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  • Russo-Turkish Divergence: the Security Dimension

    The Cutting Edge
    April 28 2012


    Russo-Turkish Divergence: the Security Dimension
    Younkyoo Kim and Stephen Blank April 27th 2012

    GLORIA Center

    Russo-Turkish relations encompass a multi-regional agenda from the
    Balkans to Central Asia, including the Caucasus and the Middle East
    and their bilateral energy relations. Much has been written about the
    strategic convergence of Russo-Turkish relations and contributing
    factors behind it. In contrast to Turkey's strained relations with its
    traditional Western partners, Ankara's ties with Moscow have
    noticeably strengthened in recent years. Turkey's reorientation
    eastward in the past decade is attributable to three factors: the U.S.
    invasion of Iraq, the derailment of Turkish accession talks to join
    the EU, and Turkey's dependence on Russia for its natural gas imports.

    Turkish and Russian interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus during
    1992`2008 converged more than they differed. In 2009 and 2010, Turkish
    officials and experts described their relations with Russia as being
    the best ever and said that bilateral harmony featured prominently in
    the past decade's international relations. Yet Russia and Turkey had
    already begun to diverge after the Georgian war in August 2008. The
    fighting between Russia and Georgia disrupted transportation, energy,
    and other infrastructure networks in the region, adversely affecting
    the interests of Turkey. In regard to Turkey's relations with Russia,
    2011 was a difficult year, and 2012 has not been much better.

    Developments since then across a host of issues give many reasons for
    suggesting the rapid but uneven erosion of those ties. Because this
    erosion is occurring unevenly, enmity will not replace amity
    overnight. Previously, the only major questions that divided them
    seemed to be Moscow's reluctance to brand the PKK (Kurdistan Workers'
    Party) a terrorist organization and Russia's support for the Greek
    Cypriots in their conflict with the Turkish-dominated state of the
    Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Yet signs have multiplied
    suggesting that this partnership is declining and that there are
    mounting tensions over the Kurdish issue, Middle East, missile
    defenses, Cyprus, and the Balkans. Furthermore, those difficulties
    will likely increase.

    Divergence

    Russo-Turkish divergence reflects the renewed assertiveness of both
    Russia and Turkey in precisely those areas of regional contestation
    that had hitherto seemed to be in abeyance between them. Turkish
    assertiveness, most notably in regard to Syria, Cyprus, and Israel,
    has been very public and strong, even high-handed in some cases.
    Arguably Ankara's assertiveness owes much to the perception that its
    former policy of `zero problems with neighbors' policy is encountering
    difficulties wherever one looks. This includes Russia, because the
    neighbors are asserting their own prerogatives and interests regarding
    democracy'or the lack of it'in Syria, energy in Cyprus, and a closed
    CIS (Confederation of Independent States) bloc in Russia's case. Yet
    this rising friction also has deeper roots stemming from the
    self-confidence of both states' elites. Turkish leaders claim that
    Turkey is now a major independent actor in its own right in all of its
    various neighborhoods, and it should therefore assert its interests in
    new ways'a view that strikingly resembles Moscow's similar
    assertiveness, which has led to confrontations with Russia's
    neighbors.

    Indeed, in 2009, Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu, the architect of
    Turkish policy, observed that neither Washington nor Moscow could
    establish order in the regions adjoining Turkey, therefore a new order
    must be established in the Middle East, Balkans, and the Caucasus;
    that Turkey wanted to play an active role in creating that order; that
    foreign actors agree to this role; but that `not even half a status
    quo had been established around Turkey so far.' Highlighting Turkey's
    ambitions he even said that Turkey was the most influential country in
    the Caucasus in every respect and that `we will move ahead by solving
    any crisis that exists in our relations. Our mission is to establish
    order.' He subsequently observed that `Istanbul will be a financial
    center, positioning it as the main station for the global economic
    network and transportation routes.' Still more recently, DavutoÄ?lu
    launched a campaign by which anyone migrating abroad from Anatolia
    would be considered part of the Turkish diaspora. Given Russia's
    pretensions to these selfsame roles and tasks'even to the right of
    intervening on behalf of its Russian diaspora and to the same status
    claimed by Turkey as a `system-forming' power'and its overt efforts to
    dominate the Caucasus, a clash with Turkey along several lines was
    probably inevitable.

    Thus this deterioration in Russo-Turkish relations owes as much to
    Russia's assertiveness and willingness to make threats against the
    West, including Turkey, as it does to Turkish assertiveness. Moscow
    has threatened NATO members regarding missile defense and has
    displayed several cases of gunboat diplomacy in the Mediterranean
    (discussed below). It has also continually displayed its determination
    to make the CIS into a closed Russian bloc'a trend that would put
    Turkish and European energy supplies at the risk of excessive
    dependence upon Moscow and thwart Ankara's ambitions in the Caucasus,
    if not Central Asia. These recent moves not only suggest the dominance
    of Vladimir Putin's more anti-Western attitude compared to that of
    outgoing President Dmitry Medvedev, but they also show a decided
    continuity in priorities regarding the insistence on a closed bloc in
    the CIS, and a heightened willingness to resort to shows of force if
    not its actual use to achieve its goals.

