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Artsakh's Prospects for the Future
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2014/01/05/artsakhs-prospects-for-the-future/
By Michael Mensoian // January 5, 2014
Special to the Armenian Weekly
Ever since the 1994 ceasefire brought a semblance of peace to Artsakh,
its people have made great strides in democratic self-governance and
in rebuilding and improving the economic and social infrastructure
wantonly destroyed by Azerbaijan during the Karabagh War. During these
difficult years the people have maintained a collective esprit and
energy that confounds the Azeri leadership.
Ever since the 1994 ceasefire brought a semblance of peace to Artsakh,
its people have made great strides in democratic self-governance and
in rebuilding and improving the economic and social infrastructure
wantonly destroyed by Azerbaijan during the Karabagh War. (Photo by
Arevik Danielian)
The ultimate concern, whether we live in Artsakh or beyond, is the
future viability of this historic Armenian land liberated through the
heroic efforts of its people. There are several questions that must be
affirmatively answered: Would Artsakh (and Armenia) be able to
withstand renewed hostilities by Azerbaijan? Can Artsakh's interests
be protected through negotiations? Does Artsakh have the resources to
develop a robust economy, not only for its present population, but as
a future frontier beckoning Diasporan Armenians wishing to return
home?
Confronting renewed hostilities
Any number of reasons would - or should - deter Azerbaijan from renewing
hostilities; if they did not exist, President Ilham Aliyev would have
already exercised his oft-threatened military option. Yet, there is
always the possibility that internal pressures or his outsized ego
could override prudent judgment. This analysis will only consider the
military strategy that Azerbaijan is likely to adopt if it were to
resume hostilities, and the difficulties that a tactical
implementation of that strategy would involve. Given these apparent
difficulties, one might question why the strategy would even be
considered. It is based primarily on the reality that the
international community, and especially the neighboring countries,
would not tolerate a protracted war. This reality requires a strategy
that would (1) seek to occupy strategic objectives within a window of
opportunity of from 12-15 days; (2) seek to breach the heavily
fortified frontier, preferably at both Agdam and Fizuli, within the
first 48-72 hours; (3) engage the defenders along the entire front
(the Northern, Central, and Southern Sectors); and (4) require the
deployment of all 3 army corps, or significant elements thereof,
currently positioned along the Armenian-Artsakh border from Georgia to
Iran.
Presently Azerbaijan has five army corps in the field. The first Army
Corps is concentrated in the vicinity of Ganja. It is responsible for
the Northern Sector and the Armenian frontier. The third is stationed
in the vicinity of Barda (Central Sector), and the second in the
vicinity of Agdzhabedi/Beylagan (Southern Sector). The second also has
responsibility for the Iranian frontier. The fourth Army Corps is
stationed in the capital district of Baku, and the fifth is deployed
in Nakhitchevan.
Yusif Agayev, an Azeri military expert who fought in the Karabagh War,
doesn't believe `...the society of my country is ready for war. I think
it would be a month or two. That is the amount of time the armed
forces could fight for. If it drags on longer, then it will be a war
that society will have to participate in, not just the army.' It is
not likely that Azerbaijan will have the month or two that Agayev
suggests. A window of opportunity of about 12-15 days would be more
likely. That is why the first 48-72 hours is so critical. Within
minutes of the first shot being fired there would be an international
demand for a ceasefire led by Russia, Iran, Georgia, and possibly
Turkey supported by Western Europe and the United States (covertly
backed by international oil interests). Given the observable signs of
an Azeri offensive build-up, these nations would not wait for the
first shot to be fired before diplomatic pressure is applied. Although
the conflict occupies a limited geographic area, its ramifications - the
`unintended consequences' - could easily destabilize the entire region.
Russia, Iran, Georgia, and Turkey each have ethnic minorities with
long-standing socio-economic and political grievances who seek either
independence or effective local autonomy. This conflict could be the
spark that ignites this historic geographic tinderbox.
Since Azerbaijan realizes a protracted war is not viable, the strategy
is to engage the Armenian defenders along the entire frontier. This
can only be accomplished by simultaneously committing elements of the
three army corps responsible for monitoring the Artsakh border. Given
this strategy, the obvious objectives would be Agdam and Fizuli. To
support these two major offensives, units of the second and third
corps would engage the Armenian defenders in such tactical movements
as holding actions to deny the redeployment of Armenian units to
critical sectors of the front; diversionary maneuvers that seek to
mislead or confuse the defenders; and diversionary attacks that would
seek to relieve the pressure on the main forces attacking Agdam and
Fizuli.
Diversionary attacks from Tartar toward Mardakert would relieve the
pressure on the Agdam forces as well as protect their northern or
right flank. At the same time a diversionary attack toward Martuni by
elements of the second Army Corps would assist the main force
attacking Fizuli and protect their eastern or right flank. The first
Army Corps at Ganja would most likely engage in diversionary maneuvers
and hold actions along the mountainous Northern Sector. Depending on
the resistance encountered, the Azeris could commit elements of the
first to a full-scale diversionary attack from Shahumian toward
Mardakert.
