistria and South Caucasus disputes.
In Search of Eurasian Hegemony
Since Boris Yeltsin demanded a sphere of influence in the CIS in 1993,
that goal has been the driving force of Russian foreign policy. Toward
that end, Russia employed every instrument of its power: energy,
trade, investment, the linkage of these factors with Russian organized
crime, political subversion, intelligence penetration, and expansion
of military bases. Russia has threatened and even used military force,
such as in Georgia in 2008. Today Moscow is pressuring Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Ukraine to join a Russia-dominated customs union that
also includes Belarus and Kazakhstan.
Russia also controls military bases and key military industrial
facilities in Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
It has been trying to subvert the Georgian government and is using
constant economic pressure to take control of Belarus's natural gas
company and pipelines. Moscow's policy remains to pressure the CIS
countries to turn their backs on Europe and preserve Russian leverage
over its neighbors' politics and economics. Concurrently, despite
official disclaimers to the contrary, Moscow assiduously attempted to
expel the U.S. from Central Asia even as the countries in the region
assist the U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan.
This adversarial view of the U.S., inherited from the Soviet past,
helps Moscow ensure that the reset policy effectively reduces U.S.
influence in Eurasia and Eastern and Central Europe. U.S. gains from
the reset policy are limited to support in Afghanistan and the New
START arms control treaty, both of which Russia would have pursued
without U.S. concessions regarding the CIS.
The High Price of Reset
As Moscow is trying to block NATO missile defenses and arguing that
sanctions and pressure against Iran are unnecessary, the reset policy
is backfiring and needs to be reassessed. While the Administration and
NATO have commendably acted to strengthen the defenses of the Baltic
states, it has not done nearly enough in the CIS. Absent coherent U.S.
policies in the CIS, the vast region is likely to destabilize. Central
Asia is already highly unstable, and Moscow is seeking pretexts for
inserting military forces into the area while simultaneously
strengthening the autocratic regimes that rule there.
In the Caucasus, Moscow is clearly working to subvert Georgia's
government and destabilize the whole region. Since the 2008
Russia-Georgia war, Russia has continued to support the `independence'
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, building up air, naval, and army bases
there.
While Ukraine backtracked on its pro-Western position of the
post-Orange era (2004-2010), Moscow's attempts to pressure Ukraine
since the bilateral Russian-Ukrainian accords of 2010 have already led
to a steady deterioration in Russian-Ukrainian relations, as Moscow's
pressure upon it is unremitting.
In Moldova, no progress has been made in restoring the country's
territorial integrity and withdrawing the remaining Russian troops
since 1992, when a Russian-backed army detached the Slavic-majority
Transnistria region and instituted a criminalized rule there.
In Nagorno-Karabakh, although Moscow mediated, with U.S. support,
between Baku and Yerevan to achieve peace, it also attained a base in
Gyumri, Armenia, until 2042 and secured the sales of up to 2 billion
cubic meters of Azeri natural gas per year to Russia. Meanwhile, the
recent failure of the Russian-sponsored summit between Armenia and
Azerbaijan opens the way to renewed hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh
that would undermine U.S. overall regional interests in the Caucasus.
New Policy for Eurasia Needed
Under the circumstances, it is very much in the U.S. interest to
refashion a coherent policy to strengthen the CIS's sovereignty and
security.
The U.S. should emphasize its support for Ukraine's independence and
sovereignty, reinvigorate its efforts at defense reform, and encourage
U.S. investment and openness to trade and foreign investment in
modernizing Ukraine's nuclear and natural gas sectors while exploring
for shale gas in the country.
In Georgia, the Administration should clarify to Russia that renewed
war would cost Moscow dearly. It needs to make clear that Moscow's
quite visible efforts to undermine the Georgian regime will facilitate
a real U.S. commitment to Georgia, including the sale of defensive
arms. The Administration should also refrain from pressuring Georgia
to yield on letting Russia join the World Trade Organization (WTO) if
Moscow is still unwilling to restore the status quo ante in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. Moscow should be made to understand that it cannot
build closed trade blocs in the CIS while seeking membership in the
WTO. In other words, the U.S. should stand for and uphold the sanctity
of international law and treaties even if it upsets Russia.
In addition, Washington needs to take much greater interest in
Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. It must stop thinking about
Azerbaijan exclusively as a flight stop on the road to Afghanistan and
make it clear that the U.S. values its companies' participation in the
development of main natural-gas-exporting pipelines. At the same time,
Washington should become an active mediator and, if necessary, a
co-guarantor of a potential future peace settlement. If the two sides
do not make serious efforts to bring about peace, the situation will
likely deteriorate further.