    The creation of a Russian sphere of influence in the CIS has been
    Moscow's priority policy since 1993 long before Putin. Medvedev
    quickly reaffirmed it in 2008, when in the wake of the Russo-Georgian
    war he announced that he would henceforth base his foreign policy on
    five principles. These included among them that Russia has the right
    to intervene in neighboring states to defend the honor and dignity of
    its citizens and that it has privileged but undefined interests with
    countries in its neighborhood. This then demonstrated that Russia not
    only wants to revise borders or intervene in other countries, it also
    demands a sphere of influence in Eurasia as a whole. Even without
    DavutoÄ?lu's extravagant rhetoric and ambitions, Russian policy, in and
    of itself, would have clashed sooner or later with Turkish interests.
    Thus Russia too has much to answer for here.

    Moscow's moves also suggest that the reset policy is coming to an end.
    If this is indeed the case, it will likely lead to more East-West
    tension in general, which Turkey will not be able to escape. Moscow
    professes a continuing desire to negotiate disputed issues with the
    United States and NATO, and will probably not attack President Obama
    during a difficult election campaign (since Moscow believes a
    Republican victory would lead to still worse outcomes). However, its
    determination to counter the United States and NATO in the Middle East
    and Eurasia and attacks on missile defenses show that once again
    efforts at East-West rapprochement have foundered on regional security
    issues in Eurasia, perhaps the most intractable item on the East-West
    agenda.

    The Middle East

    Moscow and Ankara hold different opinions on the Kurdish issue. Moscow
    continues to stall on recognizing the PKK as a terrorist group as
    Turkey desires, while both the United States and EU recognize it as
    such. Turkish intelligence reports that 80 percent of PKK weapons are
    made in Russia, including sniper rifles, anti-tank mines, and rocket
    launchers. Eighty-eight percent of mines and 85 percent of launchers
    used by the PKK originate in Russia. This does not necessarily mean
    that the PKK is buying weapons from Russia. Instead it could be
    obtaining them through gray or black markets. Yet these facts still
    put Moscow in an embarrassing position given Moscow's refusal to
    recognize the PKK as a terrorist group.

    >From Turkey's standpoint, Moscow's position compares unfavorably with
    that of Washington and Brussels on recognizing the PKK as terrorists
    and in assisting Turkey to deal with it. Indeed, the United States has
    pledged its support for Turkey's stance on the PKK. Washington has
    also provided some technological assistance to Turkey in dealing with
    it, consisting of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    data'using assets like the Predator UAV, fixed-wing spy planes, and
    satellites. Turkey has sought to buy six Predator and four armed
    Reaper UAVs from the United States, but Congress has not authorized
    the deal. Instead the U.S. announced in October 2011 its intention to
    sell Turkey three new Super Cobra attack helicopters. Moreover,
    Turkish commentators believe that absent some major crisis in
    U.S.-Turkish relations in 2012, American support for Turkey on this
    issue will continue.

    Differences regarding the PKK, however, are a relatively small issue
    in the Russo-Turkish agenda. Much more important are the issues
    pertaining to Syria and missile defense against Iran. In the 1990s,
    Turkey viewed the Russian-Iranian partnership as a counterweight to
    Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia; in the early
    2000s, Moscow showed signs of anxiety over the rapid improvement in
    Turkish-Iranian contacts. Turkey was left a bitter impression that an
    old friend of the West was turning away. It certainly looked as though
    Turkey considered Iran a friend and Israel an enemy, although Turkish
    officials vehemently denied these allegations.

    Turkish-Iranian relations are changing. Here too one sees an erosion
    of the congruence of outlooks that previously characterized
    Russo-Turkish relations. Turkey's demands that Syrian President Bashar
    al-Asad step down due to his violent repression of political protests
    clashes with Russia's support for him and staunch opposition to any
    foreign intervention in Syria. Arguably, the longer civil strife there
    continues, the more pressures will build for overt Turkish
    intervention. Indeed, by the end of 2011, not only was Turkey
    providing sanctuary and material assistance to insurgents, but
    DavutoÄ?lu was publicly discussing the possibility of intervention by
    either the Arab League or Turkey'which he considers `members of the
    family' and thus not really intervening external actors. Turkey had
    also imposed its own sanctions on Syria.

    If an intervention occurs, it is as likely as not to be associated
    with or to be in the name of Europe and trigger further Russian ire.
    Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev already
    accuses NATO of planning such an intervention from Turkey and using
    Turkish forces either to intervene directly in Syria or at least to
    establish a buffer zone within it. They also claim that NATO, which
    denies it, is discussing setting up a no fly zone in Syria that
    recalls the pretext for intervention in Libya. In the larger context,
    Turkey's converging posture with the West toward the Arab revolutions
    is an important factor drawing Turkey, Europe, and the United States
    closer together while distancing Turkey from Russia and Iran.

