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Milli Gazete, Turkey
Aug 15 2013
'Putin Adjustments' to Near-abroad
Commentary by Mehmet Seyfettin Erol
Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin's visit to Azerbaijan may
not have attracted much attention at a time when the public agenda is
dominated by the Middle East.
However, this visit closely interests Turkey at least as much as it
does Russia - particularly in terms of its Caucasus aspect where the
interests of the two countries intersect, where the priorities of
[Russia'a] "near-abroad policies" lie, and which is the scene of an
overt and covert power struggle.
No doubt, Azerbaijan, an oil-rich fraternal country, lies at the
centre of this power struggle.
The bridging role of Azerbaijan between the Caucasus and Central Asia
and its "gateway status" with respect to the Middle East in Russia's
"towards the South" policy gives this country a strategic status that
is quite important for the security of the countries of the region,
especially Turkey and Iran.
Russia-Turkey-Iran Triangle
This leads us to Russia's "near-abroad policy." Azerbaijan plays a
prominent and considerably important role in the future of Russian
"Eurasianism," which was formulated by [Russian political thinker
Aleksandr] Dugin.
Azerbaijan's demographic makeup, the history it shares [with its
neighbours], and its geographical and cultural traits - as much as its
strategic location - put this country in a vital position in Russian
Eurasianism (which is also described as the "Russia-Turkey-Iran
triangle").
Consequently, full control over Azerbaijan in Moscow's new
Turkic-Islamic-focused Eurasia policy is of great importance for the
future of Russia's regional and global policies.
At the same time, we must also note that Moscow is not ignoring the
"destabilizing role" Azerbaijan may play with respect to Russia's
security, that it holds many cards - chiefly the Karabakh and the
Caspian problems - to maintain control over Azerbaijan, and that it
plays these when necessary.
A Russia that loses Azerbaijan cannot hold on to the North Caucasus,
let alone the South Caucasus. Indeed, even its Caspian policy may take
a big blow if this happens. The agreements signed in Putin's most
recent visit [to Azerbaijan] are seen as a demonstration of Russia's
resolve on this issue.
Oil Politics
Consequently, the dimensions assumed by relations between Russia and
Azerbaijan, a central state of South [Caucasus] and a key country of
regional politics, is of great importance not only for Turkey's energy
policies but also the future of the security of its surroundings and
its regional policies focused on the Caucasus and Central Asia.
We can also not ignore Azerbaijan's prominent place in [Turkey's]
energy security policies by virtue of its energy resources as well as
its status as a route country and its importance for the supply
security of Caspian energy.
Indeed, this is why Azerbaijan has been the scene of an intense
struggle in "neft [oil in Azeri] politics," which played a big role in
the rise and shaping of the "Great Game" that has been continuing
since the 19th century and that is still remembered by many people
with the phrase "one drop of blood for one drop of oil."
The dissolution of the USSR created the opportunity for this game to
resume from where it left off [in the early 20th century] and made
Azerbaijan's oil an important piece of the "New Great Game." The share
of Western companies - through the consortia they have formed - in
Azeri oil resources and the fight over those shares are some of the
most obvious signs of this.
Consequently, Azerbaijan has become an indispensable element of the
TRACECA [Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia] and INOGATE
[Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe] programmes that the
EU has started to minimize its dependence on Russia in terms of energy
resources and routes.
Israel's 'Near-abroad Policy'
Because of this, Azerbaijan's status within the framework of the new
geopolitics of the Caucasus and the role it can play in it are
important factors of balance and cooperation for Turkey's eastern
policy as well as its relations with the West.
This "delicate position" also gives Azerbaijan prominence in the eyes
of other forces. Chief among these is Israel.
Azerbaijan has recently become a favourite country in Israel's
encirclement policies with respect to Turkey and Iran. It also
occupies an important place in Tel Aviv's "Eurasia Triad" centred on
Israel, Turkey, and Russia.
Russia is probably also following closely these notable developments
in Israel-Azerbaijan relations.
We will continue to comment on this issue in the context of Putin's
recent visit to Azerbaijan and the "near-abroad" aspect of Russia's
foreign policy.
