Tweet
GAYANE NOVIKOVA: ARMENIA IS TRYING TO FIT INTO THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
by David Stepanyan
arminfo
Monday, February 13, 14:06
Interview of Dr. Gayane Novikova, Director of the Center for Strategic
Analysis Spectrum, President of the Marshall Center Armenian Alumni
Association, Visiting Researcher Harvard University (2008-2012),
to the ArmInfo News Agency.
In your opinion, is there a collective security system in the South
Caucasus? Could you please indicate the main security threats for
Armenia within the context of the existing regional and global threats
and challenges?
Unfortunately, the collective security system in the South Caucasus
does not exist and cannot exist in the foreseeable future because of
the completely different scale of the threats to all three regional
states, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The level of interest
of each nation toward each other is also dissimilar. Their perception
of each other is very diverse - from "strategic partner" to "main
enemy." Thus, their relationships are shaped on the basis of their
political interests and on the exclusion of "reluctant" neighbors. If
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are unable to create a unified
economic system, they cannot establish a collective security system.
As concerns the main threats of Armenia's security, they can be
indentified mainly by reference to the established military and
political balance in the region. The first involves the potential
threat of a resumption of the overt stage of the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict. The second concerns the existence of two closed borders that
diminish the economic potential of Armenia and promote its artificial
isolation. However, a distinction in this respect must be made clear:
whereas the closure of the border with Azerbaijan can be viewed as
the logical aftermath of the Karabakh war, the closure of the border
with Turkey must be seen as resulting from a political decision taken
in 1993 by the Turkish leadership. The latter contains a significant
emotional component, and hence must be considered irrational.
There are serious problems with Georgia. Unfortunately, they still
have not been resolved at the level of bilateral relationships. They
are more visible in Samtskhe-Javakheti/ Javakh. If we add to this list
the intensive development of trilateral cooperation between Turkey,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia, then we can conclude that a combination of
strategic interests of Georgia with the strategic interests of Armenia
will be difficult to establish. Owing of the absence of a neighborly
relationships with Turkey and the continuing "neither war, nor peace"
stage in all relations with Azerbaijan, any instability in Georgia
may well become ramified in a manner that threatens Armenia's security.
The increasing presence of Russia in the region is also controversial.
For Armenia the preservation and strengthening of the current level of
the relationship with Russia is vital. In the meantime, it is necessary
to intensify broader cooperation with the European Union and the U.S. -
not least because any escalation of the conflict between Russia and
Georgia will bring an indirect security threat for our nation.
In the South, any escalation of the situation around Iran and inside
Iran will impact Armenia only negatively.
On the global level I would mention, as a main security threat to
Armenia, any new wave of the global economic crisis. As occurred with
the first crisis, any such new development will inevitably influence
the Armenian economy. Out-migration constitutes one of indicators
of economic developments. In case of countries like Armenia, that
is, nations with limited resources and limited opportunities to be
integrated into the world economic space, migration has already become
a serious factor that influences national security.
You have mentioned the situation around Iran. In your opinion, how
can its transformation into the military phase influence Armenia? What
could Yerevan do to secure our country, even if only partly, against
the aftermaths of military intervention in Islamic Republic?
I am not a specialist on Iranian affairs, or a specialist in military
planning, therefore I cannot allow to myself to speculate on this
theme. However, it is obvious, that for Armenia a war will lead at a
minimum to a temporary closure of another border, and the termination
of all existing economic projects with Iran and the transportation
of Iranian goods through the Armenian territory. Furthermore, it
will provoke a flow of Iranian refugees to Armenia (as well as to
Azerbaijan). We can hardly expect that the immigrants will be the
representatives of the well provided strata of the Iranian population.
Thus, Armenia be placed under a heavy burden to provide shelter,
food, medication, etc. for these people. Yerevan is highly interested
in prevention an escalation of conflict. However, I don't see any
mechanisms in place that will protect Armenia against the negative
impact of all this - incomplete - list of potential problems.