    Moscow has reacted sharply to the perceived threat of NATO
    intervention despite NATO's denials of that intention. Apart from
    sending warships in November 2011 to defend Syrian waters against some
    expected NATO `intervention,' Russia's military has also added to the
    hysteria in Moscow about NATO intentions. In October 2011, Chief of
    the General Staff General Nikolai Makarov told the army that the
    events in North Africa and the Middle East were so unpredictable and
    rapid in their development that nobody could foretell their future
    impact upon states. Therefore the army must be prepared for a Libyan
    or similar scenario. Escalating his rhetoric, Makarov then warned in
    November 2011 that tensions in Russia's neighborhood were rising and
    could even escalate to nuclear use: `The possibility of local armed
    conflicts virtually along the entire perimeter of the border has grown
    dramatically. I cannot rule out that, in certain circumstances, local
    and regional armed conflicts cold grow into a large-scale war,
    possibly even with nuclear weapons.'

    Makarov further warned, `We have it all in the doctrine, all the
    circumstances when the use of nuclear weapons is warranted.' For
    Makarov, the cause for such wars in the CIS lies in NATO's advancement
    to the CIS and Russia's borders. This is not a new position. As his
    predecessor General Yuri Baluyevsky said in 2005, while Russia faced
    no direct threat of aggression, `[given] the existence of nuclear
    weapons, any localized armed conflict'let alone a regional
    conflict'could lead the international community to the brink of a
    global war.'

    In January 2012, Moscow sent an armed ship through the NATO blockade
    to Syria to show its defiance of NATO and provide ammunition to the
    Syrian regime, if not also to the terrorists of Hizballah and Hamas,
    which it regularly supports with Russian weapons through Syria.
    Besides these forceful moves to deter NATO, Moscow has blocked UN
    resolutions against Syria and attacked NATO for staging a `political
    provocation' there. These actions, taken together, suggest that it
    sees Washington and NATO'now visibly including Turkey'as particularly
    prone to such interventionist unilateralism on behalf of democracy.
    Therefore they must be strongly deterred by even unilateral and
    forceful Russian action if necessary.

    Thus to the degree that Turkey becomes a consistent advocate of
    democracy in its neighborhood, its relations with Russia will suffer.
    As one Turkish official put it:

    Ankara came to a conclusion that as democracy is spreading around its
    neighborhood, Turkey only benefits from it. Countries like Bulgaria,
    Romania, and Georgia are testament(s) to this reality when we look at
    the great relations Turkey is having with these countries compared
    with the past. Just like the domino theory, we see democracy as an
    unstoppable force of history and we arrived at its doorstep.
    Meanwhile, Turkey is also contending with Iran, Syria's main regional
    protector and ally in the Middle East, and Russia's partner there as
    well. Just as Irano-Russian relations have improved due to their
    congruent stands regarding Syria and the threat of NATO intervention,
    Turkey's relations with Tehran and Moscow have worsened, and not only
    over Syria. This erosion has occurred despite the fact that Turkey
    opposes sanctions on Iranian oil and gas, which it buys. Turkey also
    attempted in 2010 to propose an alternative UN draft resolution with
    Brazil to mitigate the threat of sanctions on Iran and is proposing
    the resumption of talks on Iran's nuclear program, which should be
    held in Turkey.

    Indeed, 30 percent of Turkey's oil comes from Iran and is among Iran's
    top consumers of crude oil, obtaining just over 200,000 BPD. Not
    surprisingly, then, Turkey has indicated that it will not be bound by
    the newly proposed U.S. and European sanctions against Iranian oil.
    Therefore, and also to avoid a Sunni-Shi'i split over Syria and Iraq
    in the Middle East, Turkey has ample reasons to try to maintain its
    relationship with Iran. Although ties with Tehran may have weakened,
    Turkey still has enough credibility there to propose its territory as
    the site of a new attempt to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the
    issues surrounding Iranian nuclearization in talks with the United
    States, Russia, the UK, France, Germany, and Iran. This initiative
    again indicates its desire to stabilize its neighborhood and advance
    Turkey's international standing as an `order creating' power.

    Nevertheless the signs of decreasing amity with Tehran are visible and
    increasing. Turkey already competes strongly with Iran over
    Azerbaijan, which Iran is now openly threatening. Iran's ambassador to
    Russia, Ali Akbar Salehi, recently expressed Iran's desire to be
    Russia's dependable ally. A leading pro-Iranian Russian analyst,
    Radzhab Safarov, Director of the Center for the Study of Modern Iran,
    followed up by saying that `the rapprochement of Tehran and Moscow
    will make it possible to hinder the shortsighted policy of Turkey,
    which is installing American missile defenses.' This issue of missile
    defenses, just like Syria, is already estranging Turkey from both
    Russia and Iran.

    Turkish officials and pundits have long worried about the threat of
    proliferation in the Middle East and the threat posed by long-range
    missiles in the hands of Turkey's neighbors. Turkish pundits like
    Duygu Bazoglu Sezer were warning about the threat posed by
    proliferation from Iran and Iraq by 1995. By 1998 she was writing
    that:

    In July 1998, Iran successfully tested the Shahab-3 medium-range
    missile. Iranian officials described the test firing as a defensive
    move aimed at creating a balance in the region, meaning specifically a
    balance that would neutralize the American presence in the Gulf. The
    demonstration of Iran's medium-range missile capability is certainly
    not a welcome development from the perspective of Turkey, especially
    in view of the fact that Iran is strongly suspected'despite strong
    denials'of pursuing nuclear weapons capability. It is interesting
    that, following the firing, Iran took pains to send a message
    virtually to the whole world that none of its neighbors seemed
    troubled by the successful testing of the missile.
    The situation has worsened as Iran's arsenal has grown and the
    presumption of its ambition to field nuclear weapons has grown along
    with that arsenal. As Ian Lesser has observed, Iran's missile
    capability makes it in an operational sense, if not necessarily a
    political one, a Black Sea power. Indeed, Russian Foreign Minister
    Sergei Lavrov has repeatedly argued, `Iran deserves to be an equal
    partner of all regional countries in the resolution of the problems of
    the Near and Middle East.' He has also proposed a similar involvement
    of Iran in Black Sea security issues.

