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How NATO withdrawal affects situation in Azerbaijan?
Yekaterina Kudashkina
http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_02_10/How-NATO-withdrawal-affects-situation-in-Azerbaijan/
Feb 10, 2013 13:01 Moscow Time
"There might be some tensions that will rise because the position of
not only Russia but also of Armenia regarding Nagorno-Karabakh on what
the addition of these forces and how long they are going to stay in
Azerbaijan and what's the strategic intent of forces that are using
Azerbaijan as a hub - these issues will all come to the forefront,"
Theodore Karasik, director of research and consultancy at the
Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis based in Dubai,
told the Voice of Russia.
Ted, thank you so much for joining us. Just to start our interview I
would like to quote a recent statement made by NATO Liaison Officer in
the South Caucasus region William Lahue who said that Azerbaijan is a
part of the process of the withdrawal because this country is
potentially `the most suitable country in terms of its geographical
position for the withdrawal of the contingent.' With NATO personnel in
Azerbaijan, how could that affect the situation in Azerbaijan and the
situation around it?
The situation in the Caucasus may become impacted by what happens
during the withdrawal from Afghanistan and afterwards. The issue is
that there are Azerbaijanis as well as other folks coming from the
Northern Caucasus who have fought or are fighting in the northwest
frontier province or in Afghanistan proper. And these are Al Qaeda
sympathizers and once troops withdraw from Afghanistan, it is possible
that these folks may go back to their home countries in order to
inspire other radicals there to commit violence.
So, first of all, is that correct to presume that perhaps in the
course of withdrawal some NATO forces could appear in the territory of
Azerbaijan?
As they are withdrawing from Afghanistan, Azerbaijan may become a
transit way for the withdrawal process because there has to be a
number of different routes out for the equipment and the personnel
that are in Afghanistan now. Some of it, like as what happened in
Iraq, will be left behind for the Afghan Government to use. However,
there are materials and personnel, as I said, that need to be
withdrawn and Azerbaijan might actually be a good pivot or a hub
distribution point for a lot of these forces since some of them are
going back to Europe.
The reason I got so interested with this scenario was that Azerbaijan
traditionally has rather difficult relationship with Iran which is,
shall we say, not so far from Azerbaijan. Do you think that perhaps
somehow the situation when some of more anti-Iranian forces feel that
they could be protected by an outside force, could it embolden them in
a way?
I think it is very clever for the West to use Azerbaijan as a hub
because if the situation in Iran ever gets dicey or there needs to be
more pressure put on Tehran or that there needs to be some kind of
military action Azerbaijan would be a good deployment field.
Ted, but on the other hand if the situation in Azerbaijan somehow
destabilizes, there are a lot of business interests located in
Azerbaijan, business interests of the Western countries and I'm
referring to oil and gas sector, so wouldn't it somehow create
additional risks for those interests?
It very well may happen but I think we have to remember that there are
other hub states, for example the UAE, where there is a pretty high
military presence and operations that are being conducted in and out
of Afghanistan, yet the oil industry is healthy.
I'm talking about internal Caucasian problem, could they become more
acute somehow with that kind of scenario?
There might be some tensions that will rise because the position of
not only Russia but also of Armenia regarding Nagorno-Karabakh on what
the addition of these forces and how long they are going to stay in
Azerbaijan and what's the strategic intent of forces that are using
Azerbaijan as a hub - these issues will all come to the forefront and
will have to be negotiated and what is the actual intent of having
forces transit through Azerbaijan.
What is the current situation with the Azerbaijani diaspora in Iran,
is there any?
Yes, actually there is quite a large population, in the millions. And
the situation is that for the Iranians their population in Iran
constitutes sometimes a fifth column. And you'll hear stories or
reports about additional security being placed within that community
in order to keep them under control. This community in Iran sees
Azerbaijan country something like a homeland for them and in the
perfect scenario for them they would be able to break away from Iran
proper in order to create a greater Azerbaijan.
Would Azerbaijani Government and leadership be happy with this kind of
development?
I think the expansion of territory might be interesting to them and
fruitful but to have this scenario come around I think, the
probability of this is probably below 10%.
Definitely Azerbaijan is not the only country to get somehow involved
into the withdrawal process. And I remember you telling me that the
situation in Central Asia is going to get more complicated with the
withdrawal. Could you expand a little bit on that state by state? If
we are talking about the Shia states, let's look at Tajikistan for
instance.
