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Transitions Online, Czech Republic
Aug 8 2005
In Search of a Stable Eurasia
by Igor Torbakov
8 August 2005
Russia and Turkey forge new ties on security and trade. From
EurasiaNet.
Turkish Prime-Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's recent talks with
Russian President Vladimir Putin suggest that the two Eurasian
countries have found common ground on a number of key regional
security issues.
`It's our fourth meeting during the last seven months, and I guess,
all of you understand what that means,' Erdogan said at a news
conference following the 17-18 July negotiations at Putin's posh
summer residence in the Russian Black Sea resort town of Sochi. `Our
views totally coincide with regard to the situation in the region as
well as to the issues concerning the preservation of stability in the
world,' Erdogan was quoted as saying.
The recent Russian-Turkish encounter came after the Kremlin leader's
official visit to Ankara in December 2004 and Erdogan's trip to
Moscow in January 2005. Last May the Turkish prime minister also
attended festivities in the Russian capital commemorating the 60th
anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in World War II.
Such a sharp increase in top-level contacts appears to be the result
of both countries' wariness toward political turbulence in their
overlapping `near abroads' - specifically, in the South Caucasus and
Central Asia, regional analysts say.
Both Moscow and Ankara are closely following the geopolitical changes
that are taking place in post-Soviet Eurasia - particularly those
brought about by the `color revolutions.' In the South Caucasus, the
`frozen conflicts' between Tbilisi and the breakaway territories of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the stalemate between Azerbaijan and
Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh drive these shared concerns.
In public, both Russian and Turkish leaders have stressed their
commitment to the peaceful settlement of the inter-ethnic conflicts
in the Caucasus. However, a number of Turkish and Russian experts
argue that Ankara and Moscow seem reluctant to embrace political
changes in the Commonwealth of Independent States' southern tier and
would rather support the preservation of the status quo.
Even before the Putin-Erdogan meeting in Sochi, some regional
analysts suggested there might be joint Russian-Turkish attempts to
solve the Armenian-Azeri conflict. As Armenia's main geopolitical
ally, Russia can be expected to mediate between Turkey and Armenia on
a number of issues, they say.
Russian media reports confirmed that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue was
discussed during the Russian-Turkish talks. The Russian government
newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta reported on 19 July that Moscow had
expressed its readiness to pursue the settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh
`more actively,' and that Ankara had agreed to cooperate on this
issue. Furthermore, according to some Russian and Azeri sources,
Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul, who made an official visit to
Baku on 18-21 July, hinted that Ankara is interested in a
normalization of relations with Yerevan and discussed with the Azeri
leadership the prospects of Turkey's participation in the
Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.
At the same time, Turkey appears keen to act as a mediator in the
Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. Turkey is home to a sizeable Abkhazian
community, and Ankara has established friendly ties both with Moscow
and Tbilisi, some Turkish commentators note.
`We don't want to live in a world where enmity dominates; we need a
world where friendship reigns supreme,' Erdogan said in Sochi,
referring to the urgent need to settle the South Caucasus's
conflicts.
Both leaders, however, appear to share a strong apprehension
regarding potential political upheavals on post-Soviet territory.
While both Moscow and Ankara understand fully that a huge potential
exists for political change in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the
Putin administration and Erdogan government are unlikely to welcome
the revolutionary transformation of the authoritarian regimes in the
region, some Turkish analysts contend.
Azerbaijan's November 2005 parliamentary elections are a case in
point, noted Suat Kiniklioglu, head of the Turkish office of the
German Marshall Fund of the United States. For Russia, securing
stability in this energy-rich Caspian state is important within the
framework of the Kremlin's strategy of preserving its influence in
the Caucasus, Kiniklioglu said. But Turkey too wants to see
Azerbaijan stable, and keep secure the delivery of crude oil via the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan export pipeline, he said in an interview with the
Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
Similarly, Turkey and Russia are seeking to maintain the geopolitical
status quo in Central Asia. According to Kiniklioglu, both the Turks
and the Russians would prefer to deal with the likes of Uzbek
President Islam Karimov and other autocratic regional leaders than
face the uncertainty of revolutionary turmoil. A number of Turkish
foreign-policy experts suggest that Ankara's strategic perspective on
Central Asia is much closer to the Russian position than to that of
the United States. `Neither Moscow nor Ankara is happy to see U.S.
forces in the region,' wrote analyst Semih Idiz in the mass
circulation daily Milliyet.
