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RES news agency website, Tskhinvali, S. Ossetia
Jan 11 2013
Russian expert views Georgia's military potential, relations with neighbours
[Translated from Russian]
The following is the text of article by V. Y. Soshestvenskiy,
candidate of pedagogical sciences and senior academic staffer of the
Centre for Systemic Regional Studies and Prognosis of the Southern
Federal University's Retraining and Qualification Improvement
Institute and the Institute of Social and Political Studies of the
Russian Academy of Sciences, published on the South Ossetian
separatist government-run Res news agency website on 11 January
headlined "Restoration of Georgia's Armed Forces and likelihood of
deterioration of military and political situation in the South
Caucasus":
The majority of experts who have analysed the likelihood of an armed
confrontation in the South Caucasus in the near future have identified
several scenarios of how events could unfold. The first one, which is
not new and is the most pleasing one to the Georgian political
leadership, is linked to the "Russian military threat." Meanwhile,
although Georgian politicians have made a series of blunt statements
regarding the imminent military aggression against Georgia (Endnote
1), international experts believe that this scenario of developments
is an unlikely one (Endnote 2). In this context, the political
demarches by [President Mikheil] Saakashvili, [former Foreign Affairs
Minister Grigol] Vashadze, and [Paata] Zakareishvili [minister of
state for reintegration], who have accused Russia of aspiring to "turn
Georgia into a 'failed state,'" obstructing the realization of its
European and Euro-Atlantic choice, and "bringing Georgia back into the
Russian orbit by force," (Endnote 3) were rather part of the
propaganda aiming to reinforce Georgia's image as a country "whose
territories have been occupied." These actions by the Georgian
political leadership appear to be aimed at securing political,
economic, and military benefits from the "Western partners." It is
clear that, in the current international political situation, Russia
is interested in preserving its "status quo" in the South Caucasus,
rather than destabilizing the situation. Meanwhile, Georgia would
clearly benefit from intensification of armed confrontation in the
region as this would make it easier to retain the international
community's attention to the problem of Georgian-Russian disputes.
While Georgian politicians have been making peace-loving statements
saying that Georgia will aspire to resolve the problem of the
"occupied territories" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by peaceful means
only, they would like a hotbed of armed conflict to emerge as it would
confirm that Russia's foreign policy in the Caucasus is an aggressive
one. Armed confrontation in the region would force the Western
counties to be more accommodating during the discussion of the
question of Georgia's accession to NATO, as well as the provision of
other types of military and political aid to the country. Meanwhile,
the question of responsibility for triggering the conflict would
become less significant. The August 2008 events [Russia-Georgia war
over South Ossetia] clearly showed that the current level of
development of the means of waging information wars makes it possible
to mislead the international community and persuade it that the
aggressor is not at fault. Thus, the powerful misinformation campaign
that the Georgian leadership carried out in 2008 resulted in the
shifting of attention from the mistakes it had made during the
implementation of its internal ethnic policies to foreign policy
issues. At the same time, having declared the territories of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia occupied "as a result of the Russian Federation's
military aggression," (Endnote 4) the Georgian political leadership
was able to ensure that the international community viewed the
Georgian-Abkhazian and the Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts primarily
as parts of the unresolved Russian-Georgian conflict. Meanwhile,
although Georgian politicians have repeatedly stated that preserving
the country's territorial integrity is a fundamental and principal
issue on which Georgia will not make concessions under any
circumstances (Endnote 5), they understand very well that further use
of force against Tskhinvali and Sokhumi will prompt retaliation from
Russia. In this situation, it appears that the preservation of peace
in the region will depend largely on Russia's political self-restraint
as the side that is not interested in the destabilization of the
military and political situation in the South Caucasus, as well as its
ability to react appropriately to the possible provocations in the
diplomatic, informational, and military spheres, including those
organized by the Georgian special services.
The combat readiness of the Georgian Army is interesting in this
context. A number of military experts believe that Georgia was able to
restore the combat potential of its Army within a year of the defeat
in August 2008. At the same time, the number of servicemen increased
from 32,000 in 2008 (Endnote 6) to 37,800 in 2009 (Endnote 7).
Compared to August 2008, the ground component of the Georgian Army
increased by one regular infantry brigade and one artillery brigade.
