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The Unsustainable European Policy Towards The South Caucasus

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  • The Unsustainable European Policy Towards The South Caucasus

    THE UNSUSTAINABLE EUROPEAN POLICY TOWARDS THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

    Foreign Policy Journal
    October 31, 2013

    by Vahagn Avedian

    The outcome of the 2013 Azerbaijani presidential election was hardly
    surprising to anyone. That the incumbent President Ilham Aliyev
    would win a third consecutive term seemed predestined long before
    the elections.

    However, that he did not even bother to run an election campaign
    and then won by 85% majority of the votes was perceived as being too
    arrogant for the world to disregard.[1] The pronounced judgment was
    quite harsh when the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
    Europe (OSCE) and the US State Department, historically keeping a
    deliberate smoothened criticism, assessed the election as flawed.

    Usually the standard statement, regardless whether referring to
    Armenia, Azerbaijan, or Georgia, opens with the elections being "in
    line with international standards," just before amending a numerous
    pages of "potential improvements."[2] However, the recent elections
    in Azerbaijan simply did not leave any room for that diplomatic
    smoothening. The OSCE called it "seriously flawed" while the US
    State Department announced that it "fell short of international
    standards."[3]

    Nonetheless, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)
    and the European Union (EU) final report chose to turn a blind eye to
    the shortcomings and called it "a free, fair and transparent electoral
    process."[4] These positive attributes were in sharp contrast to what
    the OSCE, the US Department, other NGOs and individual MPs in the
    EU monitoring mission. One of these MPs was the Swedish Marietta de
    Pourbaix-Lundin, who criticized both the election and the official
    statement by the institution she represented.[5] De Pourbaix-Lundin
    mentions her conservative MP colleagues from Great Britain and Spain
    as examples for having shown poor judgment in this matter, and she
    "regrets that the European Council so shamelessly chooses to turn a
    blind eye to obvious violations."

    That the EU would choose any harsher tone against Azerbaijan, the
    alternative to Europe's dependency on Russian oil and natural gas,
    roughly two months ahead of the Vilnius Summit would be unimaginable
    [6] Stability (i.e. the flow of oil and gas) is historically given
    the highest priority, and realpolitik still reigns supreme in our days.

    It is hardly any secret that Europe, the US, and the OSCE have upheld
    a balanced approach towards Armenia and Azerbaijan, especially
    in regard to the Karabakh conflict during the past 20 years. The
    criticism towards these two governments and their shortcomings has
    been in almost perfect parity, where any differentiation that could
    hint or be misinterpreted as favoritism has been carefully avoided to
    uphold the image of perfect objectivity on behalf of the mediators
    of the conflict. However, two recent events should act as warnings,
    signaling the unsustainability of this flawed policy.

    The first flagrant sign was the cold shower served by the Armenian
    President Serzh Sargsyan's statement on September 3, 2013, about the
    decision to join the embryo of the non-existing Eurasian Union,[7] i.e.

    the Customs Union, rather than signing the EU Deep and Comprehensive
    Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) as planned to take place at the EU Top
    Summit in Vilnius during November.[8] Indeed, there was an apparent
    fear that the planned meeting in Moscow on September 3 between Sargsyan
    and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, would in fact end in such
    a U-turn.[9] However, the last four years of EU-negotiations with
    Armenia for signing the DCFTA and statements of incumbent ministers
    and senior members of the ruling Republican Party, some as late as
    the day prior to Sargsyan's Moscow visit,[10] all indicated that
    Armenia had chosen the EU integration path. "Russia is our military
    security choice, while the DCFTA is our economic choice," said the
    Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh Kocharyan on August 13.[11]
    That is why the Sargsyan announcement in Moscow came as a shock.

    The analysts were quite unanimous that Sargsyan had been more or
    less forced to make a choice during the closed session meeting with
    his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. Even though the details have
    not been made public and the official Yerevan refuses to admit to it,
    there are educated guesses that it was the future of Nagorno-Karabakh
    as well as the Russian economic leverage over Armenia, especially
    the subsidized natural gas price, which forced Sargsyan to make the
    U-turn. The offer was simple: choosing the EU path would imply losing
    Karabakh to Azerbaijan, prompted by the recent major Russian arms
    sale to Baku,[12] along with a "cold winter", as had been hinted to
    the Moldavian government.[13]

    The question many ask in retrospective is how much did the EU do (or
    rather not do) in order to remedy such extortion? It addition, the
    most recent EU reactions to Sargsyan's announcement were also equally
    irresponsible, when top EU representatives exonerated themselves
    by stating that EU should "respect Armenia's will", i.e. Armenia's
    choice to join the Customs Union.[14] The only problem is that the
    announced decision was obviously neither Armenia's will nor in its
    interest, at least if one would look at the aforementioned statements
    made by officials in Yerevan prior to the Sargsyan-Putin meeting. It
    was a plain "take it or face the consequences" ultimatum by Moscow,
    for which the Armenian leadership had no solution.

