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RFE/RL Newsline Special Issue, "EU Expands Eastward," - 05/03/2004

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  • RFE/RL Newsline Special Issue, "EU Expands Eastward," - 05/03/2004

    RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
    _________________________________________ __________________
    RFE/RL NEWSLINE SPECIAL ISSUE, "EU EXPANDS EASTWARD," 3 May 2004

    NOTE TO READERS: In line with RFE/RL's changing priorities, as of
    4 May, "RFE/RL Newsline" will substantially reduce its coverage of the
    eight Central, Eastern, and Southeastern European states -- Slovenia,
    Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Estonia, and the Czech
    Republic -- that became full-fledged members of the European Union on
    1 May, and also of Croatia and Bulgaria. This means that domestic
    political and economic developments in those countries will no longer
    be reported on a daily basis. We will, however, continue to report on
    topics of importance to our broadcast region, including security
    concerns and NATO-related issues, as well as human rights and
    minority issues.

    READ RFE/RL'S UNIQUE INSIGHT INTO THE EU'S HISTORIC
    EXPANSION. For detailed analysis and long-running coverage from the
    Baltics to the Balkans, see our dedicated "European Union Expands
    Eastward" webpage: http://www.rferl.org/specials/euexpands.

    ************************************************** *********
    * EU WELCOMES NEW MEMBERS, BUT WHERE IS THE
    ENTHUSIASM?
    * WHERE DOES EUROPE'S ENLARGEMENT END?
    * POLAND RIDES INTO EU ON EBBING ENTHUSIASM
    * EU EXPANSION BRINGS LITTLE JOY TO CROSS-BORDER
    TRADERS IN BELARUS, UKRAINE
    * REFERENDUMS ON EU CONSTITUTION COULD PROVE TRICKY
    * CZECHS STILL FEAR FIREWORKS MARK PYRRHIC VICTORY
    * SLOVAKIA'S EU RUN HAS LEFT PREMIER GASPING
    * THE BALTIC STATES' ROCKY ROAD TO THE EU
    * EU, RUSSIA AGREE COMPROMISE TEXT FOR JOINT
    MINORITIES DECLARATION
    * EU/RUSSIA: LANDMARK ENLARGEMENT DEAL SIGNED, BUT
    LOOSE ENDS REMAIN
    ************************************************** *********

    ANALYSIS: EU WELCOMES NEW MEMBERS, BUT WHERE IS THE
    ENTHUSIASM?

    By Ulrich Buechsenschuetz

    Ten new countries will join the European Union on 1 May: Cyprus, the
    Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
    Slovakia, and Slovenia. In figures, the event means the addition of
    some 83 million new EU citizens to the current 378 million, making
    the 25-member union a huge, complex, and economically powerful global
    player that accounts for about one-quarter of the world's economic
    output.
    In the loftier language of the EU, the enlargement is "a
    historic opportunity to unite Europe peacefully after generations of
    division and conflict," which "will extend the EU's stability and
    prosperity to a wider group of countries, consolidating the political
    and economic transition that has taken place in Central and Eastern
    Europe since 1989" (see
    http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/faq/index.htm).
    The new union's architects also hope that by pushing its
    borders beyond the former Iron Curtain, the EU will not only achieve
    peace and stability in Europe but also gain global influence. Such a
    union could eventually meet the challenges of both economic
    globalization and global terrorism, the enlarged EU's crafters hope.
    At present, it is impossible to know whether the EU will
    eventually grow into a federal state or remain a family of sovereign
    states that are bound together by common economic rather than
    political interests. Early enthusiasm for enlargement and the
    visionary period appear to have been eclipsed by popular reticence.
    Recent opinion polls suggest that public support for the
    enlargement is waning among current and acceding member states alike.
    One such poll was conducted in March by Austria's IMAS polling
    institute and included 6,000 respondents from Austria, Germany, the
    Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. It concluded the following:

    * 42 percent of Poles are convinced the enlargement will benefit
    their country, while 33 percent remain unconvinced of the advantages.

    * In Hungary, 34 percent are optimistic and 27 percent regard the
    expansion with skepticism.

    * In the Czech Republic, 35 percent of the public is optimistic and
    33 percent skeptical about the benefits of expansion.

    * 46 percent of Austrians are skeptical of expansion and 24 percent
    favor it.

    * Germans are even more critical, with 47 percent skeptical of the
    enlargement and 20 percent supporting it.

    The IMAS poll highlights two aspects of the EU enlargement. For
    representatives of the governments and the economic sectors among
    older EU countries, enlargement is widely regarded as a major
    opportunity for economic expansion. But for the broader populations
    so often influenced by the low-brow reporting of tabloid newspapers,
    the opening of the borders presents a threat to their jobs -- and not
    only among states bordering the acceding countries, such as Austria
    or Germany. Ed Vulliamy noted in "The Observer" of 11 April:
    "Suddenly, our new partner citizens in the EU -- those same people
    whose deliverance from Communism, wrought by their own bravery, we
    celebrated 14 years ago -- have become potential 'benefit tourists'
    (Daily Mail), agents of 'social upheaval' (Financial Times), a
    'menace' (the Mail again) to our social services, a horde of gypsies,
    or a 'flood tide' (Daily Express) of 'millions of immigrants' (the
    Mail again). Government talk is not of liberty or union, but of
    'habitual residence requirements' and 'employment registration
    certificates.'"
    But it is not only the largely unfounded fear of immigrant
    flows that has prompted some politicians in the older member states
    to turn populist. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder recently
    slammed calls by German industrial leaders to move facilities to the
    future member states as "unpatriotic." To avert such moves, he called
    on acceding countries not to seek to attract investments through low
    corporate tax rates. He also warned the newer EU members not to spend
    the taxes paid in the large industrial countries, such as Germany, on
    infrastructure projects in the less-developed new member states.
    On the other hand, the growing skepticism in the new member
    states about the enlargement is mainly due to such attempts by the
    larger members such as France or Germany to bully them into giving up
    their economic advantages and their sovereignty on foreign-policy
    issues.
    Negotiations on a European constitutional treaty have presented
    another sobering reminder for new EU members. Poland, the largest
    country joining the EU on 1 May, felt cheated by the EU's big players
    when the voting rights that it was granted by the 2001 Treaty of Nice
    were again restricted in the draft constitution. Although a new
    double-majority system might ensure to some extent that the EU's
    smaller countries are not so easily outvoted, many Poles still feel
    betrayed. No wonder, then, that anti-EU populists such as the radical
    leader of the Self-Defense party in Poland, Andrzej Lepper, are doing
    so well in the polls.
    There are also the Euro-skeptic torchbearers like Czech
    President Vaclav Klaus, who in an article for "Mlada fronta Dnes" of
    22 April claimed that EU membership entails a loss of independence
    for the Czech Republic. Czechs "must do everything we can so we are
    not lost in the EU, so that our unique existence over 1,000 years
    will not crumble and be lost," Klaus wrote.
    While there is little basis for such fears, they hint at what
    an enormous challenge it will be for the EU to integrate new members.
    Integration might be easy in the EU's core sectors, such as the
    economy, tax policy, or customs. However, a significant dream of some
    current members will remain a dream for some time to come -- creating
    a joint EU foreign and security policy for all 25 members. The rift
    between much of "old Europe" and "new Europe" over Iraq has clearly
    demonstrated the difficulty of attaining one of the main aims of a
    joint foreign and security policy for the EU: creating an effective
    counterweight to the United States.
    This is a question of political unity and of military power.
    Neither will the new EU members, from the Baltics to the Balkans,
    surrender their view that the United States is a necessary safeguard
    against Russian pretensions; nor will the EU reach U.S. levels of
    military expenditure anytime soon.
    In other words, at least for the time being, EU enlargement
    will bring about less change than one might have expected.