[Translated from Turkish]
From: A. Papazian
Aug 15 2013
'Putin Adjustments' to Near-abroad
Commentary by Mehmet Seyfettin Erol
Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin's visit to Azerbaijan may
not have attracted much attention at a time when the public agenda is
dominated by the Middle East.
However, this visit closely interests Turkey at least as much as it
does Russia - particularly in terms of its Caucasus aspect where the
interests of the two countries intersect, where the priorities of
[Russia'a] "near-abroad policies" lie, and which is the scene of an
overt and covert power struggle.
No doubt, Azerbaijan, an oil-rich fraternal country, lies at the
centre of this power struggle.
The bridging role of Azerbaijan between the Caucasus and Central Asia
and its "gateway status" with respect to the Middle East in Russia's
"towards the South" policy gives this country a strategic status that
is quite important for the security of the countries of the region,
especially Turkey and Iran.
Russia-Turkey-Iran Triangle
This leads us to Russia's "near-abroad policy." Azerbaijan plays a
prominent and considerably important role in the future of Russian
"Eurasianism," which was formulated by [Russian political thinker
Aleksandr] Dugin.
Azerbaijan's demographic makeup, the history it shares [with its
neighbours], and its geographical and cultural traits - as much as its
strategic location - put this country in a vital position in Russian
Eurasianism (which is also described as the "Russia-Turkey-Iran
triangle").
Consequently, full control over Azerbaijan in Moscow's new
Turkic-Islamic-focused Eurasia policy is of great importance for the
future of Russia's regional and global policies.
At the same time, we must also note that Moscow is not ignoring the
"destabilizing role" Azerbaijan may play with respect to Russia's
security, that it holds many cards - chiefly the Karabakh and the
Caspian problems - to maintain control over Azerbaijan, and that it
plays these when necessary.
A Russia that loses Azerbaijan cannot hold on to the North Caucasus,
let alone the South Caucasus. Indeed, even its Caspian policy may take
a big blow if this happens. The agreements signed in Putin's most
recent visit [to Azerbaijan] are seen as a demonstration of Russia's
resolve on this issue.
Oil Politics
Consequently, the dimensions assumed by relations between Russia and
Azerbaijan, a central state of South [Caucasus] and a key country of
regional politics, is of great importance not only for Turkey's energy
policies but also the future of the security of its surroundings and
its regional policies focused on the Caucasus and Central Asia.
We can also not ignore Azerbaijan's prominent place in [Turkey's]
energy security policies by virtue of its energy resources as well as
its status as a route country and its importance for the supply
security of Caspian energy.
Indeed, this is why Azerbaijan has been the scene of an intense
struggle in "neft [oil in Azeri] politics," which played a big role in
the rise and shaping of the "Great Game" that has been continuing
since the 19th century and that is still remembered by many people
with the phrase "one drop of blood for one drop of oil."
The dissolution of the USSR created the opportunity for this game to
resume from where it left off [in the early 20th century] and made
Azerbaijan's oil an important piece of the "New Great Game." The share
of Western companies - through the consortia they have formed - in
Azeri oil resources and the fight over those shares are some of the
most obvious signs of this.
Consequently, Azerbaijan has become an indispensable element of the
TRACECA [Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia] and INOGATE
[Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe] programmes that the
EU has started to minimize its dependence on Russia in terms of energy
resources and routes.
Israel's 'Near-abroad Policy'
Because of this, Azerbaijan's status within the framework of the new
geopolitics of the Caucasus and the role it can play in it are
important factors of balance and cooperation for Turkey's eastern
policy as well as its relations with the West.
This "delicate position" also gives Azerbaijan prominence in the eyes
of other forces. Chief among these is Israel.
Azerbaijan has recently become a favourite country in Israel's
encirclement policies with respect to Turkey and Iran. It also
occupies an important place in Tel Aviv's "Eurasia Triad" centred on
Israel, Turkey, and Russia.
Russia is probably also following closely these notable developments
in Israel-Azerbaijan relations.
We will continue to comment on this issue in the context of Putin's
recent visit to Azerbaijan and the "near-abroad" aspect of Russia's
foreign policy.
[Translated from Turkish]
From: A. Papazian