    Bluntly put, it looked too good to be true when it seemed that
    little Armenia had actually managed to eat the cake and have it
    too. Until September 3rd, around 15:00 CET, it seemed that the
    Sargsyan Administration had actually managed to walk the narrow
    passage Armenian leaders have been forced to navigate through during
    the last two millennia of Armenian statehood, jammed between rivaling
    super powers. Presumably, Yerevan had managed to convince the Kremlin
    that a viable and European-integrated Armenia is indeed the improved
    ally Russia needs in the Caucasus. That is, until Sargsyan made his
    announcement around 15:00 CET.

    Armenia, contrary to all official statements and negotiations done
    in that direction, had been forced to abandon the ratification of the
    EU DCFTA due to its incompatibility with a membership in the Customs
    Union.[15] There are no secrets that Russia has been intimidating the
    EU Eastern Partnership members (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova,
    Ukraine and Belarus) from choosing the EU over Russia. Measures such
    as stopping the natural gas deliveries to Ukraine, banning Moldovan
    wine import or hinting the approaching "cold winter"[16] were sharply
    criticized by EU as "bullying attempts."[17] Armenia is indeed not
    close to the same importance as Ukraine has for EU, or for Russia,
    but the Sargsyan announcement was nonetheless a huge prestigious loss
    for Brussels as it was an equally prestigious victory for Moscow,
    since Armenia in its present state, unlike Ukraine, would probably
    be more of an economic burden than a gain for Russia.

    The episode was also an eye-opener and cause for real concern in how
    the "friend" and the "big brother" can treat Armenia by humiliating
    its closest "ally" in the Caucasus for the sake of making a point
    about the EU and the remaining Eastern Partnership aspirers. Was the
    EU equally naïve as Armenia to believe that Russia would not react as
    it did? Given the fact that the Karabakh conflict is most probably the
    key to unlocking this riddle, why did the EU do nothing substantial
    during the last four years of the negotiations with Armenia to disarm
    the Russian leverage, at least giving Armenia some room to maneuver
    in this manner? A badly cornered Armenia with heavy Russian dependency
    had virtually no choice but to yield.

    The most tangible effect of the unsolved Karabakh conflict is the
    embarked Turkish-Azerbaijani embargo on Armenia, closing 84% of
    its borders, leaving only the borders towards Iran and Georgia open
    for trade. The border with the sanction-burdened Iran (due to its
    nuclear research dispute)[18] is less vital than the border towards
    Georgia in regard to the import of fuel, gas, and grains. Armenia
    experienced the vitality of the Georgian border during the week-long
    Russian-Georgia-Russia war in August 2008, when the import of fuel and
    grain into Armenia virtually ceased.[19] One can only imagine what
    would have happened if the war had occurred during the harsh winter
    period or lasted longer. The outspoken Azeri policy (in conjunction
    with the Turkish embargo) is to force Armenians to choose "prosperity
    without Karabakh or poverty with Karabakh,"[20] pushing Armenia
    to the degree of destitution that "people will even stop thinking
    about Karabakh."[21] This has been confirmed in numerous occasions by
    President Aliyev himself, the latest from October 7, 2013: "We must
    further keep Armenia isolated from diplomatic, political, economic,
    regional initiatives."[22] The same applies to the Turkish policy,
    which in addition to the Karabakh dispute, also aims at the issue of
    forcing Armenia to drop its efforts for an international recognition
    of the 1915 Armenian genocide.

    The aforementioned Azeri policy and statements clearly contradict
    the declarations by the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry "confirming
    their commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict,"
    guarantying the safety of the Karabakh population and their democratic
    rights in case the region is put under Azeri authority. In reality,
    there are only a handful of imaginable scenarios in case Karabakh is
    returned to the suzerainty of an Azerbaijan inflicting "prosperity
    without Karabakh or poverty with Karabakh": 1) The Armenian population
    will be forced away in the manner Nakhichevan was emptied of its
    Armenian population, a policy which was underway in Karabakh as well
    and a contributing factor to the emergence of the present-day conflict,
    i.e., by impaired social and economic standards and negligence of
    the region in order to force the unwanted population to leave;[23]
    or 2) once the Azeri armed forces have been deployed, a swift ethnic
    cleansing would get rid of the Armenian issue, either by killing or
    driving them out of Karabakh. The second scenario would potentially
    bring us back to the starting point in 1988, but with a much more
    destructive outcome. The subsequent international criticism would
    probably be swiftly abandoned for the sake of securing the energy
    resources of Baku. The remaining alternative would be implementing the
    existing OSCE Minsk Group's Madrid Principles, especially the article
    stating that the "final status of Nagorno-Karabakh to be determined in
    the future by a legally-binding expression of will [i.e., a referendum
    in Karabakh]."[24] Keeping in mind the posture of Baku towards Armenia
    and Armenians, there is no peaceful and viable solution to the conflict
    other than the implementation of the Madrid Principles.