The talk of shared security interests extends to economic issues, too
Bilateral trade and energy issues figured prominently during the
Sochi meeting. The two leaders said they aim to raise the volume of
trade between the two countries from the current $11 billion to $25
billion.
The Russian president signaled that Russia would like to increase
energy exports to Turkey. Putin set out plans for new gas pipelines
through Turkey to supply southern European markets and also raised
the possibility of electric power exports to Turkey and Iraq. Erdogan
appeared to welcome Moscow's intention to boost gas supplies to
Turkey. `There is serious potential for increasing supplies through
the Blue Stream pipeline,' the Turkish prime minister said. According
to Erdogan, the pipeline has a capacity of 16 billion cubic meters
per year, but current supplies amount to only 4.7 billion cubic
meters. The 1,213-kilometer Blue Stream gas pipeline under the Black
Sea was completed in 2002, but has since been a source of dispute
between Russia and Turkey over gas prices.
Most Russian and Turkish commentators gave a very positive overall
assessment of the outcome of the Putin-Erdogan meeting. The rapid
rapprochement between the two Eurasian powers could serve as useful
leverage for boosting each country's geopolitical stature, they
argue.
The strengthening of cooperation between Russia and Turkey `adds
significantly to our country's international prestige,' noted one
Russian commentary posted on the Politcom.ru website. Many Turkish
experts seem to agree. Argued Milliyet foreign-policy columnist Idiz:
`It may be an exaggeration to call our bilateral relations `strategic
partnership,' but Turkish-Russian relations have already grown in
importance to the extent that they affect the entire region.'
Igor Torbakov is a freelance journalist and researcher who
specializes in CIS political affairs. He is now based in Istanbul,
Turkey. This is a partner-post from EurasiaNet.
Aug 8 2005
In Search of a Stable Eurasia
by Igor Torbakov
8 August 2005
Russia and Turkey forge new ties on security and trade. From
EurasiaNet.
Turkish Prime-Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's recent talks with
Russian President Vladimir Putin suggest that the two Eurasian
countries have found common ground on a number of key regional
security issues.
`It's our fourth meeting during the last seven months, and I guess,
all of you understand what that means,' Erdogan said at a news
conference following the 17-18 July negotiations at Putin's posh
summer residence in the Russian Black Sea resort town of Sochi. `Our
views totally coincide with regard to the situation in the region as
well as to the issues concerning the preservation of stability in the
world,' Erdogan was quoted as saying.
The recent Russian-Turkish encounter came after the Kremlin leader's
official visit to Ankara in December 2004 and Erdogan's trip to
Moscow in January 2005. Last May the Turkish prime minister also
attended festivities in the Russian capital commemorating the 60th
anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in World War II.
Such a sharp increase in top-level contacts appears to be the result
of both countries' wariness toward political turbulence in their
overlapping `near abroads' - specifically, in the South Caucasus and
Central Asia, regional analysts say.
Both Moscow and Ankara are closely following the geopolitical changes
that are taking place in post-Soviet Eurasia - particularly those
brought about by the `color revolutions.' In the South Caucasus, the
`frozen conflicts' between Tbilisi and the breakaway territories of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the stalemate between Azerbaijan and
Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh drive these shared concerns.
In public, both Russian and Turkish leaders have stressed their
commitment to the peaceful settlement of the inter-ethnic conflicts
in the Caucasus. However, a number of Turkish and Russian experts
argue that Ankara and Moscow seem reluctant to embrace political
changes in the Commonwealth of Independent States' southern tier and
would rather support the preservation of the status quo.
Even before the Putin-Erdogan meeting in Sochi, some regional
analysts suggested there might be joint Russian-Turkish attempts to
solve the Armenian-Azeri conflict. As Armenia's main geopolitical
ally, Russia can be expected to mediate between Turkey and Armenia on
a number of issues, they say.
