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MASIS MAILYAN: BAKU IS WRONG TO THINK THAT "THE KEY TO KARABAKH" IS IN MOSCOW
ArmInfo's Interview with Masis Mailyan, Chairman of the Public Council
for Foreign Policy and Security of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic
by David Stepanyan
Thursday, August 29, 00:30
Do you think Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Azerbaijan
will mark the beginning of Moscow's new strategy regarding Azerbaijan
and the region in general? What are its key vectors? There is an
opinion that the President of Russia visited Baku on the threshold
of the presidential election in Azerbaijan to support another term
of office of his Azeri counterpart. What can Baku offer Moscow in
exchange for that support?
There has been no reliable information about the Kremlin's new
strategy regarding Azerbaijan yet. I think that Russian President
Vladimir Putin's visit to Azerbaijan, as well as the recent visits
of the leaders of the Turkic-speaking countries to Azerbaijan had a
purpose to demonstrate their support to the incumbent president and
candidate for president of Azerbaijan. Taking into consideration
that the Russian President's visit had a specific goal to support
Aliyev on the threshold of the presidential election in Azerbaijan,
one should not wait for sharp changing of the Russian policy after
Putin's visit to Azerbaijan.
Baku believes that Russia has got enough influence upon Armenia to
persuade Yerevan to agree to the unilateral cession of positions
in the Karabakh peace process. Do you think it is possible after
achievement of new arrangements between Moscow and Baku?
Actually, the relations between Moscow and Yerevan have different
layers and are defined by many factors. These relations are many-sided
and there is no need to simplify them. They have been always thinking
in Baku that "the key to Karabakh" is in the hands of Moscow, but
they are wrong. Such understanding of the reality hinders Azerbaijani
politicians to hold direct negotiations with the NKR.
The latest delivery of Russian military hardware worth 1 bln USD to
Azerbaijan has given another trump card to those who are against
strengthening of Russia's influence in Armenia. What do you think
Moscow was guided by when making this decision that runs counter to
the interests of Russia's only strategic ally in the Caucasus?
Russian functionaries and pro-Russian experts explain this step of
Russia by the business interests of Moscow. I think that all the
countries and force centers interested in peace in the South Caucasus
region, especially the international intermediaries in the Karabakh
process, have to refuse the steps which may break the created military
balance, which the fragile stability of the region is based on.
What do you think the NKR Vice Premier Artur Aghabekyan's Aug 14
partnership offer to Azerbaijan means? Does it mean that Stepanakert
has decided to be independent in the foreign policy issues, first
of all, in the Karabakh conflict settlement that Yerevan officially
deals with?
The idea of joint using of the hydro resources of the river Terter
is not a new one and was offered to Azerbaijan through international
intermediaries even by the former government of the Nagorno Karabakh
Republic. More than ten years ago, a border working meeting of
hydro engineers from the NKR and Azerbaijan took place through the
intermediary of Ambassador Kasprzyk. I think that by the statements
about readiness to regional cooperation the Karabakh authorities tried
to show the world their constructive intention against the background
of the Azerbaijani position that is hardening day by day.
http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=A41E3D90-1020-11E3-9D8B0EB7C0D21663
ArmInfo's Interview with Masis Mailyan, Chairman of the Public Council
for Foreign Policy and Security of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic
by David Stepanyan
Thursday, August 29, 00:30
Do you think Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Azerbaijan
will mark the beginning of Moscow's new strategy regarding Azerbaijan
and the region in general? What are its key vectors? There is an
opinion that the President of Russia visited Baku on the threshold
of the presidential election in Azerbaijan to support another term
of office of his Azeri counterpart. What can Baku offer Moscow in
exchange for that support?
There has been no reliable information about the Kremlin's new
strategy regarding Azerbaijan yet. I think that Russian President
Vladimir Putin's visit to Azerbaijan, as well as the recent visits
of the leaders of the Turkic-speaking countries to Azerbaijan had a
purpose to demonstrate their support to the incumbent president and
candidate for president of Azerbaijan. Taking into consideration
that the Russian President's visit had a specific goal to support
Aliyev on the threshold of the presidential election in Azerbaijan,
one should not wait for sharp changing of the Russian policy after
Putin's visit to Azerbaijan.
Baku believes that Russia has got enough influence upon Armenia to
persuade Yerevan to agree to the unilateral cession of positions
in the Karabakh peace process. Do you think it is possible after
achievement of new arrangements between Moscow and Baku?
Actually, the relations between Moscow and Yerevan have different
layers and are defined by many factors. These relations are many-sided
and there is no need to simplify them. They have been always thinking
in Baku that "the key to Karabakh" is in the hands of Moscow, but
they are wrong. Such understanding of the reality hinders Azerbaijani
politicians to hold direct negotiations with the NKR.
The latest delivery of Russian military hardware worth 1 bln USD to
Azerbaijan has given another trump card to those who are against
strengthening of Russia's influence in Armenia. What do you think
Moscow was guided by when making this decision that runs counter to
the interests of Russia's only strategic ally in the Caucasus?
Russian functionaries and pro-Russian experts explain this step of
Russia by the business interests of Moscow. I think that all the
countries and force centers interested in peace in the South Caucasus
region, especially the international intermediaries in the Karabakh
process, have to refuse the steps which may break the created military
balance, which the fragile stability of the region is based on.
What do you think the NKR Vice Premier Artur Aghabekyan's Aug 14
partnership offer to Azerbaijan means? Does it mean that Stepanakert
has decided to be independent in the foreign policy issues, first
of all, in the Karabakh conflict settlement that Yerevan officially
deals with?
The idea of joint using of the hydro resources of the river Terter
is not a new one and was offered to Azerbaijan through international
intermediaries even by the former government of the Nagorno Karabakh
Republic. More than ten years ago, a border working meeting of
hydro engineers from the NKR and Azerbaijan took place through the
intermediary of Ambassador Kasprzyk. I think that by the statements
about readiness to regional cooperation the Karabakh authorities tried
to show the world their constructive intention against the background
of the Azerbaijani position that is hardening day by day.
http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=A41E3D90-1020-11E3-9D8B0EB7C0D21663