    Armenia is not blameless in this situation. Let it be clear that
    the Armenian administrations since the independence in 1991 have
    failed capitally to create a stable domestic atmosphere that
    could ease the economic sanctions. While the joint Turkish-Azeri
    blockade does play a major role, not all shortcomings in Armenia
    can be blamed on external hostile forces. The constant high level
    of corruption and the post-Soviet oligarchy, quite symptomatic in
    other post-Soviet non-Baltic states, reigns supreme in Armenia and
    are the main impediments for the country becoming more attractive and
    strategic to invest in, economically, and politically. The failure
    of three consecutive administrations to remedy these issues is also
    evident in the apathy which is now being seen in Armenia, but also in
    diaspora. While consecutive alarming reports show the exodus of the
    Armenian population in search of jobs, social security, and welfare,
    neither the government nor the opposition has done much tangible to
    remedy it.

    However, the current apathy of the people, inside as well as outside
    Armenia, could also be an ominous sign of rupture. Rather being a
    sign of concession and approval, the silence could very well be due
    to the sense of conceived helplessness and perplexity just before the
    crackdown: the discontented population boils down to a critical mass
    when those who were able to emigrate have left the country and the
    people have been reduced to those who were not able to leave as well
    as those who stayed due to their principal stand and patriotism. The
    stage will be set for a revolution of some color. Whether it would
    be orange, purple, or red will depend on the boiling point.

    The second sign of the unsustainability of the EU's current policy
    towards the Caucasus is the process and the outcome of the much
    criticized Azerbaijani presidential election and the apparent
    cover-up attempts made by the EU to conceal the backward movement
    of Azerbaijan in regard to democracy and human rights. While the
    increasing authoritarian rule in Azerbaijan should be viewed from its
    apparent negative impacts on the Azerbaijani society in general, it
    has even more perilous prospects for the Karabakh population, who are
    currently subjected to the Azeri policy of submission by economical
    humiliation. Needless to say, given that the Baku policy succeeds,
    the subsequent Azeri-Karabakh relations will be neither sincere nor
    lasting, and thus the stage will be set for a new reenactment of the
    entire conflict.

    Criticizing the democratic shortcomings of Azerbaijan does not
    imply the imperfection of the same institutes in Armenia. Even if
    the Armenian presidential election last February were judged as
    "improved conduct," one should not rejoice too eagerly for the
    positive assessments, remembering the low bar set by the events in
    March 2008.[25] Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to keep Armenia
    and Azerbaijan in parity, especially when approaching the issue
    of Karabakh. The EU and the OSCE should criticize where needed
    and praise where it is deserved. The non-nuanced and watered down
    statements by these institutions have started to lose whatever shred
    of credibility and authority they had. Nowadays, the media releases
    the OSCE statements almost verbatim days prior to their official
    release simply because they are a carbon copy of the toothless and
    insignificant policy of the past 20 years.

    The European indifference and inefficiency has also enticed Baku to
    start testing the limits. One such provocation was the extradition of
    the Azerbaijani officer Ramil Safarov, convicted to life in prison
    in Hungary for murdering his sleeping Armenian colleague with an
    axe during a NATO course in Budapest. Upon Safarov's return to Baku,
    he was elevated to a national hero and praised for his actions.[26]
    The boasting about having an annual military budget greater than the
    entire GDP of Armenia[27] was a goal set by President Aliyev and
    confirmed by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
    (SIPRI), ranking Azerbaijan as the number one country in the world in
    terms of the growth of country's military spending.[28] The arm race
    does not bode well. While the previous clashes, which killed about
    30,000 people and made almost a million refugees back in the 1990s,
    was fought with outdated Soviet weapons, an armed encounter today
    between armies equipped with the latest weapons would have much more
    destructive power. Thus, the warring rhetoric of Baku in combination
    with the escalation of fatal incidents on the line of contact during
    the past 2-3 years is highly worrying. Aside from refusing to withdraw
    its snipers from the line of contact,[29] Azerbaijan has started
    testing the Armenian reaction and combat readiness, even extending
    this by shelling Armenian territory and civilian targets far away
    from Karabakh.[30]

    The signs of the unsustainability of the European appeasement policy
    towards South Caucasus are gathering fast, and unless the OSCE and
    the other involved parties make a radical change, the situation in
    the region will deteriorate rapidly, with potentially disastrous
    consequences.