The former United States ambassador to Azerbaijan, Matthew Bryza, has
suggested that `the Azeris can't retake Artsakh now. They are
militarily incapable of doing it.' He further suggested that he
`...didn't think they could dislodge the Armenian forces from the high
ground. Wayne Merry, a Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy
Council, agrees, saying that `a key factor is the topography, the
extent to which Nagorno-Karabagh has created defenses in depth.
Progress would come at a high cost.'
In addition to controlling the high ground, the Armenian defenders
have had nearly 20 years to develop fortifications in depth, as well
as construct obstacles that would impede and channel men and
mechanized equipment into prepared fields of fire. To achieve the
quick breakthrough required, the Azeris would seek to overwhelm the
defenders by deploying a numerically superior concentration of
infantry and mechanized units. Against heavily fortified positions a
disproportionate ratio of perhaps four to five Azeri casualties to one
Armenian casualty could be expected. These excessive battlefield
losses would have a demoralizing impact on the Azeri units, keeping in
mind that possibly 7 out of 10 men are either 12- or 18-month
conscripts in addition to reservists who might be called-up to augment
the professional army. Loss of morale would have a debilitating impact
on unit effectiveness, which would contribute to an increased casualty
count. Every tactical plan is dependent on an integrated hierarchy of
units from squad, platoon, on up, with each unit supporting the
mission of the next higher command, which could be a reinforced
company or a brigade. All units involved must operate as one cohesive
force with one overriding objective to have any chance of success.
Engaging the Armenians along the entire front is sound strategy given
the realities of the situation, but it is also a catch-22 situation. A
phased deployment of units would favor the defenders, while committing
significant elements of its three army corps simultaneously in a
tactical bid to overwhelm them before an expected ceasefire can be
enforced is no guarantee of success, and would most likely result in
unacceptable losses in men and equipment. It is highly unlikely that
the civilian population (if aware of the losses) or the field
commanders (senior officers) who must follow orders would tolerate
such losses.
The prize Azeri objective would be Agdam. To the east of Agdam is the
Kura River floodplain, part of which is below sea level (the Kura
River empties into the Caspian Sea, which is about 90 feet below sea
level). From this floodplain the elevation rises westward in a
step-like fashion to the high plains just west of Agdam (which is
about 1,200 feet above sea level) that give way to the hillier terrain
toward Stepanakert. If Agdam is occupied, it would allow the Azeri
forces to spill out onto this plain, thereby facilitating the
increased deployment of mechanized equipment such as tanks, armored
troop carriers, self-propelled artillery, and rocket launchers for a
final push toward Stepanakert and Shushi, with a smaller force moving
south to join the attack on Martuni.
To the south, a second major offensive would be underway toward
Fizuli. A diversionary attack on Martuni would seek to ease the
pressure on the Fizuli force as well as protect its eastern or right
flank. Holding actions at Hadrut would protect the western or left
flank of the Fizuli force. If Fizuli were to be occupied, the main
force would most likely split with the larger force wheeling eastward
toward Martuni. Should this happen, the Martuni defenders would face a
three-pronged enveloping maneuver that would either force them to fall
back or be cut off from the main Armenian forces (assuming the Azeri
offensive could succeed).
The second smaller force would augment the Azeri units engaged at
Hadrut. If Martuni were occupied, the combined Azeri forces would then
move toward Shushi/Stepanakert from the southeast to support the Agdam
forces attacking from the northeast. The Azeri Hadrut units would be
given the mission to protect the western or left flank of this final
thrust toward Artsakh's core area.
While this might be the essence of the Azeri strategy, its success is
far from assured; the deterrents are many. First and foremost, this
analysis does not consider the defensive and offensive capabilities of
the Armenian forces, who have played out the various strategies the
Azeris might adopt. An instant problem for the Azeris is the
recognition by unbiased observers that the Armenian military force is
much better prepared. Also it is unlikely that the Azeri soldier has
the emotional and psychological stamina or determination of the
Armenian soldier, who is prepared to fight for his family, his land,
his children's future, and for his right to live as an Armenian. What
reasons would the Azeri soldier have to sacrifice his life in a war he
might neither accept nor understand?
It is the expected immediate international call for a ceasefire that
would require Azerbaijan's massive deployment of men and equipment in
a military gamble that seeks to overwhelm the defenders and breach
their fortifications. It is this tactical decision that could result
in extremely high battlefield losses against a determined, entrenched
defensive force. It is not possible for Azerbaijan to gain any
advantage from a surprise attack because the intelligence gathering
technology available to the Armenian military allows for the real-time
gathering of information. This intelligence effort is likely aided by
Russian input and, during a conflict, possibly by covert Iranian
input.
Every strategic target within Azerbaijan is within the effective
retaliatory capability of the Armenian defenders. Pre-selected targets
would be engaged immediately, some of which may have a devastating
impact on Azerbaijan's war effort. So much emphasis has been placed on
the publicized expansion of its army that it is accepted as doctrine
that numerical superiority in men, which is not the same as the
principle of force concentration (achieving numerical superiority at a
given time at a given place), is the key element on the battlefield.
