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From Tripwire to Something More? Moscow Increases Military Readiness
in the South Caucasus
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 8
January 16, 2013 04:35 PM Age: 25 days
By: Paul Goble
(Source: novostink.ru)
Moscow has increased the size and activity of its flotilla on the
Caspian Sea and the readiness of its Gyumri base in Armenia over the
last several months. Russian officials say this development reflects
concerns about instability in Syria and Iran, but it also appears to
transform those forces from the tripwire they have been over the last
two decades into a capability to play a larger role both in the South
Caucasus and more generally.
Russia's Southern Military District (MD) announced last week (January
5) during a press conference that commanders had increased the number
and intensity of drills at the Gyumri base and that Moscow has
continued to expand the size and capabilities of its Caspian Flotilla.
Specifically, the MD press office said that uniformed personnel at the
base in Armenia had increased their target practice times by 25
percent over the year before, a significant intensification given the
shortage of funds for such activities that many Russian units now
experience (www.regnum.ru/news/fd-abroad/armenia/1610633.html).
At the press conference, officers added that the Caspian Flotilla had
been enlarged over the last year by five surface combat vessels,
including two capable of launching rockets and a third capable of
deploying helicopters, as well as two support ships. That expansion is
continuing with a new corvette having been added to the force in the
last month alone as well as with the announcement of plans to add
landing craft and a floating harbor and repair ship over the next
several years (rusnavy.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=16633).
Both the Gyumri base in Armenia, which has more than 3,000 Russian
military personnel, and the Caspian Flotilla are protected by the CIS
air defense center at Kaputin Yar in Astrakhan oblast and are
integrated into the Collective Reaction Forces of the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) of which Armenia, but not
Azerbaijan or Georgia, is a member.
In reporting these developments, the Regnum news agency suggested that
they should be viewed within the context of `the complex military
political situation in the Near East as a whole and around Syria and
Iran in particular.' It added that these moves `testify to the
intention of Moscow to strengthen its positions in the Trans-Caucasus
[sic] given the background of growing risks and challenges connected
with the destabilization' of the broader region.
Three Russian comments on these developments provide some additional
context. First, Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Moscow Center for the
Analysis of Strategies and Technologies and a member of the Russian
defense ministry's public council, notes that Russia has taken these
steps to remain in `the lead' militarily across the region. With the
assistance of the United States and Israel, Azerbaijan has been able
to acquire some highly advanced systems on both land and water. But
the focus of Baku's land forces remains the Karabakh dispute with
Armenia, and US-Israeli support is about Iran, not about Russia
(valdaiclub.com/defense/41620.html).
The second of these, Konstantin Sivkov, the vice president of the
Moscow Academy for Geopolitical Problems, notes that the Gyumri base
continues to be a subject of debate. He points out that `Turkey has
overwhelming military supremacy in the region and Russia will hardly
be able to stop an advance of Turkish forces' should Ankara decide to
launch one. But such an attack would mean that Turkey would find
itself in a state of war with Russia, something it clearly wants to
avoid (www.pravda.ru/world/formerussr/other/18-10-2012/1131692-gumri-0/).
Sivkov adds that Moscow has a 25-year lease on the Gyumri base but
does not pay rent. Whereas, in neighboring Azerbaijan, Moscow ended
its use of the Gabala radar site this past fall because Baku insisted
Moscow pay more. The reason for this arrangement, the analyst says, is
that `Russia and Armenia are allies [...] Russia will not fight for
Azerbaijan but it will for Armenia' because the latter is part of the
Collective Security Treaty Organization.'
Thus, Sivkov continues, `the Russian military base on the territory of
Armenia exists not only as a defense against Turkey' but also against
Azerbaijan or even NATO forces standing behind Baku. Thus, the Gyumri
base protects Armenia `equally' against both possibilities.
And third, Admiral Sergei Alekminsky, the commander of Russia's
Caspian Flotilla, points out that the Russian navy relatively closely
cooperates with Kazakhstan, but less so with other littoral states. He
adds that tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan, on the one hand, and
between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, on the other, over security
issues and oil deposits on the sea floor have intensified to the point
that `there could be war' as a result.