    Accordingly, the strategic consequences of Iran's missiles could
    easily affect not just regional defense agendas but also energy flows
    through and in the Black Sea littoral (particularly if someone strikes
    at Iran to forestall its proliferation and Iran retaliates by playing
    the energy card). Consequently, Turkish defense planners are highly
    sensitive to the threat. In 2008, Turkey apparently decided to buy
    Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Ukraine and Belarus
    for testing and training purposes `to simulate threats that may come
    from countries with ex-Soviet systems in their inventories,' i.e.,
    Iran and Syria. At that time, Turkey also announced plans to buy up to
    $4 billion of long-range air and missile defense systems.

    Last, in September 2011, Turkey agreed to host a U.S. radar as part of
    the developing missile defense system in Europe. This decision will
    clearly aggravate relations with Iran since Turkey formally feels that
    Iran's nuclear weapons and missile programs are a threat and that
    Ankara is willing to join with NATO, the United States, and even
    Israel to counter it. Indeed, in November 2011, General Amir Ali
    Hajizadeh, a senior commander in Iran's Revolutionary Guard, declared
    that if Iran were attacked by the United States or Israel, its first
    response would be to target elements of the NATO missile shield in
    Turkey. Similarly, in December 2011, the Iranian media attacked
    Turkey's secular Islamic system as an unsuitable example for countries
    now engulfed in the Arab Spring.

    Turkey may have made this decision because NATO warned that if it
    bought Russian or Chinese air and missile defense systems that were
    incompatible with NATO's systems, it would then operate without NATO's
    intelligence on incoming ballistic missiles. Ankara also agreed that
    the United States would share this system's data and intelligence
    assessments with all allies, including Israel. According to U.S.
    officials, this is `probably the biggest strategic decision between
    the United States and Turkey in the past 15 or 20 years.' Yet it also
    implicates Turkey in Russia's hostile response to these missile
    defenses as announced by President Medvedev on November 23, 2011.
    Medvedev announced the following decisions:

    First, I am instructing the Defence Ministry to immediately put the
    missile attack early warning radar station in Kaliningrad on combat
    alert. Second, protective cover of Russia's strategic nuclear weapons
    will be reinforced as a priority measure under the program to develop
    our air and space defenses. Third, the new strategic ballistic
    missiles commissioned by the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy
    will be equipped with advanced missile defense penetration systems and
    new highly effective warheads. Fourth, I have instructed the Armed
    Forces to draw up measures for disabling missile defense system data
    and guidance systems if need be. These measures will be adequate,
    effective, and low-cost. Fifth, if the above measures prove
    insufficient, the Russian Federation will deploy modern offensive
    weapon systems in the west and south of the country, ensuring our
    ability to take out any part of the U.S. missile defense system in
    Europe. One step in this process will be to deploy Iskander missiles
    in Kaliningrad Region. Other measures to counter the European missile
    defense system will be drawn up and implemented as necessary.
    Furthermore, if the situation continues to develop not to Russia's
    favor, we reserve the right to discontinue further disarmament and
    arms control measures. Besides, given the intrinsic link between
    strategic offensive and defensive arms, conditions for our withdrawal
    from the New START Treaty could also arise, and this option is
    enshrined in the treaty.
    Thus Turkey and its allies will become targets of Russia's nuclear and
    conventional missiles. Further, should a new European arms race
    develop'though Russia sells military technology to Turkey and has a
    substantial economic trade and reciprocal investment process with
    it'Turkey will be targeted. Indeed, one of the Iskander-E missiles to
    be deployed by Russia against the NATO missile shield will be deployed
    in Krasnodar on the Black Sea coast. They can reach Turkey in four
    minutes from launch. This will eliminate a major basis for the
    rapprochement between Moscow and Ankara during the past decade. The
    Russian Foreign Ministry even stated publicly that Medvedev's
    countermeasures, cited above, were justified because of the placement
    of a NATO missile defense radar in Turkey.

    Insofar as Russian officials, and not only analysts, see Turkey as
    striving to dominate the Middle East and Syria, which Moscow regards
    as an ally, and to the extent that such an outcome jeopardizes
    Moscow's naval base at Tartus, Russia, might come to see Turkey as a
    rival in the Middle East. Turkey will also become'if it is not
    already'the target of Iranian and Syrian missiles. This fact should
    enhance the value of the missile defense system and continue to bind
    Turkey to NATO and the United States.

