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  • Ambivalent Russia

    AMBIVALENT RUSSIA

    New Eastern Europe
    Oct 1 2013

    Author: Nika Sikharulidze .

    "Our unit had an order to attack the Azerbaijanis' positions;
    however, another order came from the top to change the target and
    attack the Armenians' positions. These kind of contradictive orders
    were ordinary in this war," says a Georgian former soldier who served
    in the Soviet/Russian army located on Armenian territory during the
    Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between 1988-1991. The theory says that
    a conflict between neighbouring states can emerge on the grounds
    of ethnic tensions, religious differences, border uncertainty,
    spilling-over of internal problems and other factors. Additionally,
    conflicts can also be instigated by a third party. These types of
    conflicts are the most complex to solve and the solution normally
    depends on political tradeoffs, big political games that are a matter
    of political logrolling or exchange.

    For Russia, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Caucasus
    never lost its significant importance. As a former metropolis of the
    Soviet Union, Russia still retains its influence over the region. To
    understand Russia's dualistic approach to its foreign policy and its
    Near Abroad in particular, we should glance through the history of
    tsarist Russia, continued in the same manner by the communists and
    finally Putin's re-emerged informal doctrine of neo-imperialism.

    The Russian Empire, which reached the peak of its magnificence
    in the first half of the 18th century, adopted a classical and
    common to all empires approach to its neighbours, lands, peoples
    and competing powers. Empires were always driven by the ambivalent
    stimulus of acting, rationally and irrationally. In the case of the
    Russian Empire, the examples of rational behaviour were to expand its
    influence over Azerbaijan as a bridge-head to Persia in the beginning
    of the 19th century, and later to do the same due to its energy rich
    territory. Controversially, the occupation of the Baltic states
    in the mid-20th century, and the bloody response to the Hungarian
    Revolution of 1956 had a huge component of the Russian Empire's
    irrational behaviour.

    As today's Russian Federation is a successor of the Soviet Union,
    and the Soviet Union itself is a successor of the Russian Empire, it
    is easy to understand that its foreign-policy behaviour is a rudiment
    of the old imperialistic approach which still remains in the brains
    of the Russian ruling elite of the old school KGB nomenclature.

    Russian participation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a fusion of
    the above-mentioned rational and irrational behaviour. By aggravating
    this conflict, Russia was able to accomplish a number of objectives:
    the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and Georgia's neutral position in
    this situation makes the hypothetical integration of the South Caucasus
    region impossible, therefore undermining the possibility of turning it
    into a huge geopolitical centre with likely joint foreign aspirations.

    The only way for Russia to retain its military presence in Gyumri,
    Armenia, is to be a guarantor of Armenian security and defence. Thus,
    due to the conflict, landlocked Armenia is forced to seek allies as
    it is surrounded by Turkey, with whom it has no diplomatic relations,
    Azerbaijan with whom it is in a state of war, Iran from the south and
    Georgia from the north that for certain reasons cannot be considered
    as reliable strategic partners. Therefore, Armenia's pro-Russian
    orientation is determined by the geopolitical situation on the one
    hand, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the other.

    The Russian political establishment also hopes that the existing
    conflict provides more advantages for Russia in its relations with
    Azerbaijan. The existing political configuration of the conflict
    allows for Russia's prolongation of possession and operation of
    the Gabala Radar Station, which is extremely important for Russia
    to control 6,000 kilometres of Azerbaijan's border. Azerbaijani
    politicians take into consideration that Armenia is in an alliance
    with Russia in the format of Collective Security Treaty Organization
    (CSTO), which operates similar to NATO's 5th article principle saying
    that an attack on one of the members of the alliance is considered an
    attack on all members. This particular circumstance makes Azerbaijan's
    policy more accurate and in some cases loyal to Russia.

    The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has been somewhat of a guarantee for
    Russia that the two countries would not express any NATO aspirations,
    which is a very sensitive issue for Russia. Russia can have a full
    control over the situation if one of the conflict sides shows any
    interest to NATO. Russia has great leverage to stop NATO enlargement
    to the East and particularly in the South Caucasus by retaining the
    status quo of the existing conflict. Russia uses the same leverage
    with regards to the EU enlargement policy.

    At the beginning of September 2013, during a visit to Moscow, the
    Armenian president, Serzh Sargsyan, announced Armenia's readiness to
    join the Russian-led Customs Union: "I confirmed Armenia's decision to
    join the Customs Union and participate in the processes of formation
    of the Eurasian economic union," said Sargsyan, which proves that the
    Armenians greatly depend on Russia, especially with regard to their
    foreign policy aspirations.

    Russia also hopes that by controlling the situation in the South
    Caucasus it can manipulate the energy policy and in particular hinder
    further development of alternative energy channels to Europe. Central
    Asian and Caspian energy resources are considered one of the ways
    of ensuring European energy security that would result in Russia's
    losing its monopoly position in the European energy market.

    These and some other vested interests that are driven by Russia's
    policy in the South Caucasus could be considered rational. However,
    there are irrational incentives that make Russian policy obscure
    and difficult to understand because of its emotional origins. These
    emotions are remnants of Russian imperialism which seriously restrain
    its development and transformation into Western culture. The expansion
    of Russian borders as far as is possible, washing the Russian sapog
    (boot) in the Indian Ocean, expanding its influence in Europe and
    making the whole world scared of Russia, are all the neo-imperialistic
    dreams of the Russian political elites.

    Until the new generation of Russian policymakers realise that this
    kind of political romanticism should be replaced by the real politics,
    rational behaviour and respect towards common international rules,
    Russia will not reach the level of stable development and prosperity.

    Nika Sikharulidze is the Chief Advisor with the Office of the National
    Security Council of Georgia.

    http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/960

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