For this reason, taking into account the two Army reserve brigades
that are being formed, as well as the National Guard forces, one could
assume that its size has increased by a factor of 1.5 to 2.
Despite the fact that, because of the economic crisis, the budget
allocations to the Georgian Defence Ministry have decreased
considerably (from 1bn dollars, i.e. approximately 9 per cent of GDP
in 2008, to 406m dollars in 2012), these have actually been converted
into combat power during the postwar period when weapons and military
equipment (for example, the Turkish Ejder armoured personnel carriers)
have been delivered through contracts signed earlier (Endnote 8). For
this reason, one can argue that the Georgian Army's postwar level of
equipment (excluding the navy) is higher than that of August 2008,
even if one takes into account the weapons and the military equipment
lost during the combat operations. The expanding military cooperation
between Georgia and the NATO countries has contributed significantly
to this. It is worth noting that military cooperation between Georgia
and the United States has intensified lately. For example, Washington
handed two coastal guard patrol boats worth 2m dollars to Georgia as a
gift before Hillary Clinton's visit to Georgia (the United States
allocated a total of 10m dollars for the improvement of Georgia's
coastal guard infrastructure in 2012). In June 2011, the US Department
of Defence gave Georgia for free 30 Hummer M1151 vehicles and 10
Hummer M1151A1 armoured vehicles worth a total of 5m dollars. In April
2012, an official statement was made regarding the transfer of 28
armoured vehicles with enhanced protection against mines. Moreover,
the United States is training Georgian Army units both on Georgian
territory and at the US Army training centre in Hohenfels (Germany).
Joint exercises by the armies of Georgia and the NATO countries are
also held regularly.
France, Turkey, Israel, Bulgaria, and other countries have been
actively involved in the postwar rearming of Georgia along with the
United States. A wide range of [armaments] has been delivered,
starting with firearms and their munitions and ending with heavy
armoured vehicles and modern antitank and antiaircraft systems. The
imported military equipment's share in the Georgian Army's stocks
increased to 50 per cent after the 2008 war.
The balance of interests in the region appears to be as follows:
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are resolving the problems of their
state-building and are therefore not interested in the deterioration
of the military and political situation. Such deterioration would also
be disadvantageous for Russia as it is interested in preserving its
"status quo" in the region. Georgia, meanwhile, continues to
strengthen its Armed Forces but presently still does not have
sufficient military power to solve the problem of reclaiming the
territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by force on its own.
In this context, it seems appropriate to discuss the question of how
the Georgian leadership is planning to use its Armed Forces.
The Georgian leadership considers the participation of Georgian Army
units in the US (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan very important. Before
September 2012, it involved 900 Georgian servicemen who were deployed
as part of the US Army force in the Afghan province of Helmand (at the
Shukvani military base) and the French force in Kabul. This was the
second largest force among the countries that are not members of NATO.
The situation changed in October 2012, when the Georgian leadership
sent an additional battalion to Afghanistan. As a result, the number
of Georgian servicemen increased to 1,700, which made it possible for
Georgia to claim a leading position in terms of "supplying the
overseas partners with soldiers."
The Georgian leadership has thus deployed approximately 5 per cent of
all Georgian troops in the NATO operation in Afghanistan. Meanwhile,
the Georgian military themselves are not eager to go through the
"Afghan school." According to the Tbilisi-based Kviris Palitra
newspaper, Georgia has encountered problems in terms of recruiting
contractors for service in Afghanistan. It has been reported that, in
the first quarter of 2012, some 100 servicemen filed written refusals
to serve in this Islamic republic. Those who have refused have not
even been deterred by strong punitive sanctions (28,000 lari which is
approximately 17,000 dollars) established for the violation of
contract terms (Endnote 9). At the same time, the involvement of the
Georgian military in the NATO operation in Afghanistan has come under
increasingly frequent criticism from the political opposition. For
example, in March [ 2012], Georgia's current opposition parties signed
a joined declaration whereby they informed the alliance's command of
their indignation at Georgia's disproportionately high contribution to
security in Afghanistan against the background of the reduction in the
forces of other countries (Endnote 10).
