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Istanbul: Four Myths Behind End Of Russia'S Military Presence In Aze

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  • Istanbul: Four Myths Behind End Of Russia'S Military Presence In Aze

    FOUR MYTHS BEHIND END OF RUSSIA'S MILITARY PRESENCE IN AZERBAIJAN

    Today's Zaman, Turkey
    Feb 12 2013

    Last week, the joint Azerbaijani-Russian working group held a meeting
    in Gabala to discuss the withdrawal of Russian equipment from the
    Gabala radar station and the final completion date of its operation,
    following Russia's declaration last December that Baku and Moscow
    had not reached a lease agreement and that the latter was going to
    close its military installation in Gabala.

    However, for many analysts and politicians, the question remains
    whether Russia may return asking for a new agreement. Indeed the
    most discussed questions are "Why did Russia leave?" and "What is
    the price of its exit?"

    Arguably, looking at the last three or four months, which have seen
    tensions growing between Russia and Azerbaijan, Moscow has fairly
    openly sought to increase tensions in Azerbaijan through non-official
    channels, notably by attempts to destabilize the ethno-political
    dynamics. Two months after the mutually affirmed closure, many things
    remain unclear and myths around this issue abound. I have selected
    four of the most prevalent myths surrounding the question of why
    Russia left Gabala.

    #1 Russia called Azerbaijan's bluff

    The first myth is that Azerbaijan raised the annual rent for the
    Gabala Radar Station (GRS) from $7 million to $300 million because
    Baku wanted to increase its political leverage over Russia. Following
    Vladimir Putin's return to office there were concerns that Moscow
    would not push forward with active negotiations on the resolution of
    the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and would support
    Armenia. Thus one could say, yes, Azerbaijan did bluff, raising the
    annual rent to $300 million. Interestingly, the Russian Ministry of
    Defense leaked this amount to the media in mid-2012, when negotiations
    were secret.

    It later became clear that Moscow was using the Russian media to put
    Azerbaijan under pressure. After mid-2012, Moscow revealed certain
    ethnic and political cards that could be played to Baku's disadvantage
    -- and indicated that it was ready to use them to gain traction in
    the Gabala negotiations. However, it is not fair to say that Baku's
    strategy of bluffing backfired in that it provoked this reaction;
    rather, Russia's strategy of pressuring Baku backfired, giving rise
    to a change in the latter's approach, notably with regard to its
    cooperation with Moscow.

    #2 Russia left because Gabala is outdated and it has plans to build
    new radar stations

    Russia is currently operating three Voronezh-type HDR radars: Armavir,
    Lekhtusi and Kaliningrad, although the last will only become fully
    operational in 2014. The fourth radar station is under construction
    at Mishelevka near Irkutsk, and the fifth station will be the second
    stage of Armavir. All of these are better equipped than Gabala.

    However, here is the misunderstanding: Gabala's geographical location
    gives it a number of unique advantages from a military and technical
    point of view. As retired Col. Gen. Leonid Ivashov stated, several
    months before abandoning the Gabala agreement, "If we leave Gabala,
    the Voronezh-type radar at Armavir will not be able to take over all
    of its functions." The loss of Gabala is significant as it means
    that Russia has lost its presence in Azerbaijan and, secondly,
    two stations are better than one; i.e., if the one station fails,
    the other can take over.

    #3 Azerbaijan tried to raise the rent and negotiations failed as
    a result

    The problem with this interpretation is that while the argument that
    the GRS poses a serious environmental threat was true, it was not as
    strong as the other strategic arguments. For Azerbaijan, money was
    not the motivating factor. The real reason was that Moscow wanted
    to change two conditions, neither of which was acceptable to Baku:
    First, the duration of the lease agreement and, second, the content
    of the agreement. In 2002, both sides signed an agreement whereby the
    GRS was approved as an "analytical information center," but Russia
    wanted to change its status to that of a military base -- in fact,
    to make it part of its anti-ballistic missile system (ABM).

    Also, the Moscow-led military organization, the Collective Security
    Treaty Organization (CSTO), agreed last December on the creation
    of collective ABMs on CSTO territories, essentially enabling member
    countries to use its ABM-type military bases on a common basis. This
    would have meant in theory that Moscow would allow Armenia to use the
    GRS. All of the above posed real threats -- politically, military and
    strategically -- to Azerbaijan's security. In light of this, it is
    interesting that before abandoning the GRS agreement on Dec. 5, 2012,
    the Azerbaijani leadership boycotted the Commonwealth of Independent
    States (CIS) summit.

    #4 Azerbaijan will give the GRS to either Turkey or the US and will
    use it against Iran

    This old myth was revived in the Iranian and Russian media after the
    GRS agreement was abandoned. First of all, when Moscow offered the
    US joint use of the GRS in 2007, in return for Washington halting
    the establishment of ABMs in Eastern Europe, the US declined. The US
    already has a powerful system of satellite sensors and radar stations
    in the Middle East -- in Kuwait and Bahrain, for example -- as well
    as Hawkeye and other Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
    aircraft, which have greater capabilities than the GRS.

    In Turkey's case, the situation is the same. The Turkish military is
    part of the NATO system, and it uses this system whenever necessary.

    While it is true that Gabala hosted the Azerbaijan-Turkey High-Level
    Strategic Cooperation Council meeting when Turkish Prime Minister Recep
    Tayyıp Erdogan visited Azerbaijan in September 2012, Azerbaijan did
    not issue any kind of tacit threat to Russia about leasing the GRS
    to Turkey.

    Giving the GRS to Israel is even less likely than the abovementioned
    scenarios, and in one sense, the Iranian media's "soft" response
    indicated that Iran did not seriously think it was a possibility. In
    the Caucasus, the Iranian response is a good measure of the seriousness
    and scope of the military issues. Finally, these four myths will remain
    myths; the reality is that Russia has left Gabala and Azerbaijan will
    not host any Russian military base or personnel on its territory.

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