Well, Tajikistan as a state that actually borders Afghanistan is
already feeling the brunt of a potential withdrawal from Afghanistan.
You do have fighters coming from Afghanistan who are operating in the
mountain areas outside of the capital of Dushanbe. This is a very
serious development. And so this Jihadist threat, if you will, is
already present there in that country and makes it a strategic pivot
from being able to mitigate this further spread of Jihadi fighters
into Central Asia, particularly in the 2014 to 2016 period.
Ted, remember when we were watching developments in Iraq, and at that
time there was a certain threat coming from the Shia community, a
party that appeared to be instrumental in resolving this issue was
Iran. Do you think that in this case Iran also could be instrumental?
It is a very good question. I think at this juncture Iran's footprint
in Central Asia is not as great as in Iraq and therefore Tehran would
not have the capabilities that it did in the Iraqi scenario. Having
said that, you can never say never about Iranian intentions and it is
quite possible that maybe the Government in Dushanbe would welcome
some kind of assistance. But what that assistance would be is
completely different than what we saw in Iraq.
Now, at the end of last week, at the Munich Conference Mr. Biden,
well, we all know that's a much discussed issue, has made a statement
indicating that perhaps the US could be prepared for direct talks with
Iran. Could that approach of engaging Iran be on the table for the US
Administration now?
It is on the table for the US Administration but it scares many of the
US's Arab allies that there would be some kind of bilateral agreement
or what's called a grand strategic bargain where the US and Iran would
bury the hatchet on many different issues. The probability of this
happening I think is low because of the implications for geopolitics
and geostrategy throughout the Gulf region but also ultimately it
would impact the Central Asian states and what would happen there in
terms of security and the differences between Russia and China, and
Iran, and the US over which direction these governments and the
resources of these governments will go.
Well, we all know that there is a strong Iranian presence in Central
Asian states, even in such seemingly remote locations like Kirgizstan
for instance, not mentioning other Central Asian states. So, what
could be the implications of the withdrawal from Afghanistan for those
states? And how could further relations in the given circumstances
between those states and Iran develop?
Actually I think that Iran's footprint in Central Asia is not as great
because of not only Russian influence but also because of the nature
of religion. The Central Asian states, excluding Tajikistan, and even
Tajikistan is not quite a perfect example of Shiite Islam, but the
rest of them are from the Sunni school. And maybe it is more a case
that Iranian businesses, and they are very small, are present in the
states like Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan. And so we have to be very
careful about how Iran is interpreted in Central Asia and what the US
may ultimately think of that presence if it starts to grow.
Having said that point we have to remember that Iran is very good at
setting up businesses in other states, particularly in countries like
Lebanon or Iraq and so on. Despite the sanctions regimes they may be
able to set up certain companies in the Central Asian states,
particularly Kirgizstan, if they see it as being politically
expedient.
Just a small remark, you were telling me about the religious Shia-
Sunni divide. But recently some Indian experts were telling me about
low profile or rather behind the scenes contacts between the US and
Iran in the territory of Turkey. Turkey seems to be helping developing
those contacts which is a Sunni country. So, is the divide really that
great?
Well, I'm just talking about the acceptance of Iranian business and\or
religious strictures in those states. And I think that it can be
problematic in terms of a sectarian divide. But if Turkey as a ME
country acting as a conduit is perfectly normal between the US and
Iran to have a third party act as a go-between. In the past we've seen
other countries in that position, European countries and in some minor
cases also Russia.
And Turkey as far as I understand, and please correct me if I'm wrong,
Turkey seems to be spreading its influence over those Central Asian
countries, I mean it is opening its schools, it is investing into
businesses, it is investing into creating some kind of religious
communities. So, the question is - what would you identify as the
challenges to Central Asian republics after the NATO forces withdraw
from Afghanistan? And would Turkey's and other international players'
interests in those republics be somehow affected?
I think in the scenario of the withdrawal from Afghanistan you are
going to see many countries try to come with aid to the Central Asian
states because they will be under the threat of possible
ungovernability in Afghanistan and how that spreads northward. I think
you are going to see more Chinese presence, more Russian presence,
particularly this is the critical issue for the Kremlin because they
don't want to see any more type of violence occurring in other areas
of the Russian Federation that have already happened and to see that
spread. I think also you'll see Turkey, as you mentioned correctly,
become more deeply involved in assisting the Central Asian states and
helping to protect them.