Despite all this, the current political leadership of Georgia still
considers the participation of the Georgian military in the US
operation in Afghanistan a priority objective. There is the impression
that, by sending its soldiers to the "hot spots" and effectively
"trading" in their lives, the Georgian leadership hopes to receive
certain bonuses from the United States in terms of political,
financial, and military-technical support. Protection of sovereignty
and restoration of the country's territorial integrity are the next
priority objectives of the Georgian Armed Forces. Since Georgia has
unresolved territorial disputes with all its neighbours (except for
Turkey), one can only ask where the Georgian president is planning to
use his favourite creation -the Armed Forces?
Most of Georgia's grievances are targeted at Russia which it accuses
of occupying the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and also
considers the primary threat to its national security. This was
confirmed by the results of the vote on the adoption of the new
National Security Blueprint (Endnote 3) in December 2011. It is
noteworthy that the Georgian Parliament adopted the blueprint with 111
votes in favour and three against it. The opposition's criticism only
focused on the need to use tougher language concerning Russia which is
mentioned 44 times in the document. However, despite the crisis of
interstate relations between Georgia and Russia which the Georgian
leadership has sustained artificially, the Georgian Armed Forces,
judging by the main characteristics of their combat potential, are
unlikely to be able to effectively confront the Russian Army and
conduct successful offensive combat operations against it in the
foreseeable future. At the same time, Georgia has unresolved
territorial disputes with Azerbaijan and Armenia. The village of
Erisimedi and part of the Davit Gareji monastery complex are the
disputed territory with Azerbaijan and the controversy over this led
to a serious border conflict between Azerbaijan and Georgia in May of
last year. Commenting on these developments, Georgian Deputy Foreign
Minister Nino Kalandadze said that the Georgian side "has no intention
to give up its lands" and that all controversial questions between
Georgia and Azerbaijan would be resolved "through an agreement between
friendly countries." However, she also emphasized that "...the
question of giving up the monastery complex will never be discussed"
(Endnote 11).
The territorial disputes between Armenia and Georgia appear to have
deeper roots. For example, a 96-km section of the (206-km-long)
Armenian-Georgian border is still disputed. Georgia has laid claims on
the village of Bavra in Armenia's Shirak Province (located near the
Armenian-Georgian border in Samtskhe-Javakheti Province) and the
adjacent area. Territorial disputes over this village already
triggered an incident between the border troops of the two countries
in November 2009 (the Armenian National Security Council has confirmed
that the incident did take place). The Armenian side attempted to put
up border posts in response to the Georgian side's actions but
encountered resistance by Georgians (Endnote 12). Georgia also claims
ownership of Armenia's Lori Province. Moreover, the Georgian side is
making active efforts at different levels to "reclaim" it. For
example, the Georgian media have initiated a discussion of the
question of returning all churches located on this territory to
Georgia, as well as of the (July 2012) address by the Georgian
diaspora of Lori-Tashir demanding revision of the state border between
Georgia and Armenia and unification of Lori Province with Georgia
(Endnote 13). Earlier, in September 2010, the question of border
delimitation was discussed during Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol
Vashadze's visit to Armenia. The visit was followed by a meeting of an
intergovernmental commission, but the sides have so far been unable to
reconcile their positions (Endnote 14). Considering the contemporary
trends in the development of interstate relations between Georgia and
Azerbaijan, as well as the fact that the Georgian National Security
Blueprint recognizes relations with Azerbaijan as "strategic," the
likelihood of an armed confrontation between these countries appears
to be negligible. The development of Georgian-Armenian relations seems
to be less predictable. For example, the Georgian National Security
Blueprint describes Armenian-Georgian relations merely as "close
partnership." The Georgian side has not reacted appropriately to the
years of attempts by the Armenian leadership to establish closer ties.
This is likely to be the result of Georgia's unwillingness to consider
a state engaged in a strategic partnership with Russia as its own
strategic partner. It is possible that the formation of this vector of
Georgian foreign policy is influenced by the existence of an
anti-Armenian narrative in Georgia. For example, in 2011, the
Internews organization conducted monitoring of printed media in order
to study the level of social tolerance and questions concerning the
protection of human rights in Georgia. The general figures concerning
ethnic groups are the most noteworthy ones. The survey showed that 60
per cent, i.e. the majority, of the publications in the printed media
were devoted to Armenians (and were mostly negative). Only 11 per cent
of the materials were devoted to the Abkhazians whom Georgians have
fought on two occasions during the years of independence. The rest of
the materials were distributed as follows: Azerbaijanis and Meskhetian
Turks -7 per cent, Ossetians -5 per cent, and so on. Among the
religious minorities, Armenians were once again the most frequently
mentioned group (47 per cent), while, for example, Muslims, whose
number in the country is constantly rising, have been overshadowed as
only 24 per cent of the materials were devoted to them (Endnote 15).