    Yerevan must choose reforms and rapid firm measures to halt the exodus,
    infuse confidence into the diaspora and make the country attractive
    for foreign economic and political investments. The current situation
    reminds too well of the process leading to the loss of sovereignty in
    1920, when an Armenia jammed between Moscow and Ankara and abandoned
    by Europe and the US, ironically for the sake of securing their
    share of the oil resources in Middle East, was forced to choose the
    less perilous path of Sovietization by the Red Army over the certain
    annihilation by the advancing Turkish army; the Armenian leadership
    should not be keen on repeating this history. The EU, the US, and the
    OSCE should differentiate between Armenia and Azerbaijan based on the
    real facts at hand in order to bring an end to the Karabakh conflict;
    that is, if they really want the conflict to end based on the values
    heralded in their respective charters.

    Russia has long been Armenia's closest ally and vice versa. Having
    antagonized a NATO-aspiring Georgia while holding Azerbaijan in check
    using the Karabakh card, Armenia is the only reliable Russian ally
    left in the Caucasus; assuming that Moscow is not building the new
    union in the very same manner as the previous time, i.e., by annexing
    sovereign states, willing and reluctant alike. No one would benefit
    from a Soviet Union 2.0 or a renewed Karabakh war. History is said
    to teach us lessons. However, it has also been said that the only
    lesson learned is that we don't learn anything from history.

    References

    [1] Kristin Deasy, Azerbaijan's Aliyev wins third
    presidential term: Exit poll, Global Post, 9 October, 2013;
    www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/131009/azerbaijans-aliyev-wins-third-presidential-term-exit-poll

    [2] E.g. see International Election Observation Mission: Republic
    of Armenia - Presidential Election, 18 February 2013 Statement
    of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, 19 February 2013;
    www.osce.org/odihr/elections/99675

    [3] Election in Azerbaijan undermined by limitations on fundamental
    freedoms, lack of level playing field and significant problems on
    election day, international observers say, OSCE, 9 October, 2013;
    www.osce.org/odihr/elections/106908

    [4] Presidential election in Azerbaijan: joint statement
    by PACE and EP delegations, PACE, 10 October 2013;
    www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-View-EN.asp?newsid=4699&lang=2&cat=31

    [5] Henrik Sundbom, Lågvatten i Azerbajdzjan - och
    i Europarådet, Frivarld Magasin, 22 October 2013;
    www.frivarld.se/magasin/lagvatten-i-azerbajdzjan-och-i-europaradet

    [6] For the Vilnius Summit see The third Eastern Partnership Summit
    in Vilnius, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania,
    2013; www.eu2013.lt/en/vilnius-summit

    [7] The Eurasian Economic Union is usually described as the grand plan
    of Vladimir Putin as a competitor and alternative to the European Union
    and is planned to be implemented in 2015. The Customs Union, initiated
    in 2010, is a preliminary stage of the project and consists of the
    member states Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. For a analysis of the
    viability of the Eurasian Union see Steven Blockmans, Hrant Kostanyan,
    Ievgen Vorobiov, Eurasian Economic Union: Less than favourable
    outcome for economic integration, EurActiv.com, 18 December 2012;
    www.euractiv.com/europes-east/eurasian-economic-union-favourab-analysis-516738

    [8] Serzh Sargsyan announce aobut Armenia's decision to join Customs
    Union, Armenpress, 3 September 2013; www.armenpress.am/eng/news/731583

    [9] E.g. see On Agenda: Upcoming Sargsyan-Putin meeting likely to focus
    on Armenia's EU integration plans, ArmeniaNow.com, 2 September 2013;
    armenianow.com/commentary/analysis/48105/armenia_president_serzh_sargsyan_moscow_putin

    [10] E.g. see the dismissal of an Armenian Customs Union
    membership by the senior member Galust Sahakyan in U-Turn: Official
    Yerevan's 'desire' to join Russia-led Customs Union comes as 'big
    surprise' for many in Armenia, ArmeniaNow.com, 4 September 2013;
    armenianow.com/commentary/analysis/48191/armenia_eurasian_union_customs_eu_russia

    [11] Yerevan says, 'Russia is our military choice,
    EU our economic', Panorama.am, 13 August 2013;
    www.panorama.am/en/popular/2013/08/13/armenia-russia-eu

    [12] Azeri-Russian Arms Trade $4 Billion Amid
    Tension With Armenia, Bloomberg, 13 August 2013;
    www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-13/azeri-russian-arms-trade-4-billion-amid-tension-with-armenia.html.