    Russia will now mount a threat against Turkey and its NATO allies,
    thus undermining a major basis for the previous decade of partnership.
    In the context of mounting frictions over all the issues outlined
    here, Russia's reply on missile defenses, along with other
    manifestations of Russian policy, almost inevitably means that a cycle
    of recriminations and tension in Russo-Turkish relations will
    intensify. This will lead Turkey to draw closer to its NATO allies and
    to the United States than has been the case for many years. Indeed, in
    December 2011, Turkey authorized the purchase of two F-35 Lightning II
    Fighter aircrafts from the United States.

    The Caucasus

    Indeed, the Caucasus exemplifies those not so hidden antagonisms, and
    bilateral tensions are now visible there too. The Azeri-Turkish
    reconciliation, of which the energy deal is a part, precludes
    normalization with Armenia, which still receives Russian military
    assistance against the possibility of renewed fighting in
    Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan told students in
    July 2011, that future generations would and should undertake the task
    of reclaiming what was once Western Armenia, historically part of the
    medieval Armenian kingdom, but part of Turkey since the time of the
    Ottoman Empire. Ankara's response was predictable. Prime Minister
    Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an immediately demanded an apology. Yet no such
    response came nor is any forthcoming. Worse, Sargsyan admitted that
    Armeno-Turkish relations were deadlocked and that clearly, no progress
    was to be expected in that regard. Meanwhile, he still apparently
    expects Turkey to `repent' without any preconditions, so relations
    remain deadlocked.

    This means that until Turkey delinks normalization with Armenia from
    the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh, no progress will be possible. Yet
    such delinking is ever more unlikely, especially in view of the
    evidence presented here. Given Russian imperial designs on the
    Caucasus as outlined here and in many other works, the U.S. position
    that these issues should be delinked appears quixotic and unrealistic.
    This is the case even if Washington correctly argues that the status
    quo in Nagorno-Karabakh cannot last long and that this is an urgent
    issue. Certainly the U.S. position will not bring about a negotiated
    settlement given local realities.

    For example, Armenian political scientist Arman Melikyan claims that
    in earlier tripartite negotiations in 2011, Russia ostensibly
    `brokered' Moscow to arrange for the surrender of liberated
    territories, thereby ensuring its military presence in return and
    establishing a network of military bases in Azerbaijan to prevent any
    further cooperation between Azerbaijan and NATO. While Armenian
    authorities reportedly accepted this plan, Baku refused to do so and
    saved Armenia (which clearly wants to incorporate Nagorno-Karabakh)
    from relinquishing the territory to it. Since recent Wikileaks
    revelations show that Azerbaijan desires NATO's full cooperation and
    says it would even consider membership in NATO if not for implied
    Russian and Iranian opposition, its rejection of this transparent
    neo-imperialist Russian ploy is hardly surprising.

    Moreover, these revelations show the danger in leaving the initiative
    in negotiating an end to the conflict in Russia's hands alone. Azeri
    officials, such as Elchin Gusseynli of the Ministry of International
    Affairs, have accused the OSCE of passivity and support for Armenia
    rather than Azerbaijan's just position. Gusseynli rightly cited the
    Armeno-Russian military collaboration, which underscores the conflict
    and reflects Moscow's unrelenting desire to recover some of its lost
    imperial heritage in the Caucasus. In response to Moscow and Yerevan,
    Turkish Defense Minister Ismet Yilmaz said in Baku that Turkey was
    ready to support and join with the Azeri army in defense production.
    Both states have also signed an agreement on strategic cooperation and
    formed a high advisory council. Thus, Azerbaijan decided to reject
    Moscow's demand that it subordinate its defense and security policy to
    Moscow.

    Adding to Russia's discomfiture on this issue is the fact that the EU
    has now registered its unhappiness with the stagnation of the
    Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. European Parliament member Kristian
    Vigenin, upon returning from Yerevan, stated openly the parliament's
    dissatisfaction with the failure of the OSCE Minsk Group process to
    get anywhere and added that the parliament suggested replacing
    France's delegate to the Minsk process with an EU representative, even
    possibly the EU Commissioner for External Relations and Security
    Policy, Catherine Ashton.

    Although there has been no sign of this previously, Moscow also
    apparently believes that Washington is trying to revive the Bush
    administration's `Big Caucasus Project' to pull the Transcaucasus out
    of Russia's orbit and somehow supplant Russia in the Karabakh process.
    Turkey's realignment with Azerbaijan clearly ranges it opposite
    Armenia and Russia, and if there are EU moves to join the process and
    weaken Russia's position there, it is not unlikely that Turkey will be
    on Baku's side against Yerevan and Moscow. In another irritation, a
    Russian strike team of eight agents killed three Chechens in Istanbul
    on September 16 execution-style in broad daylight. This obviously
    irritated Turkish officials, not only because there are many
    sympathizers with the Chechens and other North Caucasus insurgents in
    Turkey but also because of the blatant disregard for Turkish
    sovereignty.

