Tweet
World Politics Review
Feb 15 2013
With Re-Election Likely, Armenia's Sargsyan Has Little Reason to Change Course
By Michael Cecire, on 15 Feb 2013, Briefing
With only days to go before Armenia's Feb. 18 presidential election,
all signs point to a victory for incumbent President Serzh Sargsyan.
Should he be re-elected as expected, Armenia will most likely maintain
its status quo, which saw Yerevan open modestly to the West and
Euro-Atlantic initiatives but ultimately remain bound to its
longstanding alliance with Moscow.
Sargsyan is likely not only to win the election handily but also to
easily clear the 50 percent threshold required to prevent a
second-round runoff. With Armenia's opposition badly fractured and
handicapped by the noncandidacies of two of the most credible
opposition figures -- former President Levon Ter-Petrosian and
oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan -- Sargsyan has little to fear from the vote.
Despite widespread popular dissatisfaction over a sharp rise in
poverty during Sargsyan's term, which the ruling Republican Party
blames on the effects of the global financial crisis, none of the
current crop of opposition candidates seems able to break through the
government's political machinery and the pervasive public cynicism
over the process.
The campaign has not been without its share of drama, however. Paruyr
Hayrikyan, a Soviet-era dissident and presidential candidate, was shot
and wounded in an apparent assassination attempt outside his home on
Jan. 31. Within days, two alleged perpetrators were arrested and
confessed to the crime, though their motives are still unclear, which
has predictably given rise to rumors and competing theories.
While Hayrikyan's injuries were reportedly not life-threatening, the
attack could have triggered a postponement of the presidential poll
under Armenian voting laws. Hayrikyan did file a formal request for a
two-week delay before subsequently withdrawing it, while repeating his
calls for the opposition to unite.
But even a unified opposition would be unlikely to dislodge Sargsyan.
At best, there is a chance that it could force the election into a
second-round runoff. The Hayrikyan incident is certainly a stain on
the process and an embarrassment to the ruling party, but the tight
timeline and the ruling party's institutional advantages are almost
certainly too great for the opposition to surmount.
For most observers, a second Sargsyan term will mean foreign policy
continuity for Armenia, which has staked out a path of accepting --
and even cautiously embracing -- some elements of Westernization while
ultimately remaining well within Moscow's orbit. Russia continues to
be Armenia's closest ally and geopolitical patron. The two countries
have a mutual defense pact, and Armenia hosts a large contingent of
Russian troops in Gyumri. The Gyumri base already houses some 3,000
Russian military personnel, and Russia may be in the process of
expanding it in size and scope as a centralized regional military
node. With Russia's recent evictions from Azerbaijan's Gabala radar
base -- as well as from its Georgian bases in 2006 -- Gyumri has
become one of Moscow's few remaining military footholds in the South
Caucasus, besides its installations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Armenia's economy also remains almost wholly dependent on Russia
through trade and remittances. The landlocked and largely isolated
country is highly dependent on Iran and Russia for its energy, with
the latter owning approximately 80 percent of Armenia's energy system.
While tentative explorations of independent energy sources appear to
be underway, few expect imminent breakthroughs.
At the same time, Armenia has slowly but unmistakably opened up to the
West. While Armenia and NATO are still in the process of deciding how
and to what extent their relationship will progress, Yerevan has taken
part in NATO exercises and has even deployed a small force to the NATO
mission in Afghanistan. Despite this, there is no question as to where
Yerevan's final loyalties lie. More complicated, however, are
Yerevan's ties with Iran, with which it has friendly relations and a
healthy economic relationship. Perhaps more than Armenia's bonds to
Russia, the Armenia-Iran relationship has been a major cause of
concern for some Western officials and raises questions about
Armenia's participation in and commitment to Euro-Atlantic
initiatives.
The only potential for significant geopolitical change under a second
Sargsyan term is in Armenia-Turkey relations. In 2008, Turkish
President Abdullah Gul visited Armenia to meet with Sargsyan during a
World Cup qualifying match between their countries' national soccer
teams. The meeting seemed to kick-start a mutual bid to normalize ties
between the two countries, which have never had diplomatic relations.
However, in the face of internal pressure in both countries and
protests from Azerbaijan, with which Armenia remains technically at
war over the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh region, the Armenia-Turkey
negotiations broke down and have yet to be meaningfully revived.
The likeliest outcome of Armenia's elections, therefore, is more of
the same: Yerevan is likely to continue its modest nod to the West,
while remaining firmly in Moscow's orbit. And Azerbaijan, Armenia's
energy-rich and increasingly militarily capable archrival, will remain
at the top of Yerevan's geopolitical agenda.
At the same time, continuity under Sargsyan would preserve a
leadership that is open to the prospect of normalizing ties with
Turkey. While the process may be on hiatus for the moment, both Ankara
and Yerevan could rediscover a window of opportunity in the next term
to restart talks and move their relationship forward. This, more than
direct Western outreach, has the potential to shake up the
geopolitical dynamics of the region.
For now, though, there is no guarantee of any such a development.
Sargsyan remains a status quo political figure, and that may be all
that can be expected from his second term as president.
Michael Hikari Cecire is a Black Sea/Eurasia regional analyst and
associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, where he
contributes to the Project on Democratic Transitions. He is also a
contributing analyst for Wikistrat.