I think the one player that you are going to see almost disappear from
the scene is the US because this is a mission too far for Washington
DC right now. The US does not have the money to pay for missions
abroad like this. And we are already seeing the result of the money
issue with what's happening in the Gulf region because they've had
very publically announced that the US can no longer support two
aircraft carriers in the region, that they only support one. And on
top of that is the fact that the US is more interested in what's
happening in the Far East than anywhere else in the world. So, Central
Asia will be left up to other allies to manage.
However I think there is another quiet player who seems to be keeping
low profile but nevertheless it is quite an important player which is
China.
Absolutely!
What could be the Chinese position in that issue?
China increasingly is becoming a major player in the sense of the
energy issue, as well as trying to define the borders and to protect
the borders because they don't want to see anything from Central Asia
infecting their country. And so, their vested interest is to be able
to make sure that energy resources are kept open and flowing towards
China. They will probably act through the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization if that institution becomes more mature because right now
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is more of a debate club than
anything else. There are some exercises that occur, but are these
exercises really geared to the proper threat that these countries all
need to respond to? So, we have to see what will happen in the next
couple of years in terms of that capability and the actual role of the
Chinese on the ground in Central Asia itself.
Ted, what could be the implications for Pakistan?
For Pakistan it is going to be a critical time because Pakistan has
always used Afghanistan as its backyard proxy if you will. And because
of the nature of governance in Pakistan the transition to perhaps a
Taliban-led Government eventually in Afghanistan will have an impact
on Pakistan proper. Pakistan in my opinion is an unstable state, it
can swing in a number of different directions and the impact of having
the Taliban back in power in Afghanistan may further divide the
country in terms of vulcanization process.
And there is one more issue which is really affecting the countries of
the region, China and my own country which is drug trade. What could
happen to drug trade after the NATO leaves?
It is a very good question because ironically under the NATO
supervision of Afghanistan drug trade exploded with a great amount of
exports of narcotics from Afghanistan proper. Under the Taliban that
had actually dropped. So, the question is will the Taliban, if they
takeover, or any future Afghan Government be able to control the flow
of drugs coming from Afghanistan. And that's going to be the big
challenge because if the situation continues with this massive drug
export program from Afghanistan, there is going to have to be more
robust on the ground counternarcotics programs in Central Asia in
order to prevent this situation from ongoing.
Incidentally one of the regional experts was telling me that Iran
manages to somehow get hold of 90% of drugs which is about to be
imported into its territory. Is this a correct estimate?
I think that's pretty much correct because Iran is a major conduit for
narcotics. They do have a robust program because narcotics use in Iran
is a major social problem and the Iranian Government is desperately
trying to mitigate that threat, particularly in the eastern parts of
the country which border Afghanistan. So, I think if their mitigation
program is around 90%, I think it is probably not far from the truth
giving 10%.
Could we somehow engage Iran into cooperation in that area?
There has been cooperation with Iran in counternarcotics in the past.
I believe that there was some interaction in that area during the mid
2000 period before the latest downturn in US-Iranian relations. But I
think that this is one of the soft power areas that could help bring
Iran back into the community of nations or the family of nations is
this exact issue of fighting the drugs problem with joint efforts to
stop this issue.
Ted, and finally, what happens to all the military equipment and
personnel now stationed in Afghanistan?
Just like what happened in Iraq some of it will be left behind as a
gift, some of it will be sold to the Afghanis but at a very cut-rate
price. The very valuable stuff that is probably seen as can't be given
to a foreign Government because of the technical level of the
equipment, it will be withdrawn and taken back to the US or the other
countries where this equipment originated from.
And how about the personnel?
The personnel in Afghanistan will all be withdrawn and then there will
be the beginning of advisory programs from various states. And that
will take over a part of what would be seen as the NGO mission.
The reason I was asking about the personnel is that there are rumors
in the expert community that some of the personnel is going to be
simply relocated closer to the Asian-Pacific region. Are these rumors
correct or not?
I wouldn't be surprised, given the shift of the strategic focus, I
would give that argument some credence.
Ted, thank you so much. And just to remind you our guest speaker was
Theodore Karasik - director of research and consultancy at the
Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis, based in Dubai.