The conflict that has emerged between the goals of the Georgian
leadership's policy of building a mono-ethnic society in the country
and the aspiration of the Armenian diaspora to preserve its national
identity appears to be the main cause of this situation.
Meanwhile, given the tension in interstate relations between
Azerbaijan and Armenia, the August 2011 statement by the Georgian
president that "Azerbaijan's enemies are also enemies of Georgia" and
the subsequent anti-Armenian speeches by Azerbaijani politicians
appear controversial (Endnote 16). All this, coupled with
Saakashvili's general tendency to resolve territorial disputes by
means of military force (as was the case with Abkhazia and South
Ossetia) would prompt one to predict a possible intensification of the
Armenian-Georgian disputes (should certain geopolitical circumstances
arise).
For these reasons, military confrontation in the South Caucasus
appears unlikely in the short run. However, as the military potential
and combat power of the Georgian Armed Forces grow, and provided
certain geopolitical conditions and circumstances arise, the Georgian
leadership is very likely to once again attempt to resolve the
political disputes with its neighbours by military means. It is
possible that, as a result of the (2013) presidential election,
reasonable politicians, who are not willing to resort to violent
methods in relations with the neighbours, will assume power in the
country and these predictions will, hopefully, prove to be inaccurate.
However, the future of Georgia and of the whole region has not been
determined yet. It is necessary to be prepared for the future
developments today, including the readiness to restore peace after
those developments. [Prominent Russian writer] A. P. Chekhov was right
when he said that "if there is a gun hanging on the wall in the first
act, it must fire in the last."
Endnotes
1. Georgian Experts Consider Kavkaz-2012 Exercises Threat of Russian
Federation's Attack on Georgia, 24 April 2012,
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/[1]
2. Chitidze: United States Recognizes Russian Threat to Georgia but
Does Not Want To Anger Russia, 6 June 2012, http://www.apsny.ge/[2]
3. National Security Blueprint of Georgia, 23 December 2011.
4. Law on Occupied Territories (23 October 2010), http://www.parliament.ge/[3]
5. http://www.echo.msk.ru/programmes/beseda/908397-echoelement-text
[4][fipEoBOD YIND]
6. Tseluyko V. Force Development and the Armed Forces of Georgia under
Saakashvili, Moscow Defence Brief, 3, 2008, pp 14-15.
7. Official website of the Georgian Defence Ministry, http://www.mod.gov.ge[5]
8. Aminov S. Georgia's Air Defence in the War with South Ossetia,
Moscow Defence Brief, 3, 2008.
9. Georgian Contractors Do Not Want To Go to Afghanistan, 20 March
2012, http://www.warandpeace.ru/ru/news/view/67872/[6]
10 . http://peacekeeper.ru/ru/module=newsaction=viewid=14399/[7][fi
pBODYIND]11. Tbilisi's Illusions,
http://www.echo.msk.ru/blog/kavkaz-politic/890168-echo/[8][fip
BODYIND]12. Armenia and Georgia: Border Tension Grows, REGNUM, 12
September 2011, http://janarmenian.ru/[9]
13. Batyyev B., Edisher Gvenetadze: "You Will Not Find Single Georgian
Who Doubts This," VESTI.az,
http://azerros.ru/templates/azerros/images/logo.png[10][fipBOD
YIND]14. Armenia and Georgia: Border Tension Grows, 12 September 2011,
http://janarmenian.ru/[11]
15. Tabagari Giorgi, Chachua Diana, Monitoring of Media Coverage
Ethnic, Religious and Sexual Minorities in Georgian Printed Media,
Internews Georgia, 1 May 2011 -31 July 2011.