It is not! The Armenian defenders have the ability to achieve force
concentration to gain a tactical advantage at any sector of the front
based on their shorter interior lines of communication that facilitate
the rapid deployment of troops and equipment. In addition, a defending
force occupying heavily fortified positions may have a ratio of three-
or four- to one advantage over the attacking forces: The Azeri staging
areas where units are readied for movement to the front; their
approaches to the line of contact; as well as their supply and
resupply routes, are all vulnerable to effective Armenian
counter-measures.
Adding to the deterrents is the sophisticated level of planning,
coordination, and execution required and the real-time evaluation and
response to evolving situations at the fronts that may require
immediate tactical changes; the augmentation or redeployment of units;
resupply; and the evacuation of battlefield casualties. It is highly
problematic if the Azeri military command has this capability at the
level required. Some of the officers and a smaller number of
non-commissioned officers (NCO) may be veterans of the Karabagh War.
Assuming the publicized expansion of the army is accurate, most of the
junior officers (captain and below) who fill the majority of the
combat slots in any unit, as well as the NCO's, may well be the weak
link in the Azeri command structure in terms of training, leadership,
and indoctrination. A resumption of hostilities is not likely to
provide President Aliyev the solution he seeks.
Can negotiations protect Artsakh's interests?
The principles advanced by the Minsk Group (represented by Russia,
France, and the United States) to guide the negotiations, no matter
how nuanced they have been over time, continually stress (1) the
inviolability of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and (2) that when
and how Artsakh's final status is determined, it will be no better
than limited autonomy under Azerbaijan's jurisdiction. This raises an
important question: If Artsakh had the legal right to declare its
independence under the principles of remedial cessation or
self-determination, or under the laws of the soviet constitution, the
negotiators, including the Artsakh representatives, should be
discussing the timing of Artsakh's recognition; indemnification for
displaced people/refugees (both Armenian and Azeri); its final
boundaries; and the status of Shahumian, and the occupied border areas
of Mardakert and Martuni. It may be difficult to accept, but some
adjustments in the area to be included in Artsakh may have to be
considered. An offer giving Azeris married to Armenians (possibly
including their extended families) the right of return to Artsakh
might also be considered.
Azerbaijan continues to claim that its territorial integrity is being
violated by Armenia. This is a specious argument ostensibly supported
by the Minsk Group. Azerbaijan is purposely misinterpreting Principle
4 under Chapter 2, Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations,
which prevents a state from threatening the territorial integrity of a
neighboring state. It is the Artsakh Armenians who threatened the
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan by having legally declared their
independence. However, Principle 4 does not apply to Artsakh.
Armenia's intervention was limited to providing humanitarian and
military assistance to protect a beleaguered population from the
indiscriminate use of military force by the Azeris. The present
Armenian presence in Artsakh represents a stabilizing influence that
facilitates the recovery effort and a preventive measure against a
renewal of hostilities.
Economic development
Artsakh's natural resource base is more than adequate to support at
least 10 times its present population of approximately 140,000.
However, several interrelated factors - a reverse domino
effect - represent serious obstacles that must be addressed before a
robust economy can develop. The most obvious are (1) Artsakh's tenuous
political status, which (2) inhibits foreign investment, which (3)
discourages in-migration.
Tenuous political status
Artsakh declared its independence in 1991 and has, since the 1994
ceasefire, met all of the `unofficial' requirements for de jure
recognition. (Unfortunately, recognition is a highly subjective
political decision.) Until recognition is granted, it is vital that
Artsakh continue to invite foreign government leaders, as it did
recently with Uruguayan parliamentarians. While recognition will not
come solely or immediately from these visits, they will lay the
groundwork as well as the perception that recognition is highly likely
to occur. It is an important first step (which Stepanakert already
recognizes) if investment is to be encouraged. Dependence on the level
of aid presently received is not adequate to stimulate a robust
economy that can independently sustain Artsakh. However, this aid has
made significant improvements in basic infrastructure that has
improved the quality of life for the people - the foundation upon which
Artsakh's future will be built.
To facilitate this process Artsakh must continue to expand its public
relations effort through the various political, humanitarian, and
philanthropic organizations that are already committed to its cause.
Without getting into the political aspects of the Artsakh issue, its
long-term viability should represent the most significant issue on the
Armenian national agenda. The more the Armenian Diaspora know about
Artsakh - its achievements and potential - the greater its response to aid
in Artsakh's development.
Measured population increase
Increasing the population should go hand-in-hand with economic
development. However what is required and doable is a measured
increase in population as a means to meet political and economic
needs. Politically it is difficult to claim `empty' lands however
justified that claim may be when the lands are not reasonably
integrated with the core area. We should have learned from the Turkish
inspired genocide that emptied historic western Armenia of our people
to weaken if not eliminate potential territorial claims by Armenia. A
program of selective immigration would seek to meet the political and
economic objectives identified by a government master plan for
strategic resettlement. (See `The Strategic Resettlement of Artsakh,'
The Armenian Weekly, February 19, 2011) Stepanakert must be prepared
to effectively assist these newcomers to Artsakh. It cannot be
expected that these 21st century Armenians are pioneers able or
willing to `tame' the wilderness. That type of settlement program is a
prescription for disaster.