    See also Armenia rift over trade deal fuels EU-Russia tension, BBC,
    5 September 2013; www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23975951

    [13] Among others see Kevork Oskanian, Armenia: A Miracle of Empire?

    Sargsyan's Pauline Conversion, EastBook.eu, 4 October 2013;
    eastbook.eu/en/2013/09/material-en/news-en/a-miracle-of-empire-sargsyans-pauline-conversion.

    Naftali Bendavid and Laurence Norman, EU Stunned by
    Armenia U-Turn, The Wall Street Journal, 4 September 2013;
    blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2013/09/04/eu-stunned-by-armenia-u-turn

    [14] Lithuanian and Armenian Foreign Ministers
    discuss Armenia's decision to seek Customs Union
    membership, Lithuanian MFA, 9 September 2013;
    www.eu2013.lt/en/news/pressreleases/lithuanian-and-armenian-foreign-ministers-discuss-armenias-decision-to-seek-customs-union-membership

    [15] Statement on the pressure exercised by Russia on countries of
    the Eastern Partnership, European Commission, 11 September 2013,
    Strasbourg; europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-687_en.htm

    [16] Russia, unhappy with Moldova's EU drive, bans
    its wine and spirits, Reuters, 10 September 2013;
    www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/10/us-moldova-russia-wine-idUSBRE98916M20130910

    [17] How Russia Bullies the EU's Eastern Neighbors, Carnegie Europe,
    9 September 2013; carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=52903

    [18] E.g. see Iran's nuclear progress prompts call for tighter
    sanctions from top Democrat, The Washington Times, 28 August 2013;
    www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/28/iran-nuclear-progress-prompts-tighter-sanction/?page=all

    [19] See Armenia: Economy Hit by Georgian War, Institute for
    War & Peace Reporting, Report News: Caucasus, 14 October 2008;
    iwpr.net/report-news/armenia-economy-hit-georgian-war

    [20] Galib Mammadov, Nagorno Karabakh Conflict: Armenia's Victory
    or Nightmare?, in Foreign Policy Journal, 13 October 2011;
    www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/10/13/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-armenias-victory-or-nightmare-2

    [21] Enes Ibrahim, Armenia's aggressive policies main Obstacle
    for the country's development, in News.az, 31 October 2011;
    news.az/articles/politics/47854. See also Ilham Aliyev, Karabakh's
    independence will never be subject of Negotiations, Aliyev, in News.az,
    13 July 2011; news.az/articles/politics/40321

    [22] Azerbaijani President: "Even top-ranking
    Armenian officials admit that Armenia is not capable of
    ensuring its security itself.", Apa.az, 7 October 2013;
    en.apa.az/xeber_azerbaijani_president_____even_top-ranking_200699.html

    [23] See e.g. Vahagn Avedian, The Conflict of Nagorno Karabakh: The
    Sovietization of the Caucasus and Stalin's Policy of Divide and Rule,
    Stockholm, 2012; www.mountainous-karabakh.org/book_08.html

    [24] Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries, OSCE,
    26 June 2010; www.osce.org/mg/69515

    [25] E.g. see Eight killed in Armenia protests, BBC, 2 March 2008;
    news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7273497.stm

    [26] For the Safarov case see e.g. A Hero's Welcome for a Convicted
    Killer Reignites Tensions, The New York Times, 4 September 2012;
    www.nytimes.com/2012/09/05/world/europe/pardon-reignites-azerbaijan-armenia-tensions.html?_r=0

    [27] Aliyev Highlights Baku's Boosted Military; Yerevan
    Concerned, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 24 October 2013;
    www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-military-buildup-armenia-aliyev/25028461.html

    [28] Azerbaijan ranks first in world in growth rate of arms - SIPRI,
    News.az, 18 April 2012; news.az/articles/politics/58455

    [29] Azerbaijani Defense Ministry: "We won't withdraw snipers
    from the front line, unless war ends", APA.az, 17 September 2013;
    en.apa.az/news/199602

    [30] Azerbaijan Fired At Cars In Tavush, Armenia. One
    Conscript Killed, Three Wounded, Lragir.am, 22 October 2013;
    www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/country/view/31158

    http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2013/10/31/the-unsustainable-european-policy-towards-the-south-caucasus/view-all/




    From: A. Papazian
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