Is the situation in Syria a part of the common global process? In
your opinion, could they have an impact upon developments in the
South Caucasus in any way?
Of course, it is a part of the "global process," if you have in mind
those changes that began in February of 2011, in the Arab world.
Exactly one year ago the developed countries enthusiastically welcomed
the first "swallows" of the Arab spring. This awakening then became
transformed into civil wars in Libya and Syria; it brought to power
moderate Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt. The vigorous discussions on
the rapid democratization of the Arab world have almost disappeared
from the Western media. Many politicians seem to be attempting to
avoid a public discussions around this theme. However, the West
as a whole understands quite well that, if an avalanche is to be
avoided, which will include radical Islamization of the Arab states
and uncontrolled migration, significant economic assistance will
be necessary. It appears quite possible, against this background,
that economic assistance to those countries that are more stable and
secure will be reduced: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia..
The processes in Syria, as well as a situation around Iran increase
instability in the region directly adjacent to the South Caucasus. In
its status as a regional power, Turkey is more and more becoming
involved into the conflicts with its immediate neighbors. It does so
against the background of its own growing domestic tensions. And this
is another dangerous trend for Armenia.
Is it possible to predict further developments in Armenian-Turkish
relationships, taking into consideration the existed historical,
political, and military realities in our region?
In addition to the objectively existed processes in the region, I would
pay attention to the different level of interest of Armenia and Turkey
in establishing and improving bilateral relations. The absolute foreign
policy priority for Turkey has already become developments in the
Middle East. All the problems related to Armenia have been relegated
to a second-level of importance. It is not be excluded that further
developments in this bilateral relationships will depend upon the
results of the parliamentary elections in Armenia and the presidential
elections in Turkey. However I would not expect the serious shifts in
the Armenian dimension of the Turkish policy even if strong pressure
were to be placed upon Turkey by, first of all, the U.S. and France.
Does the Armenian leadership adequately consider the long- term
geopolitical perspectives in reference to the new realities that
characterize the security environment of the XXI century? How
confidently does Armenia fit into this environment?
I believe it does. There are three main goals. First, to preserve
the existing military-political balance in the region and to prevent
political drift toward one of the non-regional actors, whether Russia,
the U.S., or the EU. Second, to prevent the resumption of the military
stage of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Third, to secure the country
against a deep economic crisis. These goals can be considered as
belonging to the mid-term perspective; however, one cannot speak
about the long-term perspectives without considering these issues.
Armenia is trying to fit into the changing security environment in
the broader region. To some extend our country has attained the goal
of becoming a significant actor in the political processes in the
South Caucasus region. It is our major achievement up to the present.
What could be the results of the on-going arms race between Armenia
and Azerbaijan if we take into consideration that both parties,
to varying degrees, sacrifice in this process social and economic
developments and strengthening of each society?
The arms race cannot lead to anything good, especially if viewed from
the perspective of the social and economic development each state is
engaged in. Today Azerbaijan possesses more economic possibilities
owing to its capacity to produce and transport energy sources. In
the meantime, the huge expenditures for armaments, in parallel with
insignificant improvement of life conditions for the majority of
the population and against the background of the expanding Islamist
moods in the society, create fertile ground for increasing public
dissatisfaction. In Armenia an awareness that the arms race is imposes
by Azerbaijan is widespread. Thus, it is understood as necessary to
strengthen the army and the nation's defense capabilities.
Armenia's security environment includes not only external, but also
internal processes. The latter, unlike external processes, can be
controlled domestically. In your opinion, do the Armenian authorities
control internal security?
The forthcoming parliamentary elections will answer your question. I
would mention as a main component of the internal security the ability
of both the government and the opposition to be engaged in a civilized
political dialogue, one aimed at the achievement of real results,
rather than to be "a dialogue for the sake of a dialogue." In the
end, the level of the internal security and stability defines in many
respects the level of the external security.
