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False Friends
Why the United States Is Getting Tough With Turkey
By Michael J. Koplow
February 20, 2014
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Barack Obama in the White House Rose Garden,
May 16, 2013. (Kevin Lamarque / Courtesy Reuters)
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
DavutoÄ?lu did something extraordinary when they emerged from a January
12 bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Friends of Syria
conference in Paris. Such occasions are usually marked by predictable
boilerplate rhetoric about how productive the talk was and how closely
both countries are working to solve pressing global issues,
andDavutoÄ?lu's comments followed the standard script. What happened
next was more unusual. After DavutoÄ?lu finished speaking, Kerry took
the opportunity to chide his Turkish counterpart for neglecting to
mention an important component of the talks: Kerry's emphatic
rejection of Turkish claims that the United States had been meddling
in Turkish politics and trying to influence the Turkish elections. As
DavutoÄ?lu sheepishly looked at the floor, Kerry continued that
DavutoÄ?lu now understood the score, and said that the two countries
`need to calm the waters and move forward.'
Kerry's addendum came in response to what has become a familiar
Turkish government strategy of shifting the blame to outside powers,
and particularly to the United States, when faced with any sort of
internal opposition. During the Gezi Park protests in June, for
example, Turkish government figures blamed Washington, CNN, and
`foreign powers' for inciting unrest. More recently, when an ongoing
corruption scandal exploded into the open in late December, Turkish
ministers were quick to insinuate that the United States was the
hidden hand behind the graft probe. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan threatened to expel U.S. ambassador Francis Ricciardone for
allegedly provoking Turkey and `exceeding limits,' a reference to
allegations that the ambassador was somehow meddling in Turkish
affairs and prodding the investigation of government officials.
It isn't surprising that the Turkish government has blamed the United
States for self-inflicted wounds. But it is surprising that the United
States has finally responded forcefully. And, if Turkey's behavior
after the flap is any indication (it made a quick about-face on a
number of issues that have been particularly angering the United
States), the Obama administration should make getting tougher with
Turkey a priority.
PROBLEM PARTNER
Turkey voted in the UN Security Council against additional sanctions
on Iran; helped Iran get around the international sanctions regime;
and even hinted at Iran's natural right to a nuclear program.
Turkish officials like to describe the last few years as a golden age
in bilateral relations. DavutoÄ?lu, in particular, likes to wax on
about the `model partnership' between the two countries. What he is
responding to is the United States' decision early in Obama's first
term to treat Turkey with kid gloves despite an increasingly long
track record of troubling Turkish behavior. The United States had two
main motivations. The first was the hope that Turkey could serve as a
democratic example for other Muslim countries. For a variety of
reasons, includingTurkey's unique history and its distinctive
combination of structural pressures, it was never going to be a good
model, but that did not prevent Washington from pushing it
wholeheartedly.
The second motivation was a conviction that Turkey could serve as an
interlocutor between the West and the Middle East. With its ties to
groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its relationship with Iran,
Turkey was seen as irreplaceable, and Washington was reluctant to
alienate it. Even when the United States instituted a policy directly
intended to counter problematic Turkish behavior, Turkey was still
given an inordinate amount of leeway. For example, in January 2013,
when Congress passed legislation specifically outlawing trade in gas
for gold to stem Turkish sanctions-busting in Iran, Turkey was granted
a six-month buffer period. The only thing the backpedaling did was
enable ever-bolder Turkish probing of U.S. red lines.
And probe it has. As has been documented repeatedly, Turkish democracy
has been off the rails for some time. Since winning re-election in
2007, the AKP has systematically squeezed political opponents,
consolidated state power, and done all it can to marginalize the
feckless opposition. It has jailed journalists in unprecedented
numbers, prosecuted citizens for insulting the prime minister,
subjected companies that have run afoul of the government to crushing
fines, and convicted military officers on charges based on forged
evidence. All the while, the United States has largely sat on the
sidelines with its mouth shut. State Department officials repeat the
mantra that Turkey is more democratic now than it has ever been, and
in 2012, President Barack Obama listed Erdogan as one of the five
world leaders with whom he has the closest and most trusting
relationship.
Turkish provocations extend well past internal machinations to Turkish
foreign policy. Take Iran, for example. Turkey voted in the UN
Security Council against additional sanctions on Iran; dragged its
heels on hosting NATO X-Band radar installations on its territory,
which are aimed at protecting NATO states from Iranian ballistic
missiles; helped Iran get around the international sanctions regime;
and even hinted at Iran's natural right to a nuclear program and
Turkey's full support of its nuclear ambitions.
Then there is Syria, where the United States has been at odds with
Turkey over its support for anti-Western jihadi groups. Or Israel,
where Turkey's refusal to normalize ties with its former ally has
complicated U.S. intelligence-sharing efforts. The country's
bolstering of Hamas at the expense of the Palestinian Authority has
been similarly destructive. In Iraq, Turkey has consistently attempted
to undermine the Maliki government and treated the Kurdistan Regional
Government as a wholly independent entity from Baghdad.