    ************************************************** **********

    ANALYSIS: WHERE DOES EUROPE'S ENLARGEMENT END?

    By Luke Allnutt

    The European Union has always remained deliberately vague about where
    its borders lie. Provided countries fulfill the 1993 Copenhagen
    criteria -- guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights, and respect
    for minorities, as well as having a functioning market economy --
    technically anyone can join. In the late 1980s, Morocco -- with its
    eyes on the market just 16 kilometers across the Straits of Gibraltar
    -- applied to join the union, only to be told it was not European
    enough.
    Following the accession of 10 mostly Central and Eastern
    European countries on 1 May, one of the big questions is: Where next?
    If all goes well, Romania and Bulgaria (and possibly Croatia) will
    join in 2007. In the event that they meet the demands of Copenhagen,
    the remaining countries of the western Balkans and Turkey are
    probably next on the list, perhaps sometime in the next decade.
    After that, the choices become less palatable. Ukraine is still
    trying to make the right noises, but its enthusiasm for reforms
    remains laconic at best. Moldova, Europe's poorest country, has a
    flimsy civil society and a glacial pace of reform. It is burdened by
    Transdniester -- a pro-Russian breakaway region that is a lawless
    paradise for gangsters and arms dealers. Belarus, hamstrung by the
    erratic populism of autocratic President Alyaksandr Lukashenka and
    its unreformed Soviet-style economy, is a particularly unattractive
    prospect.
    Farther east, there are the countries of the South Caucasus:
    Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The latter's "Rose Revolution" in
    November brought the region back onto policymakers' radar screens,
    but subsequent tensions over the breakaway republic of Adjaria
    represent a major step backward for Georgia. Armenia's strongman
    president, Robert Kocharian, has meanwhile responded ruthlessly to
    public demands that he respect the courts and the ballot box.
    Azerbaijan remains isolated from the European family over
    shortcomings like the continuing battle for Nagorno-Karabakh, the
    government's stubborn refusal to release political prisoners, and a
    general lack of respect for democracy and human rights. The stakes in
    the CIS are considerably higher, as those former communist countries
    are part of Russia's "near abroad." With that in mind, it is
    difficult to imagine these countries joining the EU in anything less
    than two decades.
    That is not necessarily a gloomy prognosis. John Palmer, the
    political director of the Brussels-based European Policy Center,
    thinks that after the countries of the western Balkans get accepted,
    "we might see the end of classic enlargement."
    That could usher in a multispeed Europe -- one that allows for
    a certain amount of differentiation. European politicians have always
    balked at the term, for all its connotations of a Europe divided
    between dunces and high-flyers. More recently it has been seen as
    French President Jacques Chirac's Plan B -- an opportunity for France
    and Germany to forge ahead with an inward-looking European agenda
    after the failure of the European constitution talks late last year.
    Yet a multispeed EU might be the only way the union can expand
    further while maintaining the standards laid out in the acquis
    communautaire and not overstretching the purse strings of the richest
    member states. The recurring nightmare for many European politicians
    is that the inclusion of dubious democracies -- like Moldova or
    Ukraine -- would seriously discredit the union. The EU would become
    an ailing franchise, the political equivalent of a fast-food giant
    letting any old greasy spoon hang its global logo above the door.
    Even the Eurovision song contest would garner more respect on the
    international stage.
    Early signs of the EU's willingness to embrace differentiation
    can be seen in the Wider Europe program, which is a framework for
    countries in the western NIS and southern Mediterranean who will soon
    find themselves sharing a border with the union. Countries in the
    Wider Europe program have been offered the prospect of full
    participation in the EU's market and its four fundamental freedoms --
    goods, capital, services, and, eventually, people -- provided they
    adhere to certain core values and show concrete progress in
    political, economic, and institutional reforms. The ethos of the
    program is "Integration, Not Membership."
    In the future, if the EU abandoned its open-door policy, states
    on the fringes of the union would not become full members of the
    union, but there would be some elements of shared sovereignty. Europe
    might become what has been termed a "union of concentric circles,"
    with an inner core that accepts the acquis communautaire in full,
    monetary union, the Common Agricultural Policy, and then wider
    circles of countries accepting decreasing levels of commitment.
    Europe a la carte exists already to some degree, most notably
    with the single currency, and the European Policy Center's Palmer
    says these types of ad hoc alliances and groupings will become more
    common. Countries will club together and pursue various shared policy
    interests.
    There are several significant problems with such a
    differentiated approach. The first, according to Jonathan Lipkin, an
    analyst for Oxford Analytica writing for EUObserver.com, is "how
    overlapping coalitions of states could find a way to put in place
    coherent and effective administrative and enforcement mechanisms."
    The second is that prospective partners, or members, might not
    go for an "accession lite." Anything less than full membership "just
    doesn't do it for these countries. It's not enough," says Gergana
    Noutcheva, an enlargement expert at the Center for European Policy
    Studies in Brussels. And as financier and philanthropist George Soros
    wrote in a syndicated column for Project Syndicate in March, "The
    most powerful tool that the EU has for influencing political and
    economic developments in neighboring countries is the prospect of
    membership."
    Further expansion will also require a good deal of
    housekeeping. The brouhaha about the draft constitution in December
    illustrated the shortcomings of the decision-making process within a
    larger union. Without reform, the situation would only get worse.
    "The bigger the EU gets, the national veto will become more a source
    of paralysis," Palmer says. That means the union will have to rely
    more heavily on qualified majority voting (QMV) in the future.
    The likelihood and extent of further expansion (in terms of
    political will and popular tolerance) will depend largely on how this
    most recent wave goes. Enlargement fatigue has already set in. The
    richest EU states are worried about the cost of integration and are
    currently sparring with the European Commission about capping the
    budget. Europeans outside the Euro-elite tend to be lukewarm about EU
    expansion. According to a November Eurobarometer poll, 54 percent of
    the French public opposed enlargement.
    It would only take a few high-level scandals (diseased Slovak
    chickens or embezzled structural funds earmarked for a children's
    hospital in Poznan, perhaps) for the mood to swing further against
    enlargement. Britain's recent backpedaling over migration after a few
    scaremongering stories in the tabloid press about the imminent
    arrival of job-stealing, welfare-sapping Eastern Europeans showed the
    impact that public opinion can have on government policy.

