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HOW DEEP ARE AZERBAIJAN-ISRAEL RELATIONS?
http://www.valuewalk.com/2013/01/how-deep-are-azerbaijan-israel-relations/
January 18, 2013By EurasiaNet
There has been much speculation surrounding Azerbaijan's relations
with Israel, including reports that Israeli warplanes might use
Azerbaijani airfields as support bases during a potential attack
against Iran. The reality of the bilateral relationship is not so
dramatic, as it is pragmatic.
We must keep in mind that neither country is an essential strategic
asset for the other. From the Israeli point of view, relations
with Azerbaijan represent the latest incarnation of a 'periphery
strategy', under which Israel, surrounded by hostile Arab states,
reaches out to the 'outer ring' of non-Arab, 'moderate' Muslim
states. In bygone decades, Kemalist Turkey and monarchist Iran played
this role.
Today, Israel's relations with Turkey are tense, and Iran is an
arch-enemy. Azerbaijan is now a cog in the periphery strategy. But
Baku can't compensate for the loss of Israel's former strategic
assets. Azerbaijan is a country with its own geopolitical
entanglements, including one that has left roughly 20 percent of its
territory under foreign occupation. Baku is not in position to supply
the type of support that would be relevant to the security challenges
that Israel faces, especially vis a vis Iran.
Some of Israel's neoconservative allies in the United States have
dreamed about stoking separatist sentiment in northern Iran, where
there is a high concentration of ethnic Azeris. But officials in Baku
are wary of provoking Iran. They are cognizant of Iran's capacity
to retaliate - for example, by potentially staging terrorist attacks
against the country's energy infrastructure, or targeting American and
Israeli interests and mobilizing radical Islamists inside Azerbaijan.
The Azerbaijani leadership clearly does not want a war at its doorstep,
with all its unpredictable consequences. Neither does it want a full
normalization of relations with Iran. It rather seeks manageable
tension, which would allow Baku to cast itself as the West's crucial
ally against 'mad mullahs' and deflect attention from its steadily
deteriorating human rights record. As far as relations with Iran
are concerned, Baku will follow its own calculations, which may well
continue to diverge from Israel's.
>>From the Azerbaijani perspective, relations with Israel are valuable,
since Israeli officials are not bound by the US and EU embargo
on arms sales to Azerbaijan. Thus, Israel represents an important
weapons outlet amid Baku's ongoing efforts to regain control over
the Nagorno-Karabakh territory. Indeed, Israel has sold sophisticated
military hardware and know-how to Azerbaijan - enabling Baku to
produce its own drone aircraft.
But, it is worth noting, a military build-up is not likely to secure
Azerbaijan's strategic objective in Karabakh enclave. If Baku is ever
going to govern the territory effectively in the future, it will have
to convince Karabakh Armenians that their future is better secured
within Azerbaijan, not as a separate entity, or as a part of Armenia.
The odds on that happening are already poor. And drone production
does nothing to encourage Karabakh Armenians to accept Azerbaijani
control of the territory.
Another major factor behind Azerbaijan's efforts to cultivate ties
with Israel is a desire among officials to gain access to the potent
pro-Israel lobby in Washington. This makes sense from Azerbaijani
perspective, since Azerbaijan seeks to counter-balance what it sees
as an undue influence of the Armenian lobby on US policy in the South
Caucasus. But Baku's expectations in this regard are unrealistic.
Nagorno-Karabakh is a non-issue for Jewish-Americans and Israelis. And
a considerable portion of Israel's supporters in Washington
are unwilling to confront the pro-Armenian lobby, especially when
Azerbaijan's strategic ally, Turkey, is now an antagonist for both
Armenia and Israel.
Azerbaijan, in turn, can't afford to alienate Muslim countries,
specifically Turkey. This is why Baku voted at the United Nations in
favor of granting an observer status to Palestine.
It should be pointed out that most Azerbaijanis are unenthused
about Baku's ties with Israel. When Israeli officials, such as a
former minister Efraim Sneh in 2010, or, more recently, the former
ambassador to Baku, Michael Lotem, praised Azerbaijan as an "icon of
progress in the Muslim world," it merely breeds resentment among many
Azerbaijanis, who are disaffected with the high level of corruption
and the lack of individual freedoms in their country.
This is not to say that the Azerbaijani-Israeli relations have no
future. Azerbaijan, thankfully, is largely free from the poisonous
anti-Semitism that prevails in much of the Muslim world. But a sober,
realistic assessment by both sides is needed in order to maximize the
potential of bilateral relations. For the time being, the diplomatic
agendas of both Azerbaijan and Israel diverge significantly, and
neither state seems willing to adjust those priorities in the interest
of deepening bilateral ties.
Editor's note: Eldar Mamedov is a political adviser to the Socialists
& Democrats Group in the European Parliament, who writes in his
personal capacity.