As Stepanakert increases its connections with various organizations
and institutions beyond its borders; as it cultivates relations with
foreign governments; and as the world community (including our
Diaspora) are given reasons to support Artsakh, an aura of
inevitability with respect to recognition will encourage greater
interest from foreign investors, including Armenians. Although Artsakh
has already benefited from visionary diasporan entrepreneurs, de jure
recognition is essential to open the floodgate for foreign investment
Renewable energy sources
Present available data for Nagorno-Karabagh indicate a significant
potential for the development of renewable energy. This is important
given the absence of carboniferous energy resources. Several sites in
the vicinity of Jermajur and Vaghuhas in the north and in the
Stepanakert-Shushi region have been identified as `most appropriate'
for constructing wind turbines to generate electric power. Other
secondary sites exist, as well as sites in Kashatagh that have yet to
be fully evaluated.
The region receives an average of about 23 inches of precipitation
annually which is sufficient for agriculture supplemented by
irrigation if or when necessary. Precipitation generally increases
from the south/southeast toward the higher elevations to the
north/northwest. In the Kashatagh Region precipitation increases north
toward the Eastern Sevan/Mrav Mountains. Surface flow and the many
deep narrow valleys provide sites that may be used to construct dams
for water storage, hydroelectric generation and irrigation as well as
preventing floods from the annual Spring snow melt from the higher
elevations that dominate the north and northwestern portions of
Artsakh. The average precipitation would suggest a greater proportion
of days with less than one/quarter of the sky covered by clouds. This
would result in more hours of daily sunlight which would facilitate
the development of solar power. Renewable energy would be a boon for
the remote villages which could draw upon locally produced energy. In
addition Artsakh's balance of payments situation would benefit by
eliminating or reducing payments for energy imports.
Potential sectors of the economy
Artsakh's farmers should be able to produce a wide variety of field
and tree crops (including viti culture). Some specialized products
would include processed and comb honey, a variety of berries, nuts,
and fresh-cut flowers. Natural and upgraded pastures could support
commercial dairy farming including poultry and egg production, cattle
and sheep rearing and hog raising. In addition, the by-products
associated with each animal are able to support a variety of economic
activities. A recent trade report cited the shortage of pork
production in China (a potential market). Given present technology, a
hog carcass in Artsakh can be deboned and cut-up to reduce its weight
and bulk, flash frozen, vacuumed sealed in `cryovac' and boxed to be
economically air lifted to a foreign market. Historically the region
was home to the Karabagh horse. No reason why rearing horses could not
be reintroduced on a much larger scale.
Given the emphasis on the agricultural sector the processing industry
could be an important source for exports. In North America there are
significant nodes of Armenian population-Boston, New York,
Philadelphia, DC, Los Angeles, Montreal, and Toronto-that could be
developed as markets for some of Artsakh's products including wine,
vodka, brandy, bottled water and beer. This would require appropriate
advertising and maintaining trade representatives possibly in New York
and Los Angeles. These markets could also serve as conduits to
introduce Artsakh's products to a wider geographic area and a larger
population. If the Stepanakert International Airport could become
operational, it would be a significant political and economic triumph
that would give Artsakh the potential for direct links to the world.
Is it no wonder that Azerbaijan is so vehement in its opposition.
Artsakh's forests could support an important domestic construction
materials industry which would include such products as dimension
lumber and timbers, composition board, specialty wood products, and
roofing materials as well as furniture manufacturing. This could be
augmented by quarrying for building stone, sand and gravel, limestone
for cement, and the manufacturing of ceramics and glass. Given its
resource base and an educated workforce, Artsakh has many options to
pursue in developing a viable economy including an expansion of its
incipient information technology industry.
Finally, Artsakh's history, its ancient structures, archeological
sites, breath-taking scenery, and mineral springs are ideal for
tourism. Not to be overlooked are the gracious, friendly people and
the cuisine. Tourism is a means for visitors, diasporan Armenians
included, to become acquainted with the people and their country.
Tourism is a catalyst that generates the need for better roads,
transport facilities, lodgings, publications, a multitude of support
services, a wide range of goods to meet the needs of the tourists, and
most importantly, occupational opportunities. Although tourism does
not generate high paying jobs, it does provide valuable experiences
for first time employees to learn various skills as a way to move up
the employment ladder. It is also a means to improve the balance of
payments situation.