    ************************************************** **********

    ANALYSIS: POLAND RIDES INTO EU ON EBBING ENTHUSIASM

    By Jan Maksymiuk

    Poland joins the European Union on 1 May along with nine other
    newcomers. For many Poles, this will obviously be a joyous historic
    occasion. The day might well be viewed as a symbolic boundary that
    puts a definitive end to the post-World War II division of Europe
    into two antagonistic camps by the Iron Curtain. The formal admission
    of Poland to the EU crowns that country's effort to overcome the
    consequences of the 1945 Yalta Agreement, which cut Poles off from
    Europe and left them in the Soviet-dominated zone for nearly half a
    century.
    "Such days are very rare in human life," "Gazeta Wyborcza"
    Editor in Chief Adam Michnik wrote on 30 April on the occasion of the
    EU expansion.
    For a majority of Poles, however, the festive mood instilled by
    media, government officials, and communist-era dissidents on this
    occasion will be mingled with serious apprehension and anxiety. In a
    June 2003 referendum, more than 77 percent of Polish voters said
    "yes" to EU membership. But recent opinion polls suggest Polish
    enthusiasm for the EU has fallen well below 50 percent. Polish
    farmers are among the most strident EU-skeptics in the country -- no
    more than 30 percent of them view EU accession in a positive light.
    The most popular party in the country is the outspokenly anti-EU
    Self-Defense party led by Andrzej Lepper, which enjoys the support of
    one-third of Polish voters.
    What are the most pressing anxieties in Poland in relation to
    country's EU entry? Generally, most Poles are afraid that EU
    membership might not bring the economic advantages advertised by the
    government during accession talks. In particular, there is
    apprehension that Poland might become a net contributor to the EU
    budget from the outset, even though its economic output per capita is
    less than 40 percent of the EU average.
    The Polish farming sector is the most graphic example of such
    anxiety. More than 2 million farms in Poland are small and poorly
    equipped to compete with West European farmers on an expanded market
    of 450 million consumers. Initially, Polish farmers will be
    additionally handicapped by the EU's system of direct farm subsidies:
    They will receive just 25, 30, and 35 percent of full EU subsidies in
    2004, 2005, 2006, respectively. No one can predict how enlargement
    will affect and alter the Polish agricultural sector.
    Poland's unemployment rate has been fluctuating between 18 and
    20 percent in the past year, which translates into nearly 3.5 million
    job seekers. Fearing a flood of cheap labor, all EU members apart
    from Ireland and Great Britain will introduce temporary restrictions
    on access to their labor markets for Poles and other postcommunist EU
    nationals. Poland will hardly be improving its employment situation
    by virtue of joining an expanded job market. Some in Poland argue
    that the unemployment rate might even increase in the short term due
    to the closures of businesses that cannot compete with rivals from
    Western Europe.
    Another grave concern is that moneyed foreigners will "buy up"
    Poland -- that is, purchase the most attractive real estate and land
    in Poland before Poles are sufficiently wealthy to afford such
    purchases. To dampen such fears, the Polish government negotiated a
    reasonably long transition period on property land sales; foreigners
    are banned from buying farmland and forests for 12 years after Poland
    joins the EU. That period is reduced to seven years for EU farmers
    who currently lease land in the west and north of the country
    (regions that belonged to Germany before World War II), and to three
    years for similar cases throughout the rest of the country.
    However, Polish populist and nationalist parties warn their
    compatriots that Poland might be faced with a flood of property-
    restitution claims from the heirs or successors of ethnic Germans
    forced to leave the territories ceded to Poland after World War II.
    No one has convincingly assured Poles that such an eventuality is not
    on the horizon.
    Apart from the aforementioned concerns, which are shared by
    large segments of ordinary Poles, there are also tricky issues
    connected with EU entry for the Polish ruling elite. Poland and Spain
    blocked the adoption of an EU constitution late last year, objecting
    to the double-majority voting system stipulated in the document.
    Spain's new Socialist government subsequently withdrew those
    objections. Poland has signaled its desire for consensus on the
    voting-rights issue, but no face-saving compromise has emerged.
    Moreover, Warsaw's staunch pro-Washington stance is widely seen
    as a major hurdle on the EU's path toward a coherent and united
    foreign policy.
    In other words, the momentous and much-coveted "reunion of
    Poland with Europe" for many Poles signals the beginning of a new
    epoch of obstacles and, in all probability, social unrest. The fiery
    Lepper has warned that Poland will "renegotiate" most agreements with
    the EU if he comes to power. "If Poland is not treated [by the EU] on
    an equal footing, then Poland's EU accession might be the beginning
    of the end of the European Union in its present shape," Lepper told
    at a throng of cheering Poles last week.
    Or at least, to borrow Winston Churchill's witticism, the end
    of the beginning.

    ************************************************** **********

    EU EXPANSION BRINGS LITTLE JOY TO CROSS-BORDER TRADERS IN
    BELARUS, UKRAINE

    By Valentinas Mite

    On 1 May, the 10 new members of the EU will be celebrating their
    accession to the bloc. But the celebrations are unlikely to extend
    further east. Cross-border traders and travelers in the former Soviet
    republics of Belarus and Ukraine are worried the new EU borders will
    mean stricter controls on their movement and livelihood.