Yekaterina Kudashkina
http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_02_10/How-NATO-withdrawal-affects-situation-in-Azerbaijan/
Feb 10, 2013 13:01 Moscow Time
"There might be some tensions that will rise because the position of
not only Russia but also of Armenia regarding Nagorno-Karabakh on what
the addition of these forces and how long they are going to stay in
Azerbaijan and what's the strategic intent of forces that are using
Azerbaijan as a hub - these issues will all come to the forefront,"
Theodore Karasik, director of research and consultancy at the
Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis based in Dubai,
told the Voice of Russia.
Ted, thank you so much for joining us. Just to start our interview I
would like to quote a recent statement made by NATO Liaison Officer in
the South Caucasus region William Lahue who said that Azerbaijan is a
part of the process of the withdrawal because this country is
potentially `the most suitable country in terms of its geographical
position for the withdrawal of the contingent.' With NATO personnel in
Azerbaijan, how could that affect the situation in Azerbaijan and the
situation around it?
The situation in the Caucasus may become impacted by what happens
during the withdrawal from Afghanistan and afterwards. The issue is
that there are Azerbaijanis as well as other folks coming from the
Northern Caucasus who have fought or are fighting in the northwest
frontier province or in Afghanistan proper. And these are Al Qaeda
sympathizers and once troops withdraw from Afghanistan, it is possible
that these folks may go back to their home countries in order to
inspire other radicals there to commit violence.
So, first of all, is that correct to presume that perhaps in the
course of withdrawal some NATO forces could appear in the territory of
Azerbaijan?
As they are withdrawing from Afghanistan, Azerbaijan may become a
transit way for the withdrawal process because there has to be a
number of different routes out for the equipment and the personnel
that are in Afghanistan now. Some of it, like as what happened in
Iraq, will be left behind for the Afghan Government to use. However,
there are materials and personnel, as I said, that need to be
withdrawn and Azerbaijan might actually be a good pivot or a hub
distribution point for a lot of these forces since some of them are
going back to Europe.
The reason I got so interested with this scenario was that Azerbaijan
traditionally has rather difficult relationship with Iran which is,
shall we say, not so far from Azerbaijan. Do you think that perhaps
somehow the situation when some of more anti-Iranian forces feel that
they could be protected by an outside force, could it embolden them in
a way?
I think it is very clever for the West to use Azerbaijan as a hub
because if the situation in Iran ever gets dicey or there needs to be
more pressure put on Tehran or that there needs to be some kind of
military action Azerbaijan would be a good deployment field.
Ted, but on the other hand if the situation in Azerbaijan somehow
destabilizes, there are a lot of business interests located in
Azerbaijan, business interests of the Western countries and I'm
referring to oil and gas sector, so wouldn't it somehow create
additional risks for those interests?
It very well may happen but I think we have to remember that there are
other hub states, for example the UAE, where there is a pretty high
military presence and operations that are being conducted in and out
of Afghanistan, yet the oil industry is healthy.
I'm talking about internal Caucasian problem, could they become more
acute somehow with that kind of scenario?
There might be some tensions that will rise because the position of
not only Russia but also of Armenia regarding Nagorno-Karabakh on what
the addition of these forces and how long they are going to stay in
Azerbaijan and what's the strategic intent of forces that are using
Azerbaijan as a hub - these issues will all come to the forefront and
will have to be negotiated and what is the actual intent of having
forces transit through Azerbaijan.
What is the current situation with the Azerbaijani diaspora in Iran,
is there any?
Yes, actually there is quite a large population, in the millions. And
the situation is that for the Iranians their population in Iran
constitutes sometimes a fifth column. And you'll hear stories or
reports about additional security being placed within that community
in order to keep them under control. This community in Iran sees
Azerbaijan country something like a homeland for them and in the
perfect scenario for them they would be able to break away from Iran
proper in order to create a greater Azerbaijan.
Would Azerbaijani Government and leadership be happy with this kind of
development?
I think the expansion of territory might be interesting to them and
fruitful but to have this scenario come around I think, the
probability of this is probably below 10%.
Definitely Azerbaijan is not the only country to get somehow involved
into the withdrawal process. And I remember you telling me that the
situation in Central Asia is going to get more complicated with the
withdrawal. Could you expand a little bit on that state by state? If
we are talking about the Shia states, let's look at Tajikistan for
instance.
