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Russia's Aims and Priorities in Nagorno-Karabakh: 10/1/12 - Transcri

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    Russia's Aims and Priorities in Nagorno-Karabakh: 10/1/12 - Transcript

    http://www.acus.org/event/russias-aims-and-priorities-nagorno-karabakh/transcript
    October 01, 2012

    The Atlantic Council of the United States

    Panel Discussion:
    *Russia's Aims and Priorities in
    Nagorno-Karabakh*

    Panelists:
    Ross Wilson,
    Director,
    Atlantic Council Patriciu Eurasia Center;

    Thomas de Waal,
    Senior Associate, Russia and Eurasia Program,
    Carnegie Endowment;

    E. Wayne Merry,
    Senior Fellow for Europe and Eurasia,
    American Foreign Policy Council;

    Sergey Markedonov,
    Visiting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program,
    Center for Strategic and International Studies

    Location:
    Atlantic Council Patriciu Eurasia Center,
    Washington, D.C.

    Date: Monday, October 1st, 2012

    Transcript by
    Federal News Service
    Washington, D.C.

    ROSS WILSON: We're pleased today to focus on one of the longest-lasting and
    most painful conflicts in the former Soviet Union and in the Caucasus. The
    fighting and continued stalemate over Nagorno-Karabakh have been drivers of
    hardship and misery in the South Caucasus since at least 1988. The conflict
    is an unwelcome cloud over the future of Azerbaijan. It has in substantial
    measure isolated or led to the isolation of Armenia from its two neighbors
    and could again engulf these countries and the region in a destructive war
    whose consequences for the Caucasus are perhaps hard to predict but would
    certainly not be good.

    Today's conversation, as I noted, will be a little bit different than the
    usual one about Nagorno-Karabakh. These usually began in other Washington
    think tank events that I've been part of with a review of the complicated
    history and geography and politics that divide Azerbaijan and Armenia over
    this region. They work through the fighting that ravaged both countries in
    the late 1980s and early 1990s and then through the inconclusive Minsk
    Group-mediated negotiations that followed. And they conclude with a usually
    depressing review of the recent negotiations toward a settlement that have
    all, for one reason or another, fell just short of success.

    Here we want to set aside just a little bit some of those local specifics
    and examine instead the role, position and views of Russia on the
    Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Soviet legacy in the South Caucasus still
    weighs heavily in many ways. Some argue that the Karabakh conflict itself
    stems at least in part from the Stalin-era map drawing and politics that
    aimed to pit ethnic groups against one another for Moscow's benefit. That
    of course - that Soviet legacy of course reflects - affects present-day
    Russia in its approach to a position in the Caucasus.

    Post-Soviet Russia has served, along with the United States and France, as
    a co-chair in the Minsk Group Karabakh peace process. Russian President
    Medvedev and Foreign Minister Lavrov in some ways led the Minsk Group in
    2009 to 2011 by working very hard with the parties toward achieving
    agreement on so-called basic principles of an agreed settlement that could
    then form the basis of a more specific treaty to establish long-term peace
    and aim toward a mutually acceptable arrangement on the status of Karabakh
    itself.

    In recent years and really over the last 20 or more, Russia's interest and
    role in Nagorno-Karabakh have been a source of speculation. It's our hope
    today that we might move away from the easy parlor game of speculation of
    speculation and have a more informed and concrete conversation about this.

    Among key questions that I hope we can address today are the following:
    What are Russia's aims in Nagorno-Karabakh and on Nagorno-Karabakh? And how
    do these fit into the broader foreign and security policy agenda that
    Moscow has in the South Caucasus? How does Moscow see and calibrate its
    approach on Nagorno-Karabakh as functions of its relationships with Baku
    and Yerevan? How have Russia's aims evolved over time? What agenda were
    President Medvedev and Foreign Minister (sic) Putin pursuing? How
    effectively did they pursue it? Or what went wrong? And how much was their
    work coordinated with the other co-chairs? Is Iran a significant factor
    affecting Russia's strategies vis-à-vis Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and
    Azerbaijan? And if so, why?

    To look at these and other pertinent issues, the council is very pleased to
    welcome three distinguished experts on the Caucasus and on Nagorno-Karabakh
    and three close long-time friends of both the Atlantic Council's and of
    mine.

    Tom de Waal, in my opinion, is Washington's pre-eminent expert on
    Nagorno-Karabakh and one of its most influential writers and observers on
    the Caucasus as a whole. He has served since 2009 as associate - senior
    associate at the Carnegie Endowment's Eurasia Program where he specializes
    in this region. He's the author of what I think is the definitive book on
    the Karabakh conflict, `Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace
    and War,' which I believe came out recently in a new and updated edition.

    THOMAS DE WAAL: Not yet.

    MR. WILSON: Not yet. It will soon. Next year. So be looking for that.

    Sergey Markedonov is a visiting fellow at the CSIS Russia and Eurasia
    program and a prominent expert in Washington on NK and the Caucasus and on
    Russia's - Russian policy there.

    Wayne Merry served as an American diplomat many years ago with me and in
    Moscow as well in assignments in East Berlin, Athens, New York and Tunis
    over the course of 26 years in the U.S. Foreign Service. He's presently a
    senior fellow for Europe and Eurasia at the American Foreign Policy
    Council, and he traveled to the region earlier this year.

    Today's event is on the record. Our format will be relatively simple. Tom
    de Waal will begin the conversation, followed by Sergey and then - and then
    Wayne Merry, after which we will have a discussion that - questions and
    answers. I'll have some, but I'm sure many of you will have questions as
    well.

    So with no further ado, let me turn it over to Tom de Waal.

    MR. DE WAAL: Thanks very much, Ross. Thanks for inviting me. And I
    certainly agree that this is a fascinating issue which deserves to be
    explored in a whole session. We hear some rather clichéd remarks on the
    issue of Russia in the Karabakh conflict. So I think I hopefully will shed
    a bit more light on this issue over the next hour and a half.

    I suppose - might - (audio glitch) - make - going to make a central
    statement is that Russia is both an indispensable player in the resolution
    of this conflict, but one who is not trusted either. And this is - and
    possibly this paradox is something which plays out - has played out over
    the last 20 years, although I would also - I also want to make the case
    that Russia's attitude to this conflict, role in this conflict, is
    changing. Russia is both a player and a mediator. Russia simultaneously has
    a military relationship with both countries and is also negotiating peace
    with them. This conflict won't be solved without Russia, and yet I think
    this conflict will not be solved exclusively by Russia either.

    So let me just, Ross, kindly mention my book, which will be updated next
    year. My personal title for it is `Even Blacker Garden,' I'm afraid -
    (laughter) - because things have only got worse over the last 10 years. So
    let me review some of - some of my - of the historical narrative about
    Russia in this region, and Russia starting with Moscow in the late Soviet
    period.

    There's an Azerbaijani narrative that Moscow has consistently supported the
    Armenian side. I would say Moscow has more supported the Armenian side, but
    I think the whole picture of the last 20-plus years is very mixed of
    different Russian actors at different times supporting both sides in this -
    in this conflict. You know, we go right away back to when this conflict
    broke out in February 1988, and Moscow's position was very firmly on the
    Azerbaijani side supporting Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Soviet Azerbaijan.
    At the same time Andrei Sakharov and others, the Russian intelligentsia,
    more strongly supporting the Armenian side.

    And that narrative then played itself out in the late Soviet period, in
    which, as it were, the kind of - the hawks in Moscow were more on the side
    of Baku and the doves on the side of Yerevan. You had at one point Ligachev
    going to Baku with one message and Alexander Yakovlev to Yerevan with
    another message. And then that, I think, reached its kind of peak in 1991
    when the kind of hardline military establishment in Moscow supported
    Operation Ring, a(n) operation in and around Karabakh, which was basically
    to enforce Azerbaijani rule, involving the deportation of Armenian
    villagers. At the same time Russian parliamentarians were there on the
    ground trying to support the Armenians and trying to subvert Operation Ring.