    Prague, 28 April 2004 (RFE/RL) -- The 1 May EU enlargement means
    changes for people living in the new member states. But it also means
    changes for those living just beyond the new EU borders -- in
    countries like Belarus and Ukraine.
    A number of changes are taking place at the borders -- some
    gradually, some immediately. And small-scale border trading, the only
    livelihood for many impoverished residents of Ukraine and Belarus, is
    likely to be strongly scaled back.
    Thousands of Ukrainians and Belarusians travel to the border
    with imminent EU members Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and
    Hungary to sell cigarettes, vodka, and food -- a modest trade that
    brings them just enough money to support their families.
    But with the borders of those countries now regulated by the
    EU's visa regimes, such cross-border trade has already sharply
    declined.
    A majority of the trade takes place along the Ukrainian Polish
    border. Oksana Plyak is a pensioner living in the small western
    Ukrainian village of Bikiv near the Polish border. She tells Reuters
    that with pensions of only about $20 per month, many people are
    surviving thanks only to border trade.
    Poland's stricter border control has already scared off many
    traders. Plyak continues to trade, but it's not an easy day's work.
    She has to walk 7 kilometers and spend three or four hours waiting in
    line for a visa that allows her to cross into Poland for the day.
    Plyak is worried the EU expansion will mean the end of her
    extra income, even though the payoff is next to nothing.
    "And from all of this you won't make more than three to four dollars
    a crossing because you can't carry that many [things to sell]. You
    can make more money, but I don't know if I can carry any more."
    Belarusians living in the border regions with Poland, Latvia,
    and Lithuania are also afraid they will be affected by the new
    regulations.
    Andrei Fedorov is an independent political analyst in Minsk. He
    says the regulations being imposed by each of the border countries
    have slight differences.
    "As concerns Poland, as far as I know, a visa will become twice
    as cheap. From the first of May, a one-time visa will cost 5 euros
    [$6], but I think it is not even connected with the [Polish] EU
    accession because the agreement was reached earlier. As concerns
    Latvia, it will introduce a substantially more expensive visa -- from
    10 to 25 euros. However, instead of several types of visas there will
    be only two types of visas left -- a transit visa and a visa for
    entering the country," Fedorov says.
    Few border traders can afford to pay 25 or even 10 euros for a
    visa. Even Poland's 5 euro visa will dip heavily into whatever
    profits a cross-border trader can hope to make in a day's work.
    Sergio Carrera is a political analyst with the Center for
    European Policy Studies in Brussels, where he specializes in EU visa
    policy and free-movement issues. He says the European Commission has
    repeatedly said the new border regimes should not become a barrier to
    trade or cultural exchange, and has taken steps to facilitate local
    border traffic.
    "It will grant a specific sort of visa for people living in an
    area close to the border, within 50 kilometers. And this visa will
    allow people traveling to Poland -- for instance, for purposes of
    trade or for purposes of family, with those people who are living
    very close to the Polish border and have family in Poland -- they
    will have the possibility by holding this visa to come in and come
    out of Poland without the necessity of further administrative checks
    and lengthy procedures," Carrera says.
    Carrera also says that cross-border trade and traveling within
    the new EU countries will inevitably become more complicated for
    Belarusians and Ukrainians after the new members become full-fledged
    members of the Schengen agreement in three years.
    Carrera says technically, Germany's eastern border will remain
    the official EU border for that time. Until the new members fully
    join Schengen, the EU will have two eastern borders rather than one.

    ************************************************** **********

    ANALYSIS: REFERENDUMS ON EU CONSTITUTION COULD PROVE TRICKY

    By Ulrich Buechsenschuetz

    When British Prime Minister Tony Blair called for a referendum on the
    planned constitutional charter of the European Union on 20 April, he
    not only "wrong-footed" the British opposition Conservative Party, as
    London's "Independent" put it the following day. He also -- probably
    unwillingly -- highlighted the fact that a number of current EU
    members, as well as some of the new member states, which are to join
    the union on 1 May, will also hold referendums. In addition, Blair's
    move led some media to ask what would happen if any of the EU members
    rejects the EU constitution in a referendum.
    The constitutional charter is to provide a new framework for
    decision-making processes, the structure of the EU's institutions,
    and the basic rights for the enlarged EU. It is aimed at replacinig
    the old, complex, and ponderous system of treaties. Its main
    achievement, some observers contend, is that democracy within the EU
    institutions will be strengthened by granting greater powers to the
    European Parliament and the parliaments of member states. Moreover,
    the constitution could also help foster a European identity, as
    authors such as Christine Landfried of Hamburg University believe.
    Of the current EU members, Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and
    Luxembourg have already decided to hold referendums.
    There are three countries in which a decision on a referendum
    has not yet been made, but which appear set to give the people a say
    on the constitutional charter: the Netherlands, where a referendum
    would be purely consultative and not binding for the government, and,
    among the new EU members, Poland and Latvia.
    Although Estonia has not adopted any official position thus
    far, it may possibly join the countries holding referendums -- but
    only if a parliamentary majority decides to do so.
    The group of countries that have not yet decided whether to put
    the EU's new basic law to popular vote or not include Austria,
    France, Portugal, and Spain among the old members, and the Czech
    Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia among the new.
    Many Western European newspaper commentators agree that Blair's
    decision in favor of the referendum has drastically increased the
    pressure on French President Jacques Chirac to do the same. Other
    leaders, like Austria's Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel, have said they
    prefer "the right moment" to decide on the EU constitution.
    In the Czech Republic, a public debate on a possible referendum
    on the EU constitution ended without result. Hungary, Slovakia, and
    Slovenia are also still undecided on how to ratify the union's future
    constitution. In 10 countries -- Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy,
    Finland, and Sweden of the current members, and Cyprus, Estonia,
    Lithuania, and Malta of the new -- it will be up to the parliament to
    ratify the constitution. Despite traditional reservations about
    plebiscites, some smaller German parties have already signaled that
    they would prefer the people to ratify the constitution rather than
    the parliament. However, the alliance of such divergent parties as
    the governing Green Party and Bavaria's ruling Christian Social Union
    is unlikely to succeed in convincing the vast majority of German
    politicians to let the people have a say.
    Since the populations of many current and future EU members
    remain skeptical of the EU and its benefits, it might well be that,
    if given the chance to do so, they would refuse to ratify the EU
    constitution. And it is just as likely that the British, Danes, or
    Poles will go the same way.
    In that case, as Joachim-Fritz Vannahme wrote in the Hamburg
    weekly "Die Zeit" on 22 April, the "cryptic" Article IV-7 of the EU
    constitution would apply: "If, two years after the signature of the
    treaty amending the Treaty establishing the Constitution, four fifths
    of the Member States have ratified it and one or more Member States
    have encountered difficulties in proceeding with ratification, the
    matter shall be referred to the European Council." (For the full text
    of the draft constitution see
    http://www.europa.eu.int/futurum/constitution/index_en.htm.)
    Because of this article, Hans-Gert Poettering, the chairman of
    the conservative European People's Party group in the European
    Parliament, demanded on 20 April that a provision be added to the
    draft constitution stipulating that member states that vote against
    the constitution must leave the union.
    Vannahme described two possible scenarios. If only one or two
    member states fail to ratify the constitution, it will be up to the
    European Council to decide whether to go ahead without those states,
    "But only [if these states are small countries like] Denmark or
    Estonia, and not France or...Britain."
    However, if six or seven EU members fail to ratify the
    constitution, it would not be worth the paper it was written on and
    the EU would be facing a major crisis, Vannahme wrote. He added that
    this perspective is not as unlikely as it may sound today. Given that
    a number of countries holding referendums have populations prone to
    Euro-skepticism and the possibility of shifting majorities in some
    parliaments, it may well be that the EU will go on functioning
    without a constitution for some time to come, using the old system of
    treaties. This system may be ponderous, but it has the advantage of
    not completely dividing the union, Vannahme wrote.
    On the other hand, a "no" vote in a referendum need not
    necessarily mean a definite "no." After all, Ireland voted twice on
    the Treaty of Nice, while the Danes approved the Maastricht Treaty on
    the second attempt.