Well, Tajikistan as a state that actually borders Afghanistan is
already feeling the brunt of a potential withdrawal from Afghanistan.
You do have fighters coming from Afghanistan who are operating in the
mountain areas outside of the capital of Dushanbe. This is a very
serious development. And so this Jihadist threat, if you will, is
already present there in that country and makes it a strategic pivot
from being able to mitigate this further spread of Jihadi fighters
into Central Asia, particularly in the 2014 to 2016 period.
Ted, remember when we were watching developments in Iraq, and at that
time there was a certain threat coming from the Shia community, a
party that appeared to be instrumental in resolving this issue was
Iran. Do you think that in this case Iran also could be instrumental?
It is a very good question. I think at this juncture Iran's footprint
in Central Asia is not as great as in Iraq and therefore Tehran would
not have the capabilities that it did in the Iraqi scenario. Having
said that, you can never say never about Iranian intentions and it is
quite possible that maybe the Government in Dushanbe would welcome
some kind of assistance. But what that assistance would be is
completely different than what we saw in Iraq.
Now, at the end of last week, at the Munich Conference Mr. Biden,
well, we all know that's a much discussed issue, has made a statement
indicating that perhaps the US could be prepared for direct talks with
Iran. Could that approach of engaging Iran be on the table for the US
Administration now?
It is on the table for the US Administration but it scares many of the
US's Arab allies that there would be some kind of bilateral agreement
or what's called a grand strategic bargain where the US and Iran would
bury the hatchet on many different issues. The probability of this
happening I think is low because of the implications for geopolitics
and geostrategy throughout the Gulf region but also ultimately it
would impact the Central Asian states and what would happen there in
terms of security and the differences between Russia and China, and
Iran, and the US over which direction these governments and the
resources of these governments will go.
Well, we all know that there is a strong Iranian presence in Central
Asian states, even in such seemingly remote locations like Kirgizstan
for instance, not mentioning other Central Asian states. So, what
could be the implications of the withdrawal from Afghanistan for those
states? And how could further relations in the given circumstances
between those states and Iran develop?
Actually I think that Iran's footprint in Central Asia is not as great
because of not only Russian influence but also because of the nature
of religion. The Central Asian states, excluding Tajikistan, and even
Tajikistan is not quite a perfect example of Shiite Islam, but the
rest of them are from the Sunni school. And maybe it is more a case
that Iranian businesses, and they are very small, are present in the
states like Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan. And so we have to be very
careful about how Iran is interpreted in Central Asia and what the US
may ultimately think of that presence if it starts to grow.
Having said that point we have to remember that Iran is very good at
setting up businesses in other states, particularly in countries like
Lebanon or Iraq and so on. Despite the sanctions regimes they may be
able to set up certain companies in the Central Asian states,
particularly Kirgizstan, if they see it as being politically
expedient.
Just a small remark, you were telling me about the religious Shia-
Sunni divide. But recently some Indian experts were telling me about
low profile or rather behind the scenes contacts between the US and
Iran in the territory of Turkey. Turkey seems to be helping developing
those contacts which is a Sunni country. So, is the divide really that
great?
Well, I'm just talking about the acceptance of Iranian business and\or
religious strictures in those states. And I think that it can be
problematic in terms of a sectarian divide. But if Turkey as a ME
country acting as a conduit is perfectly normal between the US and
Iran to have a third party act as a go-between. In the past we've seen
other countries in that position, European countries and in some minor
cases also Russia.
And Turkey as far as I understand, and please correct me if I'm wrong,
Turkey seems to be spreading its influence over those Central Asian
countries, I mean it is opening its schools, it is investing into
businesses, it is investing into creating some kind of religious
communities. So, the question is - what would you identify as the
challenges to Central Asian republics after the NATO forces withdraw
from Afghanistan? And would Turkey's and other international players'
interests in those republics be somehow affected?
I think in the scenario of the withdrawal from Afghanistan you are
going to see many countries try to come with aid to the Central Asian
states because they will be under the threat of possible
ungovernability in Afghanistan and how that spreads northward. I think
you are going to see more Chinese presence, more Russian presence,
particularly this is the critical issue for the Kremlin because they
don't want to see any more type of violence occurring in other areas
of the Russian Federation that have already happened and to see that
spread. I think also you'll see Turkey, as you mentioned correctly,
become more deeply involved in assisting the Central Asian states and
helping to protect them.
