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CHATHAM HOUSE: LACK OF SOVEREIGNTY SHOULD BE ARMENIA'S NUMBER ONE CONCERN
arminfo
Friday, June 22, 20:26
Russia's influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia is in
decline but it keeps pushing against the tide, Chatham House says in
its report "The Long Goodbye: Waning Russian Influence in the South
Caucasus and Central Asia."
"The South Caucasus, with its potential interstate conflict, presents
a complex arena for Russian soft power. The levers of Russian influence
here vary. They are economic and military in Armenia, scarcely present
in Azerbaijan, and essentially related to negative publicity as well
as economics with regard to Georgia," the reports says, adding that
Russian influence in Armenia is so great that lack of sovereignty
should be Armenia's number one concern. The governments in Azerbaijan
and especially Georgia, where there is less Russian soft power at work,
have more traditional security concerns about Russia.
Armenia does not share these concerns (at least openly).
Concerning Russia's influence on Armenia's energy market, the report
says: "In 2003, the CEO of United Energy Systems (UES), Anatoliy
Chubais, outlined plans to integrate the South Caucasus into a Russia-
led energy-supply network through ten former Soviet republics, as
well as plans to ensure electricity outflows from Armenia to Turkey
and Azerbaijan. Chubais denied that UES sought political gains but
he has been a leading proponent of the concept of a Eurasian 'liberal
empire' and his actions gave Russia almost total control of Armenia's
energy market. It was Robert Kocharian, Armenia's president from 1998
to 2008, who effectively sold off Armenia to Chubais and other Russian
commercial and political interests. Through Gazprom's ownership of its
Armenian subsidiary, ArmRosGazprom, 80% of Armenia's energy structure
is Russian-controlled, including the majority of the Iran-Armenia
gas pipeline, thus ensuring that Armenia cannot become an independent
transit country should Iranian gas ever reach European markets.
Russia has also bought up all but two of Armenia's hydroelectric and
nuclear power stations, in exchange for writing off Armenian debt."
Regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the reports says: "Russia's
support of Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute has been based
on several interests: limiting Turkish influence, countering a
Russophobic Azerbaijan in the early years of independence, and
long-standing cultural ties reflected in the large Armenian diaspora
in Russia. Russia's positioning has given it a powerful lever of
influence over Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as external parties.
However, its backing of Armenia's stance has changed in recent years:
during his presidency, Medvedev invested more effort in mediation than
his predecessors and the Azerbaijani first family has strong interests
in Russia. But there are forces deriving financial profit and political
leverage from continued tension and the status quo. Russia sees its
mediation over Nagorno-Karabakh in terms of its influence and may
not be genuinely interested in a resolution. This is shown by Russian
objections to an international peacekeeping force and to changes in the
make-up of the Minsk Group, which has been mediating on the conflict
since 1992. Russia has proposed deploying its own troops instead. This
would strengthen its position, but seems unlikely to be accepted by
Azerbaijan. It is an open question whether Russia would support Armenia
militarily should Azerbaijan decide to retake the territory by force."
"It is conceivable, however, that this uncertainty is a factor in
Azerbaijan's restraint so far. At the trilateral summit in Kazan in
June 2011 Azerbaijan expressed scepticism about the latest Russian-led
peace initiative. It still considers Russia to be a dishonest broker,
perhaps partly owing to the Armenian background of Russian foreign
minister and chief negotiator Sergei Lavrov, but probably mostly from
fear of a pax Russica in Nagorno-Karabakh, which Azerbaijan considers
to be its territory."
"A full-blown renewal of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would jeopardize
Russia's position in Azerbaijan and Turkey, particularly if the
Armenians required military assistance. Pipeline security would also
be affected, and Russia prioritizes energy security and financial
profit over conflict manipulation," the reports concludes.
arminfo
Friday, June 22, 20:26
Russia's influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia is in
decline but it keeps pushing against the tide, Chatham House says in
its report "The Long Goodbye: Waning Russian Influence in the South
Caucasus and Central Asia."
"The South Caucasus, with its potential interstate conflict, presents
a complex arena for Russian soft power. The levers of Russian influence
here vary. They are economic and military in Armenia, scarcely present
in Azerbaijan, and essentially related to negative publicity as well
as economics with regard to Georgia," the reports says, adding that
Russian influence in Armenia is so great that lack of sovereignty
should be Armenia's number one concern. The governments in Azerbaijan
and especially Georgia, where there is less Russian soft power at work,
have more traditional security concerns about Russia.
Armenia does not share these concerns (at least openly).
Concerning Russia's influence on Armenia's energy market, the report
says: "In 2003, the CEO of United Energy Systems (UES), Anatoliy
Chubais, outlined plans to integrate the South Caucasus into a Russia-
led energy-supply network through ten former Soviet republics, as
well as plans to ensure electricity outflows from Armenia to Turkey
and Azerbaijan. Chubais denied that UES sought political gains but
he has been a leading proponent of the concept of a Eurasian 'liberal
empire' and his actions gave Russia almost total control of Armenia's
energy market. It was Robert Kocharian, Armenia's president from 1998
to 2008, who effectively sold off Armenia to Chubais and other Russian
commercial and political interests. Through Gazprom's ownership of its
Armenian subsidiary, ArmRosGazprom, 80% of Armenia's energy structure
is Russian-controlled, including the majority of the Iran-Armenia
gas pipeline, thus ensuring that Armenia cannot become an independent
transit country should Iranian gas ever reach European markets.
Russia has also bought up all but two of Armenia's hydroelectric and
nuclear power stations, in exchange for writing off Armenian debt."
Regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the reports says: "Russia's
support of Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute has been based
on several interests: limiting Turkish influence, countering a
Russophobic Azerbaijan in the early years of independence, and
long-standing cultural ties reflected in the large Armenian diaspora
in Russia. Russia's positioning has given it a powerful lever of
influence over Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as external parties.
However, its backing of Armenia's stance has changed in recent years:
during his presidency, Medvedev invested more effort in mediation than
his predecessors and the Azerbaijani first family has strong interests
in Russia. But there are forces deriving financial profit and political
leverage from continued tension and the status quo. Russia sees its
mediation over Nagorno-Karabakh in terms of its influence and may
not be genuinely interested in a resolution. This is shown by Russian
objections to an international peacekeeping force and to changes in the
make-up of the Minsk Group, which has been mediating on the conflict
since 1992. Russia has proposed deploying its own troops instead. This
would strengthen its position, but seems unlikely to be accepted by
Azerbaijan. It is an open question whether Russia would support Armenia
militarily should Azerbaijan decide to retake the territory by force."
"It is conceivable, however, that this uncertainty is a factor in
Azerbaijan's restraint so far. At the trilateral summit in Kazan in
June 2011 Azerbaijan expressed scepticism about the latest Russian-led
peace initiative. It still considers Russia to be a dishonest broker,
perhaps partly owing to the Armenian background of Russian foreign
minister and chief negotiator Sergei Lavrov, but probably mostly from
fear of a pax Russica in Nagorno-Karabakh, which Azerbaijan considers
to be its territory."
"A full-blown renewal of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would jeopardize
Russia's position in Azerbaijan and Turkey, particularly if the
Armenians required military assistance. Pipeline security would also
be affected, and Russia prioritizes energy security and financial
profit over conflict manipulation," the reports concludes.