    When we - turning to independent Russia, we - obviously, we see breakdown
    across the board, across the Soviet space. And so it becomes more difficult
    to talk about a unified - even more difficult, shall we say, to talk about
    a unified Russian attitude because there were so many Russian players. And
    researching my book, I came to the conclusion that in the summer of 1992
    you actually had elements of the former Soviet Fourth Army helping Rahim
    Gaziyev, the Azerbaijani defense minister. And funnily enough, just a few
    days ago he's confirmed this in an interview, very conveniently for us, he
    - just a few days ago - an interview marking the death of Pavel Grachev. So
    the Russian Fourth Army, or what was left of it, supporting Azerbaijani
    side, and then other Russians actually helping the Armenian side. So an
    offensive in Karabakh, very successful on the Azerbaijani side, in June
    1992 repulsed by Russians, the Russians actually fighting on both sides in
    the summer of 1992.

    Later on definitely, particularly after the fall of the Popular Front
    government, Russians providing more help to the Armenian side. And yet
    Levon Ter-Petrossian told me that Yelstin was - I think his words were
    `very strict' in the amount of weapons he would supply to the Armenian
    side. He didn't want to see the Armenian side be defeated, but he also
    didn't want to supply them with too many weapons. So Russia playing both
    sides in that conflict if, I think, ultimately more in the Armenian side.

    But another interesting fact from the cease-fire - negotiated, as you know,
    by Vladimir Kazimirov, the Russia envoy - it was a Russian plan in two
    parts: one, to have a cease-fire; and then, second, to have a Russian
    peacekeeping force on the ground. Only the first part worked. And if you
    look at the book of Tatul Hakobyan called `Green and Black,' he - we all
    knew that the Azerbaijanis didn't want a Russian peacekeeping force in
    1994. Interestingly, Hakobyan also gives evidence that the Armenian - the
    Karabakh Armenians also didn't want a Russian peacekeeping force either.
    And so both sides were, as it were, tacitly colluding to keep the Russians
    from imposing a Pax Russica in 1994, which is one reason why we've ended
    up with this strange cease-fire, which is a long cease-fire line of a
    hundred-plus miles and no peacekeepers on the grounds.

    Since then Russian strategy has evolved. And I would say that if in the
    '90s there were many reasons for Russia to manipulate the conflict and want
    to kind of keep it - keep the status quo, I think Russia has, at least
    since Key West in 2000, had a much more constructive attitude. I think the
    military was the main Russian foreign policy agent in the Caucasus in the
    '90s. That's obviously no longer - no longer true from the late '90s, the
    foreign ministry and other actors playing a more important role.

    And then we see the initiative by Dmitry Medvedev and Sergei Lavrov which,
    I think, was genuine. There is no way that it could not be genuine to
    invest all that time and effort, 10-plus meetings, between the presidents
    of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

    When I've asked senior Azerbaijanis about what they thought was behind the
    Medvedev-Lavrov initiative, they've said - and I don't think this is just
    self-importance - Russia recognizes that we're a much more player important
    player nowadays. Russia - and if you recognize that Azerbaijan is an
    important player, you have to work - if you want to win the trust of
    Azerbaijan, you have to work harder on the - to resolve the Karabakh
    conflict. We saw that in the French treaty signed in 2008 between
    Presidents Medvedev and Aliyev.

    And I think we see also - and again the Azerbaijani government doesn't -
    likes to play up its more pro-Western orientation, but let's - you know,
    let's also pay attention to the fact that Azerbaijan still has very strong
    relationship with Russia. And, you know, that comes through the president's
    family, the president's wife's family, the son-in-law, the singer
    businessman, Mr. Agalarov, who's, you know, as much Russian as he is
    Azerbaijani.

    And a couple of other reasons why I think Russia really does want to have
    this conflict solved: One, it's the kind of communication - it opens up
    communications to - right the way to Turkey, to the Persian Gulf through
    the Caucasus if this conflict is solved, and, I think, most importantly,
    the fear of another war breaking out, which is obviously very palpable.

    But clearly, there are questions about Russian motives. And I think one
    question that we will - we shall return to is the question, does Russia
    want to dominate a peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh.

    And secondly, there - I think there are also questions about whether this
    was President Medvedev's personal initiative, something that he took on for
    personal glory and got - and got dragged into, and whether, now that we
    have Vladimir Putin back in the - in the Kremlin, there's a different sort
    of attitude. I think there is certainly evidence that that is the case. I'm
    told that in September 2004 President Putin wanted to have a meeting with
    Presidents Kocharian and Aliyev, that they kept him waiting, that he
    arrived at the meeting late, already in a bad mood, and then they started
    arguing in his presence, and that put him off the idea of mediating between
    the presidents over Karabakh. That's the story I've been told. We do know
    that since 2006 the relationship with Ilham Aliyev has been poor when Putin
    was asking Azerbaijanis to restrict gas supplies to Georgia, and they told
    him no.

    We also know - and I think this is something which isn't sufficiently
    picked up in Washington, that the relationship with Serzh Sarkissian is -
    and Putin is also poor. That dates back to June 2009 when President
    Sarkissian gave Mikhail Saakashvili a medal of honor in Yerevan. It was a
    very pointed gesture that the important - about the importance of a
    relationship with Georgia. And I think since then the relationship between
    the Armenian leader and Vladimir Putin has not been of the best.

    There is also - I would also draw your attention - you can watch it on
    YouTube - to a rather bizarre moment in February of 2007 when Putin was
    asked at one of his marathon press - Kremlin press conferences about
    Karabakh. And he started quite well, saying that, you know, it's up to the
    parties to make their own decision. And then he veered off into a very
    strange monologue about Agdamski Portvein (ph). For those of you who don't
    know about Agdamski Portvein (ph), it's a kind of sickly, very sweet and
    cheap red wine, which was a popular drink, for - particularly for
    alcoholics in the Soviet era, made in Agdam in Azerbaijan, Agdam now under
    Armenian occupation. And Vladimir Putin started saying, in a rather
    flippant way, that wouldn't it be great if we could restore the Agdam
    Portvein (ph) production, which suggested that he doesn't really have -
    that conflict resolution in Karabakh is not, you know, his highest
    priority, shall we say.

    So just a few words in - from - in conclusion from me. I think we're
    seeing actually Russia losing influence in both Armenia and Azerbaijan
    progressively. Azerbaijan, I think that's been evident for some years. But
    I think there's quite strong anti-Russian sentiment in Armenia as well at
    the moment. I think Armenians reacted quite badly when the White House
    reacted instantly to the Safarov case, and it took the Russians three days
    to react. I think that was noted in Yerevan. And there is also suspicion
    amongst the leadership in Yerevan that the Russians are plotting with
    Robert Kocharian in some unspecified way. That may play out in the next
    presidential elections.

    I'll stop there, but I - just to - if I do have a thesis on Karabakh, it's
    that - it's that it's not a chessboard. I always say that it's not a
    chessboard. I say that the - if it's a chessboard, the pawns are pushing
    the kings and queens around in the Caucasus. And I think this has generally
    been true of the Karabakh conflict, that if it was up to the outsiders,
    this conflict would have been solved long ago. It's really the locals'
    resistance to resolution and to change which is the main reason it's not
    being solved. And that paradox (clearly exists ?) with asking the question
    whether we want to see - would welcome more geopolitics rather than less
    in the - in the Karabakh conflict, a concerted push by three co-chair
    countries to use some of the instruments of pressure that they haven't used
    up until now.

    MR. WILSON: Thank you. It's a very good - very good opener.

    Sergey?

    SERGEY MARKEDONOV: Yeah. Thank you.

    First of all, let me thank Ross for having me here as a contributor. It's a
    great honor for me to speak in the company of such distinguished expert -
    experts.

    Tom made detailed, very detailed historical observation of the
    Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Russia's engagement in it. This is why let me
    concentrate more on recent tendencies. And I wish to start on registration
    of differences between engagement of Russia in the Nagorno-Karabakh process
    from the conflicts in Georgia.

    I think there are three principal differences in the Russian position in
    this conflict. The first one, Russia is not engaged in a relationship with
    Nagorno-Karabakh de facto state. Even in the - in one of the first decrees
    of Vladimir Putin, signed just the same day where his inauguration took
    place, he mentioned Abkhazia and South Ossetia as entities - independent
    entities and Transnistria as a part of the conflict, engaged in the
    conflict resolution. Nagorno and Karabakh was not mentioned, completely.