From: A. Papazian
by David Stepanyan
arminfo
Monday, February 13, 14:06
Interview of Dr. Gayane Novikova, Director of the Center for Strategic
Analysis Spectrum, President of the Marshall Center Armenian Alumni
Association, Visiting Researcher Harvard University (2008-2012),
to the ArmInfo News Agency.
In your opinion, is there a collective security system in the South
Caucasus? Could you please indicate the main security threats for
Armenia within the context of the existing regional and global threats
and challenges?
Unfortunately, the collective security system in the South Caucasus
does not exist and cannot exist in the foreseeable future because of
the completely different scale of the threats to all three regional
states, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The level of interest
of each nation toward each other is also dissimilar. Their perception
of each other is very diverse - from "strategic partner" to "main
enemy." Thus, their relationships are shaped on the basis of their
political interests and on the exclusion of "reluctant" neighbors. If
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are unable to create a unified
economic system, they cannot establish a collective security system.
As concerns the main threats of Armenia's security, they can be
indentified mainly by reference to the established military and
political balance in the region. The first involves the potential
threat of a resumption of the overt stage of the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict. The second concerns the existence of two closed borders that
diminish the economic potential of Armenia and promote its artificial
isolation. However, a distinction in this respect must be made clear:
whereas the closure of the border with Azerbaijan can be viewed as
the logical aftermath of the Karabakh war, the closure of the border
with Turkey must be seen as resulting from a political decision taken
in 1993 by the Turkish leadership. The latter contains a significant
emotional component, and hence must be considered irrational.
There are serious problems with Georgia. Unfortunately, they still
have not been resolved at the level of bilateral relationships. They
are more visible in Samtskhe-Javakheti/ Javakh. If we add to this list
the intensive development of trilateral cooperation between Turkey,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia, then we can conclude that a combination of
strategic interests of Georgia with the strategic interests of Armenia
will be difficult to establish. Owing of the absence of a neighborly
relationships with Turkey and the continuing "neither war, nor peace"
stage in all relations with Azerbaijan, any instability in Georgia
may well become ramified in a manner that threatens Armenia's security.
The increasing presence of Russia in the region is also controversial.
For Armenia the preservation and strengthening of the current level of
the relationship with Russia is vital. In the meantime, it is necessary
to intensify broader cooperation with the European Union and the U.S. -
not least because any escalation of the conflict between Russia and
Georgia will bring an indirect security threat for our nation.
In the South, any escalation of the situation around Iran and inside
Iran will impact Armenia only negatively.
On the global level I would mention, as a main security threat to
Armenia, any new wave of the global economic crisis. As occurred with
the first crisis, any such new development will inevitably influence
the Armenian economy. Out-migration constitutes one of indicators
of economic developments. In case of countries like Armenia, that
is, nations with limited resources and limited opportunities to be
integrated into the world economic space, migration has already become
a serious factor that influences national security.
You have mentioned the situation around Iran. In your opinion, how
can its transformation into the military phase influence Armenia? What
could Yerevan do to secure our country, even if only partly, against
the aftermaths of military intervention in Islamic Republic?
I am not a specialist on Iranian affairs, or a specialist in military
planning, therefore I cannot allow to myself to speculate on this
theme. However, it is obvious, that for Armenia a war will lead at a
minimum to a temporary closure of another border, and the termination
of all existing economic projects with Iran and the transportation
of Iranian goods through the Armenian territory. Furthermore, it
will provoke a flow of Iranian refugees to Armenia (as well as to
Azerbaijan). We can hardly expect that the immigrants will be the
representatives of the well provided strata of the Iranian population.
Thus, Armenia be placed under a heavy burden to provide shelter,
food, medication, etc. for these people. Yerevan is highly interested
in prevention an escalation of conflict. However, I don't see any
mechanisms in place that will protect Armenia against the negative
impact of all this - incomplete - list of potential problems.
