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RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, Czech Republic
Aug 8 2005
Azerbaijan: Relations With U.S. Enter A New Phase
By Richard Giragosian
(RFE/RL)
The working visit to Washington last week by Azerbaijani Foreign
Minister Elmar Mammadyarov came at a very significant time for both
countries and could represent something of a turning point in
bilateral relations. Following a sweeping reevaluation of U.S.
policy, those relations have been subject to a dynamic, yet subtle
shift in recent months, driven by a set of external developments
ranging from the impact of the so-called colored revolutions in
several former Soviet states to a new emphasis on democratization as
the strategic priority of the second Bush Administration.
The shift in U.S.-Azerbaijani relations has also been dictated by
internal considerations, further exacerbated by Azerbaijan's looming
parliamentary elections set for 6 November. Set against the wave of
democratic change in Georgia, Ukraine, and most recently, in
Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan faces new pressure to ensure a free and fair
election. And it is this need to meet heightened democratic standards
that is the new determinant in the U.S. approach to Azerbaijan.
The necessity for improved electoral credentials in Azerbaijan has
been repeatedly stressed in recent months by the Council of Europe,
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and
was reiterated during last month's visits to Baku by former U.S.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and current Deputy Secretary of
State Paula Dobriansky. But Washington's insistence on
democratization in Azerbaijan is not merely an end in itself, but
stems from a broader American recognition of democratization as
essential to domestic stability and regional security. It also
reflects a new tool in the global war on terror, although it remains
to be seen if this "muscular Wilsonian" approach will yield better
results.
For Azerbaijan, this priority for democratic elections has sharply
raised the threshold for the regime of President Ilham Aliyev. But
preparations for the election have fallen far short of the shared
expectations of the international community and the Azerbaijani
opposition. Specifically, Azerbaijan's electoral reforms remain
incomplete, with shortfalls in both the composition of electoral
commissions and the planned monitoring of the ballot (See "RFE/RL
Caucasus Report."). American disappointment with election
preparations to date was also a central message in Mammadyarov's
talks with his American hosts.
This is also a lesson for others, however. For neighboring Armenia,
which will be facing its own elections within the next two years, and
even for Georgia, whose Rose Revolution was rewarded by an American
presidential visit and by U.S. help in pressuring Russia to withdraw
its troops from the country, but which has since created a Central
Election Commission wholly dominated by supporters of the ruling
party, there are significantly higher standards and greater
expectations.
In addition, Mammadyarov's visit was largely overshadowed by
speculation about an imminent agreement for a new U.S. military base
in the country. This speculation has been largely fueled by the
recent demand by Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov to close the
U.S. and coalition air base at Karshi-Khanabad within six months. The
loss of the use of the base in Uzbekistan is viewed by some experts
as an immediate setback to the U.S. military's operational
capabilities in nearby Afghanistan and, as the thinking holds,
necessitates the opening of new air base in Azerbaijan. While this
view is correct in recognizing the importance of the South Caucasus
air corridor as a "lifeline" between coalition forces in Afghanistan
and bases in Europe, it is flawed by a superficial understanding of
the nature of the U.S. military mission and presence in Azerbaijan,
as well as by the practical limitation of aircraft needing to refuel
en route from Azerbaijan to Afghanistan.
Despite reports predicting a "new" U.S. military engagement in
Azerbaijan, in reality, there has been a significant American
military mission there for at least three years, comprised of two
components. The first component was the creation of the "Caspian
Guard," an initiative involving both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
focusing on maritime and border security in the Caspian Sea. The
Caspian Guard initiative incorporates defensive mission areas,
including the surveillance of Caspian airspace, borders, and
shipping. It encourages greater coordination and cooperation in
counter-proliferation efforts by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. This
effort was further bolstered by a $20 million program launched in
July 2004 and implemented by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency
to train the Azerbaijan Maritime Border Guard. Additional training
and combined exercises were also provided by U.S. Navy SEALS to
Azerbaijan's 41st Special Warfare Naval Unit in June 2004.
The second component was the establishment of several "Cooperative
Security Locations," tactical facilities with pre-positioned stock
that provide contingency access but, unlike a traditional base, have
little or no permanent U.S. military presence. These locations are
designed to increase the mobility of U.S. military forces and, most
importantly, facilitate counter-proliferation missions along
Azerbaijan's southern border with Iran and northern borders with
Georgia and Daghestan.
In line with the U.S. military need to project military power
rapidly, the U.S. presence in Azerbaijan may be further expanded from
the existing Cooperative Security Locations to Forward Operating
Sites, host-country "warm sites" endowed with a limited military
presence and capable of hosting rotational forces. These forward
operating sites can also serve as centers for bilateral and regional
training.
Thus, while the utility of a permanent, traditional military base in
Azerbaijan is seriously limited, the expansion of the forward
stationing of forces is likely. (Azerbaijani presidential aide Novruz
Mamedov's recent statement to Interfax that Azerbaijan will not host
"U.S. military bases" may draw a fine semantic line between "bases"
in the traditional sense and forward operating sites.) Yet even the
military relationship is in the final analysis contingent on
Azerbaijan's ability to meet the new, more stringent U.S. standards
of democracy and free elections. The steadfast refusal by the
Azerbaijani authorities to amend the composition of election
commissions and their reluctance to permit the marking of voters to
preclude multiple voting cast doubt on President Aliyev's repeated
assertions that the ballot will indeed be free, fair, and
transparent.