    The second point, Russian engagement in the resolution process is supported
    both by Armenia and Azerbaijan, for very different reasons, but both
    countries have a wide spectrum of topics for cooperation of Russia outside
    of Nagorno-Karabakh agenda. Armenia is practically the only military ally
    of Russia in the Caucasus. It's a CSTO member. As for Azerbaijan, don't
    forget that Russia shares with this republic Dagestani part of this border.
    It's one of the most turbulent region inside Russia. And Russia is
    interested to cooperate on Azerbaijan on this direction.

    Gabala Radar Station - some days ago source who is very, very close to
    negotiation process said to RIA Novosti that two sides are very close to
    begin. And Russia is interested in making this begin. It could help us to
    explain why a Russian reaction on Safarov case was not so loud -
    (inaudible) - the Western reaction, by the way, it could be compared.

    And third point, last but not least, the Russian engagement, even special
    engagement in the peacekeeping process, is supported by the West, unlike
    situation in Georgia. Even in 2008 even Matt Bryza greeted Russian activity
    for preparation in providing Meindorf conference. It was 2008 -
    Russo-Georgian war and so on, so on. And then the West, both France and
    U.S., two co-chairmen of the Minsk Group, supported another additional
    format of negotiations. I mean here three-side format, between three
    presidents, Medvedev, Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan. And even Vladimir Putin is
    not against this format. But it's necessary to understand many restrictions
    on the Russian side.

    But before description of those restrictions, let me estimate briefly the
    effectiveness of Russian special engagement since 2008 to Kazan meeting in
    2011. On the one side, this engagement was not really effective because no
    breakthrough. There were no breakthrough before 2008, and after also. But
    first time after cease-fire agreement, signed in May 1994, two presidents,
    president of Armenia and Azerbaijan, shared signatures after one document.
    Even in May 1994, presidents didn't meet to put their signatures on the
    cease-fire agreement. In Meindorf, 2008, it took place. In Sochi and
    Astrakhan, sides made very, very minor compromises - I am not overestimated
    them - but compromises concerning humanitarian aspects of the conflict. In
    my mind, it's (maximum ?), but no breakthrough.

    I think Russia has many, many limitations and restrictions to promote the
    conflict resolution. First of all, the conflict resolution doesn't depend
    on Russia's will or Washington's will. First of all, it depends on the
    interests and motivations of two sides. (Inaudible) - Armenia - both
    Armenia and Azerbaijan are not ready to real peacekeeping. Speaking about
    peacekeeping, I am not here - I am not meaning here victory of one side,
    loss-win strategy. I mean here a win-win strategy, compromises, from both
    sides. For this scenario, both sides are not ready. It's not guilty of
    Russia or the West. It's reality with which Russia really deals. And Russia
    would not resolve this conflict without interest and engagement of Armenia
    and Azerbaijan.

    The second point: In 2008 Russia recognized independence of Abkhazia and
    South Ossetia and lost its influence resources in the relationship with
    Georgia. In this situation, final choice between Armenia and Azerbaijan
    would be a real challenge for Russia. This is why Russia provides policy of
    (scales ?), trying to have windows for maneuver with Azerbaijan and with
    Armenia. On the one side, as I said, common border with Dagestan; on
    another side CSTO, Eurasian military-political integration, which is
    important not only for Russia but personally for Vladimir Putin. And this
    is why it forces Russia to provide checks and balances policy, no final
    choice.

    I understand that both Baku and Yerevan are interested in this final
    choice, not only in Russia's final choice but in the West final choice.
    Both Russia and the West aren't ready to make such final choice. And in
    this situation, status quo as an option, as the best option, is supported
    by the West, maybe not openly. Openly, yes, representatives of the West,
    Hillary Clinton and representatives of European Union countries, especially
    France, repeat like mantra that status quo is not so good; it provokes
    possibility for a new war and so on, so on. But in reality, no real
    proposals, interesting offers which would be shared by two sides. In this
    way, I don't see real differences between Russian attitude and the West
    attitude. And Nagorno-Karabakh, unlike Georgia, could be considered as a
    platform for cooperation in the Caucasus, in the South Caucasus. It's very
    different from situation in Georgia.

    This is why, making final conclusions, I could not overestimate the
    resources of Russia or such rather artificial theories that Russia is not
    interested to have a peaceful relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
    Why not? This situation would be much better for Russia, especially taking
    into account situation around Georgia.

    Now I would stop - (chuckles) - my introduction, and then I would ready - I
    would be ready to answer any questions. Thanks.

    MR. WILSON: Very good, Sergey. Thank you very much.

    Wayne.

    WAYNE MERRY: Thank you, Ross. Always nice to be back at the Atlantic
    Council, where I was once a program director in the council's somewhat more
    threadbare years. It's nice to see the positive impact that money has here.

    I'd like to start by asking what seems to me a puzzling question: Why has
    Russia not attempted to exclude the Western powers from an active
    engagement in Nagorno-Karabakh? One could logically occupy that Moscow
    would seek to do precisely that. I mean, this area is with its near abroad,
    within an area that has been of - where there's been droit de regard not
    just in Soviet times but in imperial times. It's an area of great
    sensitivity, involving the Caspian and the Black Sea regions. One could
    logically assume that Moscow would be - have been very hostile to the kind
    of multilateral approach which has marked Karabakh for almost 20 years.

    Indeed, in the early part of the conflict, in 1994, the Russian government
    at that time was quite prepared to accept American participation in a
    peacekeeping force which would have put active American ground forces for a
    long term as part of a multilateral force in the region, and with a senior
    American role in the management of a force that would have included
    Russians. Now, since that time they've been an active part of the Minsk
    Group, the co-chairs, and have not sought to sabotage initiatives either
    from, say, the Americans at Key West or the French initiatives. And all of
    my information is that the Kazan initiatives were very full coordinated
    with both Washington and Paris.

    I would argue that what seems to be contradictory, almost counterintuitive,
    is explained by Russia's objectives and what I would say is the dilemma of
    Russian policy towards Karabakh. Russia overtly, at least in the medium
    term, has sought the preservation of the status quo. And that is not just
    because it fears a renewal of conflict, but it fears having to make choices
    between Armenia and Azerbaijan that would compromise Russian interests.

    There's no question that Russia is closer to Armenia. It has a treaty-based
    security alliance. It has long-term connections that are cultural and
    political and historical and variety of other things, and some significant
    economic ties. This does not, however, mean that Russia does not value its
    relationship with Azerbaijan and that with - and it certainly does not want
    to compromise a relationship with Baku, which has been very difficult and
    very - sometimes very tortured in the last 20 years.

    I think the one thing that Russia does not want is to be in a situation
    where it essentially has to honor its commitments to Armenia at the expense
    of significant losses in its relationships with Azerbaijan. It would like
    to maintain a degree of balance and success in that. I think in Moscow,
    people are very well-aware that in the patron-client relationship they have
    with Armenia that you get this kind of situation that Tom referred to of
    the pawns pushing the kings or, as it's sometimes said, the danger that the
    Armenian tail will wag the Russian dog. I think this is particularly a
    danger in a conflict - in an open conflict situation. That's something
    that Russia would seek to avoid.

    A consequence of that is that Russia has welcomed the multilateral Minsk
    Group process as a vehicle, a mechanism to essentially spread out the
    liabilities of the problem so that it does not end up essentially holding
    the hot potato of Karabakh by itself. Now, while I would argue that this
    has been an entirely reasonable policy for Russia in past years, I think it
    no longer is viable, for two important reasons.

    The first is that I think the Minsk Group process was perfectly appropriate
    in a postwar environment. But as some of you from my previous writings and
    public statements, I think that Karabakh is now a prewar situation, and I
    think that creates a very different dynamic not just for the Minsk Group as
    a mechanism but for Russian interests. And I think the failure at Kazan
    demonstrates a turning point not just in the viability of the Minsk Group
    but in the viability of existing Russian policy, this effort to preserve
    the status quo. I think the potential for a renewal of armed conflict not
    just over Karabakh but between the two republics, Armenia and Azerbaijan,
    is becoming increasingly real. I'm not predicting that it's imminent or
    inevitable, but I'm certainly not the only person who thinks that the
    prospects for another war in the Central Caucasus are increasing.