Several years ago I wrote an article entitled, `Artsakh: The Key to
Armenia's Political and Economic Future' (The Armenian Weekly, January
2010 Special Magazine Issue). Three years later I am even more bullish
on Artsakh's prospects after having witnessed the tremendous progress
its people have made. Artsakh is a land of unlimited opportunity that
can and will become our nation's future frontier beckoning Armenians
to return home to participate in rebuilding an ancient land that has
been reborn.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2014/01/05/artsakhs-prospects-for-the-future/
By Michael Mensoian // January 5, 2014
Special to the Armenian Weekly
Ever since the 1994 ceasefire brought a semblance of peace to Artsakh,
its people have made great strides in democratic self-governance and
in rebuilding and improving the economic and social infrastructure
wantonly destroyed by Azerbaijan during the Karabagh War. During these
difficult years the people have maintained a collective esprit and
energy that confounds the Azeri leadership.
Ever since the 1994 ceasefire brought a semblance of peace to Artsakh,
its people have made great strides in democratic self-governance and
in rebuilding and improving the economic and social infrastructure
wantonly destroyed by Azerbaijan during the Karabagh War. (Photo by
Arevik Danielian)
The ultimate concern, whether we live in Artsakh or beyond, is the
future viability of this historic Armenian land liberated through the
heroic efforts of its people. There are several questions that must be
affirmatively answered: Would Artsakh (and Armenia) be able to
withstand renewed hostilities by Azerbaijan? Can Artsakh's interests
be protected through negotiations? Does Artsakh have the resources to
develop a robust economy, not only for its present population, but as
a future frontier beckoning Diasporan Armenians wishing to return
home?
Confronting renewed hostilities
Any number of reasons would - or should - deter Azerbaijan from renewing
hostilities; if they did not exist, President Ilham Aliyev would have
already exercised his oft-threatened military option. Yet, there is
always the possibility that internal pressures or his outsized ego
could override prudent judgment. This analysis will only consider the
military strategy that Azerbaijan is likely to adopt if it were to
resume hostilities, and the difficulties that a tactical
implementation of that strategy would involve. Given these apparent
difficulties, one might question why the strategy would even be
considered. It is based primarily on the reality that the
international community, and especially the neighboring countries,
would not tolerate a protracted war. This reality requires a strategy
that would (1) seek to occupy strategic objectives within a window of
opportunity of from 12-15 days; (2) seek to breach the heavily
fortified frontier, preferably at both Agdam and Fizuli, within the
first 48-72 hours; (3) engage the defenders along the entire front
(the Northern, Central, and Southern Sectors); and (4) require the
deployment of all 3 army corps, or significant elements thereof,
currently positioned along the Armenian-Artsakh border from Georgia to
Iran.
Presently Azerbaijan has five army corps in the field. The first Army
Corps is concentrated in the vicinity of Ganja. It is responsible for
the Northern Sector and the Armenian frontier. The third is stationed
in the vicinity of Barda (Central Sector), and the second in the
vicinity of Agdzhabedi/Beylagan (Southern Sector). The second also has
responsibility for the Iranian frontier. The fourth Army Corps is
stationed in the capital district of Baku, and the fifth is deployed
in Nakhitchevan.
Yusif Agayev, an Azeri military expert who fought in the Karabagh War,
doesn't believe `...the society of my country is ready for war. I think
it would be a month or two. That is the amount of time the armed
forces could fight for. If it drags on longer, then it will be a war
that society will have to participate in, not just the army.' It is
not likely that Azerbaijan will have the month or two that Agayev
suggests. A window of opportunity of about 12-15 days would be more
likely. That is why the first 48-72 hours is so critical. Within
minutes of the first shot being fired there would be an international
demand for a ceasefire led by Russia, Iran, Georgia, and possibly
Turkey supported by Western Europe and the United States (covertly
backed by international oil interests). Given the observable signs of
an Azeri offensive build-up, these nations would not wait for the
first shot to be fired before diplomatic pressure is applied. Although
the conflict occupies a limited geographic area, its ramifications - the
`unintended consequences' - could easily destabilize the entire region.
Russia, Iran, Georgia, and Turkey each have ethnic minorities with
long-standing socio-economic and political grievances who seek either
independence or effective local autonomy. This conflict could be the
spark that ignites this historic geographic tinderbox.
Since Azerbaijan realizes a protracted war is not viable, the strategy
is to engage the Armenian defenders along the entire frontier. This
can only be accomplished by simultaneously committing elements of the
three army corps responsible for monitoring the Artsakh border. Given
this strategy, the obvious objectives would be Agdam and Fizuli. To
support these two major offensives, units of the second and third
corps would engage the Armenian defenders in such tactical movements
as holding actions to deny the redeployment of Armenian units to
critical sectors of the front; diversionary maneuvers that seek to
mislead or confuse the defenders; and diversionary attacks that would
seek to relieve the pressure on the main forces attacking Agdam and
Fizuli.
Diversionary attacks from Tartar toward Mardakert would relieve the
pressure on the Agdam forces as well as protect their northern or
right flank. At the same time a diversionary attack toward Martuni by
elements of the second Army Corps would assist the main force
attacking Fizuli and protect their eastern or right flank. The first
Army Corps at Ganja would most likely engage in diversionary maneuvers
and hold actions along the mountainous Northern Sector. Depending on
the resistance encountered, the Azeris could commit elements of the
first to a full-scale diversionary attack from Shahumian toward
Mardakert.
