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Today's Zaman, Turkey
Aug 18 2013
Putin's Baku visit: Background and consequences
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
[email protected]
Russian President Vladimir Putin's one-day visit to Azerbaijan last
week passed without any of his characteristically enigmatic promises
or apparent changes to bilateral relations, as some experts had
predicted. Nonetheless, Putin's visit (his first since 2006; former
President Dmitry Medvedev came in 2010) has sent ripples across the
region.
Though local analysts and the media speculated that Putin would
arrive, James Bond-like, at Baku port in the Russian Caspian flotilla,
they were wrong. But during Putin's visit, the squadron of the Russian
Caspian Flotilla, including the missile ship `Dagestan' and small
artillery ship `Volgodonsk' did dock in Baku.
The expectation before Putin's visit was that it would illuminate a
number of unresolved questions. Broadly speaking, over the past year,
the two countries' relationship has been seen as problematic,
especially after Putin returned to the presidency for the third time,
bringing ambitious plans to connect the Post-Soviet space countries
under Moscow's economic-security umbrella. The so-called Eurasian
Union has caused concerns across all the republics, in particular
Azerbaijan. Prior to this, the Azerbaijani leadership rejected
Moscow's invitation to Commonwealth of Independent States meetings on
a number of occasions. Compounding the failure to reach a lease
agreement for the Gabala Radar station in December 2012, bilateral
tensions increased.
Another part of the discussion, at least at the non-official level, is
Azerbaijan's upcoming presidential election. Azerbaijan's opposition
candidate, Rustam Ibrahimbeyov, has Russian citizenship -- and
Azerbaijani legislation prohibits dual citizenship. Thus, in one key
way, Ibrahimbeyov's candidacy is dependent on Moscow's assistance in
removing his citizenship.
It is against this background that Putin's one-day visit to Baku
should be considered. He arrived with a large delegation that included
the foreign minister, defense minister, minister of transport, energy
minister and the presidents of energy companies Rosneft and Lukoil.
During the meeting, he signed a number of bilateral agreements, most
significantly the `Agreement on Cooperation between the State Oil
Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Rosneft Oil Company' and
`Main Terms of Oil Transportation between the State Oil Company of the
Republic of Azerbaijan and Rosneft.'
Despite expectations, nothing was said about the Azerbaijani
presidential election and the citizenship status of the main
opposition candidate, at least not as far as the public is aware.
Furthermore, it would be politically naïve to suggest that the recent
visit was a demonstration of Putin's support for the incumbent,
President Ilham Aliyev.
Second, this visit proved once more that Moscow, specifically Putin,
has no significant interest in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
resolution negotiations. Already, since the start of Putin's third
term, there were signs that Russia wanted to end the trilateral
meetings between the Azerbaijani, Armenian and Russian Presidents,
which took place most recently in January 2012 in Sochi. Moscow has
been in no hurry to start a new set of negotiations on the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. Moreover, there are ongoing
tensions between Moscow and Yerevan, in regard first of all to
Armenia's wish to sign an Association Agreement with the EU at the
forthcoming Vilnius summit in November and, secondly, to the lack of
open support for the Russian-led Customs Union and Eurasian Union
initiatives. Thus, we must not fall prey to the naïve assumption that
Moscow is still a `muscular mediator' in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
negotiations. There are signs that Moscow no longer has a clear idea
of an end game for this particular issue. Notably, in a press
conference after the bilateral talks, Putin said vaguely that `Russia
is actively contributing to the soonest resolution of the conflict
that is possible only by peaceful means.'
Third, there is a widespread belief -- especially among the Armenian
media -- that Putin sent a message to Yerevan from Baku. But Putin's
real message was addressed to the West, particularly to Washington.
The subject of this message is defense cooperation: Recent months have
seen active negotiations on increasing Azerbaijan's defense
cooperation with Turkey and Georgia, as approved at the March 28
trilateral meeting in Batumi. This is crucial for the future of
military cooperation. In addition, Azerbaijan-US talks are continuing,
regarding Afghanistan. Approximately two weeks ago, Azerbaijan's
defense minister visited Washington for negotiations with the
Pentagon. The presence of the Russian defense minister during Putin's
visit is a bad sign. Russia's aim is to kill the trilateral
cooperation with Georgia, Turkey and any military involvement with
Washington. Most people tend to focus on the Gabala Radar Station
issue, but the visit concluded that this chapter between Moscow and
Baku is closed. As suggested before, Moscow's chief intention in the
military realm is to make Azerbaijan dependent on Russian arms
exports.
Fourth, it is possible that behind closed doors, Russia raised the
issue of the opening of the Abkhaz railway with Azerbaijan. Baku
strongly opposes this idea, while Moscow sees that the project can
help rescue Armenia from its current geographic isolation through rail
connections. It's unclear whether or not this matter was discussed;
after his Baku visit, Putin's met with the leader of the breakaway
Abkhaz region, Alexander Ankvab, a meeting which fuelled speculation.
Last but not the least, during the bilateral negotiations, there was
no discussion of the `union' issue -- either the Customs or the
so-called Eurasian Union, or Azerbaijan's negotiations with the
European Union. And neither Moscow nor Baku used the word `united' --
the visit does not mark a new chapter for bilateral relations, but nor
has it proved that they will have a united position on a number of key
issues.