Up to now, Russian forces on both land and sea in the South Caucasus
appear to have functioned primarily as a tripwire intended to dissuade
others from acting. But the growing size of the flotilla and the
enhanced military preparedness of both it and the units at Gyumri mean
that at least potentially, Moscow may be positioning itself to be able
to deploy them for more forward reasons.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40307&tx_ttnews[backPid]=620
in the South Caucasus
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 8
January 16, 2013 04:35 PM Age: 25 days
By: Paul Goble
(Source: novostink.ru)
Moscow has increased the size and activity of its flotilla on the
Caspian Sea and the readiness of its Gyumri base in Armenia over the
last several months. Russian officials say this development reflects
concerns about instability in Syria and Iran, but it also appears to
transform those forces from the tripwire they have been over the last
two decades into a capability to play a larger role both in the South
Caucasus and more generally.
Russia's Southern Military District (MD) announced last week (January
5) during a press conference that commanders had increased the number
and intensity of drills at the Gyumri base and that Moscow has
continued to expand the size and capabilities of its Caspian Flotilla.
Specifically, the MD press office said that uniformed personnel at the
base in Armenia had increased their target practice times by 25
percent over the year before, a significant intensification given the
shortage of funds for such activities that many Russian units now
experience (www.regnum.ru/news/fd-abroad/armenia/1610633.html).
At the press conference, officers added that the Caspian Flotilla had
been enlarged over the last year by five surface combat vessels,
including two capable of launching rockets and a third capable of
deploying helicopters, as well as two support ships. That expansion is
continuing with a new corvette having been added to the force in the
last month alone as well as with the announcement of plans to add
landing craft and a floating harbor and repair ship over the next
several years (rusnavy.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=16633).
Both the Gyumri base in Armenia, which has more than 3,000 Russian
military personnel, and the Caspian Flotilla are protected by the CIS
air defense center at Kaputin Yar in Astrakhan oblast and are
integrated into the Collective Reaction Forces of the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) of which Armenia, but not
Azerbaijan or Georgia, is a member.
In reporting these developments, the Regnum news agency suggested that
they should be viewed within the context of `the complex military
political situation in the Near East as a whole and around Syria and
Iran in particular.' It added that these moves `testify to the
intention of Moscow to strengthen its positions in the Trans-Caucasus
[sic] given the background of growing risks and challenges connected
with the destabilization' of the broader region.
Three Russian comments on these developments provide some additional
context. First, Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Moscow Center for the
Analysis of Strategies and Technologies and a member of the Russian
defense ministry's public council, notes that Russia has taken these
steps to remain in `the lead' militarily across the region. With the
assistance of the United States and Israel, Azerbaijan has been able
to acquire some highly advanced systems on both land and water. But
the focus of Baku's land forces remains the Karabakh dispute with
Armenia, and US-Israeli support is about Iran, not about Russia
(valdaiclub.com/defense/41620.html).
The second of these, Konstantin Sivkov, the vice president of the
Moscow Academy for Geopolitical Problems, notes that the Gyumri base
continues to be a subject of debate. He points out that `Turkey has
overwhelming military supremacy in the region and Russia will hardly
be able to stop an advance of Turkish forces' should Ankara decide to
launch one. But such an attack would mean that Turkey would find
itself in a state of war with Russia, something it clearly wants to
avoid (www.pravda.ru/world/formerussr/other/18-10-2012/1131692-gumri-0/).
Sivkov adds that Moscow has a 25-year lease on the Gyumri base but
does not pay rent. Whereas, in neighboring Azerbaijan, Moscow ended
its use of the Gabala radar site this past fall because Baku insisted
Moscow pay more. The reason for this arrangement, the analyst says, is
that `Russia and Armenia are allies [...] Russia will not fight for
Azerbaijan but it will for Armenia' because the latter is part of the
Collective Security Treaty Organization.'
Thus, Sivkov continues, `the Russian military base on the territory of
Armenia exists not only as a defense against Turkey' but also against
Azerbaijan or even NATO forces standing behind Baku. Thus, the Gyumri
base protects Armenia `equally' against both possibilities.
And third, Admiral Sergei Alekminsky, the commander of Russia's
Caspian Flotilla, points out that the Russian navy relatively closely
cooperates with Kazakhstan, but less so with other littoral states. He
adds that tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan, on the one hand, and
between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, on the other, over security
issues and oil deposits on the sea floor have intensified to the point
that `there could be war' as a result.
Up to now, Russian forces on both land and sea in the South Caucasus
appear to have functioned primarily as a tripwire intended to dissuade
others from acting. But the growing size of the flotilla and the
enhanced military preparedness of both it and the units at Gyumri mean
that at least potentially, Moscow may be positioning itself to be able
to deploy them for more forward reasons.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40307&tx_ttnews[backPid]=620