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Asharq Alawsat (English) - The Middle East
April 27, 2012 Friday
"Sunni" Turkey and the containment policy failure
By Adel Al Toraifi
When the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Tehran in
May 2010, to offer support for the Brazilian project regarding the
Iranian nuclear file, the conservative press in Iran described Erdogan
as an example of wise leadership in the region. Some newspapers also
devoted extensive column inches to Erdogan's statements in support of
Iran, particularly his critical stance towards Israel and the Western
world's view of Muslim states. Some commentators even considered
Turkish-Iranian relations to be a model of stability and cooperation,
arguing that since the signing of the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin - or the
Treaty of Zuhab as it is known in Turkey - in 1639 between the Ottoman
and Safavid empires, borders have continually been respected; this
agreement remains the basis for all border treaties between the two
countries.
Over the past ten years, the government of the Turkish Justice and
Development Party [AKP] has been able to converge with Iran and Syria,
to the extent that Iran supported Turkey's military campaign against
the strongholds of the Kurdistan Worker's Party [PKK] in 2006, and to
the extent that Syria retracted its position regarding the Iskenderun
region, and abolished the need for visas to travel between the two
countries. Furthermore, Turkey has strengthened its economic ties with
both Syria and Iran to exceed record figures in just a few years; even
obtaining Iranian concessions in the oil and gas sectors. Perhaps this
is what prompted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to preach of a
pro-resistance Iranian-Syrian axis including both Turkey and Iraq, in
the face of what he considered to be the counter forces of Saudi
Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf States (al-Hayat newspaper, 26 October
2010).
In truth, Turkey let down the expectations of observers after the fall
of Saddam Hussein's regime; it did not seek to fill the Sunni vacuum
caused by the rise of Shia political Islam to power in Iraq, nor did
it show any desire to restore its Ottoman heritage in old spheres of
influence. On the contrary, Turkey's Islamists adopted a more
conciliatory tone with the Syrian Baathist party, and were less
sensitive towards Iranian revolutionary activities in the region,
perhaps because the "containment policy" [towards Syria and Iran] that
Erdogan and his party take pride in had reaped substantial benefits
for Turkey. However, in the last year, this policy has been exposed to
a sizeable tremor, forcing Turkey to significantly re-evaluate its
relations.
When the popular uprisings began in some Arab capitals in early 2011,
Turkey tried to wait before declaring its support for the masses, but
showed resistance to foreign intervention in Libya, and Erdogan
himself issued strong criticism towards NATO. Even when the uprising
began in Syria, Turkey dispatched its diplomats to Damascus in an
attempt to contain the situation and convince al-Assad to conduct
reforms, but with the rising death toll on the Syrian streets, Ankara
issued a series of statements condemning the regime of President
Bashar al-Assad. Not long afterwards, Turkey was compelled to
participate - logistically at least - in NATO operations in Libya, and
this damaged its relations with Tehran significantly. Turkey's stance
seemed hesitant; while Erdogan was releasing statements threatening
direct military intervention, and threatening al-Assad with the same
fate met by Gaddafi, Turkey's diplomatic apparatus appeared more
cautious and less zealous than the speeches of the Turkish leader.
This prompted many observers to say that Turkey was witnessing a
divide, either in the military institution or in the foreign affairs
department, regarding the danger of intervention or regime change in
Syria due to security reasons, and because of dimensions of ethnicity
and sectarianism, which could extend into Turkey itself if Syria
turned into a scene of sectarian warfare between Turkey, Iran and
other Arab parties.
In order to understand the shift in Turkish foreign policy, we need to
review some historical facts, and here I am alluding to three
historical stages:
First: It is not true that the history of Turkish-Iranian relations
has always been stable, as claimed by the Turkish advocates of
rapprochement with Iran, because Turkish-Iranian relations remained
troubled and unstable until the last decade. In his book "Islam,
Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey" (2007), Soner Cagaptay
indicates that there is an illusion with regards to the Treaty of
Qasr-e Shirin, confirming that the tension inherent in Turkish-Iranian
relations is based on nationalist and sectarian reasons, which have
remained constant even after the emergence of a modern state in both
countries. In fact, the Turkish-Iranian clash goes far beyond the four
major wars between the two parties. It is true that Reza Shah was an
admirer of Ataturk's secular nationalist project, but at the same time
both countries fought a war in 1930 that led to the amendment of the
border treaty between them. After that, Turkey broke off contacts with
Tehran, in order to orientate towards the West at the expense of the
region.