    Yet beyond these currents, there are even more tensions rising in the
    Caucasus, mainly due to the increasingly strong Russian anxiety that a
    U.S. or Israeli strike against Iran might spill over into this region,
    if not Central Asia. According to Sergei Konovalov, Moscow is
    receiving reports of a U.S.-backed Israeli (if not U.S. too) surprise
    strike on Iran. When added to the civil war now germinating in Syria,
    these reports have generated great concern in Moscow for the fate of
    Russian troops in the Caucasus and Caspian basin. Thus Moscow has
    launched military and diplomatic moves to forestall such a strike or
    if that fails to be prepared to respond credibly to any threats
    arising out of them. Indeed, these preparations began in 2010. During
    October-November 2011, Moscow optimized the 102nd Military Base in
    Armenia. Dependents were withdrawn to Russia, the garrison near
    Yerevan was reduced, and subunits stationed there redeployed to Gyumri
    nearer to the Turkish border. On December 1, 2011, Russian forces at
    their bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia were put on full combat
    readiness. Russian land forces in Armenia are now essentially isolated
    because Georgia has broken off the treaty allowing military transit
    through its territory to this base in Armenia. This has led some
    former commanders of this force to opine about having to launch
    breakthrough operations to support this force in the event of a
    conflict in Iran.

    Meanwhile, the Black Sea Fleet is patrolling near Georgia, which could
    side with the anti-Iran forces. A separate coastal missile division
    with Bal-E (Bastion) coastal anti-ship missiles that have a range of
    130 km was placed on permanent combat readiness. The missile launchers
    of the Caspian Flotilla were redeployed from Astrakhan southwards to
    Makhachkala and Kaspiysk to form a single ship grouping there. The
    small artillery ship Volgodonsk will join the missile patrol ship
    Tatarstan, the Flotilla's flagship, and the Dagestan missile ship. The
    Tatarstan's missiles have a range of up to 200 km. An aircraft carrier
    group of the Northern Fleet has departed for the Mediterranean led by
    the aircraft cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov to call at Tartus. Given the
    possibility of a war in Nagorno-Karabakh, which could break out in
    conjunction with a conflict of Iran, the military commentator Col.
    Vladimir Popov raised the possibility of a Russian operation to defend
    Armenia against Turkey, a NATO member, a threat that led Russia in
    1993 to warn Turkey that such an operation risked nuclear war.

    Whatever else these military moves suggest, they certainly do not
    suggest deepening amity with Turkey. Quite the opposite, they clearly
    show continued suspicion of Turkish aims here, particularly in
    conjunction with U.S./NATO intentions, which Moscow views so
    negatively. Perhaps this is why Moscow arranged another summit with
    Armenia and Azerbaijan on January 23-24, 2012. Finally these moves are
    another example of the increasing resort to military threats in
    Russia's relations with its neighbors, interlocutors, and partners.
    Nor do such threats end at the former Soviet border. They have been
    seen in Syria, and they also appeared directly in response to Turkish
    actions in Cyprus.

    The Cyprus Gas Conflict

    New tension brewed between Turkey and Cyprus after Cyprus's and
    Israel's enormous gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean in
    2010-2011. Turkey's reaction to those finds was extremely negative.
    Turkey was embroiled with a conflict, not only with Cyprus, its
    European backers and Israel, but with Russia as well. During 2009 and
    2010, Cyprus and Israel discovered enormous natural gas deposits off
    their shores in the Mediterranean Sea. Then, in late 2011, Noble
    Energy, the firm contracted by Cyprus to explore its waters for gas,
    announced a discovery estimated at 5-8 trillion cubic feet of natural
    gas there. This discovery could not have come at a better time for
    Cyprus, which in 2011 endured a slippage in its fiscal ratings, was
    shut out of international capital markets, was hit by a large
    munitions blast, and was finally forced to accept a Russian bailout.
    All told, the discoveries by both countries amount to 33 TCF of gas.
    The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Levant Basin, where most
    of these discoveries have occurred, may hold 122 TCF.

    Yet these discoveries have also had some negative repercussions. They
    have heightened tensions between the TRNC and the Greek-led Republic
    of Cyprus. The discoveries offer Cyprus the prospect of becoming a
    local economic powerhouse in contrast to the near disasters of 2011,
    and of thus reducing Turkish leverage upon Cyprus's policies regarding
    the Cypriot Turks and Cyprus's policies in general. Indeed, the gas
    finds to date give Cyprus enough gas to meet its needs for an
    estimated 150 years, fully satisfy its electricity generating needs
    for 210 years, and provide it with billions of dollars of revenues
    that will allow it to become a major exporter to Europe once pipelines
    or tankers carrying LNG can be built. So it can also expect an influx
    of much more foreign European capital to build those facilities and to
    strengthen and diversify its sources of foreign investment. It is
    likely that any pipeline will have to be built to connect with those
    that now or soon will cross Turkey or that a liquefaction plant will
    need to be built to process Cypriot and Israeli gas finds.

    Not surprisingly, the TRNC government reacted coolly to the gas
    discovery, and Turkey, which does not recognize the government of
    Cyprus, even sent an exploration ship accompanied by warships and
    fighter jets to the area after Noble started drilling. Turkey's
    threats against Cyprus and Israel to their exploration and drilling
    for gas in the Eastern Mediterranean also caused concern in Russia.
    Moscow recently organrized a large loan to Cyprus to sustain it
    against a crisis should Greece default, since so many Russian accounts
    are held in Cyprus's banks. Cyprus then reinvested in Russia or
    laundered the elite's money by cycling it out of Russia into the
    global banking system.