The former United States ambassador to Azerbaijan, Matthew Bryza, has
suggested that `the Azeris can't retake Artsakh now. They are
militarily incapable of doing it.' He further suggested that he
`...didn't think they could dislodge the Armenian forces from the high
ground. Wayne Merry, a Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy
Council, agrees, saying that `a key factor is the topography, the
extent to which Nagorno-Karabagh has created defenses in depth.
Progress would come at a high cost.'
In addition to controlling the high ground, the Armenian defenders
have had nearly 20 years to develop fortifications in depth, as well
as construct obstacles that would impede and channel men and
mechanized equipment into prepared fields of fire. To achieve the
quick breakthrough required, the Azeris would seek to overwhelm the
defenders by deploying a numerically superior concentration of
infantry and mechanized units. Against heavily fortified positions a
disproportionate ratio of perhaps four to five Azeri casualties to one
Armenian casualty could be expected. These excessive battlefield
losses would have a demoralizing impact on the Azeri units, keeping in
mind that possibly 7 out of 10 men are either 12- or 18-month
conscripts in addition to reservists who might be called-up to augment
the professional army. Loss of morale would have a debilitating impact
on unit effectiveness, which would contribute to an increased casualty
count. Every tactical plan is dependent on an integrated hierarchy of
units from squad, platoon, on up, with each unit supporting the
mission of the next higher command, which could be a reinforced
company or a brigade. All units involved must operate as one cohesive
force with one overriding objective to have any chance of success.
Engaging the Armenians along the entire front is sound strategy given
the realities of the situation, but it is also a catch-22 situation. A
phased deployment of units would favor the defenders, while committing
significant elements of its three army corps simultaneously in a
tactical bid to overwhelm them before an expected ceasefire can be
enforced is no guarantee of success, and would most likely result in
unacceptable losses in men and equipment. It is highly unlikely that
the civilian population (if aware of the losses) or the field
commanders (senior officers) who must follow orders would tolerate
such losses.
The prize Azeri objective would be Agdam. To the east of Agdam is the
Kura River floodplain, part of which is below sea level (the Kura
River empties into the Caspian Sea, which is about 90 feet below sea
level). From this floodplain the elevation rises westward in a
step-like fashion to the high plains just west of Agdam (which is
about 1,200 feet above sea level) that give way to the hillier terrain
toward Stepanakert. If Agdam is occupied, it would allow the Azeri
forces to spill out onto this plain, thereby facilitating the
increased deployment of mechanized equipment such as tanks, armored
troop carriers, self-propelled artillery, and rocket launchers for a
final push toward Stepanakert and Shushi, with a smaller force moving
south to join the attack on Martuni.
To the south, a second major offensive would be underway toward
Fizuli. A diversionary attack on Martuni would seek to ease the
pressure on the Fizuli force as well as protect its eastern or right
flank. Holding actions at Hadrut would protect the western or left
flank of the Fizuli force. If Fizuli were to be occupied, the main
force would most likely split with the larger force wheeling eastward
toward Martuni. Should this happen, the Martuni defenders would face a
three-pronged enveloping maneuver that would either force them to fall
back or be cut off from the main Armenian forces (assuming the Azeri
offensive could succeed).
The second smaller force would augment the Azeri units engaged at
Hadrut. If Martuni were occupied, the combined Azeri forces would then
move toward Shushi/Stepanakert from the southeast to support the Agdam
forces attacking from the northeast. The Azeri Hadrut units would be
given the mission to protect the western or left flank of this final
thrust toward Artsakh's core area.
While this might be the essence of the Azeri strategy, its success is
far from assured; the deterrents are many. First and foremost, this
analysis does not consider the defensive and offensive capabilities of
the Armenian forces, who have played out the various strategies the
Azeris might adopt. An instant problem for the Azeris is the
recognition by unbiased observers that the Armenian military force is
much better prepared. Also it is unlikely that the Azeri soldier has
the emotional and psychological stamina or determination of the
Armenian soldier, who is prepared to fight for his family, his land,
his children's future, and for his right to live as an Armenian. What
reasons would the Azeri soldier have to sacrifice his life in a war he
might neither accept nor understand?
It is the expected immediate international call for a ceasefire that
would require Azerbaijan's massive deployment of men and equipment in
a military gamble that seeks to overwhelm the defenders and breach
their fortifications. It is this tactical decision that could result
in extremely high battlefield losses against a determined, entrenched
defensive force. It is not possible for Azerbaijan to gain any
advantage from a surprise attack because the intelligence gathering
technology available to the Armenian military allows for the real-time
gathering of information. This intelligence effort is likely aided by
Russian input and, during a conflict, possibly by covert Iranian
input.
Every strategic target within Azerbaijan is within the effective
retaliatory capability of the Armenian defenders. Pre-selected targets
would be engaged immediately, some of which may have a devastating
impact on Azerbaijan's war effort. So much emphasis has been placed on
the publicized expansion of its army that it is accepted as doctrine
that numerical superiority in men, which is not the same as the
principle of force concentration (achieving numerical superiority at a
given time at a given place), is the key element on the battlefield.
