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ANKARA: Aktan: Privileged partnership

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  • ANKARA: Aktan: Privileged partnership

    Aktan: Privileged partnership

    TDN
    Thursday, May 19, 2005

    OPINIONS

    Gunduz AKTAN

    In the framework of its Dec. 17 conclusions, the European Union
    agreed to open entry talks with Turkey on Oct. 3. It is known that
    France and Germany have reached an agreement on this issue. The
    German opposition (CDU-CSU) and the ruling parties in France (UMP and
    UDF) are in favor of giving Turkey privileged partnership as opposed
    to full membership. There is a strong chance the opposition will come
    to power in Germany after general elections in the fall of 2006 and
    that UMP leader Sarkozy will win the 2007 presidential election in
    France.

    It is not only the EU that has committed itself to Turkish
    membership or, to put it differently, giving Turkey a date for the
    start of accession talks. These two countries have made a pledge as a
    state to this effect. Backing off on these pledges with the change in
    governments would not be compatible with the seriousness of a state.

    However, those that oppose our membership give the impression that
    they would not hesitate to switch to the privileged partnership
    formula.

    Quite recently, I had a talk with the chairman of a think tank
    who is known for his closeness to President Chirac. I was surprised
    to see that he had been extremely well prepared on the issue of
    privileged partnership. My understanding of his remarks on this issue
    can be summed up in the following manner:

    The accession talks would take 15-20 years and the outcome is
    uncertain, whereas privileged partnership can be established without
    delay. Besides, Turkey does not have to give up full membership.

    Parallel talks could be held.

    Turkey would become a member of the Defense Ministers Committee
    with voting rights on European defense and security matters.

    As a privileged partner, Turkey would get nearly as much EU aid
    as it would have obtained in the course of the full membership
    process.

    Turkey would not have to comply with EU standards that would
    cause production costs to go up significantly. The cost of these
    health, environmental and workplace standards amounts to 3-4 percent
    of the GDP, on average, for the EU's recently admitted 10 members. In
    Turkey's case, that would entail a cost in the $9-12 billion range.

    That cost would have to be absorbed by the private sector and would
    not create new jobs. In fact, it could even reduce the employment
    rate. Due to these costs, during the EU's latest expansion, whenever
    a specific business sector in one of these candidate countries became
    the subject of negotiations between the EU and that country, the
    sector in question started opposing the country's EU membership.

    Once Turkey and the EU take joint measures to protect Turkey's
    borders the visa requirement for Turks would be eased.

    The most attractive aspect of the privileged partnership formula
    involves a number of foreign policy issues. Currently, unilateral
    concessions are being sought from us on the Cyprus issue (and,
    afterwards, on Aegean problems). In fact, this is being stipulated as
    a condition. With privileged partnership these issues would be
    dropped from the EU agenda. During the process of privileged
    partnership talks with Turkey neither Greece nor the Greek Cypriots
    would be permitted to exercise veto rights.

    Naturally, the Armenian genocide claims would be discarded
    offhand and the Kurdish problem would no longer be considered part of
    the Copenhagen political criteria.

    The problem is whether the Turkish stock market would have an
    adverse reaction to the switch from the full membership formula to
    the privileged partnership one. And that, too, can be eased thanks to
    the cooperation to be made between the two sides.

    It is not possible to know to what extent this think tank is
    capable of influencing French policies. In other words, it is not
    known whether what it says would actually be done. However, it is not
    possible to say that the option it has developed is entirely lacking
    in seriousness.

    Greek/Greek Cypriot greed is preventing resolution of the Cyprus
    problem. Papadopoulos insists that Turkey should recognize the Greek
    Cypriot administration and withdraw its troops (and the Turkish
    settlers) from the island. He insists that the Greek Cypriots should
    be permitted to settle in the northern parts of the island without
    any restrictions and that Greek Cypriot property should be totally
    returned to former owners. This way the "solution" would be
    brought about automatically within the EU. The events of the
    1963-1974 era would be legitimized. Turkish Cypriots would be reduced
    to minority status and they would be quickly removed from the scene.

    Greece, meanwhile, wants to legitimize the changes it would bring
    about -- via faits accomplis -- to the status quo in the Aegean.

    The French people may reject the Turkish EU accession treaty in a
    referendum if Turkey does not recognize the Armenian genocide claims.

    Efforts are being made to have Ocalan retried and to provide the
    ethnic Kurds with collective minority rights through the new
    Accession Partnership Document.

    Turkey cannot possibly accept any of these. In fact, it is as if
    these issues are being put forward to block Turkey's path, that is,
    to prompt Turkish refusal. If things continue in this manner we will,
    at some point in this process, run into some insurmountable
    obstacles, anyway.

    The question is whether to wait until colliding with these
    obstacles or to see what is going to happen and take due measures
    now.

    Both options are very hard to take, and they both entail a high
    cost.
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