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Radio Free Europe, Czech Rep.
June 22 2005
Georgia/Russia: Withdrawal Agreement Clears First Hurdle
By Liz Fuller
Senior Georgian politicians, including President Mikheil Saakashvili,
Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli, and Foreign Minister Salome
Zourabichvili, hailed the agreement reached in Moscow on 30 May on
the terms and time frame for the closure of the two remaining Russian
military bases in Georgia as heralding a new era in bilateral
relations. So too did international organizations, including NATO and
the EU.
But within days, Georgian and Russian officials were arguing over the
ownership of equipment at one ancillary facility in Tbilisi, while
the Azerbaijani government formally protested to Moscow plans to move
part of the materiel currently deployed in Georgia to the Russian
military base in Armenia. Moreover, several crucial issues remained
to be addressed in subsequent agreements.
The 30 May agreement did, nonetheless, clarify the central issue of
the time frame for withdrawal, stating clearly that the process
should be completed by 1 October 2007 or, if that proves impossible
(for example, due to adverse weather conditions), by 31 December
2007. Russia further pledges not to deploy any further equipment or
ammunition to the two bases. The two sides agree to set in motion
preparations for a formal inspection by the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Germany of the Gudauta military
base that Russia claims to have vacated in July 2001. They also
agreed to seek additional sources of funding to cover the expenses of
transporting equipment from the two Georgian bases.
The 30 May agreement also provided for an unspecified quantity of
equipment and personnel to be transferred from the two existing bases
to a new Georgian-Russian antiterrorism center. Further details on
the creation, staffing, and operations of that facility are to be
addressed in a separate agreement, which has yet to be signed.
Georgian Foreign Minister Zourabichvili told RFE/RL on 7 June that
the creation of that center, which has been under discussion for over
a year, was a Georgian initiative, the rationale for it being that
"we did not want Russia to think it was being thrown out of Georgia."
It is, however, difficult to reconcile the formal agreement on the
transfer of unspecified Russian equipment to that base with Georgian
National Security Council press secretary Davit Gunashvili's
statement that it will be purely an "analytical center." Other
Georgian officials have suggested that other countries, including
possibly the United States, could be invited to provide experts to
work at the center.
Real Agreement?
Almost immediately, however, the sincerity of both Tbilisi and Moscow
was called into question. The Georgian authorities denied a visa to
the new commander of the Group of Russian Forces in the
Transcaucasus, Major General Aleksandr Bespalov, thus forcing him to
coordinate the withdrawal from Yerevan, Interfax reported on 7 June.
At the same time, the Georgian military raised objections to the
removal from the Russian Tank-Repair Workshop in Tbilisi, which was
to be handed over to Georgia by 15 June, of equipment deployed there,
including trucks, spare parts, armored vehicles, and eight
diesel-fuelled generators. Those Georgian objections temporarily
halted the planned removal of Russian equipment from the base,
ITAR-TASS reported on 14 June. Georgia subsequently dropped its
opposition to the Russian military taking portable equipment from
that facility, and a written agreement formalizing the handover was
duly signed on 16 June.
Meanwhile Gennadii Gudkov, chairman of the Russian State Duma's
Defense and Security Committee, paid a private visit in early June to
the two Russian bases, after which he concluded that the Defense and
Foreign ministries will not be able to meet the agreed deadline of
late 2007 for closing them. Caucasus Press on 7 June quoted Gudkov as
saying that five years was a more realistic estimate, given that it
would, he claimed, take two years just to de-mine the two bases -- a
procedure on which Georgia insists.
Gudkov added that the withdrawal process could be expedited if the
United States agreed to provide additional funding to finance the
construction of alternative bases in Russia to house the personnel
and equipment withdrawn from Georgia. Russian Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov similarly appealed on 16 June to the Russian government to
earmark additional funding to cover the cost of the Russian
withdrawal from Georgia. Nino Burdjanadze -- speaker of the Georgian
parliament, which has consistently adopted a more hard-line and less
flexible position on the Russian military presence in Georgia than
has the Georgian Foreign Ministry -- refused to meet with Gudkov
while he was in Tbilisi, "Nezavisimaya gazeta" reported on 10 June.