It is not! The Armenian defenders have the ability to achieve force
concentration to gain a tactical advantage at any sector of the front
based on their shorter interior lines of communication that facilitate
the rapid deployment of troops and equipment. In addition, a defending
force occupying heavily fortified positions may have a ratio of three-
or four- to one advantage over the attacking forces: The Azeri staging
areas where units are readied for movement to the front; their
approaches to the line of contact; as well as their supply and
resupply routes, are all vulnerable to effective Armenian
counter-measures.
Adding to the deterrents is the sophisticated level of planning,
coordination, and execution required and the real-time evaluation and
response to evolving situations at the fronts that may require
immediate tactical changes; the augmentation or redeployment of units;
resupply; and the evacuation of battlefield casualties. It is highly
problematic if the Azeri military command has this capability at the
level required. Some of the officers and a smaller number of
non-commissioned officers (NCO) may be veterans of the Karabagh War.
Assuming the publicized expansion of the army is accurate, most of the
junior officers (captain and below) who fill the majority of the
combat slots in any unit, as well as the NCO's, may well be the weak
link in the Azeri command structure in terms of training, leadership,
and indoctrination. A resumption of hostilities is not likely to
provide President Aliyev the solution he seeks.
Can negotiations protect Artsakh's interests?
The principles advanced by the Minsk Group (represented by Russia,
France, and the United States) to guide the negotiations, no matter
how nuanced they have been over time, continually stress (1) the
inviolability of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and (2) that when
and how Artsakh's final status is determined, it will be no better
than limited autonomy under Azerbaijan's jurisdiction. This raises an
important question: If Artsakh had the legal right to declare its
independence under the principles of remedial cessation or
self-determination, or under the laws of the soviet constitution, the
negotiators, including the Artsakh representatives, should be
discussing the timing of Artsakh's recognition; indemnification for
displaced people/refugees (both Armenian and Azeri); its final
boundaries; and the status of Shahumian, and the occupied border areas
of Mardakert and Martuni. It may be difficult to accept, but some
adjustments in the area to be included in Artsakh may have to be
considered. An offer giving Azeris married to Armenians (possibly
including their extended families) the right of return to Artsakh
might also be considered.
Azerbaijan continues to claim that its territorial integrity is being
violated by Armenia. This is a specious argument ostensibly supported
by the Minsk Group. Azerbaijan is purposely misinterpreting Principle
4 under Chapter 2, Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations,
which prevents a state from threatening the territorial integrity of a
neighboring state. It is the Artsakh Armenians who threatened the
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan by having legally declared their
independence. However, Principle 4 does not apply to Artsakh.
Armenia's intervention was limited to providing humanitarian and
military assistance to protect a beleaguered population from the
indiscriminate use of military force by the Azeris. The present
Armenian presence in Artsakh represents a stabilizing influence that
facilitates the recovery effort and a preventive measure against a
renewal of hostilities.
Economic development
Artsakh's natural resource base is more than adequate to support at
least 10 times its present population of approximately 140,000.
However, several interrelated factors - a reverse domino
effect - represent serious obstacles that must be addressed before a
robust economy can develop. The most obvious are (1) Artsakh's tenuous
political status, which (2) inhibits foreign investment, which (3)
discourages in-migration.
Tenuous political status
Artsakh declared its independence in 1991 and has, since the 1994
ceasefire, met all of the `unofficial' requirements for de jure
recognition. (Unfortunately, recognition is a highly subjective
political decision.) Until recognition is granted, it is vital that
Artsakh continue to invite foreign government leaders, as it did
recently with Uruguayan parliamentarians. While recognition will not
come solely or immediately from these visits, they will lay the
groundwork as well as the perception that recognition is highly likely
to occur. It is an important first step (which Stepanakert already
recognizes) if investment is to be encouraged. Dependence on the level
of aid presently received is not adequate to stimulate a robust
economy that can independently sustain Artsakh. However, this aid has
made significant improvements in basic infrastructure that has
improved the quality of life for the people - the foundation upon which
Artsakh's future will be built.
To facilitate this process Artsakh must continue to expand its public
relations effort through the various political, humanitarian, and
philanthropic organizations that are already committed to its cause.
Without getting into the political aspects of the Artsakh issue, its
long-term viability should represent the most significant issue on the
Armenian national agenda. The more the Armenian Diaspora know about
Artsakh - its achievements and potential - the greater its response to aid
in Artsakh's development.
Measured population increase
Increasing the population should go hand-in-hand with economic
development. However what is required and doable is a measured
increase in population as a means to meet political and economic
needs. Politically it is difficult to claim `empty' lands however
justified that claim may be when the lands are not reasonably
integrated with the core area. We should have learned from the Turkish
inspired genocide that emptied historic western Armenia of our people
to weaken if not eliminate potential territorial claims by Armenia. A
program of selective immigration would seek to meet the political and
economic objectives identified by a government master plan for
strategic resettlement. (See `The Strategic Resettlement of Artsakh,'
The Armenian Weekly, February 19, 2011) Stepanakert must be prepared
to effectively assist these newcomers to Artsakh. It cannot be
expected that these 21st century Armenians are pioneers able or
willing to `tame' the wilderness. That type of settlement program is a
prescription for disaster.