Is the situation in Syria a part of the common global process? In
your opinion, could they have an impact upon developments in the
South Caucasus in any way?
Of course, it is a part of the "global process," if you have in mind
those changes that began in February of 2011, in the Arab world.
Exactly one year ago the developed countries enthusiastically welcomed
the first "swallows" of the Arab spring. This awakening then became
transformed into civil wars in Libya and Syria; it brought to power
moderate Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt. The vigorous discussions on
the rapid democratization of the Arab world have almost disappeared
from the Western media. Many politicians seem to be attempting to
avoid a public discussions around this theme. However, the West
as a whole understands quite well that, if an avalanche is to be
avoided, which will include radical Islamization of the Arab states
and uncontrolled migration, significant economic assistance will
be necessary. It appears quite possible, against this background,
that economic assistance to those countries that are more stable and
secure will be reduced: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia..
The processes in Syria, as well as a situation around Iran increase
instability in the region directly adjacent to the South Caucasus. In
its status as a regional power, Turkey is more and more becoming
involved into the conflicts with its immediate neighbors. It does so
against the background of its own growing domestic tensions. And this
is another dangerous trend for Armenia.
Is it possible to predict further developments in Armenian-Turkish
relationships, taking into consideration the existed historical,
political, and military realities in our region?
In addition to the objectively existed processes in the region, I would
pay attention to the different level of interest of Armenia and Turkey
in establishing and improving bilateral relations. The absolute foreign
policy priority for Turkey has already become developments in the
Middle East. All the problems related to Armenia have been relegated
to a second-level of importance. It is not be excluded that further
developments in this bilateral relationships will depend upon the
results of the parliamentary elections in Armenia and the presidential
elections in Turkey. However I would not expect the serious shifts in
the Armenian dimension of the Turkish policy even if strong pressure
were to be placed upon Turkey by, first of all, the U.S. and France.
Does the Armenian leadership adequately consider the long- term
geopolitical perspectives in reference to the new realities that
characterize the security environment of the XXI century? How
confidently does Armenia fit into this environment?
I believe it does. There are three main goals. First, to preserve
the existing military-political balance in the region and to prevent
political drift toward one of the non-regional actors, whether Russia,
the U.S., or the EU. Second, to prevent the resumption of the military
stage of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Third, to secure the country
against a deep economic crisis. These goals can be considered as
belonging to the mid-term perspective; however, one cannot speak
about the long-term perspectives without considering these issues.
Armenia is trying to fit into the changing security environment in
the broader region. To some extend our country has attained the goal
of becoming a significant actor in the political processes in the
South Caucasus region. It is our major achievement up to the present.
What could be the results of the on-going arms race between Armenia
and Azerbaijan if we take into consideration that both parties,
to varying degrees, sacrifice in this process social and economic
developments and strengthening of each society?
The arms race cannot lead to anything good, especially if viewed from
the perspective of the social and economic development each state is
engaged in. Today Azerbaijan possesses more economic possibilities
owing to its capacity to produce and transport energy sources. In
the meantime, the huge expenditures for armaments, in parallel with
insignificant improvement of life conditions for the majority of
the population and against the background of the expanding Islamist
moods in the society, create fertile ground for increasing public
dissatisfaction. In Armenia an awareness that the arms race is imposes
by Azerbaijan is widespread. Thus, it is understood as necessary to
strengthen the army and the nation's defense capabilities.
Armenia's security environment includes not only external, but also
internal processes. The latter, unlike external processes, can be
controlled domestically. In your opinion, do the Armenian authorities
control internal security?
The forthcoming parliamentary elections will answer your question. I
would mention as a main component of the internal security the ability
of both the government and the opposition to be engaged in a civilized
political dialogue, one aimed at the achievement of real results,
rather than to be "a dialogue for the sake of a dialogue." In the
end, the level of the internal security and stability defines in many
respects the level of the external security.
From: A. Papazian