16. Parliament Member: "Armenia Has Territorial Grievances Against All
Its Neighbours," 3 September 2011, http://day.az/politics/[12]
[Translated from Russian]
Jan 11 2013
Russian expert views Georgia's military potential, relations with neighbours
[Translated from Russian]
The following is the text of article by V. Y. Soshestvenskiy,
candidate of pedagogical sciences and senior academic staffer of the
Centre for Systemic Regional Studies and Prognosis of the Southern
Federal University's Retraining and Qualification Improvement
Institute and the Institute of Social and Political Studies of the
Russian Academy of Sciences, published on the South Ossetian
separatist government-run Res news agency website on 11 January
headlined "Restoration of Georgia's Armed Forces and likelihood of
deterioration of military and political situation in the South
Caucasus":
The majority of experts who have analysed the likelihood of an armed
confrontation in the South Caucasus in the near future have identified
several scenarios of how events could unfold. The first one, which is
not new and is the most pleasing one to the Georgian political
leadership, is linked to the "Russian military threat." Meanwhile,
although Georgian politicians have made a series of blunt statements
regarding the imminent military aggression against Georgia (Endnote
1), international experts believe that this scenario of developments
is an unlikely one (Endnote 2). In this context, the political
demarches by [President Mikheil] Saakashvili, [former Foreign Affairs
Minister Grigol] Vashadze, and [Paata] Zakareishvili [minister of
state for reintegration], who have accused Russia of aspiring to "turn
Georgia into a 'failed state,'" obstructing the realization of its
European and Euro-Atlantic choice, and "bringing Georgia back into the
Russian orbit by force," (Endnote 3) were rather part of the
propaganda aiming to reinforce Georgia's image as a country "whose
territories have been occupied." These actions by the Georgian
political leadership appear to be aimed at securing political,
economic, and military benefits from the "Western partners." It is
clear that, in the current international political situation, Russia
is interested in preserving its "status quo" in the South Caucasus,
rather than destabilizing the situation. Meanwhile, Georgia would
clearly benefit from intensification of armed confrontation in the
region as this would make it easier to retain the international
community's attention to the problem of Georgian-Russian disputes.
While Georgian politicians have been making peace-loving statements
saying that Georgia will aspire to resolve the problem of the
"occupied territories" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by peaceful means
only, they would like a hotbed of armed conflict to emerge as it would
confirm that Russia's foreign policy in the Caucasus is an aggressive
one. Armed confrontation in the region would force the Western
counties to be more accommodating during the discussion of the
question of Georgia's accession to NATO, as well as the provision of
other types of military and political aid to the country. Meanwhile,
the question of responsibility for triggering the conflict would
become less significant. The August 2008 events [Russia-Georgia war
over South Ossetia] clearly showed that the current level of
development of the means of waging information wars makes it possible
to mislead the international community and persuade it that the
aggressor is not at fault. Thus, the powerful misinformation campaign
that the Georgian leadership carried out in 2008 resulted in the
shifting of attention from the mistakes it had made during the
implementation of its internal ethnic policies to foreign policy
issues. At the same time, having declared the territories of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia occupied "as a result of the Russian Federation's
military aggression," (Endnote 4) the Georgian political leadership
was able to ensure that the international community viewed the
Georgian-Abkhazian and the Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts primarily
as parts of the unresolved Russian-Georgian conflict. Meanwhile,
although Georgian politicians have repeatedly stated that preserving
the country's territorial integrity is a fundamental and principal
issue on which Georgia will not make concessions under any
circumstances (Endnote 5), they understand very well that further use
of force against Tskhinvali and Sokhumi will prompt retaliation from
Russia. In this situation, it appears that the preservation of peace
in the region will depend largely on Russia's political self-restraint
as the side that is not interested in the destabilization of the
military and political situation in the South Caucasus, as well as its
ability to react appropriately to the possible provocations in the
diplomatic, informational, and military spheres, including those
organized by the Georgian special services.
The combat readiness of the Georgian Army is interesting in this
context. A number of military experts believe that Georgia was able to
restore the combat potential of its Army within a year of the defeat
in August 2008. At the same time, the number of servicemen increased
from 32,000 in 2008 (Endnote 6) to 37,800 in 2009 (Endnote 7).
Compared to August 2008, the ground component of the Georgian Army
increased by one regular infantry brigade and one artillery brigade.