    Clearly Moscow cannot allow Cyprus to go under without incurring
    serious domestic losses. Turkish threats therefore deeply disturb both
    Cyprus and Russia. Once Turkey's navy openly threatened Cyprus for
    signing an agreement with the Texas-based firm Noble Energy, which is
    a partner with Israel in developing Israel's maritime gas fields,
    Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly backed Cyprus's right to
    develop its Mediterranean gas. Cyprus in turn labeled Moscow `a shield
    against any threats by Turkey.' Furthermore, Russia dispatched an
    aircraft carrier with fighter planes, and at last one submarine to
    Cyprus as a show of support in another open example of gunboat
    diplomacy.

    Russia has already demonstrated its will and ability to check Turkey
    in regard to Cyprus. That interest will only grow in the future,
    because it is inconceivable that Moscow, which sees itself as Europe's
    main gas supplier, will simply let Israel and Cyprus cut into its
    sales with such massive impact and compete with it at no cost. This
    does not mean the use of military force, but it does suggest that
    Moscow will bring substantial pressure to bear on Cyprus, if not
    Israel, to demand entrée into the gas business from their recent
    discoveries. Not only does this make it harder for Turkey to coerce
    Cyprus, it also has two negative implications for Turkey.

    First, Russia's presence in this sector of the gas market would
    enhance its leverage vis-Ã-vis Turkey in their bilateral energy
    dealings and would limit Turkey's ability to posture as an energy hub
    with the attendant benefits thereof. Second, geopoliticians and
    geographers of all stripes have known that whoever controls Cyprus
    possesses the means to threaten with serious damage Turkey's
    Mediterranean ports. Given Russia's proclivities and that of its naval
    commanders, who seek permanent anchorages and bases in the
    Mediterranean and may be in trouble in Syria due to its civil war, to
    seek such a facility at Cyprus may be tempting. This challenges
    Turkish security and NATO planning as well. However, in conjunction
    with the Turkish threats to Cyprus and Moscow's expected demand for a
    major place in Cyprus's energy trade, it is a highly probable outcome
    based on existing trends.

    The Cyprus issue, considered in all its many dimensions, highlights
    the fact that Turkey's zero problems with neighbors has run aground on
    the shoals of these neighbors' competitive interests with those of
    Turkey and with great power politics in the overall Mediterranean
    basin. The Cyprus issue also shows the limits of Turkish power despite
    the ambitious and even aggressive rhetoric emanating from Ankara. It
    suggests the need for Turkey to find a modus vivendi with Cyprus, if
    not Israel, as it did earlier with Russia. Some will say that it also
    shows the need for arriving at such an outcome as well or continuing
    to abide by the existing one with Moscow. Yet here, in fact, there was
    such an agreement. Despite the recent energy agreements signed on
    December 30, 2011, with Russia, Cyprus is merely one of many signs of
    what is arguably a worsening trend in Turkey's relations with a Russia
    that is as ambitious as Turkey and even more aggressive insofar as its
    vital interests are involved.

    The Cyprus energy conflict also serves as another reminder that energy
    politics are inseparable from larger security considerations and
    produce new issues and combinations that undermine the status quo. It
    also shows the urgency of making progress on the tangled issue of
    Cyprus's future and the relationships among its two ethno-religious
    groups and of fully integrating Turkey into Europe. Turkey's exclusion
    from the EU, in part a direct result of the Cyprus question, limits
    the ability of both sides to live up to and maximize their potential
    for enhancing security, democracy, and prosperity. As these events
    show, the failure to overcome these obstacles always leaves open the
    possibility of regression to heightened interstate conflict on Cyprus
    and international strife in the Mediterranean.

    These developments are part of a larger theme. For Turkey, the idea of
    zero problems with neighbors while it serenely navigates along the
    complex shoals of Mediterranean Europe, the Middle East, and the
    Caucasus and gains leverage throughout these zones has proven
    unsustainable. There are too many issues that preclude upholding this
    posture while everyone else is pursuing their own national interests,
    and Turkey cannot stop them. The failure of neighboring governments
    like Syria, Russia, and Iran to heed Turkish interests or refrain from
    threatening them clearly betokens the failure of Turkey's policy to
    increase Turkey's standing and leverage among its neighbors. This is
    especially the case when the issues involved are central to those
    governments' economic and political objectives. This failure could
    then translate as well into domestic opposition to a failed foreign
    policy.

    Therefore the failure of the `zero problems with neighbors' policy
    could eventually lead to serious domestic political costs. Turkey's
    recent foreign policy moves have estranged Israel, Syria, Cyprus,
    Greece, Russia, and Iran, and have certainly caused major headaches
    for U.S. policymakers trying to tamp down the angry rhetoric against
    Israel, Turkey's erstwhile ally. Although Russian threats in the
    Caucasus and bullying tactics regarding energy in Southeastern Europe
    demonstrate Moscow's unregenerate neo-imperialism and traditional
    outlook toward these areas, the fundamental concept of Turkish foreign
    policy has also been weighed in the balance and been found wanting.
    Not surprisingly Turkey is now in many cases, notably Cyprus and
    Israel, lashing out and trying to assert itself in forceful rhetoric,
    which, however, cannot be sustained by equally forceful deeds.