I think the one player that you are going to see almost disappear from
the scene is the US because this is a mission too far for Washington
DC right now. The US does not have the money to pay for missions
abroad like this. And we are already seeing the result of the money
issue with what's happening in the Gulf region because they've had
very publically announced that the US can no longer support two
aircraft carriers in the region, that they only support one. And on
top of that is the fact that the US is more interested in what's
happening in the Far East than anywhere else in the world. So, Central
Asia will be left up to other allies to manage.
However I think there is another quiet player who seems to be keeping
low profile but nevertheless it is quite an important player which is
China.
Absolutely!
What could be the Chinese position in that issue?
China increasingly is becoming a major player in the sense of the
energy issue, as well as trying to define the borders and to protect
the borders because they don't want to see anything from Central Asia
infecting their country. And so, their vested interest is to be able
to make sure that energy resources are kept open and flowing towards
China. They will probably act through the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization if that institution becomes more mature because right now
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is more of a debate club than
anything else. There are some exercises that occur, but are these
exercises really geared to the proper threat that these countries all
need to respond to? So, we have to see what will happen in the next
couple of years in terms of that capability and the actual role of the
Chinese on the ground in Central Asia itself.
Ted, what could be the implications for Pakistan?
For Pakistan it is going to be a critical time because Pakistan has
always used Afghanistan as its backyard proxy if you will. And because
of the nature of governance in Pakistan the transition to perhaps a
Taliban-led Government eventually in Afghanistan will have an impact
on Pakistan proper. Pakistan in my opinion is an unstable state, it
can swing in a number of different directions and the impact of having
the Taliban back in power in Afghanistan may further divide the
country in terms of vulcanization process.
And there is one more issue which is really affecting the countries of
the region, China and my own country which is drug trade. What could
happen to drug trade after the NATO leaves?
It is a very good question because ironically under the NATO
supervision of Afghanistan drug trade exploded with a great amount of
exports of narcotics from Afghanistan proper. Under the Taliban that
had actually dropped. So, the question is will the Taliban, if they
takeover, or any future Afghan Government be able to control the flow
of drugs coming from Afghanistan. And that's going to be the big
challenge because if the situation continues with this massive drug
export program from Afghanistan, there is going to have to be more
robust on the ground counternarcotics programs in Central Asia in
order to prevent this situation from ongoing.
Incidentally one of the regional experts was telling me that Iran
manages to somehow get hold of 90% of drugs which is about to be
imported into its territory. Is this a correct estimate?
I think that's pretty much correct because Iran is a major conduit for
narcotics. They do have a robust program because narcotics use in Iran
is a major social problem and the Iranian Government is desperately
trying to mitigate that threat, particularly in the eastern parts of
the country which border Afghanistan. So, I think if their mitigation
program is around 90%, I think it is probably not far from the truth
giving 10%.
Could we somehow engage Iran into cooperation in that area?
There has been cooperation with Iran in counternarcotics in the past.
I believe that there was some interaction in that area during the mid
2000 period before the latest downturn in US-Iranian relations. But I
think that this is one of the soft power areas that could help bring
Iran back into the community of nations or the family of nations is
this exact issue of fighting the drugs problem with joint efforts to
stop this issue.
Ted, and finally, what happens to all the military equipment and
personnel now stationed in Afghanistan?
Just like what happened in Iraq some of it will be left behind as a
gift, some of it will be sold to the Afghanis but at a very cut-rate
price. The very valuable stuff that is probably seen as can't be given
to a foreign Government because of the technical level of the
equipment, it will be withdrawn and taken back to the US or the other
countries where this equipment originated from.
And how about the personnel?
The personnel in Afghanistan will all be withdrawn and then there will
be the beginning of advisory programs from various states. And that
will take over a part of what would be seen as the NGO mission.
The reason I was asking about the personnel is that there are rumors
in the expert community that some of the personnel is going to be
simply relocated closer to the Asian-Pacific region. Are these rumors
correct or not?
I wouldn't be surprised, given the shift of the strategic focus, I
would give that argument some credence.
Ted, thank you so much. And just to remind you our guest speaker was
Theodore Karasik - director of research and consultancy at the
Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis, based in Dubai.