From: Baghdasarian
http://www.valuewalk.com/2013/01/how-deep-are-azerbaijan-israel-relations/
January 18, 2013By EurasiaNet
There has been much speculation surrounding Azerbaijan's relations
with Israel, including reports that Israeli warplanes might use
Azerbaijani airfields as support bases during a potential attack
against Iran. The reality of the bilateral relationship is not so
dramatic, as it is pragmatic.
We must keep in mind that neither country is an essential strategic
asset for the other. From the Israeli point of view, relations
with Azerbaijan represent the latest incarnation of a 'periphery
strategy', under which Israel, surrounded by hostile Arab states,
reaches out to the 'outer ring' of non-Arab, 'moderate' Muslim
states. In bygone decades, Kemalist Turkey and monarchist Iran played
this role.
Today, Israel's relations with Turkey are tense, and Iran is an
arch-enemy. Azerbaijan is now a cog in the periphery strategy. But
Baku can't compensate for the loss of Israel's former strategic
assets. Azerbaijan is a country with its own geopolitical
entanglements, including one that has left roughly 20 percent of its
territory under foreign occupation. Baku is not in position to supply
the type of support that would be relevant to the security challenges
that Israel faces, especially vis a vis Iran.
Some of Israel's neoconservative allies in the United States have
dreamed about stoking separatist sentiment in northern Iran, where
there is a high concentration of ethnic Azeris. But officials in Baku
are wary of provoking Iran. They are cognizant of Iran's capacity
to retaliate - for example, by potentially staging terrorist attacks
against the country's energy infrastructure, or targeting American and
Israeli interests and mobilizing radical Islamists inside Azerbaijan.
The Azerbaijani leadership clearly does not want a war at its doorstep,
with all its unpredictable consequences. Neither does it want a full
normalization of relations with Iran. It rather seeks manageable
tension, which would allow Baku to cast itself as the West's crucial
ally against 'mad mullahs' and deflect attention from its steadily
deteriorating human rights record. As far as relations with Iran
are concerned, Baku will follow its own calculations, which may well
continue to diverge from Israel's.
>>From the Azerbaijani perspective, relations with Israel are valuable,
since Israeli officials are not bound by the US and EU embargo
on arms sales to Azerbaijan. Thus, Israel represents an important
weapons outlet amid Baku's ongoing efforts to regain control over
the Nagorno-Karabakh territory. Indeed, Israel has sold sophisticated
military hardware and know-how to Azerbaijan - enabling Baku to
produce its own drone aircraft.
But, it is worth noting, a military build-up is not likely to secure
Azerbaijan's strategic objective in Karabakh enclave. If Baku is ever
going to govern the territory effectively in the future, it will have
to convince Karabakh Armenians that their future is better secured
within Azerbaijan, not as a separate entity, or as a part of Armenia.
The odds on that happening are already poor. And drone production
does nothing to encourage Karabakh Armenians to accept Azerbaijani
control of the territory.
Another major factor behind Azerbaijan's efforts to cultivate ties
with Israel is a desire among officials to gain access to the potent
pro-Israel lobby in Washington. This makes sense from Azerbaijani
perspective, since Azerbaijan seeks to counter-balance what it sees
as an undue influence of the Armenian lobby on US policy in the South
Caucasus. But Baku's expectations in this regard are unrealistic.
Nagorno-Karabakh is a non-issue for Jewish-Americans and Israelis. And
a considerable portion of Israel's supporters in Washington
are unwilling to confront the pro-Armenian lobby, especially when
Azerbaijan's strategic ally, Turkey, is now an antagonist for both
Armenia and Israel.
Azerbaijan, in turn, can't afford to alienate Muslim countries,
specifically Turkey. This is why Baku voted at the United Nations in
favor of granting an observer status to Palestine.
It should be pointed out that most Azerbaijanis are unenthused
about Baku's ties with Israel. When Israeli officials, such as a
former minister Efraim Sneh in 2010, or, more recently, the former
ambassador to Baku, Michael Lotem, praised Azerbaijan as an "icon of
progress in the Muslim world," it merely breeds resentment among many
Azerbaijanis, who are disaffected with the high level of corruption
and the lack of individual freedoms in their country.
This is not to say that the Azerbaijani-Israeli relations have no
future. Azerbaijan, thankfully, is largely free from the poisonous
anti-Semitism that prevails in much of the Muslim world. But a sober,
realistic assessment by both sides is needed in order to maximize the
potential of bilateral relations. For the time being, the diplomatic
agendas of both Azerbaijan and Israel diverge significantly, and
neither state seems willing to adjust those priorities in the interest
of deepening bilateral ties.
Editor's note: Eldar Mamedov is a political adviser to the Socialists
& Democrats Group in the European Parliament, who writes in his
personal capacity.
From: Baghdasarian