    I think it's - one must face the reality that neither the United States nor
    France is likely to be particularly effective in being able to prevent or
    limit a renewal of conflict. France and the Europeans are obviously very
    focused on their internal European problems. The United States is up to its
    eyeballs in international problems. I doubt very much that anyone in
    Washington would want more than a rhetorical political American engagement
    in response to a new open conflict in the Caucasus.

    This would mean that Russia would be faced with the responsibility, as a
    regional great power, to try to exercise not only political suasion but
    even more active instruments of influence both on its client state Armenia
    and on its other neighbor Azerbaijan. It's almost impossible for Russia to
    do that without suffering significant damage to its own interests vis-à-vis
    both of those countries. And I think this is something that Russia would
    very much like to avoid but, I fear, no longer is able to do so.

    The second reason that Turkey's (sic) policy is going to have to change is
    because of the increasing role of another regional great power, and that is
    Turkey. Twenty years ago, at the time of the Karabakh war, Turkey's role
    was largely peripheral. That's no longer true. At that time Turkey's
    foreign policy towards its immediate neighborhood was Kemalist, which is
    very conservative, very risk-averse. Today Turkey is a much more activist
    power not only in the Middle East, in the Black Sea Region, in the Aegean,
    but increasingly in the Caucasus.

    And one has to expect that in a real crisis situation between Armenia and
    Azerbaijan that Turkey will play a very influential role, in fact, I think,
    almost certainly a more important role either than France or the United
    States. They now have a patron-client relationship with Azerbaijan, in
    which I think it's all too apparent that the problem of the tail wagging
    the dog is a danger for Ankara's policy and interests. And obviously,
    Turkey has a very, very delicate situation in its relationship or
    semirelationship with Armenia, in which a renewed conflict in the Caucus
    could stand to significantly damage Turkish interests.

    Therefore, the two regional great powers have parallel, not identical, not
    similar but somewhat overlapping and parallel concerns about the problems
    of renewed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. I don't speak, in this
    regard, about the third regional great power, Iran, partly because I think
    the poisonous character of its relationship with Baku essentially rules it
    out as a positive contributor either to conflict avoidance or conflict
    resolution. But what I do think is true is that Moscow and Ankara both are
    potentially facing a situation in which they are going to have to be much
    more activist, much less passive, much more engaged in the problems of
    Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, or they could be faced with a crisis which
    would compromise their interests and willy-nilly drag them into situations
    which could be very compromising to their interests and very risky.

    Now, each of them has a patron-client relationship. Each of them has
    borders with one or more of the two participants. Each of them is a weapons
    supplier to one or the other of the adversaries. This is a situation in
    which a conflict - in which a conflict, an active conflict, which, again,
    would not just be about Karabakh but would be between Armenia and
    Azerbaijan at a number of points on their common frontier, could easily
    spill over into other parts of the Central Caucasus and compromise the
    interests - and of necessity, each of the two client states will try to
    engage its respective patron to the maximum it can to its own benefit in
    this conflict.

    Now, I think it's beyond imagination that Turkey and Russia would actually
    come to blows with each other over this situation, but it is certainly true
    that Turkey and Russia could stand to benefit by a higher degree of
    coordination and mutual understanding of what their parallel interests are
    than they have shown heretofore. I think there is simply a reality that
    Turkey is still fairly low on the learning curve about the realities of the
    Karabakh situation. The politics of Turkey vis-à-vis its cousins in
    Azerbaijan have made it very difficult for Turkey to look at this problem
    in a dispassionate way, and I think Moscow could actually play a
    significant role in helping education policymaking levels in Ankara about
    this problem because Turkey has significant potential benefits from a more
    positive resolution of this problem, particularly in the normalization of
    its relations with Armenia.

    Now, it might sound here like I'm almost, as an American, advocating that
    the Russians and the Turks engage in great-power collusion in the Caucasus,
    almost to the exclusion of the United States. Let me say why I think that a
    more activist role by Moscow and Ankara is in American interests.

    First, I think the prospects that Armenia and Azerbaijan are going to
    settle their differences by themselves is virtually zero. I think the
    prospects for much positive contribution from the existing multilateral
    prospect - mechanisms, the Minsk Group, is pretty low as well. I think the
    prospects for renewed armed conflict, a war, are increasingly high. I think
    a war in the Caucasus would, among other things, damage American interests.
    I think the United States and France will have very little capacity either
    to prevent or to limit that conflict if it happens.

    Therefore, it's desirable that somebody do it. And it seems to me that the
    two regional great powers, Turkey and Russia, are the logical, in fact, the
    only candidates to play a restraining role in this conflict, and it is
    therefore in the interests of the United States that they do so.

    MR. WILSON: Great. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Wayne. I think
    that is a very good and useful way to start off this discussion.

    Let me take the moderator's prerogative just to ask a first question -Wayne
    has introduced this idea of a sort of - that the Karabakh conflict is
    settling in to a kind of prewar situation - and get the views of Tom and
    Sergey on that proposition. And maybe more importantly, in your opinion
    does Russia share that view? To the extent that Russia shares that view, is
    that something that makes Russia as anxious as Wayne would portray it to
    be, or would Russia see - would Russia see that it has other interests? And
    how would Russia - maybe third, how would Russia's approach change to the
    extent that it sees a prewar situation as opposed to a cease-fire that
    needs to be managed and maintained?

    MR. DE WAAL: I basically agree with Wayne. I'm slightly - I mean, it's just
    a nuance, really - I'm slightly less worried about war, but I think the
    situation is moving certainly more towards war than peace. I think the
    pardoning of Ramil Safarov August 31st basically killed off the existing
    peace process, which I think was pretty much on life support anyway. No one
    has yet declared it dead, but I don't see the Armenians sitting down at the
    table with Azerbaijan at the moment after the Safarov pardoning. And
    therefore, there is therefore a trend line more towards war than peace.

    And I would agree with Wayne that Russia definitely doesn't want - for many
    reasons doesn't want conflict in the region. That would force Russia to
    honor its military alliance with Armenia, to take sides - (inaudible) -
    lose Azerbaijan, something that Russia could not tolerate.

    Just - as Wayne mentioned Ankara, I was actually in Ankara a few weeks ago
    and I got a slightly more sanguine view from a Turkish official who I won't
    name when - because he was talking about this issue - he said we can
    influence the Azerbaijanis on many issues, but Karabakh is one thing where
    they will not listen to us, they will only listen to themselves, and that
    makes sense. But he also said that he didn't think Azerbaijan was ready for
    war, that he thought it was more bluster. And he said, and our military
    advisers come back from Azerbaijan and they say there's no - that they
    may have weapons, but there's certainly not a fighting spirit yet in the
    Azerbaijani army. So that's a slightly - those of us who are afraid about -
    of a war, I think that's a slightly more positive message.

    MR. MARKEDONOV: Speaking about the official Russian position, we face a
    real lack of interpretation made by Kremlin. I didn't hear any official
    statements concerning prewar conditions around Nagorno-Karabakh. But being
    generally pessimistic -- me personally; I'm not an official representative
    of the Russian Federation, but as an expert -- I could not share alarmist
    notes made by my distinguished colleagues, because a new war in
    Nagorno-Karabakh was predicted many times, after Key West or, for example,
    after failure of previous year Kazan meeting. Every time after failures of
    the next round of negotiations or after absence of predicted or expected
    breakthrough, the situation exists the same. No breakthroughs, status quo
    is preserved, but no new war.

    I think we need to have more prerequisites on the ground for new war. First
    of all, it's military domination of one side. We are facing the arms
    raising - conventional, of course, not nuclear - on the ground, but there
    is no domination of one side. I think that first - fast victory in this
    conflict is possible only due to blitzkrieg scenario, like Serbian Krajina
    of 1995. For Serbian Krajina, Azerbaijani side must have military
    superiority and absolute information superiority and support, (shadowed or
    clear?), of the most important international actors. Those conditions,
    those prerequisites don't exist right now. Yes, we could see attempts to
    unfreeze the conflicts through engaged military component, military aspect
    or elements of maybe risky game, but it's not prewar situation.