Second: The Turkish position was clear in its rejection of the Iranian
revolutionary model, and Turkey played a prominent role as a member of
NATO in addressing Iran's aspirations to export its revolution.
Perhaps for this reason the Khomeini regime supported left-wing
Kurdish, Armenian and Islamist armed groups, such as the Turkish
Hezbollah, against Ankara during the 1980s, and the late Turkish Prime
Minister Turgut Özal led a clear policy in support of Pakistan during
the Afghan war with the Soviet Union. Turkey remained skeptical of the
intentions of the Iranian regime. The 1990s witnessed the
assassination of several secular Turkish intellectuals and
journalists, and Ankara accused Tehran of being involved.
Third: The idea of rapprochement with Tehran was the initiative of
Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamic Welfare Party, who is
considered the godfather of converging relations with the Islamic
Republic. He paved the way for the visit of President Mohammad
Khatami, and the signing of oil and security agreements between the
two countries. This approach was opposed by some leaders of military
and secular institutions, who saw it as an attempt by the Islamists of
Turkey to repeat the Khomeinist model in their own country. Perhaps
this explains Erbakan's visit to Tehran after his political ban was
lifted in 2009, and also explains Ali Velayati, Iran's former Foreign
Minister and adviser to the Supreme Guide, saying that Erbakan has
always been a friend of Iran.
Such historical milestones are important in order to explain the
Turkish shift from a policy of containment towards Iran and Syria
between 2003 and 2010, and the current state of verbal sparring
between the two sides. In recent months, Erdogan has received several
opponents of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki such as President of
the Iraqi Kurdistan Region Massoud Barzani, [Iraqi Vice President]
Tariq al-Hashemi and Iyad Allawi. He has gone even further than this
and accused al-Maliki of adopting a dictatorial and sectarian trend,
whereby he excludes his opponents. In return, al-Maliki reacted to
Erdogan's move by visiting Tehran, condemning what he termed the
'sectarian' - meaning Sunni - interference in his government in Iraq,
branding Turkey as a "hostile" state in the region.
There can be no doubt that Turkey is re-evaluating its relations with
Iraq and Syria. Yet, at the same time, I must emphasize that there are
two currents within the Turkish policymaking sphere: one is eager to
confront the Syrian-Iranian axis, and the other current - which
includes figures from within Erdogan's own party - continues to warn
against abandoning the containment policy that has been adopted
towards these two countries.
Recent events have proven that the historical differences between the
two parties still exist; no matter how Turkey has tried to use its
containment policy, it has eventually been forced to resort to its
"Sunni" identity and "Turkish" nationalism, even if indirectly. This
is nothing new. When the Nagorno-Karabakh War broke out in February
1988 between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis in the Southern
Caucasus, Iran and Turkey adopted contrasting positions towards the
crisis, which sparked a diplomatic row between the two countries. Iran
had sought to embrace the Azerbaijanis with open arms, welcoming them
as Shiites and revolutionaries, whilst Turkey was wary of the
expansion of Khomeini's influence in the Southern Caucasus. This
prompted Prime Minister Turgut Özal to overtly declare, during his
visit to the US in 1990, that "the Azerbaijanis are Shia, unlike the
Turks, and hence, of more concern to Iran, since Turkey does not have
pan-Turkic ambitions."
Today, Turkish-Iranian disagreements over Syria are being renewed. The
Turks have made no secret of their feeling that their interests will
be jeopardized so long as the Bashar al-Assad regime remains in power.
As for Iran, it considers the Turkish stance - especially Turkey's
sponsorship of the Syrian Transitional Council and the asylum it is
granting to the displaced Syrian Sunnis - to represent a hostile
approach towards its strategic interest, namely the survival of its
Baathist ally.
There is no doubt that, for the most part, politics is governed by
interests, which may explain Turkey reconsidering its containment
policy towards the Iranian-Syrian axis, for its interests are now at
stake. The Turks fear the danger of the Syrian Kurds rising to power
after al-Assad is overthrown, and they fear that relations with the
Alawite minority in Turkey may become strained, and they are therefore
now seeking a Muslim Brotherhood alternative to rule Syria.
In 1985, Turgut Özal expressed his disappointment at the future of
Iran under the rule of the mullahs, and the Iranian press reacted by
saying "Turkey is nothing more than a pawn for US interests." 25 years
later, Erdogan directed similar words of criticism towards Iran, and
this prompted the Iranian press to react by saying "Turkey is
implementing an American agenda to spread the Turkish model of
political Islam."