    ************************************************** **********

    ANALYSIS: CZECHS STILL FEAR FIREWORKS MARK PYRRHIC VICTORY

    By Michael Shafir

    As fireworks lit up Prague's historic Old Town after midnight on 1
    May to mark the country's accession to the European Union, divisions
    among the country's political elites over the significance and the
    implications of the step were equally prominent over the Czech
    capital's horizon.
    Former President Vaclav Havel was expected to celebrate the
    event together with the speakers of both houses of parliament and
    representatives of the 25 old and new EU members in the Czech
    Senate's Wallenstein Gardens on the evening of 1 May -- an extension
    of celebrations that began one day earlier in the company of Prime
    Minister Vladimir Spidla, Czech and European writers, and other
    luminaries.
    "As it always is in this world, it won't come for free, it will
    take work, and it won't be easy for everyone -- especially at the
    beginning, in a new environment," Spidla told an audience on 30
    April. "But I am sure that we will overcome and that this historic
    choice will pay off for us."
    On the other hand, the current occupant of Prague Castle,
    President Vaclav Klaus, had announced that he saw no need to take
    part in the celebrations and that for him the evening would be spent
    quietly, without doing "anything special." Klaus ended up delivering
    a television speech in which he urged Czechs not to "lose ourselves"
    or "blur our identity" and warned: "Today we are not entering Europe,
    because we have long been in [Europe] and always will be -- including
    in the period of our greatest subjugation. Today we are entering the
    European Union; and our task is thus far more prosaic: to learn to
    orient ourselves and operate within the Brussels structures and in
    the formation of a complex supranational entity, which has nothing at
    all in common with poetry."
    The Czech Republic's self-described "Euro-realist" head of
    state announced his intention of "doing nothing" to celebrate EU
    accession during a recent trip to China -- arguably not the most
    appropriate spot for such a comment. It was also during that trip
    that Klaus lashed out at EU enlargement: In an article published in
    the daily "Mlada fronta Dnes," Klaus wrote that the Czech Republic
    would cease to exist as an independent country and urged his
    countrymen to "do everything we can so we are not lost in the EU, so
    that our unique existence over 1,000 years will not crumble and be
    lost." A former prime minister under whose leadership the country
    applied for EU membership, Klaus has often stated that joining the EU
    is to be regarded as a "marriage of convenience," not of love, and
    that the Czech Republic has had no choice but to join the union out
    of fear of finding itself in isolation on the continent. He has
    squandered few occasions to bash "Brussels bureaucrats" or insist
    that manifold aspects of EU overregulation or financial indiscretion
    will have a negative impact on his country.
    In the Czech Republic's case, a feeling of entitlement dates
    all the way back to the 1938 Munich Agreement, when France and
    Britain "sold out" the independent Czechoslovak state to Hitler's
    Germany.
    These are also, by and large, the positions of the senior
    opposition Civic Democratic Party (ODS), whose honorary chairman
    Klaus remains. The ODS is comfortably leading in opinion polls. It
    would be imprudent to attribute that popularity solely to the party's
    positions on the EU, but it demonstrates that -- at a minimum --
    there are many Czechs who do not object to such Euro-skepticism. In a
    June 2003 referendum on EU membership, Czech voters endorsed
    membership by a large majority of 77 percent, but turnout was also a
    mere 55 percent. Since then, however, Czechs have become increasingly
    skeptical of EU enlargement.
    A recent poll for the widest-circulation Czech daily, "Mlada
    fronta Dnes," suggested that a majority of Czechs reject Klaus's talk
    of "the dissolving of [the Czech Republic] in the EU." But fears
    abound of higher prices after accession, a decreased level of control
    over events, and a lack of preparedness for EU membership, according
    to the same research. One-third of Czechs believe the country's
    political leadership conducted itself poorly in negotiations over the
    terms of accession, the pollsters concluded.
    Other independent polls suggest Czechs are less supportive of
    EU membership than either Hungarians or Poles, with a negligible
    difference between "Euro-optimists" and "Euro-skeptics," at roughly
    one-third each of the total population.
    Three main factors appear to have contributed most strongly to
    the drop in popularity of EU membership: the immediate costs of
    enlargement for the Czech taxpayer; panic among the EU's 15 "old"
    members over a possible invasion of cheap labor from the "new"
    members; and persistent squabbles over the postwar Benes Decrees with
    neighboring Germany and Austria, but also with segments of the
    Hungarian political elite.
    The decision of the Czech government to use the goal of value-
    added-tax harmonization with the EU effectively to increase taxation
    (a move that President Klaus unsuccessfully vetoed) -- amid talk of
    elusive fiscal discipline ahead of adopting the euro, moreover -- has
    highlighted fears of higher costs. Few Czechs, or for that matter few
    nationals from among the other new members, are likely to gain much
    solace from the long-term promises of EU advantages.
    Second, Czechs and other accession citizens feel they are being
    treated unfairly by being depicted as potential invaders in search of
    jobs in Western Europe -- all the more so as their own government has
    opted not to impose retaliatory measures (unlike Hungary and Poland).
    But they also feel that their western partners are betraying the
    ideals enounced during the long period of communist dominance over
    the eastern part of the continent. As Czech Labor and Social Affairs
    Minister Zdenek Skromach put it recently, the sentiment is widespread
    that the West was able to fight communism successfully and raise
    living standards in part because Easterners presented a telling
    picture of the alternative. Consequently the West "owes us
    something," Skromach said, suggesting that the time is ripe for the
    repayment of that debt by doing precisely what the West most fears --
    namely, channeling funds into the eastern part of the continent. In
    the Czech Republic's case (even more than in Slovakia), that feeling
    of entitlement dates all the way back to the 1938 Munich Agreement,
    when France and Britain "sold out" the independent Czechoslovak state
    to Hitler's Germany.
    That "debt" has helped turn the thorny issue of the 1945-46
    Benes Decrees into one that helps build a consensus across party
    lines. The insistence of organizations representing expelled Sudeten
    Germans that the decrees be abolished -- and the backing of that
    insistence by politicians from Germany's Christian Democratic Union,
    Austria's Freedom Party, and Hungary's FIDESZ -- heighten suspicions
    in the Czech Republic that disputes will continue well into the era
    of EU membership.
    The fireworks in Prague after midnight on 1 May were
    nevertheless a sign that optimism has prevailed. It is now up to
    Czechs and their fellow EU citizens to demonstrate that those
    pyrotechnics did not mark a Pyrrhic victory.