Finally, the Administration should reassure local governments in
Central Asia, which have supported the U.S. in Afghanistan and now
depend on America to secure them against Russian and Chinese pressure.
Though the U.S. may withdraw troops from Afghanistan by 2014, America
will leave behind facilities, allowing them to train their forces to
defend themselves against terrorism. The U.S. needs to convert the
Northern Distribution Network into a permanently functioning regional
transportation mechanism for economic development and cooperation with
these states. And simultaneously, the U.S. needs to formulate plans
not just for bilateral trade and investment but for overall regional
development, boosting transparent political institutions, good
governance, and the rule of law.
Invest Now, Save Later
Clearly, the paramount geopolitical interest of the U.S. remains
prevention of a return of a Eurasian empire or reversal of the
post-Cold War settlement in Eurasia. Moreover, failure to invest the
needed resources now all but guarantees that when the next crisis
occurs - whether provoked by Islamism, Russian imperial overreach, or
Chinese truculence - the cost of confronting it will be greater than any
investments that America could presently make. Prevention is always
cheaper than the cure.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. , is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian
Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah
Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The
Heritage Foundation.
Stephen J. Blank, Ph.D., is Research Professor of National Security
Affairs at the U.S. Army War College.
Source: URL: http://www.heritage.org/
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=21674&It emid=132
July 23 2011
`Reset' Regret - Russian `Sphere of Privileged Interests' in Eurasia
Undermines U.S. Foreign Policy
July 23, 2011
By Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. and Stephen Blank
For many years, Russian diplomats have openly proclaimed that the
former Soviet republics that make up the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) are not truly sovereign states. Russian analysts have
stated that Russia regards the Obama Administration's `reset' policy
as a U.S. admission that the CIS is within Russia's sphere of
influence.
The reset policy has hitherto conspicuously failed to address
important U.S. interests in Eurasia, including preventing the
emergence of a hegemonic power in Eurasia, maintaining a level playing
field in access to markets and natural resources, and developing
democracy and free markets based on the rule of law. Since the
`reset,' President Obama has downgraded his meetings with post-Soviet
heads of state, signaling a lesser U.S. involvement and interest. Some
senior U.S. officials have even told their subordinates not to bother
them with the problems of the Caucasus.
It is clear that Washington needs a new approach to Eurasian foreign
policy to prevent an emergence of a Russian sphere of influence or
another regional hegemony. The United States should boost its
diplomatic support of sovereign states, such as Ukraine and Georgia,
and expand a real commitment to the region. Specifically, Washington
should provide political support to East-West energy pipelines and
uphold sovereignty and territorial integrity under international
law - even if this upsets Russia - while at the same time becoming an
active mediator in the Transnistria and South Caucasus disputes.
In Search of Eurasian Hegemony
Since Boris Yeltsin demanded a sphere of influence in the CIS in 1993,
that goal has been the driving force of Russian foreign policy. Toward
that end, Russia employed every instrument of its power: energy,
trade, investment, the linkage of these factors with Russian organized
crime, political subversion, intelligence penetration, and expansion
of military bases. Russia has threatened and even used military force,
such as in Georgia in 2008. Today Moscow is pressuring Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Ukraine to join a Russia-dominated customs union that
also includes Belarus and Kazakhstan.
Russia also controls military bases and key military industrial
facilities in Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
It has been trying to subvert the Georgian government and is using
constant economic pressure to take control of Belarus's natural gas
company and pipelines. Moscow's policy remains to pressure the CIS
countries to turn their backs on Europe and preserve Russian leverage
over its neighbors' politics and economics. Concurrently, despite
official disclaimers to the contrary, Moscow assiduously attempted to
expel the U.S. from Central Asia even as the countries in the region
assist the U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan.
This adversarial view of the U.S., inherited from the Soviet past,
helps Moscow ensure that the reset policy effectively reduces U.S.
influence in Eurasia and Eastern and Central Europe. U.S. gains from
the reset policy are limited to support in Afghanistan and the New
START arms control treaty, both of which Russia would have pursued
without U.S. concessions regarding the CIS.