Aug 18 2013
Putin's Baku visit: Background and consequences
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
[email protected]
Russian President Vladimir Putin's one-day visit to Azerbaijan last
week passed without any of his characteristically enigmatic promises
or apparent changes to bilateral relations, as some experts had
predicted. Nonetheless, Putin's visit (his first since 2006; former
President Dmitry Medvedev came in 2010) has sent ripples across the
region.
Though local analysts and the media speculated that Putin would
arrive, James Bond-like, at Baku port in the Russian Caspian flotilla,
they were wrong. But during Putin's visit, the squadron of the Russian
Caspian Flotilla, including the missile ship `Dagestan' and small
artillery ship `Volgodonsk' did dock in Baku.
The expectation before Putin's visit was that it would illuminate a
number of unresolved questions. Broadly speaking, over the past year,
the two countries' relationship has been seen as problematic,
especially after Putin returned to the presidency for the third time,
bringing ambitious plans to connect the Post-Soviet space countries
under Moscow's economic-security umbrella. The so-called Eurasian
Union has caused concerns across all the republics, in particular
Azerbaijan. Prior to this, the Azerbaijani leadership rejected
Moscow's invitation to Commonwealth of Independent States meetings on
a number of occasions. Compounding the failure to reach a lease
agreement for the Gabala Radar station in December 2012, bilateral
tensions increased.
Another part of the discussion, at least at the non-official level, is
Azerbaijan's upcoming presidential election. Azerbaijan's opposition
candidate, Rustam Ibrahimbeyov, has Russian citizenship -- and
Azerbaijani legislation prohibits dual citizenship. Thus, in one key
way, Ibrahimbeyov's candidacy is dependent on Moscow's assistance in
removing his citizenship.
It is against this background that Putin's one-day visit to Baku
should be considered. He arrived with a large delegation that included
the foreign minister, defense minister, minister of transport, energy
minister and the presidents of energy companies Rosneft and Lukoil.
During the meeting, he signed a number of bilateral agreements, most
significantly the `Agreement on Cooperation between the State Oil
Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Rosneft Oil Company' and
`Main Terms of Oil Transportation between the State Oil Company of the
Republic of Azerbaijan and Rosneft.'
Despite expectations, nothing was said about the Azerbaijani
presidential election and the citizenship status of the main
opposition candidate, at least not as far as the public is aware.
Furthermore, it would be politically naïve to suggest that the recent
visit was a demonstration of Putin's support for the incumbent,
President Ilham Aliyev.
Second, this visit proved once more that Moscow, specifically Putin,
has no significant interest in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
resolution negotiations. Already, since the start of Putin's third
term, there were signs that Russia wanted to end the trilateral
meetings between the Azerbaijani, Armenian and Russian Presidents,
which took place most recently in January 2012 in Sochi. Moscow has
been in no hurry to start a new set of negotiations on the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. Moreover, there are ongoing
tensions between Moscow and Yerevan, in regard first of all to
Armenia's wish to sign an Association Agreement with the EU at the
forthcoming Vilnius summit in November and, secondly, to the lack of
open support for the Russian-led Customs Union and Eurasian Union
initiatives. Thus, we must not fall prey to the naïve assumption that
Moscow is still a `muscular mediator' in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
negotiations. There are signs that Moscow no longer has a clear idea
of an end game for this particular issue. Notably, in a press
conference after the bilateral talks, Putin said vaguely that `Russia
is actively contributing to the soonest resolution of the conflict
that is possible only by peaceful means.'
Third, there is a widespread belief -- especially among the Armenian
media -- that Putin sent a message to Yerevan from Baku. But Putin's
real message was addressed to the West, particularly to Washington.
The subject of this message is defense cooperation: Recent months have
seen active negotiations on increasing Azerbaijan's defense
cooperation with Turkey and Georgia, as approved at the March 28
trilateral meeting in Batumi. This is crucial for the future of
military cooperation. In addition, Azerbaijan-US talks are continuing,
regarding Afghanistan. Approximately two weeks ago, Azerbaijan's
defense minister visited Washington for negotiations with the
Pentagon. The presence of the Russian defense minister during Putin's
visit is a bad sign. Russia's aim is to kill the trilateral
cooperation with Georgia, Turkey and any military involvement with
Washington. Most people tend to focus on the Gabala Radar Station
issue, but the visit concluded that this chapter between Moscow and
Baku is closed. As suggested before, Moscow's chief intention in the
military realm is to make Azerbaijan dependent on Russian arms
exports.
Fourth, it is possible that behind closed doors, Russia raised the
issue of the opening of the Abkhaz railway with Azerbaijan. Baku
strongly opposes this idea, while Moscow sees that the project can
help rescue Armenia from its current geographic isolation through rail
connections. It's unclear whether or not this matter was discussed;
after his Baku visit, Putin's met with the leader of the breakaway
Abkhaz region, Alexander Ankvab, a meeting which fuelled speculation.
Last but not the least, during the bilateral negotiations, there was
no discussion of the `union' issue -- either the Customs or the
so-called Eurasian Union, or Azerbaijan's negotiations with the
European Union. And neither Moscow nor Baku used the word `united' --
the visit does not mark a new chapter for bilateral relations, but nor
has it proved that they will have a united position on a number of key
issues.