For this reason, taking into account the two Army reserve brigades
that are being formed, as well as the National Guard forces, one could
assume that its size has increased by a factor of 1.5 to 2.
Despite the fact that, because of the economic crisis, the budget
allocations to the Georgian Defence Ministry have decreased
considerably (from 1bn dollars, i.e. approximately 9 per cent of GDP
in 2008, to 406m dollars in 2012), these have actually been converted
into combat power during the postwar period when weapons and military
equipment (for example, the Turkish Ejder armoured personnel carriers)
have been delivered through contracts signed earlier (Endnote 8). For
this reason, one can argue that the Georgian Army's postwar level of
equipment (excluding the navy) is higher than that of August 2008,
even if one takes into account the weapons and the military equipment
lost during the combat operations. The expanding military cooperation
between Georgia and the NATO countries has contributed significantly
to this. It is worth noting that military cooperation between Georgia
and the United States has intensified lately. For example, Washington
handed two coastal guard patrol boats worth 2m dollars to Georgia as a
gift before Hillary Clinton's visit to Georgia (the United States
allocated a total of 10m dollars for the improvement of Georgia's
coastal guard infrastructure in 2012). In June 2011, the US Department
of Defence gave Georgia for free 30 Hummer M1151 vehicles and 10
Hummer M1151A1 armoured vehicles worth a total of 5m dollars. In April
2012, an official statement was made regarding the transfer of 28
armoured vehicles with enhanced protection against mines. Moreover,
the United States is training Georgian Army units both on Georgian
territory and at the US Army training centre in Hohenfels (Germany).
Joint exercises by the armies of Georgia and the NATO countries are
also held regularly.
France, Turkey, Israel, Bulgaria, and other countries have been
actively involved in the postwar rearming of Georgia along with the
United States. A wide range of [armaments] has been delivered,
starting with firearms and their munitions and ending with heavy
armoured vehicles and modern antitank and antiaircraft systems. The
imported military equipment's share in the Georgian Army's stocks
increased to 50 per cent after the 2008 war.
The balance of interests in the region appears to be as follows:
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are resolving the problems of their
state-building and are therefore not interested in the deterioration
of the military and political situation. Such deterioration would also
be disadvantageous for Russia as it is interested in preserving its
"status quo" in the region. Georgia, meanwhile, continues to
strengthen its Armed Forces but presently still does not have
sufficient military power to solve the problem of reclaiming the
territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by force on its own.
In this context, it seems appropriate to discuss the question of how
the Georgian leadership is planning to use its Armed Forces.
The Georgian leadership considers the participation of Georgian Army
units in the US (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan very important. Before
September 2012, it involved 900 Georgian servicemen who were deployed
as part of the US Army force in the Afghan province of Helmand (at the
Shukvani military base) and the French force in Kabul. This was the
second largest force among the countries that are not members of NATO.
The situation changed in October 2012, when the Georgian leadership
sent an additional battalion to Afghanistan. As a result, the number
of Georgian servicemen increased to 1,700, which made it possible for
Georgia to claim a leading position in terms of "supplying the
overseas partners with soldiers."
The Georgian leadership has thus deployed approximately 5 per cent of
all Georgian troops in the NATO operation in Afghanistan. Meanwhile,
the Georgian military themselves are not eager to go through the
"Afghan school." According to the Tbilisi-based Kviris Palitra
newspaper, Georgia has encountered problems in terms of recruiting
contractors for service in Afghanistan. It has been reported that, in
the first quarter of 2012, some 100 servicemen filed written refusals
to serve in this Islamic republic. Those who have refused have not
even been deterred by strong punitive sanctions (28,000 lari which is
approximately 17,000 dollars) established for the violation of
contract terms (Endnote 9). At the same time, the involvement of the
Georgian military in the NATO operation in Afghanistan has come under
increasingly frequent criticism from the political opposition. For
example, in March [ 2012], Georgia's current opposition parties signed
a joined declaration whereby they informed the alliance's command of
their indignation at Georgia's disproportionately high contribution to
security in Afghanistan against the background of the reduction in the
forces of other countries (Endnote 10).