    ************************************************** **********

    ANALYSIS: SLOVAKIA'S EU RUN HAS LEFT PREMIER GASPING

    By Michael Shafir

    Slovakia's diminutive prime minister, Mikulas Dzurinda, is a
    passionate marathon runner. The marathon over which he has presided
    during his country's race to EU membership, however, has assuredly
    left him breathless. And although it will have ended on 1 May,
    Dzurinda crosses the finish line to anything but an ovation among
    Slovaks. Some even doubt the Slovak premier will survive for long in
    his current position.
    When Dzurinda first became prime minister in 1998, his country
    had been excluded from the first wave of postcommunist NATO invitees
    and the European Union had left it out among "fast-track" candidates
    for membership in that organization. It was no secret that the
    perceived culprit for such failures was three-time former Prime
    Minister Vladimir Meciar, whose policies had increasingly isolated
    Slovakia from the West.
    Under Dzurinda's leadership, the Slovak government set out to
    undo that damage. Many at the time questioned the country's ability
    to overcome the many obstacles created by Meciar's hectic policies of
    nationalism and cronysim, his harassment of political opponents, and
    his courting of dubious political figures in Moscow. But by early
    2004, Slovakia had been included among the seven new postcommunist
    states that would join NATO in April, and it could boast success in
    its bid for EU membership, having met that organization's political
    and economic criteria for membership.
    Such accomplishments appeared to be paying political dividends
    at home, too. Dzurinda was quite openly backed by EU and NATO
    officials ahead of the 2002 parliamentary elections, while Meciar was
    (unsuccessfully) trying to shrug off his image as a leader
    unacceptable to the West. Slovaks for the first time in the country's
    brief 10-year history overcame their reluctance to vote in
    plebiscites with a May 2003 vote on EU membership; an overwhelming
    majority of 92 percent of the 52 percent of voters who cast ballots
    in that referendum endorsed Slovakia's accession.
    On the face of things, it seemed nothing could stop the hard-
    running prime minister.
    Yet on the eve of EU accession, Slovakia has placed its future
    partners in an awkward position. This month's presidential election
    produced an unlikely head of state. Ex-parliamentary speaker Ivan
    Gasparovic is a former Meciar crony. While he successfully skirted
    responsibility for the policies and abuses of his erstwhile ally in
    the eyes of voters in the 17 April presidential runoff, his
    credibility among EU officials leaves room for doubt. Notably,
    European Commission President Romano Prodi waited one day to
    congratulate Gasparovic on his victory. It is Gasparovic who will now
    preside officially over his country's foreign policy, including
    aspects linked to Slovakia's EU membership, despite the weak nature
    of the Slovak presidency.
    As in many other acceding states, public enthusiasm for EU
    membership has waned as its perceived costs have become increasingly
    clear -- particularly among low-income households, the poorly
    uneducated, and pensioners. Slovakia's future EU partners have also
    displayed more than generalized fears about the effect of the 10-
    country enlargement; particular fears have been raised concerning
    Slovakia. Its Roma population, estimated at some 9 percent of the
    Slovak population of 5.4 million people, is living in dire poverty;
    unemployment rates among Roma are the highest in the country, while
    education levels are the lowest. There have been widespread attempts
    at emigration by Slovak Roma before; riots and looting erupted
    earlier this year after the government in Bratislava decided to cut
    social spending in its reform drive. Populists like the country's
    most popular politician, Smer (Direction) party leader and Gasparovic
    supporter Robert Fico -- who has a record of Roma-baiting --
    invariably know how to benefit from such situations.
    Dzurinda can only hope he gets his second wind. After all, his
    cabinet has managed to turn Slovakia into an attractive country for
    foreign investment by introducing a 19-percent flat tax; by 2006,
    Slovakia is expected to have become the EU's largest car producer in
    per capita terms. In many other respects, Slovakia is still lagging,
    even among accession states. According the United Nations Development
    Program (UNDP), Slovakia's per capita GDP is less than $4,000 -- that
    is to say, lowest among the eight postcommunist countries now joining
    the EU -- while its jobless rate of over 15 percent is second-highest
    after Poland. But looking back at where Slovakia stood in 1998 --
    when the entire political spectrum allied to unseat Meciar's Movement
    for a Democratic Slovakia -- by most accounts, this should be a
    success story.
    If that is not quite the case, Dzurinda must partly blame
    himself. His indelicate handling of political allies has isolated him
    since his second term as prime minister began in 2002; a question
    mark hangs over the future of his coalition government, which lost
    its parliamentary majority largely as a result of the prime
    minister's maladroit performance. The result is that the first
    criterion that Slovakia managed to meet on its path to EU membership
    -- political stability -- might become the first one that Slovakia
    stumbles over after having crossed the finish line.