    It remains to be seen how Ankara will extricate itself from its
    largely self-made difficulties. Turkey possesses considerable assets
    and strategic importance. Nonetheless, it has clearly overreached and
    based its foreign policy on unwarranted and unsustainable
    presuppositions. Since greater powers than Turkey have failed to
    secure lasting influence in their Southeastern European and Middle
    Eastern policies, Ankara should have realized that it could not
    supplant them and thus should have aimed for more modest objectives.
    Certainly Turkey alone cannot resist Russian encroachments in the
    Caucasus and Europe, resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict, ensure good
    governance in Syria, become a Eurasian energy hub, and uphold its
    security against Iran all by itself.

    Hopefully upon sober reflection Ankara will realize its need for
    democratic friends and partners if not allies, as in the case of
    missile defense. This might even mean a return in the direction of the
    historic Kemalist orientation toward Europe, which has been so
    antithetical to the AKP Party's ideology (though not necessarily all
    of its practice). Indeed, by all accounts, despite the rupture with
    Israel and its missteps in Cyprus, Turkey's relations with Washington
    have been at a recent high. This is no doubt due to the Syria and Iran
    issues. Although the quest for partnership within Europe has run
    aground in the past, a carefully prepared and more targeted, even
    modest, objective may be within reach. This would apply to energy
    policy in particular as well as to missile defenses, and to Syria if
    Ankara can draw the appropriate lessons from its current predicament.
    One can only hope that Ankara will learn from these sobering and
    disappointing experiences, lest it experience even more and possibly
    greater rebuffs in the future.

    Yet these events also have significant implications for Russia. One
    sees an unremitting determination to extinguish the sovereignty of
    Central Asian and European members of the CIS. Not only have Putin and
    Medvedev pursued these policies against Turkmenistan, but Russia is
    also shutting down Belarus' sovereignty by taking over its energy and
    key economic sectors and attempting to do the same with Ukraine. It is
    quite clear that it does not regard these states, or for that matter
    the former members of the Warsaw Pact and Serbia, as truly sovereign.
    Moreover, its representatives lose no opportunity to remind them of
    their vulnerability and make demands that Moscow have an unlimited
    right to intervene in their affairs. Indeed, Russian legislation
    enacted under Medvedev gives the President the right to intervene
    militarily in their affairs without any accountability to the Duma or
    anyone else whatsoever.

    In addition, Russia continues to see NATO and the United States as
    powers that are intent on dismantling its pretensions to a
    neo-imperial domination of Eurasia in the name of democracy and as
    attempting to intimidate it by depriving it of its main military
    trump, i.e., its ability to intimidate Europe with its nuclear and
    conventional missiles. Thus it has demanded legally binding guarantees
    that missile defenses will not threaten its nuclear arsenal, despite
    scores of briefings and acceptance of the fact that these systems
    cannot threaten Russia's nuclear weapons by Russian experts, but
    refuses to suggest giving Europe such guarantees. It also clearly sees
    itself under threat from these NATO policies. It believes these
    policies will inevitably lead to a coercive NATO operation in the CIS
    or Russia itself'either by actual force majeure or `information
    warfare' to undermine Russia's imperial pretensions and political
    system, without which it believes Russia would cease to exist as a
    state or independent great power. Thus operations like those in Libya
    or those it believes will take place in Syria potentially have direct
    consequences for Russia. It will reply in the only language it knows,
    i.e., military and other threats.

    Russia's position, its insistence on a free hand at the expense of
    every other state east of the Elbe, and its presupposition of conflict
    with NATO all but ensure that the reset policy will run aground over
    the issues of regional security in Eurasia. That denouement is clearly
    in the wind as Moscow's statements on missile defense all but rule out
    an improvement in relations with NATO at the May 2012 Chicago summit.
    Turkey cannot escape the inevitable consequences of this outcome,
    because so many of its vital interests are now threatened by Russia's
    resort to gunboat diplomacy, military threats, and coercive energy
    diplomacy. Here too, as in the Middle East, zero problems with
    neighbors has foundered on the inevitable rocks of competing national
    interests, including Russia. Yet Russia has also succumbed to the
    temptation to define its interests as being a priori hostile to those
    of its principal interlocutors. Turkey's democracy allows it the
    opportunity to rethink its policy, liquidate over-extended positions,
    and regain strength in what will hopefully be a revived Atlantic
    alliance, concomitant advance in European integration and democracy in
    the Middle East. Yet Russia has clearly opted'or is now opting
    for'another round of self-imposed neo-imperial isolation that it
    cannot sustain and which it can only defend by threats of force. While
    it may not be too late for Turkey to repair its position with Israel,
    Cyprus, and NATO, it appears that for Russia the die has already been
    cast and not in favor of international reconciliation.

    Younkyoo Kim, PhD (Purdue University) is an associate professor in the
    Division of International Studies, Hanyang University, Seoul. Stephen
    Blank, PhD (University of Chicago) is Professor of Russian National
    Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army
    War College. They wrote this article for the MERIA Journal, a
    publication of the GLORIA Center, from where it is adapted.


    http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=73149&pageid=13&pagename=Analysi s




    From: A. Papazian
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