April 27, 2012 Friday
"Sunni" Turkey and the containment policy failure
By Adel Al Toraifi
When the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Tehran in
May 2010, to offer support for the Brazilian project regarding the
Iranian nuclear file, the conservative press in Iran described Erdogan
as an example of wise leadership in the region. Some newspapers also
devoted extensive column inches to Erdogan's statements in support of
Iran, particularly his critical stance towards Israel and the Western
world's view of Muslim states. Some commentators even considered
Turkish-Iranian relations to be a model of stability and cooperation,
arguing that since the signing of the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin - or the
Treaty of Zuhab as it is known in Turkey - in 1639 between the Ottoman
and Safavid empires, borders have continually been respected; this
agreement remains the basis for all border treaties between the two
countries.
Over the past ten years, the government of the Turkish Justice and
Development Party [AKP] has been able to converge with Iran and Syria,
to the extent that Iran supported Turkey's military campaign against
the strongholds of the Kurdistan Worker's Party [PKK] in 2006, and to
the extent that Syria retracted its position regarding the Iskenderun
region, and abolished the need for visas to travel between the two
countries. Furthermore, Turkey has strengthened its economic ties with
both Syria and Iran to exceed record figures in just a few years; even
obtaining Iranian concessions in the oil and gas sectors. Perhaps this
is what prompted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to preach of a
pro-resistance Iranian-Syrian axis including both Turkey and Iraq, in
the face of what he considered to be the counter forces of Saudi
Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf States (al-Hayat newspaper, 26 October
2010).
In truth, Turkey let down the expectations of observers after the fall
of Saddam Hussein's regime; it did not seek to fill the Sunni vacuum
caused by the rise of Shia political Islam to power in Iraq, nor did
it show any desire to restore its Ottoman heritage in old spheres of
influence. On the contrary, Turkey's Islamists adopted a more
conciliatory tone with the Syrian Baathist party, and were less
sensitive towards Iranian revolutionary activities in the region,
perhaps because the "containment policy" [towards Syria and Iran] that
Erdogan and his party take pride in had reaped substantial benefits
for Turkey. However, in the last year, this policy has been exposed to
a sizeable tremor, forcing Turkey to significantly re-evaluate its
relations.
When the popular uprisings began in some Arab capitals in early 2011,
Turkey tried to wait before declaring its support for the masses, but
showed resistance to foreign intervention in Libya, and Erdogan
himself issued strong criticism towards NATO. Even when the uprising
began in Syria, Turkey dispatched its diplomats to Damascus in an
attempt to contain the situation and convince al-Assad to conduct
reforms, but with the rising death toll on the Syrian streets, Ankara
issued a series of statements condemning the regime of President
Bashar al-Assad. Not long afterwards, Turkey was compelled to
participate - logistically at least - in NATO operations in Libya, and
this damaged its relations with Tehran significantly. Turkey's stance
seemed hesitant; while Erdogan was releasing statements threatening
direct military intervention, and threatening al-Assad with the same
fate met by Gaddafi, Turkey's diplomatic apparatus appeared more
cautious and less zealous than the speeches of the Turkish leader.
This prompted many observers to say that Turkey was witnessing a
divide, either in the military institution or in the foreign affairs
department, regarding the danger of intervention or regime change in
Syria due to security reasons, and because of dimensions of ethnicity
and sectarianism, which could extend into Turkey itself if Syria
turned into a scene of sectarian warfare between Turkey, Iran and
other Arab parties.
In order to understand the shift in Turkish foreign policy, we need to
review some historical facts, and here I am alluding to three
historical stages:
First: It is not true that the history of Turkish-Iranian relations
has always been stable, as claimed by the Turkish advocates of
rapprochement with Iran, because Turkish-Iranian relations remained
troubled and unstable until the last decade. In his book "Islam,
Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey" (2007), Soner Cagaptay
indicates that there is an illusion with regards to the Treaty of
Qasr-e Shirin, confirming that the tension inherent in Turkish-Iranian
relations is based on nationalist and sectarian reasons, which have
remained constant even after the emergence of a modern state in both
countries. In fact, the Turkish-Iranian clash goes far beyond the four
major wars between the two parties. It is true that Reza Shah was an
admirer of Ataturk's secular nationalist project, but at the same time
both countries fought a war in 1930 that led to the amendment of the
border treaty between them. After that, Turkey broke off contacts with
Tehran, in order to orientate towards the West at the expense of the
region.