    ************************************************** **********

    ANALYSIS: THE BALTIC STATES' ROCKY ROAD TO THE EU

    By Saulius Girnius

    With their respective accessions to the European Union on 1 May and
    to NATO in late March, the Baltic states have achieved their two most
    important foreign policy goals since regaining independence. NATO is
    seen as an ironclad guarantee of national independence, no small
    matter for countries that have spent most of the past two centuries
    under foreign rule. EU membership is considered to be the key to
    future economic prosperity, setting conditions for a level of
    personal welfare for their citizens that would otherwise be hardly
    attainable. Equally important, membership is public recognition at
    the highest level of the European identity of the Baltic states, a
    central aspect of the national identities of Estonia, Latvia, and
    Lithuania. Although insistently, even pugnaciously assertive of their
    being as much a part of Europe, as say France or Sweden, the people
    of the Baltic states have also feared, particularly during the years
    of Soviet occupation, that Western Europeans might forget or minimize
    this tie. Their presence in the first wave of postcommunist countries
    to join the EU is thus deeply satisfying and reassuring.
    The effort to rejoin Europe has been a driving force in Baltic
    foreign policy from the very start, even when membership in the EU
    and NATO seemed a very distant, if not unimaginable, goal. Most Balts
    felt little kinship with Russia and the other former Soviet republics
    who joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and
    politicians who argued that exploring the possibility of informal
    ties with the CIS should not be rejected out of hand were vigorously
    rebuffed. By 1992, the initiatives of Baltic diplomacy bore their
    first fruits with the signing of separate trade and economic-
    cooperation treaties with Western European states. In 1994, all three
    countries signed free-trade agreements with the EU and further
    intensified European-integration efforts. Another important step was
    the signing in Luxembourg in June 1995 of the so-called European
    agreements, granting them the status of EU associate members. The
    Baltic states also submitted applications to become full members of
    the union.
    Satisfying the stringent criteria for EU membership was no easy
    task for any state of the former Eastern bloc. For the Baltic states,
    it was arguably harder. Their incorporation into the USSR not only
    meant that they lacked the most basic elements of sovereignty while
    being burdened by lower standards of living and wages, but also that
    their economies and judiciaries were merely subdivisions of the
    Soviet whole. Many of the most important institutions -- such as the
    central bank, diplomatic corps, trade representatives, and the
    judiciary -- had to be created ex nihilo. The cutting of the
    umbilical cord was an extremely complicated task and one that had to
    be performed in the teeth of a severe economic recession.
    When the EU began to evaluate the candidate states in 1997, it
    noted considerable differences in their developments and abilities to
    make necessary reforms. In July of the same year, the European
    Commission decided to recommend that only six candidate states,
    including Estonia, be invited to begin EU accession talks. The actual
    negotiations on admission, dealing with a broad range of topics in 29
    areas, were begun only in 1998. The main deficiency of the other
    candidate states was their inability to establish a functioning
    market economy that could have liberalized prices and trade, along
    with the lack of an enforceable legal system with property rights. EU
    reports on the candidate states in 1997 stated that some -- including
    Latvia and Lithuania -- were capable of passing the EU political
    criteria for accession set in Copenhagen in June 1993, namely that
    they achieve "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the
    rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
    minorities."
    In the next several years, Latvia and Lithuania embarked on a
    series of economic reforms that stabilized their economies,
    attracting substantial foreign direct investment. By February 2002,
    the EU decided that both had made substantial progress and were ready
    to begin accession negotiations. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were
    among the 10 states that completed their accession negotiations at an
    EU summit meeting in Copenhagen on 13 December 2002, and each
    officially signed an EU Accession Treaty in Athens on 16 April 2003.
    Lithuania was the first of the Baltic states to hold the
    required referendum on EU membership. Out of fear of low voter
    participation, the balloting was held over two days, 10-11 May 2003.
    Voter turnout on the first day was low, creating fears that the
    requirement of at least 50 percent participation by eligible voters
    might not be met. In an effort to persuade more people to vote, the
    owners of the largest foodstore chain advertised on both radio and
    television that various items -- such as laundry detergent, chocolate
    bars, or beer -- would be sold at giveaway prices to any customer who
    showed a sticker indicating that they had voted. In the end, 63.3
    percent of the 2.6 million eligible voters participated, with 91.07
    percent of the valid ballots favoring membership.
    Estonia and Latvia held their referendums on 14 and 20
    September, respectively. In Estonia, 64.1 percent of the 867,714
    eligible voters cast ballots, with 66.5 percent voting "yes." In
    Latvia, 1.01 million, or 71.5 percent of eligible voters, cast
    ballots, with 67 percent voting "yes."
    Russia never disguised its deep dissatisfaction with the Baltic
    states' NATO membership, stating more than once that it would be
    forced to take strong measures to counter the growth of foreign
    forces on its borders. Its comments on Baltic membership in the EU
    were more moderate, recognizing the right of the three states to
    pursue closer ties with whichever states they wished. However, Moscow
    intensified its campaign against what it described as the
    mistreatment of Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia, while
    protesting that the Kaliningrad exclave must not be left isolated
    from Russia after Lithuania joined the EU. Intense negotiations on
    the latter issue led to a compromise solution among the EU,
    Lithuania, and Russia. Moscow never eased its verbal attacks on
    Latvia and Estonia. The Kremlin made a final show of its displeasure
    when it demurred on an EU request that Russia assent to the inclusion
    of the new members in the EU-Russian Partnership and Cooperation
    Agreement immediately upon entry on 1 May. Russia responded by
    presenting 14 points it demanded in exchange for its agreement.
    Twelve of the points dealt with economic matters and were quickly
    resolved, but two concerned political matters, transit to and from
    the Kaliningrad Oblast through Lithuania, and the rights of the
    Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia. When the EU stood firm, the
    Russian minorities issue was deleted.
    Although some residents in the Baltic states have expressed
    their dissatisfaction that their countries will be giving up a
    measure of independence by joining the European Union, the vast
    majority see numerous benefits that were lacking in the almost 50
    years spent in a another union (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).
    EU supporters stress that the two unions should not be compared, as
    membership in the EU is a voluntary decision approved by a referendum
    and not imposed by the invasion of a foreign army. They recall that
    in the period between the two World Wars, they had established
    independent republics whose forced incorporation into the USSR in
    1940 many Western countries never recognized.