Local Hurdles
In her 7 June comments to RFE/RL, Zourabichvili acknowledged that
there is a risk Russia will not comply with the December 2007
deadline. She added that while Tbilisi considers it encouraging that
at the very highest level, both Russian President Vladimir Putin and
the Russian Foreign Ministry have admitted that the two bases do not
serve any strategic purpose and are thus no longer needed, there is
no guarantee that local Russian commanders, acting on their own
initiative, might not seek to delay the withdrawal for their own
ends.
Despite those misgivings, Russian and Georgian delegations succeeded
in two subsequent rounds of talks, in Tbilisi on 8-10 June and in
Moscow on 16-17 June, in ironing out the remaining, mostly logistical
issues connected with the Russian withdrawal. The text of the
relevant agreement has been coordinated, and it should be signed "as
soon as possible," Interfax reported on 20 June, quoting an unnamed
Russian Foreign Ministry official.
While the bases-closure agreement has removed one major bone of
contention between Moscow and Tbilisi, it has not demolished the
coldness and mutual suspicion that have dogged bilateral relations
for many years. Indeed, Russian moves since the signing of the
withdrawal agreement seem calculated to fuel that suspicion.
First, Russian Defense Minister Ivanov announced on 6 June that
within the next 3 1/2 years, Russia will establish two military bases
near its border with Georgia to prevent "terrorists" entering Russia
from Georgian territory. One of the new bases will be located in
Karachaevo-Cherkessia and the second in Daghestan's Botlikh Raion
close to the border with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Ivanov said three
mountain brigades will be stationed at those bases, together with
helicopters, but no tanks or heavy armor.
Then on 10 June, newly appointed North Ossetian President Taymuraz
Mamsurov said in an interview with "Novaya gazeta" that he sees no
alternative to the "reunification" of his republic and Georgia's
unrecognized Republic of South Ossetia, most of the Ossetian
population of which already have Russian citizenship. That statement
suggests that Moscow may have come to the conclusion that
deliberately sabotaging President Mikheiil Saakashvili's proclaimed
vow to restore Georgia's territorial integrity may constitute more
sophisticated, and more effective leverage in relations with Tbilisi
than the Russian military presence ever did.
June 22 2005
Georgia/Russia: Withdrawal Agreement Clears First Hurdle
By Liz Fuller
Senior Georgian politicians, including President Mikheil Saakashvili,
Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli, and Foreign Minister Salome
Zourabichvili, hailed the agreement reached in Moscow on 30 May on
the terms and time frame for the closure of the two remaining Russian
military bases in Georgia as heralding a new era in bilateral
relations. So too did international organizations, including NATO and
the EU.
But within days, Georgian and Russian officials were arguing over the
ownership of equipment at one ancillary facility in Tbilisi, while
the Azerbaijani government formally protested to Moscow plans to move
part of the materiel currently deployed in Georgia to the Russian
military base in Armenia. Moreover, several crucial issues remained
to be addressed in subsequent agreements.
The 30 May agreement did, nonetheless, clarify the central issue of
the time frame for withdrawal, stating clearly that the process
should be completed by 1 October 2007 or, if that proves impossible
(for example, due to adverse weather conditions), by 31 December
2007. Russia further pledges not to deploy any further equipment or
ammunition to the two bases. The two sides agree to set in motion
preparations for a formal inspection by the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Germany of the Gudauta military
base that Russia claims to have vacated in July 2001. They also
agreed to seek additional sources of funding to cover the expenses of
transporting equipment from the two Georgian bases.
The 30 May agreement also provided for an unspecified quantity of
equipment and personnel to be transferred from the two existing bases
to a new Georgian-Russian antiterrorism center. Further details on
the creation, staffing, and operations of that facility are to be
addressed in a separate agreement, which has yet to be signed.
Georgian Foreign Minister Zourabichvili told RFE/RL on 7 June that
the creation of that center, which has been under discussion for over
a year, was a Georgian initiative, the rationale for it being that
"we did not want Russia to think it was being thrown out of Georgia."
It is, however, difficult to reconcile the formal agreement on the
transfer of unspecified Russian equipment to that base with Georgian
National Security Council press secretary Davit Gunashvili's
statement that it will be purely an "analytical center." Other
Georgian officials have suggested that other countries, including
possibly the United States, could be invited to provide experts to
work at the center.