    As for Safarov case, I think Armenian side could only dream about Safarov
    case, because it's a brilliant argument to not be engaged in the
    negotiations. Safarov case was not started today or yesterday. It's
    prolonged, protracted history, which is why no admiration from my personal
    side.

    As for Russian position in the potential conflict, I see that some towers
    of the Kremlin would follow different positions because there are different
    groups of influence - oil, gas lobby, Armenian lobby and so on. I don't
    believe - (inaudible) -- in the force and potential of CSTO. CSTO now is a
    club of different interests. It has very, very, extremely strong Central
    Asian dominant. And I'm not sure that Tajikistan or Kazakhstan would be
    really engaged in the conflict on the Armenian side, taking into account
    Kazakhstani relationship with Azerbaijan, a growing Tajikistani-Azerbaijani
    relationship. Even Belarus. Even Belarus. Don't forget that Belarus in 2008
    didn't support the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
    Nagorno-Karabakh case is much more controversial than situation in Abkhazia
    and South Ossetia.

    This is why situation on the one side is not so simple, but I think that
    maybe cross of different interests and necessity to keep balanced
    relationship within Kremlin would help to preserve status quo. Honestly
    speaking, not as a Russian but as an expert, I think that status quo is the
    worst scenario even you would have no other scenarios. Without jokes,
    keeping status quo, preserving the status quo is better if you wouldn't
    have now compromise between two sides engaged in the conflict.

    MR. MERRY: Ross, if I might just clarify one point, Sergey has described a
    scenario for resumption of war which is essentially based on a policy
    choice by one side or the other to initiate war. I think that's rather - I
    agree that's rather unlikely. I'm inclined to see a new conflict resulting
    from a deteriorating situation between the two republics along their
    borders in which there's a failure of rational policy on one or both sides
    to control that deterioration and in which there would be an almost
    simultaneous eruption of violence on both sides. Among other things, I no
    longer share the view that a new war would only - could only come from the
    Azerbaijani side. I think it could come almost simultaneously at various
    points along the common frontiers by both sides. This would not - I'm not
    predicting rational choice; I'm predicting the failure of rationality.

    MR. DE WAAL: The research - (inaudible).

    MR. MERRY: 1914.

    MR. WILSON: That's encouraging.

    MR. : Yes. (Laughter.)

    MR. WILSON: Let me open it up to our audience for some questions. When I
    recognize you, a microphone will come. I would ask that you please identify
    yourself. Please state a question that our group can respond to. And
    remember the topic here is Russia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The focus is sort
    of the Russian aspects that relate to this terrible and long-lasting
    problem.

    Back here, please.

    Q: Thank you. Astan Karajan (ph) from Voice of America's Armenian Service.
    Thank you. It's one of the rare occasions where you have such a
    distinguished panel where people actually honestly spoke their mind on a
    lot of points, and that's a pleasure to have this kind of afternoon.

    I have a question which is - we're not going to be able to basically keep
    the big elephant in the room, which is Safarov, which probably changed the
    dimension of the conflict the most since, I don't know, maybe the
    cease-fire, even. You mentioned, Mr. Markedonov, that it was a present for
    Armenians, in a way, to do that because now the Armenians have a good
    reason to withdraw from the negotiations. And I agree with that. Why do you
    think Aliyev decided to do this?

    And the question is for everyone. I mean, why do you think the Azerbaijani
    authorities went after the Safarov extradition?

    MR. MARKEDONOV: Do we have to answer right now or -

    MR. WILSON: Why don't we - why don't we answer this question, and let me
    just expand it a little bit, if one of you could speak a little bit more
    about the Russian reaction - the Russian reaction to the pardoning.

    MR. MARKEDONOV: Now it's time to answer. You know that Russian reaction was
    not so fluent. I touched on the Nikolay Bordyuzha statement. It's not
    completely Russian official; it's general-secretary of CSTO who blamed
    Azerbaijan and the decision of Ilham Aliyev. Why did he do this decision?
    Don't forget that, first of all, Ilham Aliyev thought about domestic
    audience, not for his partners in the West, because due to some projects or
    programs of so-called energy alternatives, there are no such fluent
    reactions from the Western side, and no prerequisites for agitation, for
    worrying on this side.

    The next year, presidential elections would be in Azerbaijan. I think this
    reason was very decisive because domestic dimension of Nagorno-Karabakh
    conflict is very important for both societies. It's the central element of
    post-Soviet identity of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is why I think
    this reason was decisive for Ilham Aliyev.

    MR. WILSON: Tom or Wayne, anything you want to add on why this pardon was
    given?

    MR. DE WAAL: Yeah. I'm at a bit of a loss. It certainly had something to do
    with domestic politics, but I think the international backlash has been far
    more damaging to Azerbaijan than any domestic benefits that the president
    would receive from this. And I would echo that this was certainly Dash
    Maksatun's (ph) best day in years, the pardoning of Safarov.

    The Russian reaction, again I do just reiterate, was this just slowness or
    whatever, but I think this went down badly in Armenia, the fact that it
    took Russia several days to react when there had already been statements
    out of Washington and out of Brussels. And I think this confirms a sort of
    slow but palpable estrangement between the authorities in Yerevan and those
    in Moscow. Clearly this relationship is one that will endure, but it's not
    nearly as strong as it was a few years ago.

    MR. MERRY: I'd like to relate the Safarov affair to Kazan because I see
    them as parallel. And what I found most disturbing in both cases was the
    evident premeditation of Baku's policy. The Safarov affair was not a matter
    of the government in Azerbaijan having been presented with this guy
    returning from Budapest and they overreacted. This whole thing had been in
    preparation for many months and was clearly - whatever its domestic
    political component, was understood to have - would have a negative impact
    on the potential for a bilateral relationship with Yerevan.

    I think the same is also true in a multilateral context at Kazan, where the
    Russian government, the Russian president, the Russian foreign minister had
    invested enormous amounts of their own time and prestige and essentially
    had the rug pulled out from under them at Kazan. I think that was not only
    really a quite extraordinary act for Azerbaijan to do to its neighboring
    great power Russia, but it essentially represented a premeditated decision
    to abandon any prospect for multilateral progress. So I tend to see those
    two things in parallel.

    MR. WILSON: Here in the front.

    Q: Thank you very much. I'm Darna Kovansa (ph) from the Embassy of Armenia.
    I would like also to thank the distinguished panel for very insightful
    presentations.

    I have a question, actually, but I would like also to comment on the last
    discussed issue about the Safarov case and its possible implication on the
    negotiations. Actually as an Armenian diplomat and I haven't heard anything
    coming from the Armenian side that Armenia will in any way exploit this
    issue on the negotiations table. And just to share with you very fresh news
    coming from New York, my minister earlier today delivered a statement at
    the UNGA saying that Armenia is remaining committed to the Minsk process,
    and even more, that the Minsk process views are in line with that of
    Armenia's prospect and - position on the conflict resolution. Of course,
    Safarov case was a serious blow to trust between parties and to the
    people-to-people contacts, but I don't like to have for the audience
    impression that it will somehow influence Armenia to change its position
    around the negotiating table.

    My question will go to Mr. Merry regarding the Turkish possible involvement
    in the peace process. Don't you think, Mr. Merry, that there is a
    contradiction between the Turkish involvement and the Minsk Group peace
    process as a whole? I haven't heard you avert to a question of the
    prospects of a peace negotiated under the Minsk process. On the contrary,
    in the previous articles you supported the Minsk process. However, Turkey
    wholeheartedly backs only Azerbaijani position on the negotiations, on the
    peace prospect. That is quite different from what the co-chairs are
    proposing on the table, the basic principles.

    And this is where the contradiction starts. I'm not talking about the
    Armenian-Turkish relations, which are very difficult, as you know, the
    genocide denial, borders, but there is an actual contradiction on the
    Nagorno-Karabakh field. Turkey backs only one position and not the whole
    peace process. How can it be worked out, or you are advocating for a change
    of the format?

    Thank you.

    MR. MERRY: Well, I might note that Turkey is part of the Minsk Group. It's
    not one of the co-chairs, but the Minsk Group is substantially larger than
    just the three co-chairs. I think people tend to forget that.