Despite all this, the current political leadership of Georgia still
considers the participation of the Georgian military in the US
operation in Afghanistan a priority objective. There is the impression
that, by sending its soldiers to the "hot spots" and effectively
"trading" in their lives, the Georgian leadership hopes to receive
certain bonuses from the United States in terms of political,
financial, and military-technical support. Protection of sovereignty
and restoration of the country's territorial integrity are the next
priority objectives of the Georgian Armed Forces. Since Georgia has
unresolved territorial disputes with all its neighbours (except for
Turkey), one can only ask where the Georgian president is planning to
use his favourite creation -the Armed Forces?
Most of Georgia's grievances are targeted at Russia which it accuses
of occupying the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and also
considers the primary threat to its national security. This was
confirmed by the results of the vote on the adoption of the new
National Security Blueprint (Endnote 3) in December 2011. It is
noteworthy that the Georgian Parliament adopted the blueprint with 111
votes in favour and three against it. The opposition's criticism only
focused on the need to use tougher language concerning Russia which is
mentioned 44 times in the document. However, despite the crisis of
interstate relations between Georgia and Russia which the Georgian
leadership has sustained artificially, the Georgian Armed Forces,
judging by the main characteristics of their combat potential, are
unlikely to be able to effectively confront the Russian Army and
conduct successful offensive combat operations against it in the
foreseeable future. At the same time, Georgia has unresolved
territorial disputes with Azerbaijan and Armenia. The village of
Erisimedi and part of the Davit Gareji monastery complex are the
disputed territory with Azerbaijan and the controversy over this led
to a serious border conflict between Azerbaijan and Georgia in May of
last year. Commenting on these developments, Georgian Deputy Foreign
Minister Nino Kalandadze said that the Georgian side "has no intention
to give up its lands" and that all controversial questions between
Georgia and Azerbaijan would be resolved "through an agreement between
friendly countries." However, she also emphasized that "...the
question of giving up the monastery complex will never be discussed"
(Endnote 11).
The territorial disputes between Armenia and Georgia appear to have
deeper roots. For example, a 96-km section of the (206-km-long)
Armenian-Georgian border is still disputed. Georgia has laid claims on
the village of Bavra in Armenia's Shirak Province (located near the
Armenian-Georgian border in Samtskhe-Javakheti Province) and the
adjacent area. Territorial disputes over this village already
triggered an incident between the border troops of the two countries
in November 2009 (the Armenian National Security Council has confirmed
that the incident did take place). The Armenian side attempted to put
up border posts in response to the Georgian side's actions but
encountered resistance by Georgians (Endnote 12). Georgia also claims
ownership of Armenia's Lori Province. Moreover, the Georgian side is
making active efforts at different levels to "reclaim" it. For
example, the Georgian media have initiated a discussion of the
question of returning all churches located on this territory to
Georgia, as well as of the (July 2012) address by the Georgian
diaspora of Lori-Tashir demanding revision of the state border between
Georgia and Armenia and unification of Lori Province with Georgia
(Endnote 13). Earlier, in September 2010, the question of border
delimitation was discussed during Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol
Vashadze's visit to Armenia. The visit was followed by a meeting of an
intergovernmental commission, but the sides have so far been unable to
reconcile their positions (Endnote 14). Considering the contemporary
trends in the development of interstate relations between Georgia and
Azerbaijan, as well as the fact that the Georgian National Security
Blueprint recognizes relations with Azerbaijan as "strategic," the
likelihood of an armed confrontation between these countries appears
to be negligible. The development of Georgian-Armenian relations seems
to be less predictable. For example, the Georgian National Security
Blueprint describes Armenian-Georgian relations merely as "close
partnership." The Georgian side has not reacted appropriately to the
years of attempts by the Armenian leadership to establish closer ties.
This is likely to be the result of Georgia's unwillingness to consider
a state engaged in a strategic partnership with Russia as its own
strategic partner. It is possible that the formation of this vector of
Georgian foreign policy is influenced by the existence of an
anti-Armenian narrative in Georgia. For example, in 2011, the
Internews organization conducted monitoring of printed media in order
to study the level of social tolerance and questions concerning the
protection of human rights in Georgia. The general figures concerning
ethnic groups are the most noteworthy ones. The survey showed that 60
per cent, i.e. the majority, of the publications in the printed media
were devoted to Armenians (and were mostly negative). Only 11 per cent
of the materials were devoted to the Abkhazians whom Georgians have
fought on two occasions during the years of independence. The rest of
the materials were distributed as follows: Azerbaijanis and Meskhetian
Turks -7 per cent, Ossetians -5 per cent, and so on. Among the
religious minorities, Armenians were once again the most frequently
mentioned group (47 per cent), while, for example, Muslims, whose
number in the country is constantly rising, have been overshadowed as
only 24 per cent of the materials were devoted to them (Endnote 15).