Real Agreement?
Almost immediately, however, the sincerity of both Tbilisi and Moscow
was called into question. The Georgian authorities denied a visa to
the new commander of the Group of Russian Forces in the
Transcaucasus, Major General Aleksandr Bespalov, thus forcing him to
coordinate the withdrawal from Yerevan, Interfax reported on 7 June.
At the same time, the Georgian military raised objections to the
removal from the Russian Tank-Repair Workshop in Tbilisi, which was
to be handed over to Georgia by 15 June, of equipment deployed there,
including trucks, spare parts, armored vehicles, and eight
diesel-fuelled generators. Those Georgian objections temporarily
halted the planned removal of Russian equipment from the base,
ITAR-TASS reported on 14 June. Georgia subsequently dropped its
opposition to the Russian military taking portable equipment from
that facility, and a written agreement formalizing the handover was
duly signed on 16 June.
Meanwhile Gennadii Gudkov, chairman of the Russian State Duma's
Defense and Security Committee, paid a private visit in early June to
the two Russian bases, after which he concluded that the Defense and
Foreign ministries will not be able to meet the agreed deadline of
late 2007 for closing them. Caucasus Press on 7 June quoted Gudkov as
saying that five years was a more realistic estimate, given that it
would, he claimed, take two years just to de-mine the two bases -- a
procedure on which Georgia insists.
Gudkov added that the withdrawal process could be expedited if the
United States agreed to provide additional funding to finance the
construction of alternative bases in Russia to house the personnel
and equipment withdrawn from Georgia. Russian Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov similarly appealed on 16 June to the Russian government to
earmark additional funding to cover the cost of the Russian
withdrawal from Georgia. Nino Burdjanadze -- speaker of the Georgian
parliament, which has consistently adopted a more hard-line and less
flexible position on the Russian military presence in Georgia than
has the Georgian Foreign Ministry -- refused to meet with Gudkov
while he was in Tbilisi, "Nezavisimaya gazeta" reported on 10 June.
Local Hurdles
In her 7 June comments to RFE/RL, Zourabichvili acknowledged that
there is a risk Russia will not comply with the December 2007
deadline. She added that while Tbilisi considers it encouraging that
at the very highest level, both Russian President Vladimir Putin and
the Russian Foreign Ministry have admitted that the two bases do not
serve any strategic purpose and are thus no longer needed, there is
no guarantee that local Russian commanders, acting on their own
initiative, might not seek to delay the withdrawal for their own
ends.
Despite those misgivings, Russian and Georgian delegations succeeded
in two subsequent rounds of talks, in Tbilisi on 8-10 June and in
Moscow on 16-17 June, in ironing out the remaining, mostly logistical
issues connected with the Russian withdrawal. The text of the
relevant agreement has been coordinated, and it should be signed "as
soon as possible," Interfax reported on 20 June, quoting an unnamed
Russian Foreign Ministry official.
While the bases-closure agreement has removed one major bone of
contention between Moscow and Tbilisi, it has not demolished the
coldness and mutual suspicion that have dogged bilateral relations
for many years. Indeed, Russian moves since the signing of the
withdrawal agreement seem calculated to fuel that suspicion.
First, Russian Defense Minister Ivanov announced on 6 June that
within the next 3 1/2 years, Russia will establish two military bases
near its border with Georgia to prevent "terrorists" entering Russia
from Georgian territory. One of the new bases will be located in
Karachaevo-Cherkessia and the second in Daghestan's Botlikh Raion
close to the border with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Ivanov said three
mountain brigades will be stationed at those bases, together with
helicopters, but no tanks or heavy armor.
Then on 10 June, newly appointed North Ossetian President Taymuraz
Mamsurov said in an interview with "Novaya gazeta" that he sees no
alternative to the "reunification" of his republic and Georgia's
unrecognized Republic of South Ossetia, most of the Ossetian
population of which already have Russian citizenship. That statement
suggests that Moscow may have come to the conclusion that
deliberately sabotaging President Mikheiil Saakashvili's proclaimed
vow to restore Georgia's territorial integrity may constitute more
sophisticated, and more effective leverage in relations with Tbilisi
than the Russian military presence ever did.