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THE EU-ARMENIA ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT: WEIGHING THE PROS AND CONS
11:02, August 29, 2013
There has been much talk about the pending EU-Armenia Association
Agreement, but little in the way of objective analysis from competent
commentators. To fill this void, Hetq has sought the input of experts
in the field.
What follows is our interview with one such individual, Professor
Gerard Libaridian.
While the EU-Armenia Association Agreement is to be signed in November,
just two months hence, it appears that none of the parties is willing
to reveal the text of the document. What, in your view, is the reason
for such reluctance? Given that the Agreement will be a lengthy and
detailed document, it appears that the public in Armenia will not
have sufficient time to weigh the pros and cons.
If we want to be charitable, we can argue that it is not proper to
publish a document while it is still under negotiation.
Or, the parties to the projected Agreement may fear that the release
of a draft version may provide the space to over-politicize or even
sabotage the Agreement.
It is clear that the politicization of the Agreement has already
taken place; but now it is taking place in the dark.
The EU claims that the new Association Agreement has yet to be
"finalized", and thus isn't ready for publication. Essentially,
it would seem that the finalized Association Agreement is being
ironed out as we speak and that the document will have already been
"agreed to" in theory by the parties anyway. The signing will be a
mere formality. Is this a correct view of the process?
The fact that there is a date set for the signing of the Agreement
means that there is agreement, at the least, on the principles of
the association and the main areas covered. The latter could be made
public. It is also possible to imagine that there are still substantial
areas to be negotiated. I am not familiar enough with the details of
the current negotiations to answer your last question.
The continued investment of millions of Euros by the EU in Armenia is
ostensibly pegged to progress on a number of fronts - legislative and
judicial reforms, strengthening of democratic institutions, transition
to a market economy, respect of human rights, etc. It would seem that
the EU feels sufficient progress had been made in order to take the
next step with this new Association Agreement. Would you agree with
this assessment?
Your premise is valid, generally speaking. The EU must make such a
positive judgment in order to offer the association possibility to
Armenia and to conduct negotiations that are marked for a positive
conclusion in November.
However, we know that international and regional institutions often
have undeclared, larger concerns regarding a country when they make
their assessments regarding the market economy, democratization,
human rights, etc. Just as it happens when they assess elections,
or when Kazakhstan happens to chair the OSCE that has very high
standards in the areas mentioned.
Sometimes such easing of standards is justified, at least in the minds
of these international organizations, as a strategy to encourage the
little progress that has been made. However, this easing of standards
is more often tied to larger strategic and security concerns. To make
things simple with an example: have you ever seen the US or the EU
determining their relations with Saudi Arabia, on the basis of that
country's level of democracy and human rights?
A note on your initial assessment that millions of investments will be
pouring in with this agreement: we need to learn to distinguish between
investment potential, the promise of investment, and actual investment.
So much depends on the "eventualities," the conditions, the "ifs"
and the "buts," all escape windows for the other side, in this case
the EU. May be I have read too much history. But as they say, the
devil is in the detail. The text may look OK, and many of us will
look for the best, others for the worst in such a text, when it is
signed and released. Nonetheless, the EU will have escape clauses
and the responsibility for anything going wrong with the agreement
will be placed on us.
In other words, the EU will not pay a price for the non-functioning
of the agreement. We will.
What are the likely consequences for Armenia if it signs the
Association Agreement as opposed to membership in the Russian-led
Eurasian Customs Union?
It is obvious that such a document as the Association Agreement with
the EU must be assessed on at least two levels. The first level is
what the document offers in and by itself. Are the provisions of the
Agreement advantageous to Armenia, while not harming any of its vital
interests? The second level is the larger context of what is commonly
known as the "orientation" issue.
There are good reasons why we are focusing on the second level: we
do not have a draft of the agreement under negotiation, so we could
discuss its particulars; we have tensions in our relations with Russia,
our most important strategic partner; and, for me most importantly,
we have a dangerous level in our conflicts with two of our four
neighbors. It is understandable that we are drawn to analyzing at
the second level.
I am reluctant to provide a clear-cut answer to your question until
I see the final EU Agreement document.
But I can offer a couple of reflections. These choices would not have
been so difficult and even so risky if we had resolved our problems
with our neighbors. I know most of my colleagues do not wish to discuss
the reason why all of the choices available to us are now so difficult,
and potentially so costly.
