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RUSSIA-GEORGIA WAR THE HIGH-WATER MARK FOR MOSCOW'S BLACK SEA RESURGENCE
World Politics Review
Aug 8 2013
By Michael Cecire, on 08 Aug 2013, Briefing
Five years ago, Georgian forces crossed into the Moscow-backed
separatist territory of South Ossetia, seeking to clamp down on attacks
against ethnic Georgian villages along the de facto boundaries and
re-establish authority over the breakaway region. Russia's response
was swift: Its troops poured into South Ossetia, pushing out Georgia's
overmatched military. When the guns were finally silenced after the
short but fierce war, hundreds had been killed or wounded and tens
of thousands of civilians were displaced.
Although the global community refused to follow Moscow's lead in
recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia's
other separatist province, the war nonetheless buried what little
hopes remained for peaceful reconciliation between Tbilisi and the
breakaway regions. And to many, the war seemed to mark the end of
one era and the beginning of another. For the first time since the
end of the Cold War, Russian troops had invaded another state.
Moscow's decision to unilaterally prosecute its objectives in
Georgia, at Europe's edge, called into question the very fabric of
the prevailing Euro-Atlantic security architecture, which enshrined
a rules-based order underwritten and policed by NATO's unquestioned
dominance. While a diplomatic blitz by Europe, led by French President
Nicolas Sarkozy, seemed to save Georgia from a possibly worse fate,
the peace deal's final tally underlined which side held the cards:
Moscow won exceedingly favorable language in the six-point plan
(.pdf), which it continues to contravene at will.
The Russian invasion of Georgia not only exposed the apparent
frailties of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, which was
genuinely unable to formulate an effective response to the war's
outbreak, but also appeared to directly challenge it. While the debates
still rage over blame for the war-Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini's
European Union-commissioned probe framed the conflict as a natural
outgrowth of Russian provocations but said the "first shot" was fired
by Georgian forces-Moscow's actions signaled a "re-imperialization"
of its foreign policy. This strategy seeks to deny the West standing
within Moscow's so-called near abroad through the use of economic
leverage, zero-sum diplomacy, transnational institutions and even
war-as 2008 well illustrated.
But while many at the time feared a resurgence of Russian influence in
the region and beyond, August 2008 may instead come to be seen as the
high-water mark of Russia's re-imperialization project. While the war
was calibrated by Moscow to signal its return to great power status,
the past five years have not seen a burgeoning of Russian power and
influence. Indeed, the Black Sea region, the focal point of Russia's
aspirations for hegemony, has not become noticeably more pro-Russian
or submissive to Moscow. Instead, Moscow actually exercises less sway
in the region now than it did five years ago.
In Georgia, Russia squandered its most potent leverage by recognizing
the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, leaving it little
influence save for the occasional border provocation. And despite
Georgian voters' strong repudiation of the now-opposition United
National Movement in last October's parliamentary elections, the new
government in Tbilisi appears more tactically pragmatic but ultimately
opposed to Russia's aims in the region.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, which has long characterized the textbook
definition of an interests-based relationship with Russia, is entering
a period of cooler relations with Moscow as the two states come to
terms with the divergence of their foreign policy visions. For Baku,
Moscow's bid for regional supremacy is a threatening proposition;
Baku knows that a hegemonic Russia would have little patience for
Azerbaijan's multivector foreign policy and competing energy exports.
Closer to home, Azerbaijan sees no good precedents in either Russia's
backing for the Georgian separatist regions or Russia's close
relationship with Armenia, which continues to occupy Azerbaijani
territory.
Yet even Armenia is having second thoughts about its dependence on
Russia, which dominates the landlocked Caucasian state geopolitically
as well as economically. Russian troops patrol Armenia's borders
with Turkey and Iran; the Armenian economy greatly relies on
remittances from its diaspora in Russia; and Armenia's critical energy
infrastructure is overwhelmingly dominated by Russian interests. This
Russian dominance is increasingly rubbing Armenia's citizens the
wrong way on the heels of a prearranged arms sale to Azerbaijan,
rising energy prices and the recent humiliation of an ethnic Armenian
on trial for a fatal car accident in Russia.