Aug 8 2005
Azerbaijan: Relations With U.S. Enter A New Phase
By Richard Giragosian
(RFE/RL)
The working visit to Washington last week by Azerbaijani Foreign
Minister Elmar Mammadyarov came at a very significant time for both
countries and could represent something of a turning point in
bilateral relations. Following a sweeping reevaluation of U.S.
policy, those relations have been subject to a dynamic, yet subtle
shift in recent months, driven by a set of external developments
ranging from the impact of the so-called colored revolutions in
several former Soviet states to a new emphasis on democratization as
the strategic priority of the second Bush Administration.
The shift in U.S.-Azerbaijani relations has also been dictated by
internal considerations, further exacerbated by Azerbaijan's looming
parliamentary elections set for 6 November. Set against the wave of
democratic change in Georgia, Ukraine, and most recently, in
Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan faces new pressure to ensure a free and fair
election. And it is this need to meet heightened democratic standards
that is the new determinant in the U.S. approach to Azerbaijan.
The necessity for improved electoral credentials in Azerbaijan has
been repeatedly stressed in recent months by the Council of Europe,
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and
was reiterated during last month's visits to Baku by former U.S.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and current Deputy Secretary of
State Paula Dobriansky. But Washington's insistence on
democratization in Azerbaijan is not merely an end in itself, but
stems from a broader American recognition of democratization as
essential to domestic stability and regional security. It also
reflects a new tool in the global war on terror, although it remains
to be seen if this "muscular Wilsonian" approach will yield better
results.
For Azerbaijan, this priority for democratic elections has sharply
raised the threshold for the regime of President Ilham Aliyev. But
preparations for the election have fallen far short of the shared
expectations of the international community and the Azerbaijani
opposition. Specifically, Azerbaijan's electoral reforms remain
incomplete, with shortfalls in both the composition of electoral
commissions and the planned monitoring of the ballot (See "RFE/RL
Caucasus Report."). American disappointment with election
preparations to date was also a central message in Mammadyarov's
talks with his American hosts.
This is also a lesson for others, however. For neighboring Armenia,
which will be facing its own elections within the next two years, and
even for Georgia, whose Rose Revolution was rewarded by an American
presidential visit and by U.S. help in pressuring Russia to withdraw
its troops from the country, but which has since created a Central
Election Commission wholly dominated by supporters of the ruling
party, there are significantly higher standards and greater
expectations.
In addition, Mammadyarov's visit was largely overshadowed by
speculation about an imminent agreement for a new U.S. military base
in the country. This speculation has been largely fueled by the
recent demand by Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov to close the
U.S. and coalition air base at Karshi-Khanabad within six months. The
loss of the use of the base in Uzbekistan is viewed by some experts
as an immediate setback to the U.S. military's operational
capabilities in nearby Afghanistan and, as the thinking holds,
necessitates the opening of new air base in Azerbaijan. While this
view is correct in recognizing the importance of the South Caucasus
air corridor as a "lifeline" between coalition forces in Afghanistan
and bases in Europe, it is flawed by a superficial understanding of
the nature of the U.S. military mission and presence in Azerbaijan,
as well as by the practical limitation of aircraft needing to refuel
en route from Azerbaijan to Afghanistan.
Despite reports predicting a "new" U.S. military engagement in
Azerbaijan, in reality, there has been a significant American
military mission there for at least three years, comprised of two
components. The first component was the creation of the "Caspian
Guard," an initiative involving both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
focusing on maritime and border security in the Caspian Sea. The
Caspian Guard initiative incorporates defensive mission areas,
including the surveillance of Caspian airspace, borders, and
shipping. It encourages greater coordination and cooperation in
counter-proliferation efforts by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. This
effort was further bolstered by a $20 million program launched in
July 2004 and implemented by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency
to train the Azerbaijan Maritime Border Guard. Additional training
and combined exercises were also provided by U.S. Navy SEALS to
Azerbaijan's 41st Special Warfare Naval Unit in June 2004.
The second component was the establishment of several "Cooperative
Security Locations," tactical facilities with pre-positioned stock
that provide contingency access but, unlike a traditional base, have
little or no permanent U.S. military presence. These locations are
designed to increase the mobility of U.S. military forces and, most
importantly, facilitate counter-proliferation missions along
Azerbaijan's southern border with Iran and northern borders with
Georgia and Daghestan.
In line with the U.S. military need to project military power
rapidly, the U.S. presence in Azerbaijan may be further expanded from
the existing Cooperative Security Locations to Forward Operating
Sites, host-country "warm sites" endowed with a limited military
presence and capable of hosting rotational forces. These forward
operating sites can also serve as centers for bilateral and regional
training.
Thus, while the utility of a permanent, traditional military base in
Azerbaijan is seriously limited, the expansion of the forward
stationing of forces is likely. (Azerbaijani presidential aide Novruz
Mamedov's recent statement to Interfax that Azerbaijan will not host
"U.S. military bases" may draw a fine semantic line between "bases"
in the traditional sense and forward operating sites.) Yet even the
military relationship is in the final analysis contingent on
Azerbaijan's ability to meet the new, more stringent U.S. standards
of democracy and free elections. The steadfast refusal by the
Azerbaijani authorities to amend the composition of election
commissions and their reluctance to permit the marking of voters to
preclude multiple voting cast doubt on President Aliyev's repeated
assertions that the ballot will indeed be free, fair, and
transparent.