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  • Stateless peoples pose conundrums for great powers

    Hindustan Times, India
    June 16 2005

    Stateless peoples pose conundrums for great powers

    Daniel Schnieder (IANS)

    New Delhi, June 16, 2005

    There are, in this world, 'inconvenient nations'. These peoples -
    often oppressed and bound by language, culture and sometimes religion
    - are the unfinished business of modern history.

    When the wave of nationalism swept the world in the 19th and 20th
    centuries and the old empires were carved up, these peoples were left
    stateless. In some cases they were divided up, thrown in with nations
    that not only didn't share their values or ethnicity but sometimes
    also sought their annihilation.

    The list of the inconvenient nations is mostly a familiar one - Jews,
    Armenians, Kurds and Palestinians in the Middle East. Some are less
    celebrated - Tibetans and Chechens - and the Taiwanese are relative
    newcomers to the group.

    All of these peoples occupy vital pieces of geography. Their
    frustrated national ambitions create political tinderboxes that could
    trigger war or deepen existing conflicts. Already some of these
    conflicts intersect with the global war against Islamic extremism.
    Others could complicate the coming contest for power between China
    and the US.

    Through sheer persistence, some of these peoples have won statehood -
    modern Israel and Armenia, with the Palestinians on the verge. Even
    then, the boundaries of these states remain contested and their
    security at risk.

    Granting all of these inconvenient nations statehood poses serious
    challenges to the existing order in the world.

    For the US, the country most likely to be an ally of change, they
    pose a particular conundrum. In recent years, President George W.
    Bush's administration has embraced with great fervour its role as an
    agent of transformation through the spread of democracy worldwide.
    Invariably, democratic rights have fed the growth of nationalism.

    At the same time, the US is the guardian of a status quo that largely
    serves its interests. Historically, American administrations have
    resisted demands for change in boundaries that challenge the
    principle of territorial integrity. Inherently conservative, the US
    has been uncomfortable with the radical fervour of nationalists
    unwilling to compromise on their aims.

    Great powers have always responded schizophrenically to the
    inconvenient nations. They have manipulated stateless peoples'
    aspirations for self-rule for their own purposes, but then abandoned
    them when ambitions for statehood got in the way of larger interests.

    In the Middle East, the British, French and others used the desires
    for nationhood of Jews, Armenians, Kurds and Palestinians to pick
    apart the Ottoman Empire. During and after World War I, in which the
    Turks sided with Germany, the allies backed independence for most of
    those peoples to encourage anti-Turkish revolts. As soon as the
    allies could build their own empires in the region, those promises
    were betrayed.

    In East Asia, the Central Intelligence Agency fed arms to Tibetans
    rebelling in the 1950s against Chinese invasion. But the conquered
    Tibetans were largely forgotten when the West turned to wooing China.

    The Taiwanese also have been victims of US fickleness. The US
    defended Taiwan as a base for the Chinese who lost the struggle
    against Chinese communists. But when native Taiwanese used democracy
    in the past decade to assert their desire for a separate identity,
    Taiwan became an awkward impediment to partnership with Beijing.

    To understand the passions and persistence of the inconvenient
    nations, look at "the Armenian question," as it has been known since
    the 19th century. The Armenians are an ancient Christian people who
    once were spread from the Russian-controlled Caucasus down into the
    Ottoman Empire, what is now modern Turkey.

    During the latter half of the 19th century, the mistreatment of
    Armenians by the Ottoman Turks became a prominent issue in
    international politics. Things only got worse when the Young Turks,
    the architects of modern Turkey, overthrew the Ottoman rulers during
    World War I. They then carried out what is considered by many to be
    the first modern genocide, killing and driving out most Armenians
    from Turkey.

    Still there was hope for a homeland. Amid the chaos after the
    Bolshevik revolution, Russian-ruled Armenia, a small part of
    historical Armenia, declared its independence and received the
    support of President Woodrow Wilson, the champion of national
    self-determination. Under a 1920 treaty with the World War I allies,
    Turkey was compelled to recognise Armenian independence and to cede
    part of what had been its Armenian-populated areas to the new state.