Ukraine's pro-Western government was shown the door by the electorate
in 2010, which brought President Viktor Yanukovich's Russia-leaning
Party of Regions to power. As expected, the new government reversed
many of the policies of its predecessor, and went so far as to jail
opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenka on trumped-up charges. Yet even the
Ukrainian government has chafed at Russia's heavy-handedness; Moscow's
hard line over energy issues has prompted Kiev to seek alternatives to
ease its crushing dependence. And in November, Ukraine is expected to
sign an association agreement at the EU Eastern Partnership summit
in Vilnius, which would dramatically deepen its integration with
the Euro-Atlantic space. Georgia and Armenia are expected to initial
agreements at the same summit, followed by signings once technical
benchmarks are met.
The Vilnius summit-should Ukraine's signing and Georgia and Armenia's
initialing occur as planned-highlights the failure of the Russian
re-imperialization initiative. With Georgia and two of Russia's
ostensibly closest allies essentially rejecting its customs union and
Eurasian Union projects in favor of EU integration, the rudiments of a
post-Russia system are emerging in the Black Sea region. The Eastern
Partnership is beginning to yield fruit just as the Eurasian Union
flounders. Turkey, though not without its own problems, is establishing
an arc of influence from the Black Sea through Georgia and Azerbaijan
to the Caspian. And the Russian pipeline energy paradigm, long the key
to economic stability and geopolitical leverage, is rapidly coming
undone as Black Sea states look to reduce dependence on Moscow's
fickle spigot.
With the initial shock and alarm not borne out by subsequent events,
the fuller legacy of the 2008 South Ossetia war becomes clearer:
Rather than illustrating Russian authority in its near abroad, the
2008 war may be better remembered as the apex heralding decline.
Michael Hikari Cecire is a Black Sea and Eurasia regional analyst and
an associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is
also a member of the Georgian Institute of Politics.
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13150/russia-georgia-war-the-high-water-mark-for-moscow-s-black-sea-resurgence
From: A. Papazian
World Politics Review
Aug 8 2013
By Michael Cecire, on 08 Aug 2013, Briefing
Five years ago, Georgian forces crossed into the Moscow-backed
separatist territory of South Ossetia, seeking to clamp down on attacks
against ethnic Georgian villages along the de facto boundaries and
re-establish authority over the breakaway region. Russia's response
was swift: Its troops poured into South Ossetia, pushing out Georgia's
overmatched military. When the guns were finally silenced after the
short but fierce war, hundreds had been killed or wounded and tens
of thousands of civilians were displaced.
Although the global community refused to follow Moscow's lead in
recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia's
other separatist province, the war nonetheless buried what little
hopes remained for peaceful reconciliation between Tbilisi and the
breakaway regions. And to many, the war seemed to mark the end of
one era and the beginning of another. For the first time since the
end of the Cold War, Russian troops had invaded another state.
Moscow's decision to unilaterally prosecute its objectives in
Georgia, at Europe's edge, called into question the very fabric of
the prevailing Euro-Atlantic security architecture, which enshrined
a rules-based order underwritten and policed by NATO's unquestioned
dominance. While a diplomatic blitz by Europe, led by French President
Nicolas Sarkozy, seemed to save Georgia from a possibly worse fate,
the peace deal's final tally underlined which side held the cards:
Moscow won exceedingly favorable language in the six-point plan
(.pdf), which it continues to contravene at will.
The Russian invasion of Georgia not only exposed the apparent
frailties of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, which was
genuinely unable to formulate an effective response to the war's
outbreak, but also appeared to directly challenge it. While the debates
still rage over blame for the war-Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini's
European Union-commissioned probe framed the conflict as a natural
outgrowth of Russian provocations but said the "first shot" was fired
by Georgian forces-Moscow's actions signaled a "re-imperialization"
of its foreign policy. This strategy seeks to deny the West standing
within Moscow's so-called near abroad through the use of economic
leverage, zero-sum diplomacy, transnational institutions and even
war-as 2008 well illustrated.