    What I was indicating was that in a renewed regional crisis, a new renewed
    series of small-scale conflicts potentially leading to an open war between
    Armenia and Azerbaijan, that Turkey, as a country which borders both, a
    country which has a patron-client relationship with Azerbaijan, which has a
    difficult nonrelationship with Armenia, is definitely going to play an
    important role. It is therefore important that that role be a positive one.
    And it is therefore important, I think, that Turkish understanding and
    thinking about the nature of the conflict and the problem be more
    sophisticated than it has been shown to be in the past, and that its role
    as a regional great power be carefully coordinated with the other regional
    great power, Russia, so that the two of them can hopefully make a positive
    joint contribution rather than as regional great powers losing control.

    Now, if I thought that other external powers were likely to be able to do a
    better job, I would advocate it, but I think it is highly improbable that
    either the Europeans or the Americans, given everything else that they've
    got to deal with for the foreseeable future, are likely to be able to do
    so. I mean, for example, the United States has positive relations with both
    Armenia and Azerbaijan, but it has no actual commitments to either. And
    exactly what would we do in a conflict situation? We are not a weapons
    supplier to either. We could not do the kinds of things we did in the 1973
    Middle East war of exercising suasion on Israel. Exactly, other than strong
    words, what would the United States or France be able to do in a real
    crisis situation? Whereas I think both Moscow and Ankara are inevitably
    countries that, whether they wanted to or not, because they are regional
    powers, will be forced to react, and it is therefore important that that
    reaction be a positive one.

    MR. WILSON: I think I would add, just to take my moderator's priority, just
    to add a little bit to Wayne's point, I think it would be important not to
    perceive Turkey or Turkish policy in the region in black and white,
    although it's easy to do that and in particular it's easy to do that from
    the point of view of Yerevan. It was clear in the aftermath of the
    Russia-Georgia war in 2008 that the Turks looked at what happened and they
    were horrified by it and, in particular, were - saw rising instability or
    this very sharp and obvious instability that the Russia-Georgia war
    represented as something threatening to their interests and in - and
    created a circumstance in which that for a period they looked at more
    creative avenues to involve - to involve Turkey constructively in Caucasus
    affairs.

    One was the Turkey-Armenia normalization process, which had been - the
    negotiations had been going on for some time but, on the - on the Turkish
    side, got a significant kick in the pants by this - by this circumstance.
    Another was the resurfacing of the Caucasus - I've forgotten the exact
    name, but the Caucasus stability platform, which I think was seen in the
    United States as a somewhat ham-handed effort, but it was to provide a
    framework for a different kind of Turkish role.

    The other point, I think, as events play out over the coming couple of
    years, you'll see - we are likely to see a further change or evolution in
    Turkey's role and its interests in Caucasus stability as Turkey becomes
    more and more dependent on Caspian gas. That will be a - quite a different
    situation from something that exist 10 or 20 or even one or two years ago.
    Currently very small volumes of Azeri gas reach Turkish markets. Within
    five or seven years, it would be very substantial volumes. It - and I think
    then the imperative for Turkish policy to find more constructive roles in
    preserving stability will go up really quite substantially and lead to some
    different - certainly leads to a context in which Turkish policy may be
    quite different.

    A question over here.

    Q: Thank you, Ambassador. My name is Fahrad Ismalaban (ph) from Embassy of
    Azerbaijan. I will also certainly have a question to ask, but before asking
    question, I would ask ambassador's indulgence to say a few words about - a
    few comments on the - what has been said previously.

    Actually, I didn't felt any - in the presentation of the - of the
    panelists, any - much of urgency of solving this conflict. And - but from
    point of view Azerbaijan IDP situation - (inaudible). They are victims of
    the occupation. They are waiting to return back for more than 20 years. And
    then when actually they - (sorry to say ?) that we need to listen to expert
    presentation and sometimes from (the best encounters ?). And the situation
    is described, and position of the countries are described in the same
    terms. And then the people in Azerbaijan don't feel that really this
    negotiation made between the country of occupiers and the country of
    sufferers and that at this point it creates more frustration.

    And even the reaction to the so-called Safarov case didn't get - actually,
    people in Azerbaijan didn't get this reaction - overreaction to this matter
    because the issue was dead in 2004, and then it's only the - for several
    years the - and then when the - this - (inaudible) - in history are played
    up in Yerevan, it serves to prove the audience - this audience statements
    made in 2003 by former President Kocharian saying this, the Azerbaijanis
    are - and Armenians are ethnically incompatible and that they can't live in
    the - in the same country or on the side by side. And we believe that this
    policy at the end will complicate the peace and will not bring the peace
    and probably will bring new elements to the conflict because in Azerbaijan,
    never at any point this conflict was seen through the point of ethnicity.
    This was a - clearly a territorial conflict and one country taking another
    country's territory. And this was the - but unfortunately, this - all this
    - (inaudible) - played up the Ramil Safarov case will not probably help the
    - this peace. And I can't really - also, I agree with the - with Tom de
    Waal saying that this also a blow to the negotiations, which probably
    aren't existing for several months, actually. This is some comments.

    But also, the - you know, the reaction also is not the - now Armenia and
    Yerevan - actually, it's trying to announce to - imminent flight from
    Yerevan to Khojali airport. And then they try to prepare, you know, to send
    in something - (inaudible) - international community. For a time we
    wouldn't hear any reaction from the countries. And then would they wait for
    this flight to try to enter Azerbaijan's space and then to something
    happen? What would reaction of the experts to this announcement? Is it a
    real provocation to start the war or was give the reason to start the war?
    Thank you very much.

    MR. WILSON: Thank you. Just to answer one part of what you - of the
    comments that you've made, the purpose of this event was not really to look
    at the conflict per se, not to look at the particular painful issues that
    you have referred to. Our Armenian colleagues could - they have their own
    painful narrative as well. It was, rather, to look at Russian policy in
    this region and on this conflict, how that has changed over time. So the
    purpose was just a little bit different.

    At least from what I heard, I thought Wayne Merry in particular talked
    about the urgency of this conflict in raising the specter of a sort of
    prewar situation and the urgency of trying to find ways to head that off.

    I don't know, do any of the rest of you want to comment on other points
    that were made there?

    MR. MARKEDONOV: (Off mic) - and purpose of our event today was to consider
    to analyze the position of Russia. Of course, every ethnic political
    conflicts, be conflicts in Georgia or Nagorno-Karabakh, have such elements
    like refugees, IDPs and so on. It's impossible to imagine any
    ethno-political conflict without such elements. But we analyze the position
    of Russia.

    As for airport, you raise the question of airport opening in Stepanakert,
    close to Khojali, the place which is connected in their opinion of Azeris
    like tragedy and so on. But this question is multidimensional, in my mind.
    On the one hand, yes, we could speak that it's kind of quasi-recognition
    of Nagorno-Karabakh and so on. But on the other side, we could speak about
    engagement of this territory. Is it possible to discuss the fate of
    territory, its perspectives, without people living on the ground? I am not
    sure.

    Yes, now negotiations are done between - are provided between Azerbaijan
    and Armenia. But the future status would concern not people from Yerevan,
    Dilijan or Abovian. It would touch people living in Stepanakert, Mardakert,
    Gadruten (ph) and so on, so on. OK, we could ignore their opinion of
    Nagorno-Karabakh. We could ignore this entity, considering it like
    nonexistent. But would it be productive? Because without people living on
    the ground, it's impossible to resolve the conflict itself because the
    conflict, the core of this conflict is disputed area and population living
    on this area, in my mind. It's necessary to understand - it's not bad; it's
    not good.

    MR. MERRY: On the airport, let me address an issue that's not directly -
    not related to Russia but is related to the future of Azerbaijani policy,
    which is with the opening of this airport, there are going to be a lot more
    people from the outside world going to Karabakh. And it's - this full page
    in The New York Times' travel section on Sunday a week ago is emblematic
    of that. The recent visit by two former astronauts, one American, one Swiss,
    to some space-related event in Stepanakert is representative of that. When
    you had to go in through the Lachin corridor, I can tell you it's kind of a
    long schlep to get into Karabakh. But with the airport open, Karabakh is
    going to become a tourist destination.