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12719/with-re-election-likely-armenias-sargsyan-has-little-reason-to-change-course
Feb 15 2013
With Re-Election Likely, Armenia's Sargsyan Has Little Reason to Change Course
By Michael Cecire, on 15 Feb 2013, Briefing
With only days to go before Armenia's Feb. 18 presidential election,
all signs point to a victory for incumbent President Serzh Sargsyan.
Should he be re-elected as expected, Armenia will most likely maintain
its status quo, which saw Yerevan open modestly to the West and
Euro-Atlantic initiatives but ultimately remain bound to its
longstanding alliance with Moscow.
Sargsyan is likely not only to win the election handily but also to
easily clear the 50 percent threshold required to prevent a
second-round runoff. With Armenia's opposition badly fractured and
handicapped by the noncandidacies of two of the most credible
opposition figures -- former President Levon Ter-Petrosian and
oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan -- Sargsyan has little to fear from the vote.
Despite widespread popular dissatisfaction over a sharp rise in
poverty during Sargsyan's term, which the ruling Republican Party
blames on the effects of the global financial crisis, none of the
current crop of opposition candidates seems able to break through the
government's political machinery and the pervasive public cynicism
over the process.
The campaign has not been without its share of drama, however. Paruyr
Hayrikyan, a Soviet-era dissident and presidential candidate, was shot
and wounded in an apparent assassination attempt outside his home on
Jan. 31. Within days, two alleged perpetrators were arrested and
confessed to the crime, though their motives are still unclear, which
has predictably given rise to rumors and competing theories.
While Hayrikyan's injuries were reportedly not life-threatening, the
attack could have triggered a postponement of the presidential poll
under Armenian voting laws. Hayrikyan did file a formal request for a
two-week delay before subsequently withdrawing it, while repeating his
calls for the opposition to unite.
But even a unified opposition would be unlikely to dislodge Sargsyan.
At best, there is a chance that it could force the election into a
second-round runoff. The Hayrikyan incident is certainly a stain on
the process and an embarrassment to the ruling party, but the tight
timeline and the ruling party's institutional advantages are almost
certainly too great for the opposition to surmount.
For most observers, a second Sargsyan term will mean foreign policy
continuity for Armenia, which has staked out a path of accepting --
and even cautiously embracing -- some elements of Westernization while
ultimately remaining well within Moscow's orbit. Russia continues to
be Armenia's closest ally and geopolitical patron. The two countries
have a mutual defense pact, and Armenia hosts a large contingent of
Russian troops in Gyumri. The Gyumri base already houses some 3,000
Russian military personnel, and Russia may be in the process of
expanding it in size and scope as a centralized regional military
node. With Russia's recent evictions from Azerbaijan's Gabala radar
base -- as well as from its Georgian bases in 2006 -- Gyumri has
become one of Moscow's few remaining military footholds in the South
Caucasus, besides its installations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Armenia's economy also remains almost wholly dependent on Russia
through trade and remittances. The landlocked and largely isolated
country is highly dependent on Iran and Russia for its energy, with
the latter owning approximately 80 percent of Armenia's energy system.
While tentative explorations of independent energy sources appear to
be underway, few expect imminent breakthroughs.
At the same time, Armenia has slowly but unmistakably opened up to the
West. While Armenia and NATO are still in the process of deciding how
and to what extent their relationship will progress, Yerevan has taken
part in NATO exercises and has even deployed a small force to the NATO
mission in Afghanistan. Despite this, there is no question as to where
Yerevan's final loyalties lie. More complicated, however, are
Yerevan's ties with Iran, with which it has friendly relations and a
healthy economic relationship. Perhaps more than Armenia's bonds to
Russia, the Armenia-Iran relationship has been a major cause of
concern for some Western officials and raises questions about
Armenia's participation in and commitment to Euro-Atlantic
initiatives.
The only potential for significant geopolitical change under a second
Sargsyan term is in Armenia-Turkey relations. In 2008, Turkish
President Abdullah Gul visited Armenia to meet with Sargsyan during a
World Cup qualifying match between their countries' national soccer
teams. The meeting seemed to kick-start a mutual bid to normalize ties
between the two countries, which have never had diplomatic relations.
However, in the face of internal pressure in both countries and
protests from Azerbaijan, with which Armenia remains technically at
war over the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh region, the Armenia-Turkey
negotiations broke down and have yet to be meaningfully revived.
The likeliest outcome of Armenia's elections, therefore, is more of
the same: Yerevan is likely to continue its modest nod to the West,
while remaining firmly in Moscow's orbit. And Azerbaijan, Armenia's
energy-rich and increasingly militarily capable archrival, will remain
at the top of Yerevan's geopolitical agenda.
At the same time, continuity under Sargsyan would preserve a
leadership that is open to the prospect of normalizing ties with
Turkey. While the process may be on hiatus for the moment, both Ankara
and Yerevan could rediscover a window of opportunity in the next term
to restart talks and move their relationship forward. This, more than
direct Western outreach, has the potential to shake up the
geopolitical dynamics of the region.
For now, though, there is no guarantee of any such a development.
Sargsyan remains a status quo political figure, and that may be all
that can be expected from his second term as president.
Michael Hikari Cecire is a Black Sea/Eurasia regional analyst and
associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, where he
contributes to the Project on Democratic Transitions. He is also a
contributing analyst for Wikistrat.
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12719/with-re-election-likely-armenias-sargsyan-has-little-reason-to-change-course