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Persian Tunes In Azerbaijani Foreign Policy

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  • Persian Tunes In Azerbaijani Foreign Policy

    PERSIAN TUNES IN AZERBAIJANI FOREIGN POLICY

    Vestnik Kavkaza, Russia
    Feb 27 2013

    Mikhail Belyaev, exclusively to Vestnik Kavkaza

    Less than ten months are left before the presidential elections in
    Azerbaijan. Considering that the South Caucasus is characterized by
    many geopolitical contradictions between regional and global powers and
    unsolved international and inter-ethnic conflicts, this political event
    will have an important consequence: the country steps into a phase of
    internal and foreign political risks; despite the fact that Azerbaijan
    is the most economically and politically stable state in the region.

    On the one hand, it is connected with intensification of internal
    processes ahead of the presidential elections on October 16th, 2013.

    Despite the absence of the united opposition as an alternative
    to the current authorities headed by Ilham Aliyev, activeness of
    the opposition entities and pro-governmental groups will increase
    inevitably.

    Foreign players can play a significant role in these processes,
    especially Russia, the USA, Turkey, and Iran. These states won't
    officially interfere with Azerbaijani internal policy, but they
    will try to find levers of pressure on Azerbaijan, considering the
    pre-election process a good opportunity for influencing its foreign
    and internal policy.

    Due to Azerbaijani multivector policy, it managed to maintain the
    fragile system of checks and balances between the West, Russia,
    and Iran, trying to solve the problem of Armenian occupation of
    Nagorno-Karabakh and seven other regions.

    A pause in Russian-Azerbaijani contacts at the top level appeared
    for several reasons. On the one hand, after Vladimir Putin became
    President for the third time, Moscow is stepping away from the active
    mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and intensification
    of Russian-Armenian military cooperation within the CSTO. We saw
    withdrawal of the Russian troops from the radio-location station in
    Qabala and Azerbaijani-Turkish decision on building the gas pipeline
    TANAP which is aimed at improvement of Europe's energy independence
    from Russia. It confirms that Baku didn't get the expected support
    from the Kremlin and turned its head to the West in the sphere of
    the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.

    However, distancing from Russia can lead to an undesirable situation,
    considering Azerbaijani tense relations with the other regional power -
    Iran. Baku might appear to be "unfavorable" for both important players
    in the region. Thus, this situation increases chances for interior
    destabilization ahead of the presidential elections.

    At the same time, Russian-Iranian relations are multisided and often
    contradictory. There is objective coincidence of interests between
    Moscow and Tehran in the sphere of the Syrian conflict. As for the
    Iranian nuclear program, Russia is much more moderate and this is
    explainable. Firstly, Russia is a global power and is responsible
    for peace in the world. It cannot be interested in proliferation of
    nuclear armament. Secondly, nuclear Iran would definitely expand its
    influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Thirdly, Iran which
    has huge energy resources, but experiences tough sanctions cannot be
    a competitor for Russia in the energy market.

    The situation in the South Caucasus, including Azerbaijan, should be
    considered in the context of regional interests of Moscow and Tehran.

    No secret that Russia and Iran are historic rivals in this region. Two
    Russian-Iranian wars which ended in 1828 determined influence
    spheres between Russia and Iran before the USSR's collapse. After
    three independent republics appeared in the South Caucasus, a long
    rivalry between Russia and Iran became acute.

    Iran uses the Shiah theme for spreading its influence in Azerbaijan
    - the majority of Azerbaijanis are followers of Shiah Islam. The
    positions of Shiah Islamists are very strong on the Absheron peninsula
    - the Iranian spiritual authorities are playing the leading role
    in their support. It is unacceptable for Azerbaijan. Relations
    between official Baku and official Tehran have been close to
    direct confrontation in recent years: Iran is jealous about close
    Azerbaijani-Israeli defense cooperation, while Azerbaijan is annoyed
    with Armenian-Iranian strategic partnership. Big scandals, arrests
    of radical Islamists terrorist groups which seem to be controlled by
    Iranian forces in Azerbaijan, the murder of the Azerbaijani writer
    after the Iranian's ayatollah's fatwa, the arrest of two Azerbaijani
    poets in Iran, and so on - all these events fueled the situation.

    However, in recent weeks scandals seem to stop. Azerbaijan set free
    some accused Islamists, Ayatollah pardoned Azerbaijani poets, the
    number of negative articles in the mass media reduced, and certain thaw
    is visible between Azerbaijan and Iran. In late February Azerbaijani
    President Ilham Aliyev personally welcomed the secretary of the
    Supreme Council of National Security of the IRI, Seid Jalili.

    FarsNews reported that Azerbaijani President confirmed that Azerbaijan
    would support the Iranian peaceful nuclear program. Jalili stressed
    that Iran stood for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
    only within territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

    Probably this maneuver of Baku toward Iran is tactical and is connected
    with Azerbaijan's desire to see neutral attitude of the south neighbor,
    if not support, during the pre-election campaign.

    However, long-prospect approaching to Tehran would enable Azerbaijan
    to make further political maneuver in relations with Russia and Turkey.

    http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/37512.html

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