    ************************************************** **********

    BALTICS: EU, RUSSIA AGREE COMPROMISE TEXT FOR JOINT
    MINORITIES DECLARATION

    By Ahto Lobjakas

    EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg have settled on a compromise
    proposal to jointly address with Moscow the situation of Russian-
    speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia. Disagreements over the
    wording of a paragraph on Baltic minorities are the last obstacle to
    the signing of a landmark joint EU-Russia declaration on enlargement.
    Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will respond to the proposal
    at today's Partnership Council meeting with the EU.
    Brussels, 27 April 2004 (RFE/RL) -- After weeks of bitter
    wrangling, the EU-Russia joint declaration on enlargement is
    virtually ready.
    The two sides have already resolved all of Russia's concerns
    over the economic impact of enlargement. Last week, they reached
    agreement on most key issues to do with goods transit between the
    Russian mainland and Kaliningrad.
    On 26 April, the EU agreed to what it hopes is an acceptable
    compromise for Russia to address what is perhaps the thorniest issue
    -- the situation of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and
    Latvia.
    There are hundreds of thousands of Russian speakers in the two
    Baltic countries. Moscow has argued that the Russian-speaking
    minority, though large, suffers discrimination because of strict
    language and citizenship laws that affect everything from education
    to employment.
    Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is due today to hold
    talks on the issue with European Union officials. If Russia accepts
    the compromise, it will pave the way for extending Moscow's
    partnership treaty with the EU to the bloc's new members.
    This in turn will help prevent a possible trade war and
    heightened tensions in EU-Russia relations.
    According to a draft obtained by RFE/RL, the EU now suggests
    that the last paragraph of its joint statement with Russia should
    read as follows: "The EU and the Russian Federation welcome EU
    membership as a firm guarantee for the protection of human rights and
    the protection of persons belonging to minorities. Both sides
    underline their commitment to the protection of human rights and the
    protection of persons belonging to minorities."
    Estonia's foreign minister, Kristiina Ojuland, told RFE/RL that
    Estonia is satisfied with the agreement.
    "I am very pleased to be able to note that the EU position that
    was formulated [on 23 April] has remained the same. It has been
    passed on to the Russian side. This position, in my opinion, embodies
    fully the solidarity principle inherent in European Union
    [membership]," Ojuland said.
    Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen, speaking for the current EU
    presidency, said he expects the agreement will be signed today.
    That sentiment was echoed by the EU's external relations
    commissioner, Chris Patten.
    Russia has been holding out for wording that is more critical
    of the governments of Estonia and Latvia.
    But its suggestion -- that the EU add another sentence
    supporting the "social integration" of minorities -- was refused
    following talks yesterday.
    Estonian sources have told RFE/RL that, instead of the Russia
    suggestion, the EU has retained a second possible formulation should
    difficulties arise in today's discussions.
    An EU source told RFE/RL the sentence says that further support
    will be provided to the "social inclusion" of the minorities. It is
    not clear if Russia would accept such wording.
    Estonian Foreign Minister Kristiina Ojuland refused to comment
    on any further possible modifications.
    "At this stage, it would not be politic to comment on the text
    in any greater detail. It meets the Estonian position, and is within
    the confines of the mandate provided by the Estonian government [on
    22 April]. And I think this text is, in any case, a very significant
    improvement over the draft first tabled by the European Commission a
    week ago," Ojuland says.
    Latvian Foreign Minister Rihards Piks added he was very
    satisfied with yesterday's compromise, and urged Russia not to press
    for further modifications.
    A number of sources told RFE/RL that Latvia was highly
    concerned with securing for itself a binding guarantee from the other
    member states, as well as from the European Commission, that it fully
    meets the Copenhagen political EU membership criteria.
    The issue has received relatively little attention in Latvia,
    but has become politically very sensitive in Estonia.
    Accordingly, Estonia last week listed a number of tightly
    defined conditions without the fulfillment of which it would be
    unable to support any reference to its minorities.
    Among them were a refusal to accept the naming of specific
    member states or groups of member states who might suffer from
    minority issues. Any references to minorities were also to be non-
    specific. Finally, Estonia said it would reject the term
    "integration" as too far-reaching.

    ************************************************** **********

    EU/RUSSIA: LANDMARK ENLARGEMENT DEAL SIGNED, BUT LOOSE ENDS
    REMAIN

    By Ahto Lobjakas

    Brussels, 27 April 2004 (RFE/RL) -- The European Union and Russia
    today signed an agreement extending their existing Partnership and
    Cooperation Agreement (PCA) to the 10 new EU member states.
    The deal -- signed this morning in Luxembourg by Russian
    Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and an EU delegation headed by Irish
    Foreign Minister Brian Cowen -- puts an end to months of bitter
    wrangling that threatened to seriously undermine relations between
    the two sides.
    Cowen today said the agreement would put relations on a "new
    level." "Now that PCA has been extended to take account of the
    enlargement of the European Union, I believe that the EU and Russia
    can look forward to a productive summit in May and to bringing EU-
    Russia partnership to a new level. The extension of the PCA to the 10
    acceding states would allow the enlarged European Union and the
    Russian Federation to benefit from the opportunities created by EU
    enlargement," he said.
    As part of the deal, the EU and Russia also signed a joint
    statement detailing EU responses to a number of Russian concerns
    related to enlargement.
    The declaration addresses various trade issues, the transit of
    goods to Russia's Kaliningrad exclave, and the easing of the EU visa
    regime for Russia.
    The statement also makes reference to the protection of
    minorities, although it does not name any countries.
    Lavrov today said further EU action on minorities is needed
    before the PCA extension deal can be ratified by the Russian Duma.
    "I would also like to express my satisfaction that we were
    promised to be handed in the coming days concrete information on EU
    action plans for the social integration of minorities," Lavrov said.
    "We will have a close look at them and support them. Now it is about
    putting what was agreed into practice. I underscore that specifically
    this aspect will be take into consideration by the Russian [Duma] at
    the ratification of the protocols extending the [PCA] signed by us
    today to the new member states."
    Russia had initially demanded that the phrase "social
    integration" be included in the joint statement. However, spirited
    resistance from Estonia and Latvia -- which both have sizable
    Russian-speaking minorities -- prevented this. The reference in the
    joint statement to minorities does not name specific countries or
    minorities.
    EU diplomats said the European Commission will now collate
    information about existing integration schemes for the new member
    states. However, they did not rule out the creation of new schemes.
    Estonian and Latvian diplomats, speaking on condition of
    anonymity, warned this could give rise to demands from Russia for
    further talks in the coming months.
    Lavrov said today Russia agrees to the extension of the PCA on
    a provisional basis, meaning pending final ratification by the Duma.
    EU External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten today appeared to
    rule out what he called any further "conditionality." He repeated the
    EU view that the agreement to extend the PCA and the joint statement
    are separate issues and not conditionally linked.
    "Let's be clear about terms," Patten said. "We've been
    discussing this joint statement in parallel to the discussions about
    the enlargement protocol and the application of the PCA to the 10 new
    member states. We haven't been talking about conditionalities, we've
    been talking about a parallel addressing of concerns."
    Latvia yesterday took the unusual step of having a note
    appended to the minutes of the EU foreign ministers' meeting stating
    that the bloc reconfirms it meets the so-called Copenhagen political
    entry criteria.
    The minutes are not normally made public, although RFE/RL has
    obtained a copy of the note.
    Latvian sources say the note was deemed necessary to avoid
    future Russian attempts to raise the minorities issue at the EU
    level.

    ************************************************** **********

    QUOTATIONS

    "Europe is opening its borders today for the young, for their energy,
    for their knowledge. This will probably be a generation -- the first
    generation -- that will actually wonder what the borders were for,
    because they really gave no cause for joy." -- Slovenian Prime
    Minister Anton Rop

    "As is always the case in a person's life and in the life of human
    civilization, we are gaining something today; but at the same time we
    are losing something. Always something for something. We should do
    everything to ensure that the relationship between what we are
    gaining and what we are losing remains in our favor -- which is not
    and will not in any case be automatic. It will depend foremost on
    ourselves." -- Czech President Vaclav Klaus

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