I remember very well one of President Levon Ter-Petrossian's addresses
to the people of Armenia, where he made it clear that the choices
available to us did not include good ones. Our choice was between
bad and worse, he said. Now we are at a point where we have to choose
between worse and the worst. Soon we may not have that choice either.
What should have been a relatively simple assessment of which
association offers the most for Armenia's economic and political
development as a state, we will find that our options are getting
narrower, and each decision has become a more difficult one.
My first comment is, therefore, that we should not have allowed the
situation to reach to this point. It is difficult to discuss these
issues without a historical context, even if that context is limited
to our experience in our most recent independence, since 1991. I
have always maintained that the goal of Armenia's foreign policy,
at least of an Armenia that is independent, should be to identify
options, to create an environment where viable options exist and
that such options invite the least negative side effects. Currently
it appears that we are discussing options. But these are not really
options if each possibility brings with it such dangers, risks, and
uncertainty that we are apt to adopt a fatalistic position: Then,
each side of the political spectrum-those supporting the EU agreement
and those opposing it-will somehow feel that we do not really have
options, that we are condemned to take this rather than that position,
and then blame fate, geography, treacherous foreign powers, and most
importantly, blame each other for whatever will happen, for whatever
new losses we will sustain.
We want to ensure that at the end we have a relief valve for the
consequences of our attitudes. The relief will be in the explanation
that somehow we could not control our destiny and, therefore, we
are free from political responsibility. In fact, it is we who had
relinquished our responsibility a long time ago when we decided that
we did not have any responsibility in resolving our own problems,
that our problems were to be resolved by others, that we were guests
in the region and others should offer solutions which we could take or
reject, and when in that mind-set we missed opportunities to resolve
these issues ourselves.
This kind of logic gives us a false sense that we are free of political
responsibility, when, in fact, we did everything-all in the name of
super-patriotism, under the cover of feeling right rather than doing
right-that would lead us to where we are now: gradually and over as
period of time, almost imperceptibly, we closed off our options. Or
we were left with choices that were difficult to make. But, it seems,
the important element of this kind of logic is that we are able to
shed responsibility.
As if we are saying, collectively, "We will lead you to a dead end
but do so in a way that others could be blamed for it." Just look at
our history and the way we write and debate it.
At each stage of this relinquishing of responsibility, options came
with greater risk and more uncertainty than bearable. I am not raising
this point to argue that our policies were right. Rather, it is to
offer a gentle reminder to all concerned that even at this late date,
we should be aiming at the creation of real options for Armenia.
Secondly, Armenia will probably be penalized for signing the
Association Agreement with the EU. We may have to pay a price and that
price may be on the economic front or on the Karabakh issue. We have
so many vulnerabilities; faith and super-patriotism are not adequate
tools to overcome these difficulties.
What are the likely consequences if Armenia does not sign the
Association Agreement and instead opts for the Russian-led Eurasian
Customs Union?
Armenia will have lost a great opportunity to develop its institutions
and economy along more desirable lines. Armenia will have lost a
sense of what it should look like as a state.
What are the likely consequences if Armenia were to reject the
Association Agreement and the Eurasian Customs Union? Is this a
viable option?
We would be paying double the price. We would have the negative
consequences on both fronts and none of the advantages.
In your opinion, will Armenia sign the Association Agreement this
November?
It appears that it will; although a short moment in the history of
our people and of the region, two months is a long time when you
consider that short moment.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Professor Gerard Libaridian retired recently from the University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, where he held the Alex Manoogian Chair in Modern
Armenian History and was Director of the Armenian Studies Program. He
has authored and edited a number of books, most recently Modern Armenia
(2004) andThe Challenge of Statehood (1999). He has published and
lectured worldwide on the modern history and contemporary affairs
of Armenia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. He was editor of the
Armenian Review (1982-1988), co-founder and Director of the Zoryan
Institute (1982-1990), and Director of the ARF Archives (1982-1988).
>From 1991 to 1997, Dr. Libaridian served as adviser, then senior
adviser (foreign and security policies) to the first President
of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian; he was First Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs (1993-1994) of the newly independent republic,
and Ambassador-at-Large as well as secretary of Armenia's Security
Council (1994-1997) with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary.
Professor Libaridian has returned to Cambridge, Mass., to devote his
time to writing and the pursuit of other interests. He is currently
working on a number of projects, including a new book, "Anatomy of
Conflict. Nagorno Karabakh and the New World Order."
http://hetq.am/eng/interviews/28959/the-eu-armenia-association-agreement-weighing-the-pros-and-cons.html
11:02, August 29, 2013
There has been much talk about the pending EU-Armenia Association
Agreement, but little in the way of objective analysis from competent
commentators. To fill this void, Hetq has sought the input of experts
in the field.