    And this creates a choice for Azerbaijan. If you just automatically
    publicly declare persona non grata everybody that goes in, you get some
    gratification; you accomplish nothing. For example, in the case of the two
    astronauts, what Azerbaijan should have done is to immediately invite them
    to Azerbaijan, to show them your side, to let them meet with some of the
    IDPs, to let them see your side of the line, to let them see the new Baku.
    You should have reached out and engaged them, not basically told them that
    they were not welcome, something of which they were no doubt entirely
    unaware when they went to Stepanakert. The opening of the airport - this is
    going to be a recurrent issue for Azerbaijan. You can either make this into
    a potential benefit for yourself by engaging people, or you can simply take
    the view that anyone who goes on a tourist holiday because they read
    something in the Sunday New York Times travel section is therefore a leper.
    That's not to your advantage.

    MR. WILSON: Here in the front.

    Q: Alex van Oss, Foreign Service Institute. The word `suasion' has come up
    a number of times. And getting back to Russia, what forms of `suasion'
    could Russia take that are being footed, and what other forms might they
    take that are more delicate and sophisticated? This is all speculative, I
    realize.

    MR. : (Chuckles.)

    MR. DE WAAL: I mean, Russia, obviously, does have influence in Armenia. But
    I think it pretty much used up - you know, we're told that Russia pretty
    much twisted the arm of Serzh Sarkissian before, the Kazan meeting. He
    basically signed up to that agreement, what was on the table. He gave
    himself a let-out clause that had to be approved by the - what he agreed
    had to be approved by the Armenians of Karabakh. But, you know, Russia does
    have a certain amount of influence with the Armenian side.

    But I think this is one issue where both Armenia and Azerbaijan, you know,
    push back. They - it's - they regard this as one hundred percent in their
    national interest to maintain a position on this issue. And it's only ever
    going to be 5 (percent) or 10 percent or whatever in interests of Turkey or
    Russia or the United States to apply pressure. And I think that's why local
    resistance has always been stronger than external pressure. That I think
    would only change if it's not just Russia but Russia, the United States,
    the Europeans, maybe Turkey, all pushing at the same time, and that's
    obviously something we haven't yet seen.

    MR. MARKEDONOV: And speaking about Russian influence and pressure, as well
    as external pressure as a whole, we have lost that updated Madrid
    Principles themselves are very contradictory. They don't contain concrete
    mechanisms of realization, of step one, step two. The first step,
    liberation of five districts - what about 12 districts - (inaudible)? No
    clarifications. What about referendum? Would it be compulsory or
    recommendation? Many, many questions. (Precise ?), but no mechanisms, no
    real clear steps how to realize those brilliant ideas contradictory to each
    other.

    We really believed that signatures under updated Madrid Principles would be
    the end of the story. No. It would be start of the new story. What about
    interpretation of these signatures? Presidents of both Armenia and
    Azerbaijan thinks first of all about their future - (inaudible) - after the
    signature and their homes. In their situation, that could - they could
    ignore any pressures from outside, both Russian and the West. The document
    (basement ?) for the future peace is very, very contradictory, and many
    points are unclear - seven points, but most of them are unclear, and here -
    first of all mechanisms of realization. It's necessary to take it into
    account, first of all.

    MR. MERRY: Well, I think for any great power to actually exercise suasion
    is a dicey business. I mean, look how much difficulty the United States has
    getting people in Iraq or Afghanistan to do what we want.

    I think this actually illustrates my point, is that for Russia actually to
    use the significant influence it has in both Armenia and Azerbaijan will
    come at a significant cost. I mean, great powers like to have influence
    without actually having to use the resources. You know, the last thing
    Armenia would want to have is for the Russians sort of to have technical
    difficulties in delivering military supplies or spare parts. But these
    things can be done. But it will cause some damage to the relationship.
    Anything that Moscow would do with Baku that would be effective will have
    some lasting damage on the relationship and therefore would be not - you
    know, a net negative to Moscow's interest. I think this is why Russia would
    like not to be in a situation where it has to do that kind of thing.

    MR. WILSON: We're getting to the end. Let me just take here - take a couple
    of different questions. If we could please make it a question more than a
    comment. Over here, please.

    Q: Thank you. Adil Baguirov from the U.S. Azeris Network. I've got three
    short questions.

    Number one, why is Russia opposed to the conflict mediation moving to the
    U.N. Security Council from the OSCE Minsk Group? Number two, why do you
    think Azerbaijan is not joining the CSTO or rejoining it? And number three,
    why didn't we hear from Russia or any other big power, co-chairs, anything
    in 2001, for example, when the French court released a terrorist, Varoujan
    Garabedian, and he was taking (sic) to Armenia where he was promptly given
    citizenship. The mayor of Yerevan provided him an apartment and salary and
    a bunch of other benefits and really glorified a guy who was born in Syria,
    not even in Armenia. He was a convicted terrorist who killed eight people,
    including two U.S. citizens - and several other such examples of -
    Melkonian and, you know, many other convicted terrorists who killed
    civilians as opposed to military targets. Thank you.

    MR. WILSON: Three good questions. Back in the back here, there was someone
    - yes.

    Q: Hi. Will Englund, with The Washington Post. Just following up on
    something that Mr. Markedonov has said a little bit earlier. There has been
    a lot of talk today about - some talk today about tails wagging dogs. And
    of course, Nagorno-Karabakh itself is kind of a tail that wags the Armenian
    dog. And I'm wondering in - if we're entering a period of increased danger
    of something irrational happening. Has Russia been too reliant on Yerevan
    as the - as the authority, as the director of the - what you might call the
    larger Armenian side?

    MR. WILSON: OK.

    MR. DE WAAL: There's - are we going to take one more, or -

    MR. WILSON: I think we're about out of time, but maybe here in the back.
    But last - the last question, then we'll wrap it up.

    Q: Thank you very much. This is - (inaudible). I'm from the Turkish
    embassy, and I have a very small comment and - (inaudible) - small question.

    I would like to - I think I have the right here to underline that Turkey
    has a constructive and positive approach concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh
    issue, and - because it's our immediate neighborhood, and as Mr. Merry has
    mentioned, we are a member of the Minsk Group, although we are not part of
    the three co-chairs. So we know it is very - it is very difficult and
    complicated. It's a very difficult problem.

    But it is unfortunate to hear that representatives of Armenia would be
    against any kind of positive initiative that may come from Turkey just
    because it's coming from Turkey, just because it's coming from a country
    that is not part of the co-chairs. I have difficulty in understanding this
    approach of Armenia because we all know that any positive step in
    Nagorno-Karabakh issue can contribute to other problems in our
    neighborhood, in our region, including Turkish-Armenian bilateral
    relations. So this is my comment.

    And my question concerns Russia. As Mr. Merry mentions, Turkey and Russia
    can play a role. Yes, it can - we can - we can think about that. But I
    wonder how Russia and other co-chairs would be - would think about that and
    would stay - would they welcome it, or they just say we don't want any
    other player in this area, we are OK? Thank you.

    MR. WILSON: Gentlemen. Maybe Tom go first, then Sergey.

    MR. DE WAAL: Sure. Adil's questions - I think it's not just Russia. The -
    all the three co-chairs seem to be opposed to moving to the U.N., maybe not
    on principle, but simply that really, the - changing the format I don't
    think changes the substance of the problem. You would just sort of -
    changing the frame - the picture frame, but you're not changing the
    picture. I think if anyone thought it could make a significant difference,
    they probably would favor it.

    Why does Azerbaijan not join the CSTO? I think you can probably answer that
    just as well as we can. It's - you know, Azerbaijan has a different
    geopolitical orientation.

    The Garabedian case is an interesting one. I certainly have started reading
    up on it myself since people have been mentioning it. And it's just - I
    think - and, you know, I think it's - it was certainly an outrageous thing
    to do to give this man citizenship. I suppose he did serve full 17 years in
    a - in a - in a French jail and was released. But still, it was a very
    provocative gesture. I suppose it was done with much less fanfare; it was
    done more quietly. But it certainly deserved some condemnation the way he
    was treated. And I'm happy to add - (chuckles) - you know, my criticism of
    that. But certainly, two wrongs don't make a right. The idea that you can
    sort of say, the Armenian side behaved badly, therefore, we're going to
    behave badly too, it doesn't stand up as an argument.