Second: The Turkish position was clear in its rejection of the Iranian
revolutionary model, and Turkey played a prominent role as a member of
NATO in addressing Iran's aspirations to export its revolution.
Perhaps for this reason the Khomeini regime supported left-wing
Kurdish, Armenian and Islamist armed groups, such as the Turkish
Hezbollah, against Ankara during the 1980s, and the late Turkish Prime
Minister Turgut Özal led a clear policy in support of Pakistan during
the Afghan war with the Soviet Union. Turkey remained skeptical of the
intentions of the Iranian regime. The 1990s witnessed the
assassination of several secular Turkish intellectuals and
journalists, and Ankara accused Tehran of being involved.
Third: The idea of rapprochement with Tehran was the initiative of
Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamic Welfare Party, who is
considered the godfather of converging relations with the Islamic
Republic. He paved the way for the visit of President Mohammad
Khatami, and the signing of oil and security agreements between the
two countries. This approach was opposed by some leaders of military
and secular institutions, who saw it as an attempt by the Islamists of
Turkey to repeat the Khomeinist model in their own country. Perhaps
this explains Erbakan's visit to Tehran after his political ban was
lifted in 2009, and also explains Ali Velayati, Iran's former Foreign
Minister and adviser to the Supreme Guide, saying that Erbakan has
always been a friend of Iran.
Such historical milestones are important in order to explain the
Turkish shift from a policy of containment towards Iran and Syria
between 2003 and 2010, and the current state of verbal sparring
between the two sides. In recent months, Erdogan has received several
opponents of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki such as President of
the Iraqi Kurdistan Region Massoud Barzani, [Iraqi Vice President]
Tariq al-Hashemi and Iyad Allawi. He has gone even further than this
and accused al-Maliki of adopting a dictatorial and sectarian trend,
whereby he excludes his opponents. In return, al-Maliki reacted to
Erdogan's move by visiting Tehran, condemning what he termed the
'sectarian' - meaning Sunni - interference in his government in Iraq,
branding Turkey as a "hostile" state in the region.
There can be no doubt that Turkey is re-evaluating its relations with
Iraq and Syria. Yet, at the same time, I must emphasize that there are
two currents within the Turkish policymaking sphere: one is eager to
confront the Syrian-Iranian axis, and the other current - which
includes figures from within Erdogan's own party - continues to warn
against abandoning the containment policy that has been adopted
towards these two countries.
Recent events have proven that the historical differences between the
two parties still exist; no matter how Turkey has tried to use its
containment policy, it has eventually been forced to resort to its
"Sunni" identity and "Turkish" nationalism, even if indirectly. This
is nothing new. When the Nagorno-Karabakh War broke out in February
1988 between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis in the Southern
Caucasus, Iran and Turkey adopted contrasting positions towards the
crisis, which sparked a diplomatic row between the two countries. Iran
had sought to embrace the Azerbaijanis with open arms, welcoming them
as Shiites and revolutionaries, whilst Turkey was wary of the
expansion of Khomeini's influence in the Southern Caucasus. This
prompted Prime Minister Turgut Özal to overtly declare, during his
visit to the US in 1990, that "the Azerbaijanis are Shia, unlike the
Turks, and hence, of more concern to Iran, since Turkey does not have
pan-Turkic ambitions."
Today, Turkish-Iranian disagreements over Syria are being renewed. The
Turks have made no secret of their feeling that their interests will
be jeopardized so long as the Bashar al-Assad regime remains in power.
As for Iran, it considers the Turkish stance - especially Turkey's
sponsorship of the Syrian Transitional Council and the asylum it is
granting to the displaced Syrian Sunnis - to represent a hostile
approach towards its strategic interest, namely the survival of its
Baathist ally.
There is no doubt that, for the most part, politics is governed by
interests, which may explain Turkey reconsidering its containment
policy towards the Iranian-Syrian axis, for its interests are now at
stake. The Turks fear the danger of the Syrian Kurds rising to power
after al-Assad is overthrown, and they fear that relations with the
Alawite minority in Turkey may become strained, and they are therefore
now seeking a Muslim Brotherhood alternative to rule Syria.
In 1985, Turgut Özal expressed his disappointment at the future of
Iran under the rule of the mullahs, and the Iranian press reacted by
saying "Turkey is nothing more than a pawn for US interests." 25 years
later, Erdogan directed similar words of criticism towards Iran, and
this prompted the Iranian press to react by saying "Turkey is
implementing an American agenda to spread the Turkish model of
political Islam."