Russian media reports confirmed that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue was
discussed during the Russian-Turkish talks. The Russian government
newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta reported on 19 July that Moscow had
expressed its readiness to pursue the settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh
`more actively,' and that Ankara had agreed to cooperate on this
issue. Furthermore, according to some Russian and Azeri sources,
Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul, who made an official visit to
Baku on 18-21 July, hinted that Ankara is interested in a
normalization of relations with Yerevan and discussed with the Azeri
leadership the prospects of Turkey's participation in the
Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.
At the same time, Turkey appears keen to act as a mediator in the
Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. Turkey is home to a sizeable Abkhazian
community, and Ankara has established friendly ties both with Moscow
and Tbilisi, some Turkish commentators note.
`We don't want to live in a world where enmity dominates; we need a
world where friendship reigns supreme,' Erdogan said in Sochi,
referring to the urgent need to settle the South Caucasus's
conflicts.
Both leaders, however, appear to share a strong apprehension
regarding potential political upheavals on post-Soviet territory.
While both Moscow and Ankara understand fully that a huge potential
exists for political change in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the
Putin administration and Erdogan government are unlikely to welcome
the revolutionary transformation of the authoritarian regimes in the
region, some Turkish analysts contend.
Azerbaijan's November 2005 parliamentary elections are a case in
point, noted Suat Kiniklioglu, head of the Turkish office of the
German Marshall Fund of the United States. For Russia, securing
stability in this energy-rich Caspian state is important within the
framework of the Kremlin's strategy of preserving its influence in
the Caucasus, Kiniklioglu said. But Turkey too wants to see
Azerbaijan stable, and keep secure the delivery of crude oil via the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan export pipeline, he said in an interview with the
Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
Similarly, Turkey and Russia are seeking to maintain the geopolitical
status quo in Central Asia. According to Kiniklioglu, both the Turks
and the Russians would prefer to deal with the likes of Uzbek
President Islam Karimov and other autocratic regional leaders than
face the uncertainty of revolutionary turmoil. A number of Turkish
foreign-policy experts suggest that Ankara's strategic perspective on
Central Asia is much closer to the Russian position than to that of
the United States. `Neither Moscow nor Ankara is happy to see U.S.
forces in the region,' wrote analyst Semih Idiz in the mass
circulation daily Milliyet.
The talk of shared security interests extends to economic issues, too
Bilateral trade and energy issues figured prominently during the
Sochi meeting. The two leaders said they aim to raise the volume of
trade between the two countries from the current $11 billion to $25
billion.
The Russian president signaled that Russia would like to increase
energy exports to Turkey. Putin set out plans for new gas pipelines
through Turkey to supply southern European markets and also raised
the possibility of electric power exports to Turkey and Iraq. Erdogan
appeared to welcome Moscow's intention to boost gas supplies to
Turkey. `There is serious potential for increasing supplies through
the Blue Stream pipeline,' the Turkish prime minister said. According
to Erdogan, the pipeline has a capacity of 16 billion cubic meters
per year, but current supplies amount to only 4.7 billion cubic
meters. The 1,213-kilometer Blue Stream gas pipeline under the Black
Sea was completed in 2002, but has since been a source of dispute
between Russia and Turkey over gas prices.
Most Russian and Turkish commentators gave a very positive overall
assessment of the outcome of the Putin-Erdogan meeting. The rapid
rapprochement between the two Eurasian powers could serve as useful
leverage for boosting each country's geopolitical stature, they
argue.
The strengthening of cooperation between Russia and Turkey `adds
significantly to our country's international prestige,' noted one
Russian commentary posted on the Politcom.ru website. Many Turkish
experts seem to agree. Argued Milliyet foreign-policy columnist Idiz:
`It may be an exaggeration to call our bilateral relations `strategic
partnership,' but Turkish-Russian relations have already grown in
importance to the extent that they affect the entire region.'
Igor Torbakov is a freelance journalist and researcher who
specializes in CIS political affairs. He is now based in Istanbul,
Turkey. This is a partner-post from EurasiaNet.