As Stepanakert increases its connections with various organizations
and institutions beyond its borders; as it cultivates relations with
foreign governments; and as the world community (including our
Diaspora) are given reasons to support Artsakh, an aura of
inevitability with respect to recognition will encourage greater
interest from foreign investors, including Armenians. Although Artsakh
has already benefited from visionary diasporan entrepreneurs, de jure
recognition is essential to open the floodgate for foreign investment
Renewable energy sources
Present available data for Nagorno-Karabagh indicate a significant
potential for the development of renewable energy. This is important
given the absence of carboniferous energy resources. Several sites in
the vicinity of Jermajur and Vaghuhas in the north and in the
Stepanakert-Shushi region have been identified as `most appropriate'
for constructing wind turbines to generate electric power. Other
secondary sites exist, as well as sites in Kashatagh that have yet to
be fully evaluated.
The region receives an average of about 23 inches of precipitation
annually which is sufficient for agriculture supplemented by
irrigation if or when necessary. Precipitation generally increases
from the south/southeast toward the higher elevations to the
north/northwest. In the Kashatagh Region precipitation increases north
toward the Eastern Sevan/Mrav Mountains. Surface flow and the many
deep narrow valleys provide sites that may be used to construct dams
for water storage, hydroelectric generation and irrigation as well as
preventing floods from the annual Spring snow melt from the higher
elevations that dominate the north and northwestern portions of
Artsakh. The average precipitation would suggest a greater proportion
of days with less than one/quarter of the sky covered by clouds. This
would result in more hours of daily sunlight which would facilitate
the development of solar power. Renewable energy would be a boon for
the remote villages which could draw upon locally produced energy. In
addition Artsakh's balance of payments situation would benefit by
eliminating or reducing payments for energy imports.
Potential sectors of the economy
Artsakh's farmers should be able to produce a wide variety of field
and tree crops (including viti culture). Some specialized products
would include processed and comb honey, a variety of berries, nuts,
and fresh-cut flowers. Natural and upgraded pastures could support
commercial dairy farming including poultry and egg production, cattle
and sheep rearing and hog raising. In addition, the by-products
associated with each animal are able to support a variety of economic
activities. A recent trade report cited the shortage of pork
production in China (a potential market). Given present technology, a
hog carcass in Artsakh can be deboned and cut-up to reduce its weight
and bulk, flash frozen, vacuumed sealed in `cryovac' and boxed to be
economically air lifted to a foreign market. Historically the region
was home to the Karabagh horse. No reason why rearing horses could not
be reintroduced on a much larger scale.
Given the emphasis on the agricultural sector the processing industry
could be an important source for exports. In North America there are
significant nodes of Armenian population-Boston, New York,
Philadelphia, DC, Los Angeles, Montreal, and Toronto-that could be
developed as markets for some of Artsakh's products including wine,
vodka, brandy, bottled water and beer. This would require appropriate
advertising and maintaining trade representatives possibly in New York
and Los Angeles. These markets could also serve as conduits to
introduce Artsakh's products to a wider geographic area and a larger
population. If the Stepanakert International Airport could become
operational, it would be a significant political and economic triumph
that would give Artsakh the potential for direct links to the world.
Is it no wonder that Azerbaijan is so vehement in its opposition.
Artsakh's forests could support an important domestic construction
materials industry which would include such products as dimension
lumber and timbers, composition board, specialty wood products, and
roofing materials as well as furniture manufacturing. This could be
augmented by quarrying for building stone, sand and gravel, limestone
for cement, and the manufacturing of ceramics and glass. Given its
resource base and an educated workforce, Artsakh has many options to
pursue in developing a viable economy including an expansion of its
incipient information technology industry.
Finally, Artsakh's history, its ancient structures, archeological
sites, breath-taking scenery, and mineral springs are ideal for
tourism. Not to be overlooked are the gracious, friendly people and
the cuisine. Tourism is a means for visitors, diasporan Armenians
included, to become acquainted with the people and their country.
Tourism is a catalyst that generates the need for better roads,
transport facilities, lodgings, publications, a multitude of support
services, a wide range of goods to meet the needs of the tourists, and
most importantly, occupational opportunities. Although tourism does
not generate high paying jobs, it does provide valuable experiences
for first time employees to learn various skills as a way to move up
the employment ladder. It is also a means to improve the balance of
payments situation.
Several years ago I wrote an article entitled, `Artsakh: The Key to
Armenia's Political and Economic Future' (The Armenian Weekly, January
2010 Special Magazine Issue). Three years later I am even more bullish
on Artsakh's prospects after having witnessed the tremendous progress
its people have made. Artsakh is a land of unlimited opportunity that
can and will become our nation's future frontier beckoning Armenians
to return home to participate in rebuilding an ancient land that has
been reborn.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress