Tweet
RUSSIA'S CREDIBILITY AND ITS MILITARY SALES TO AZERBAIJAN
Joshua Kucera
EurasiaNet.org
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64085
Aug 23, 2011
NY
With Azerbaijan's confirmation of its purchase of a new air defense
system from Russia, the S-300, by displaying it at its Armed Forces
Day parade in Baku a few weeks ago, it "instantly becomes the most
capable SAM [surface-to-air missile] system in the region," writes
air defense analyst Sean O'Connor in the latest edition of the IMINT &
Analysis newsletter.
The most intriguing part of the sale is that Azerbaijan's foe,
Armenia, is a strong military ally of Russia; Russia stations troops
at a big base in Gyumri, Armenia, and supplies heavily discounted
weapons to the Armenian forces (and by extension, the Armenians who
control the breakaway Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno Karabakh). All
that, no doubt, was part of the reason that Russia denied that the
sale had taken place, only to be proven wrong in a flashy parade in
central Baku:
Regardless of Russia's motivations for keeping the sale out of the
public eye, Rosoboronexport's public denial of the contract represents
an interesting occurrence. On one hand, Rosoboronexport's implications
may have been completely accurate if a complete contract did not
exist at the time of announcement. Finalization of the contract and
subsequent non-announcement to temper Armenian concerns represents a
logical course of action in that regard. On the other hand, however,
the following statement represents a factual description of the
Azeri Favorit situation: the press reported a sale, Rosoboronexport
denied a sale, and Rosoboronexport then delivered Favorit components
to Azerbaijan.
This incident will serve to cast doubt upon any future denials of
Russian military sales to foreign states, leaving observers to ask
the question: "what is really going on?"
There is an ongoing debate about whether Russia, through the mechanism
of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, would intervene on
Armenia's side in the case of a war with Azerbaijan over Karabakh. If
so, Russian missiles -- and more importantly, planes and pilots --
would then face the prospect of being shot down by Russian air defense
systems. But O'Connor notices an interesting detail: the new systems
will have a range large enough to cover Nagorno Karabakh, but not
the Russian military base in northern Armenia:
Azerbaijan currently operates two S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) batteries near
Baku and Mingechaur; the S-300PMU-2 represents a logical replacement
for these systems offering coverage of the majority of the nation.
Furthermore, deployment of the Favorit batteries at S-200 complexes
offers coverage of the entire Nagorno-Karabakh region and the bulk
of Armenia, while conveniently leaving the Russian military complexes
near Gyumri out of reach.
Joshua Kucera
EurasiaNet.org
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64085
Aug 23, 2011
NY
With Azerbaijan's confirmation of its purchase of a new air defense
system from Russia, the S-300, by displaying it at its Armed Forces
Day parade in Baku a few weeks ago, it "instantly becomes the most
capable SAM [surface-to-air missile] system in the region," writes
air defense analyst Sean O'Connor in the latest edition of the IMINT &
Analysis newsletter.
The most intriguing part of the sale is that Azerbaijan's foe,
Armenia, is a strong military ally of Russia; Russia stations troops
at a big base in Gyumri, Armenia, and supplies heavily discounted
weapons to the Armenian forces (and by extension, the Armenians who
control the breakaway Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno Karabakh). All
that, no doubt, was part of the reason that Russia denied that the
sale had taken place, only to be proven wrong in a flashy parade in
central Baku:
Regardless of Russia's motivations for keeping the sale out of the
public eye, Rosoboronexport's public denial of the contract represents
an interesting occurrence. On one hand, Rosoboronexport's implications
may have been completely accurate if a complete contract did not
exist at the time of announcement. Finalization of the contract and
subsequent non-announcement to temper Armenian concerns represents a
logical course of action in that regard. On the other hand, however,
the following statement represents a factual description of the
Azeri Favorit situation: the press reported a sale, Rosoboronexport
denied a sale, and Rosoboronexport then delivered Favorit components
to Azerbaijan.
This incident will serve to cast doubt upon any future denials of
Russian military sales to foreign states, leaving observers to ask
the question: "what is really going on?"
There is an ongoing debate about whether Russia, through the mechanism
of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, would intervene on
Armenia's side in the case of a war with Azerbaijan over Karabakh. If
so, Russian missiles -- and more importantly, planes and pilots --
would then face the prospect of being shot down by Russian air defense
systems. But O'Connor notices an interesting detail: the new systems
will have a range large enough to cover Nagorno Karabakh, but not
the Russian military base in northern Armenia:
Azerbaijan currently operates two S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) batteries near
Baku and Mingechaur; the S-300PMU-2 represents a logical replacement
for these systems offering coverage of the majority of the nation.
Furthermore, deployment of the Favorit batteries at S-200 complexes
offers coverage of the entire Nagorno-Karabakh region and the bulk
of Armenia, while conveniently leaving the Russian military complexes
near Gyumri out of reach.