The High Price of Reset
As Moscow is trying to block NATO missile defenses and arguing that
sanctions and pressure against Iran are unnecessary, the reset policy
is backfiring and needs to be reassessed. While the Administration and
NATO have commendably acted to strengthen the defenses of the Baltic
states, it has not done nearly enough in the CIS. Absent coherent U.S.
policies in the CIS, the vast region is likely to destabilize. Central
Asia is already highly unstable, and Moscow is seeking pretexts for
inserting military forces into the area while simultaneously
strengthening the autocratic regimes that rule there.
In the Caucasus, Moscow is clearly working to subvert Georgia's
government and destabilize the whole region. Since the 2008
Russia-Georgia war, Russia has continued to support the `independence'
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, building up air, naval, and army bases
there.
While Ukraine backtracked on its pro-Western position of the
post-Orange era (2004-2010), Moscow's attempts to pressure Ukraine
since the bilateral Russian-Ukrainian accords of 2010 have already led
to a steady deterioration in Russian-Ukrainian relations, as Moscow's
pressure upon it is unremitting.
In Moldova, no progress has been made in restoring the country's
territorial integrity and withdrawing the remaining Russian troops
since 1992, when a Russian-backed army detached the Slavic-majority
Transnistria region and instituted a criminalized rule there.
In Nagorno-Karabakh, although Moscow mediated, with U.S. support,
between Baku and Yerevan to achieve peace, it also attained a base in
Gyumri, Armenia, until 2042 and secured the sales of up to 2 billion
cubic meters of Azeri natural gas per year to Russia. Meanwhile, the
recent failure of the Russian-sponsored summit between Armenia and
Azerbaijan opens the way to renewed hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh
that would undermine U.S. overall regional interests in the Caucasus.
New Policy for Eurasia Needed
Under the circumstances, it is very much in the U.S. interest to
refashion a coherent policy to strengthen the CIS's sovereignty and
security.
The U.S. should emphasize its support for Ukraine's independence and
sovereignty, reinvigorate its efforts at defense reform, and encourage
U.S. investment and openness to trade and foreign investment in
modernizing Ukraine's nuclear and natural gas sectors while exploring
for shale gas in the country.
In Georgia, the Administration should clarify to Russia that renewed
war would cost Moscow dearly. It needs to make clear that Moscow's
quite visible efforts to undermine the Georgian regime will facilitate
a real U.S. commitment to Georgia, including the sale of defensive
arms. The Administration should also refrain from pressuring Georgia
to yield on letting Russia join the World Trade Organization (WTO) if
Moscow is still unwilling to restore the status quo ante in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. Moscow should be made to understand that it cannot
build closed trade blocs in the CIS while seeking membership in the
WTO. In other words, the U.S. should stand for and uphold the sanctity
of international law and treaties even if it upsets Russia.
In addition, Washington needs to take much greater interest in
Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. It must stop thinking about
Azerbaijan exclusively as a flight stop on the road to Afghanistan and
make it clear that the U.S. values its companies' participation in the
development of main natural-gas-exporting pipelines. At the same time,
Washington should become an active mediator and, if necessary, a
co-guarantor of a potential future peace settlement. If the two sides
do not make serious efforts to bring about peace, the situation will
likely deteriorate further.
Finally, the Administration should reassure local governments in
Central Asia, which have supported the U.S. in Afghanistan and now
depend on America to secure them against Russian and Chinese pressure.
Though the U.S. may withdraw troops from Afghanistan by 2014, America
will leave behind facilities, allowing them to train their forces to
defend themselves against terrorism. The U.S. needs to convert the
Northern Distribution Network into a permanently functioning regional
transportation mechanism for economic development and cooperation with
these states. And simultaneously, the U.S. needs to formulate plans
not just for bilateral trade and investment but for overall regional
development, boosting transparent political institutions, good
governance, and the rule of law.
Invest Now, Save Later
Clearly, the paramount geopolitical interest of the U.S. remains
prevention of a return of a Eurasian empire or reversal of the
post-Cold War settlement in Eurasia. Moreover, failure to invest the
needed resources now all but guarantees that when the next crisis
occurs - whether provoked by Islamism, Russian imperial overreach, or
Chinese truculence - the cost of confronting it will be greater than any
investments that America could presently make. Prevention is always
cheaper than the cure.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. , is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian
Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah
Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The
Heritage Foundation.
Stephen J. Blank, Ph.D., is Research Professor of National Security
Affairs at the U.S. Army War College.
Source: URL: http://www.heritage.org/
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=21674&It emid=132