What follows is our interview with one such individual, Professor
Gerard Libaridian.
While the EU-Armenia Association Agreement is to be signed in November,
just two months hence, it appears that none of the parties is willing
to reveal the text of the document. What, in your view, is the reason
for such reluctance? Given that the Agreement will be a lengthy and
detailed document, it appears that the public in Armenia will not
have sufficient time to weigh the pros and cons.
If we want to be charitable, we can argue that it is not proper to
publish a document while it is still under negotiation.
Or, the parties to the projected Agreement may fear that the release
of a draft version may provide the space to over-politicize or even
sabotage the Agreement.
It is clear that the politicization of the Agreement has already
taken place; but now it is taking place in the dark.
The EU claims that the new Association Agreement has yet to be
"finalized", and thus isn't ready for publication. Essentially,
it would seem that the finalized Association Agreement is being
ironed out as we speak and that the document will have already been
"agreed to" in theory by the parties anyway. The signing will be a
mere formality. Is this a correct view of the process?
The fact that there is a date set for the signing of the Agreement
means that there is agreement, at the least, on the principles of
the association and the main areas covered. The latter could be made
public. It is also possible to imagine that there are still substantial
areas to be negotiated. I am not familiar enough with the details of
the current negotiations to answer your last question.
The continued investment of millions of Euros by the EU in Armenia is
ostensibly pegged to progress on a number of fronts - legislative and
judicial reforms, strengthening of democratic institutions, transition
to a market economy, respect of human rights, etc. It would seem that
the EU feels sufficient progress had been made in order to take the
next step with this new Association Agreement. Would you agree with
this assessment?
Your premise is valid, generally speaking. The EU must make such a
positive judgment in order to offer the association possibility to
Armenia and to conduct negotiations that are marked for a positive
conclusion in November.
However, we know that international and regional institutions often
have undeclared, larger concerns regarding a country when they make
their assessments regarding the market economy, democratization,
human rights, etc. Just as it happens when they assess elections,
or when Kazakhstan happens to chair the OSCE that has very high
standards in the areas mentioned.
Sometimes such easing of standards is justified, at least in the minds
of these international organizations, as a strategy to encourage the
little progress that has been made. However, this easing of standards
is more often tied to larger strategic and security concerns. To make
things simple with an example: have you ever seen the US or the EU
determining their relations with Saudi Arabia, on the basis of that
country's level of democracy and human rights?
A note on your initial assessment that millions of investments will be
pouring in with this agreement: we need to learn to distinguish between
investment potential, the promise of investment, and actual investment.
So much depends on the "eventualities," the conditions, the "ifs"
and the "buts," all escape windows for the other side, in this case
the EU. May be I have read too much history. But as they say, the
devil is in the detail. The text may look OK, and many of us will
look for the best, others for the worst in such a text, when it is
signed and released. Nonetheless, the EU will have escape clauses
and the responsibility for anything going wrong with the agreement
will be placed on us.
In other words, the EU will not pay a price for the non-functioning
of the agreement. We will.
What are the likely consequences for Armenia if it signs the
Association Agreement as opposed to membership in the Russian-led
Eurasian Customs Union?
It is obvious that such a document as the Association Agreement with
the EU must be assessed on at least two levels. The first level is
what the document offers in and by itself. Are the provisions of the
Agreement advantageous to Armenia, while not harming any of its vital
interests? The second level is the larger context of what is commonly
known as the "orientation" issue.
There are good reasons why we are focusing on the second level: we
do not have a draft of the agreement under negotiation, so we could
discuss its particulars; we have tensions in our relations with Russia,
our most important strategic partner; and, for me most importantly,
we have a dangerous level in our conflicts with two of our four
neighbors. It is understandable that we are drawn to analyzing at
the second level.
I am reluctant to provide a clear-cut answer to your question until
I see the final EU Agreement document.
But I can offer a couple of reflections. These choices would not have
been so difficult and even so risky if we had resolved our problems
with our neighbors. I know most of my colleagues do not wish to discuss
the reason why all of the choices available to us are now so difficult,
and potentially so costly.