    But the Armenians were betrayed when Turkey repudiated the treaty,
    seized Armenian cities and then made a deal with the invading Russian
    army which brought Armenia back under the control of the Soviet
    state.

    The Soviets, who also claimed to champion self-determination,
    preserved an Armenian republic within their modern empire. But
    Stalin, making deals with the Turks, cynically stripped away some
    Armenian-inhabited territories and placed them under the
    administration of an Azeri Turkish republic within the Soviet Union.

    Seven decades later, the Armenians rose to seize back their
    independence. In 1988, a movement for the return of the
    Armenian-populated territory of Nagorno-Karabakh from the Soviet
    republic of Azerbaijan signalled the beginning of the disintegration
    of the Soviet Union in 1991.

    The struggle intensified when Armenia won its independence from the
    Soviet Union and nationalist passions quickly fanned into a white hot
    heat, drawing Armenians from their scattered diaspora in places such
    as Beirut, Paris and Los Angeles. In a short but fierce war,
    Armenians regained control of Karabakh, which they hold tightly to
    this day.

    Today, the Armenian question simmers quietly. Although Russia and the
    US support Armenia, both press for the return of Karabakh to
    Azerbaijan and encourage Armenians there to accept autonomy within
    Azerbaijan. Although the boundary lines of Karabakh were the product
    of Stalin's pen, the great powers insist that they are now inviolable
    international frontiers, never to be altered. The defence of
    principle, however, is a convenient cloak for a more basic interest:
    access to Azerbaijan's rich oil fields.

    The Kurds next door to the Armenians were also promised statehood out
    of the rubble of the Ottoman Empire. They too are an ancient people
    whose common identity stretches back more than 2,000 years. Most of
    the 20 million Kurds live in a mountainous area straddling Iran, Iraq
    and Turkey - countries that have all crushed Kurdish nationhood. In
    the modern era, Kurdish nationalism has been encouraged-and
    abandoned-by both the US and the Soviet Union.

    When Washington needed to topple Saddam Hussein, the Kurds regained
    favour, providing a base for operations against his government.
    Today, when the US seeks to rebuild Iraq as its own bastion of
    influence, Kurdish aspirations for separation and self-rule are again
    inopportune.

    For the great powers, inconvenient nations are, by their nature,
    irritating. They are single-minded, often undeterred by those who
    advise caution or patience. Even as clients, they are hard, if not
    impossible, to control.

    There is some hope these days that globalisation will help diminish
    the authority of nation-states - replacing their influence with
    multinational corporations and other trans-national entities - and
    therefore also diminish the inconvenient nations' drive for
    self-rule.

    But nationalism is hardly a diminished force. Witness the spiralling
    tensions between Chinese and Japanese in recent months, fighting and
    re-fighting issues more than a half-century old. And French and Dutch
    voters recently rejected a new constitution that would more
    completely merge those states into a unified Europe.

    Some in the Bush administration, meanwhile, argued that the spread of
    democracy also would cool nationalist flames by giving minorities
    such as the peoples of the inconvenient nations more clout in their
    current countries.

    But to the contrary, the more people are free to express their will,
    the more nationalism seems to gain fervour. Kurds in Iraq vote
    virtually without exception only for Kurds and are no less determined
    to eventually be independent of the Arab state.

    More than other great powers, Americans find the idea of a nation
    defined by ethnic identity disturbing. As a country built by
    immigrants, America explicitly rejects any ethnic definition of
    citizenship. The passions of peoples that seek to separate themselves
    from others are often seen as irrational, somehow less acceptable
    than our patriotism.

    Indeed, Americans are remarkably blind to their own bellicose
    nationalism, garbed as it is by the assertion of the universality of
    American ideals and of self-defence against possible attack.

    "Since most Americans don't realise that they do have a nationalism
    and that it is so strong, perhaps it does make it more difficult for
    Americans to appreciate and understand the force of other peoples'
    nationalism," said Anatol Lieven, author of America Right or Wrong:
    An Anatomy of American Nationalism.

    History, however, tells us that the inconvenient nations will not go
    away. No wave of globalisation can sweep their passions into a dusty
    corner forever. And the desire for freedom will not conveniently stop
    short of national self-determination.
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