But while many at the time feared a resurgence of Russian influence in
the region and beyond, August 2008 may instead come to be seen as the
high-water mark of Russia's re-imperialization project. While the war
was calibrated by Moscow to signal its return to great power status,
the past five years have not seen a burgeoning of Russian power and
influence. Indeed, the Black Sea region, the focal point of Russia's
aspirations for hegemony, has not become noticeably more pro-Russian
or submissive to Moscow. Instead, Moscow actually exercises less sway
in the region now than it did five years ago.
In Georgia, Russia squandered its most potent leverage by recognizing
the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, leaving it little
influence save for the occasional border provocation. And despite
Georgian voters' strong repudiation of the now-opposition United
National Movement in last October's parliamentary elections, the new
government in Tbilisi appears more tactically pragmatic but ultimately
opposed to Russia's aims in the region.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, which has long characterized the textbook
definition of an interests-based relationship with Russia, is entering
a period of cooler relations with Moscow as the two states come to
terms with the divergence of their foreign policy visions. For Baku,
Moscow's bid for regional supremacy is a threatening proposition;
Baku knows that a hegemonic Russia would have little patience for
Azerbaijan's multivector foreign policy and competing energy exports.
Closer to home, Azerbaijan sees no good precedents in either Russia's
backing for the Georgian separatist regions or Russia's close
relationship with Armenia, which continues to occupy Azerbaijani
territory.
Yet even Armenia is having second thoughts about its dependence on
Russia, which dominates the landlocked Caucasian state geopolitically
as well as economically. Russian troops patrol Armenia's borders
with Turkey and Iran; the Armenian economy greatly relies on
remittances from its diaspora in Russia; and Armenia's critical energy
infrastructure is overwhelmingly dominated by Russian interests. This
Russian dominance is increasingly rubbing Armenia's citizens the
wrong way on the heels of a prearranged arms sale to Azerbaijan,
rising energy prices and the recent humiliation of an ethnic Armenian
on trial for a fatal car accident in Russia.
Ukraine's pro-Western government was shown the door by the electorate
in 2010, which brought President Viktor Yanukovich's Russia-leaning
Party of Regions to power. As expected, the new government reversed
many of the policies of its predecessor, and went so far as to jail
opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenka on trumped-up charges. Yet even the
Ukrainian government has chafed at Russia's heavy-handedness; Moscow's
hard line over energy issues has prompted Kiev to seek alternatives to
ease its crushing dependence. And in November, Ukraine is expected to
sign an association agreement at the EU Eastern Partnership summit
in Vilnius, which would dramatically deepen its integration with
the Euro-Atlantic space. Georgia and Armenia are expected to initial
agreements at the same summit, followed by signings once technical
benchmarks are met.
The Vilnius summit-should Ukraine's signing and Georgia and Armenia's
initialing occur as planned-highlights the failure of the Russian
re-imperialization initiative. With Georgia and two of Russia's
ostensibly closest allies essentially rejecting its customs union and
Eurasian Union projects in favor of EU integration, the rudiments of a
post-Russia system are emerging in the Black Sea region. The Eastern
Partnership is beginning to yield fruit just as the Eurasian Union
flounders. Turkey, though not without its own problems, is establishing
an arc of influence from the Black Sea through Georgia and Azerbaijan
to the Caspian. And the Russian pipeline energy paradigm, long the key
to economic stability and geopolitical leverage, is rapidly coming
undone as Black Sea states look to reduce dependence on Moscow's
fickle spigot.
With the initial shock and alarm not borne out by subsequent events,
the fuller legacy of the 2008 South Ossetia war becomes clearer:
Rather than illustrating Russian authority in its near abroad, the
2008 war may be better remembered as the apex heralding decline.
Michael Hikari Cecire is a Black Sea and Eurasia regional analyst and
an associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is
also a member of the Georgian Institute of Politics.
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13150/russia-georgia-war-the-high-water-mark-for-moscow-s-black-sea-resurgence
From: A. Papazian