    And I would - to Will's - I'd also like to comment on Will's question. I
    think we have an interesting election in Karabakh this summer, when - which
    the opposition candidate, Vitaly Balasanyan, got, I think, 32 percent of
    the vote. That was a pretty impressive vote in a post-Soviet territory like
    Karabakh, and that does suggest that we shouldn't take for granted the fact
    that the Karabakh Armenians will automatically do what Yerevan says.

    MR. WILSON: Sergey.

    MR. MARKEDONOV: OK. Now it's my turn. The answer on the first question
    would be very simple. Russia is not interested to lose its monopoly, as
    well as USA and France. I think that engagement of U.N. would mean
    inflation of OSCE Minsk Group in the conflict resolution, which is why not
    only Russia but USA and France are not so lucky from the U.N. engagement.
    And maybe this thing would be not so politically correct, but I'm not sure
    that some other reasons besides populist would be really discussed in the
    framework of U.N., you know.

    As for the second question, we spoke that Russia tries to provide balanced,
    nuanced or - (inaudible) - policy in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan also. I know
    that in 2005 Azerbaijan really discussed the joining CSTO. Ilham Aliyev
    publicly said that he studied the documents - (inaudible) - some years
    before, studied documents. Why? Context of 2004-2005, colored revolutions -
    (inaudible) - movement on the streets of Azerbaijan Azadlig, and so on and
    so on. In 2006 Azerbaijan was called as the Islamic ally of the United
    States. It was second country after Turkey which was named by this honorary
    title. And problems of CSTO were taken away. It's a balance.

    I think that geopolitical configuration over Azerbaijan is not so - is not
    completely definite. I could not completely agree with Tom thesis that
    Azerbaijan geopolitical configuration is rather different. Azerbaijan has
    restrictions in its movement, both to the Russian direction and to the
    Western direction, to the Western also, problems of democracy, elections
    and so on and so on. There are many (hooks ?) from the Western side which
    are not so appropriate in Azerbaijan. In contrast, Russia could recognize
    results of any elections before central committee of Azerbaijan, central
    electoral committee, would recognize them as legitimate. Remember
    experience of 2005 parliamentary elections. This is why Russia is also very
    good as a counterbalance because Russians in Gabala would be very effective
    for Azerbaijan because Russians in would be maybe guarantee from the
    Iranian engagement, which is very risky and dangerous for Azerbaijan. This
    is why maybe in a couple of months, we would discuss here or in other think
    tank of Washington - at CSIS, for example - prospects of prolongation of
    Russian-Azerbaijani cooperation for Gabala.

    The question about tails and dogs. (Chuckles.) Of course, Russia relies on
    the official at Yerevan. It's usual - it's habitual for Russia to rely on
    official position, not only in Yerevan but in Azerbaijan. Russian
    authorities ignores many other factors. And this is why they are not really
    ready for new challenges. Before my contribution here, I analyzed the first
    results of the Georgian exit polls, very interesting. Georgian Dream_ maybe
    would be more successful. (When I was speaking ?), I predicted such
    results, and it was necessary to argue with somebody. But Russia now is not
    ready to this scenario. OK, if everybody instead of Saakashvili would be in
    Tbilisi, what Russia would really propose, what topics? This is why, yes,
    it's necessary to be more attentive to different actors in Yerevan, in
    Baku, in Tbilisi. It's a problem of the Russian foreign policy, I
    understand.

    But - yeah, and last but not least, comment about the Turkish policy. It's
    a very interesting and controversial topic. I think this problem is twofold
    in the Caucasus. We discussed readiness of another co-chairs for the
    Turkish engagement, readiness of Armenia. But what about readiness of
    Turkey itself? Nowadays Turkey is engaged more actively in the Middle East
    agenda, and it takes much more energy from the Turkish side. I'm not sure
    that Turkey itself really ready to be the fourth co-chair of the Minsk
    Group. I'm not sure.

    And Karabakh conflict is very important for Turkey, but in the context of
    Armenian-Turkish relations, first of all. It's impossible to abandon the
    principles of national egoism. OK, we have Turkey brothers in Azerbaijan,
    but first and foremost our national interests. As for the Armenian and
    Turkey dialogue, now it's frozen, but it's not completely stopped because
    we have request for this normalization both in the Turkish society and in
    Armenian society. Unlike situation five, six years ago, we have discourse
    of discussion between not only Turkish people and Armenians about the
    normalization, about the rapprochement, but between Turks and Turks,
    between Armenians and Armenians about the cost of this rapprochement, about
    the price of it, about tempos, about many, many other aspects.

    And this request was - were not due to so-called soccer diplomacy. It was
    born in 1991 after the - (inaudible) - and sometimes this process was
    frozen and then was revitalized. Karabakh factor is a factor of not only
    Turkish foreign policy but domestic also. Don't forget about some millions
    of Azeris in Turkey. It's domestic factor. Those people are engaged in the
    elections, they vote, and it's a very important factor. But first and
    foremost in the bilateral relations between Turkey and Armenia.

    MR. WILSON: Wayne, briefly.

    MR. MERRY: OK, three points. One of the reasons why the Minsk Group was
    created was because the U.N. Security Council didn't want to touch Karabakh
    at all from the beginning. I've seen no indication that that has changed.
    In fact, in the fall of 1994 in New York, I personally set up a meeting
    between Levon Ter-Petrossian and Heydar Aliyev, and I can assure you that
    the people in the U.N. secretariat, the secretary-general's office, were
    perfectly happy to stay far away from that and not have anything to do with
    it. I see no indication that anybody in New York wants to add Karabakh to
    their - to their docket.

    A point about the Safarov case that is unique is that the crime took place
    in the context of a program in the Partnership for Peace. And this was a
    problem for NATO, for all the Partnership for Peace countries and for the
    country that was hosting the event, Hungary. I actually was partially
    involved in that because I was the person in the Pentagon who found the
    money for Armenia and Azerbaijan to send military officers to programs like
    that, and I argued in favor of doing that on the notion if you got the two
    people - military officers from the two sides together in a neutral venue,
    they might establish some kind of personal relationship. Well - (laughter)
    - the fact remains that the crime involved was one which violated a program
    of an important multilateral venture of the alliance, and so it offended a
    lot of people in that context.

    And finally, the question from the representative of the Turkish embassy,
    well, I might note your Russian embassy colleague is here. You could just
    sort of set - you know, settle it right here. (Laughter.) But my point was
    not that Turkey should be a fourth co-chair of the Minsk Group, not at all.
    My point is that Turkey is an objective reality as a Caucasian regional
    great power with a much more activist and involved foreign policy, with a
    patron-client relationship with one of the two participants in this
    conflict and with a very important semirelationship with the other one, and
    in any crisis, Turkey is going to be important. As difficult as reality can
    be for people at Foggy Bottom or the Quai d'Orsay or Smolenskaya Ploshchad
    to deal with, they will deal with the reality of Turkey because it is a
    reality. Two of those countries are allies of Turkey, for crying out loud.

    And while there are still some difficulties in the relationship between
    Moscow and Ankara, I think the Turkish-Russian relationship is actually one
    of the most positive aspects of the post-Cold War world. I see no reason to
    believe that a Turkish involvement that is seen as being more than just
    serving Azerbaijan is one that would not be welcome to the other
    participants, partly because it's part of the - if it's part of the
    solution rather than contributing to the problem.

    MR. WILSON: As a former American ambassador to Turkey, it's interesting
    that the conversation that started about Russia ends up with Turkey.
    Seriously, I think this helped, for me at least, and, I hope, all of you in
    understanding a little bit more clearly what is Russia's role, what is
    Russia seeking, how have things evolved, how - what are some of the
    interests that come more directly into play as far as Russia is concerned
    on issues of Nagorno-Karabakh and, for that matter, the broader Caucasus.

    I want to thank all of you for being an excellent audience and having some
    good questions. I want to thank the Atlantic Council staff and, in
    particular, Anna Borshchevskaya, our assistant director of the Eurasia
    Center, for the arrangements here. And please join me in thanking our three
    panelists. (Applause.)

    (END)

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