The conflict that has emerged between the goals of the Georgian
leadership's policy of building a mono-ethnic society in the country
and the aspiration of the Armenian diaspora to preserve its national
identity appears to be the main cause of this situation.
Meanwhile, given the tension in interstate relations between
Azerbaijan and Armenia, the August 2011 statement by the Georgian
president that "Azerbaijan's enemies are also enemies of Georgia" and
the subsequent anti-Armenian speeches by Azerbaijani politicians
appear controversial (Endnote 16). All this, coupled with
Saakashvili's general tendency to resolve territorial disputes by
means of military force (as was the case with Abkhazia and South
Ossetia) would prompt one to predict a possible intensification of the
Armenian-Georgian disputes (should certain geopolitical circumstances
arise).
For these reasons, military confrontation in the South Caucasus
appears unlikely in the short run. However, as the military potential
and combat power of the Georgian Armed Forces grow, and provided
certain geopolitical conditions and circumstances arise, the Georgian
leadership is very likely to once again attempt to resolve the
political disputes with its neighbours by military means. It is
possible that, as a result of the (2013) presidential election,
reasonable politicians, who are not willing to resort to violent
methods in relations with the neighbours, will assume power in the
country and these predictions will, hopefully, prove to be inaccurate.
However, the future of Georgia and of the whole region has not been
determined yet. It is necessary to be prepared for the future
developments today, including the readiness to restore peace after
those developments. [Prominent Russian writer] A. P. Chekhov was right
when he said that "if there is a gun hanging on the wall in the first
act, it must fire in the last."
Endnotes
1. Georgian Experts Consider Kavkaz-2012 Exercises Threat of Russian
Federation's Attack on Georgia, 24 April 2012,
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/[1]
2. Chitidze: United States Recognizes Russian Threat to Georgia but
Does Not Want To Anger Russia, 6 June 2012, http://www.apsny.ge/[2]
3. National Security Blueprint of Georgia, 23 December 2011.
4. Law on Occupied Territories (23 October 2010), http://www.parliament.ge/[3]
5. http://www.echo.msk.ru/programmes/beseda/908397-echoelement-text
[4][fipEoBOD YIND]
6. Tseluyko V. Force Development and the Armed Forces of Georgia under
Saakashvili, Moscow Defence Brief, 3, 2008, pp 14-15.
7. Official website of the Georgian Defence Ministry, http://www.mod.gov.ge[5]
8. Aminov S. Georgia's Air Defence in the War with South Ossetia,
Moscow Defence Brief, 3, 2008.
9. Georgian Contractors Do Not Want To Go to Afghanistan, 20 March
2012, http://www.warandpeace.ru/ru/news/view/67872/[6]
10 . http://peacekeeper.ru/ru/module=newsaction=viewid=14399/[7][fi
pBODYIND]11. Tbilisi's Illusions,
http://www.echo.msk.ru/blog/kavkaz-politic/890168-echo/[8][fip
BODYIND]12. Armenia and Georgia: Border Tension Grows, REGNUM, 12
September 2011, http://janarmenian.ru/[9]
13. Batyyev B., Edisher Gvenetadze: "You Will Not Find Single Georgian
Who Doubts This," VESTI.az,
http://azerros.ru/templates/azerros/images/logo.png[10][fipBOD
YIND]14. Armenia and Georgia: Border Tension Grows, 12 September 2011,
http://janarmenian.ru/[11]
15. Tabagari Giorgi, Chachua Diana, Monitoring of Media Coverage
Ethnic, Religious and Sexual Minorities in Georgian Printed Media,
Internews Georgia, 1 May 2011 -31 July 2011.
16. Parliament Member: "Armenia Has Territorial Grievances Against All
Its Neighbours," 3 September 2011, http://day.az/politics/[12]
[Translated from Russian]