I remember very well one of President Levon Ter-Petrossian's addresses
to the people of Armenia, where he made it clear that the choices
available to us did not include good ones. Our choice was between
bad and worse, he said. Now we are at a point where we have to choose
between worse and the worst. Soon we may not have that choice either.
What should have been a relatively simple assessment of which
association offers the most for Armenia's economic and political
development as a state, we will find that our options are getting
narrower, and each decision has become a more difficult one.
My first comment is, therefore, that we should not have allowed the
situation to reach to this point. It is difficult to discuss these
issues without a historical context, even if that context is limited
to our experience in our most recent independence, since 1991. I
have always maintained that the goal of Armenia's foreign policy,
at least of an Armenia that is independent, should be to identify
options, to create an environment where viable options exist and
that such options invite the least negative side effects. Currently
it appears that we are discussing options. But these are not really
options if each possibility brings with it such dangers, risks, and
uncertainty that we are apt to adopt a fatalistic position: Then,
each side of the political spectrum-those supporting the EU agreement
and those opposing it-will somehow feel that we do not really have
options, that we are condemned to take this rather than that position,
and then blame fate, geography, treacherous foreign powers, and most
importantly, blame each other for whatever will happen, for whatever
new losses we will sustain.
We want to ensure that at the end we have a relief valve for the
consequences of our attitudes. The relief will be in the explanation
that somehow we could not control our destiny and, therefore, we
are free from political responsibility. In fact, it is we who had
relinquished our responsibility a long time ago when we decided that
we did not have any responsibility in resolving our own problems,
that our problems were to be resolved by others, that we were guests
in the region and others should offer solutions which we could take or
reject, and when in that mind-set we missed opportunities to resolve
these issues ourselves.
This kind of logic gives us a false sense that we are free of political
responsibility, when, in fact, we did everything-all in the name of
super-patriotism, under the cover of feeling right rather than doing
right-that would lead us to where we are now: gradually and over as
period of time, almost imperceptibly, we closed off our options. Or
we were left with choices that were difficult to make. But, it seems,
the important element of this kind of logic is that we are able to
shed responsibility.
As if we are saying, collectively, "We will lead you to a dead end
but do so in a way that others could be blamed for it." Just look at
our history and the way we write and debate it.
At each stage of this relinquishing of responsibility, options came
with greater risk and more uncertainty than bearable. I am not raising
this point to argue that our policies were right. Rather, it is to
offer a gentle reminder to all concerned that even at this late date,
we should be aiming at the creation of real options for Armenia.
Secondly, Armenia will probably be penalized for signing the
Association Agreement with the EU. We may have to pay a price and that
price may be on the economic front or on the Karabakh issue. We have
so many vulnerabilities; faith and super-patriotism are not adequate
tools to overcome these difficulties.
What are the likely consequences if Armenia does not sign the
Association Agreement and instead opts for the Russian-led Eurasian
Customs Union?
Armenia will have lost a great opportunity to develop its institutions
and economy along more desirable lines. Armenia will have lost a
sense of what it should look like as a state.
What are the likely consequences if Armenia were to reject the
Association Agreement and the Eurasian Customs Union? Is this a
viable option?
We would be paying double the price. We would have the negative
consequences on both fronts and none of the advantages.
In your opinion, will Armenia sign the Association Agreement this
November?
It appears that it will; although a short moment in the history of
our people and of the region, two months is a long time when you
consider that short moment.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Professor Gerard Libaridian retired recently from the University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, where he held the Alex Manoogian Chair in Modern
Armenian History and was Director of the Armenian Studies Program. He
has authored and edited a number of books, most recently Modern Armenia
(2004) andThe Challenge of Statehood (1999). He has published and
lectured worldwide on the modern history and contemporary affairs
of Armenia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. He was editor of the
Armenian Review (1982-1988), co-founder and Director of the Zoryan
Institute (1982-1990), and Director of the ARF Archives (1982-1988).
>From 1991 to 1997, Dr. Libaridian served as adviser, then senior
adviser (foreign and security policies) to the first President
of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian; he was First Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs (1993-1994) of the newly independent republic,
and Ambassador-at-Large as well as secretary of Armenia's Security
Council (1994-1997) with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary.
Professor Libaridian has returned to Cambridge, Mass., to devote his
time to writing and the pursuit of other interests. He is currently
working on a number of projects, including a new book, "Anatomy of
Conflict. Nagorno Karabakh and the New World Order."
http://hetq.am/eng/interviews/28959/the-eu-armenia-association-agreement-weighing-the-pros-and-cons.html