Even more serious was Turkey's announcement in September that it had
selected China Precision Machinery Export-Import Corporation (CPMEIC),
a Chinese firm under sanctions for violating the Iran, North Korea,
and Syria Nonproliferation Act, to coproduce with Turkey a new missile
defense system. The country rejected bids from NATO ally companies.
The move meant that Turkey was not only flouting the sanctions regime
that the United States had painstakingly constructed but also that
Turkey was purchasing a system that could not be integrated into the
larger NATO missile defense shield.
TOUGH TALK
The Chinese deal seems to have been a red line. It prompted at least a
temporary shift in U.S. dealings with Ankara. Turkey's decision to go
with the Chinese firm, a decision that was driven by Turkey's
priorities of transfer technology and joint coproduction in order to
bolster its own defense industry, caused something of a crisis within
NATO. The United States responded with harsh public and private
warnings that Turkey was opening itself to sanctions and causing
Turkey's NATO partners to rethink Turkey's role in the alliance. The
United States and NATO also told Turkey in no uncertain terms that the
Chinese system would not be compatible with NATO radar and defense
systems, and that it would therefore be useless. Then came Kerry's
public airing in January of what must have been an incredibly
uncomfortable conversation and otherAmerican pushback on the smears
against Ricciardone.
In other areas as well, the U.S. tone has grown harsher. For example,
consider that when Erdogan called Israel a terrorist state in November
2012, the State Department wouldn't go farther than calling his
comments `not helpful at this moment.' But when he accused Israel of
being behind Egypt's military coup in August 2013, the State
Department blasted back, saying, `We strongly condemn the statements
that were made by Prime Minister Erdogan today. Suggesting that Israel
is somehow responsible for recent events in Egypt is offensive,
unsubstantiated, and wrong.'
So far, the evidence suggests that taking a tougher line with Turkey
works well. In early February, Ankara announced that it had not made a
final decision to go with the Chinese missile bid, and was open to
bids from other companies. Given that the French offer includes some
coproduction and technology transfer, there is a good chance that the
United States and NATO will be able to pressure Turkey into accepting
it. Also this month, Turkey announced that it was close to normalizing
ties with Israel after nearly a year of foot-dragging following Israel
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's own 2010 apology to Erdogan for
the deaths of Turkish citizens aboard the Mavi Marmara. Public talk of
a thaw with Israel is a clear effort to signal to the West that Turkey
is still a worthwhile partner. Rapprochement with Israel is not
exactly a winning political issue, and if Turkey and Israel do end up
normalizing ties, it will bring some hardline domestic criticism.
Were it not for the United States' cold shoulder and the drumbeat of
EU criticism, Ankara would likely be proceeding with business as
usual.
So far, the evidence suggests that taking a tougher line with Turkey works well.
Treading lightly with Turkey did not prevent Ankara from subverting
the United States in the Middle East. It is time for something
different. The United States needs to institutionalize its new,
sterner approach to Turkey by making it clear to Ankara what its
expectations are and ceasing its rhetoric on the strength of Turkish
democracy, which has made it easier for American diplomats to fall
back on a reality that has rapidly disappeared. If the United States
gets tough with Turkey in a more systematic way, as it has with the
Chinese arms deal, and makes it clear that the U.S.-Turkey strategic
relationship cannot be taken for granted, perhaps Turkey will see the
value in being a reliable ally and actually become one.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140952/michael-j-koplow/false-friends
Why the United States Is Getting Tough With Turkey
By Michael J. Koplow
February 20, 2014
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Barack Obama in the White House Rose Garden,
May 16, 2013. (Kevin Lamarque / Courtesy Reuters)
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
DavutoÄ?lu did something extraordinary when they emerged from a January
12 bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Friends of Syria
conference in Paris. Such occasions are usually marked by predictable
boilerplate rhetoric about how productive the talk was and how closely
both countries are working to solve pressing global issues,
andDavutoÄ?lu's comments followed the standard script. What happened
next was more unusual. After DavutoÄ?lu finished speaking, Kerry took
the opportunity to chide his Turkish counterpart for neglecting to
mention an important component of the talks: Kerry's emphatic
rejection of Turkish claims that the United States had been meddling
in Turkish politics and trying to influence the Turkish elections. As
DavutoÄ?lu sheepishly looked at the floor, Kerry continued that
DavutoÄ?lu now understood the score, and said that the two countries
`need to calm the waters and move forward.'
Kerry's addendum came in response to what has become a familiar
Turkish government strategy of shifting the blame to outside powers,
and particularly to the United States, when faced with any sort of
internal opposition. During the Gezi Park protests in June, for
example, Turkish government figures blamed Washington, CNN, and
`foreign powers' for inciting unrest. More recently, when an ongoing
corruption scandal exploded into the open in late December, Turkish
ministers were quick to insinuate that the United States was the
hidden hand behind the graft probe. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan threatened to expel U.S. ambassador Francis Ricciardone for
allegedly provoking Turkey and `exceeding limits,' a reference to
allegations that the ambassador was somehow meddling in Turkish
affairs and prodding the investigation of government officials.
It isn't surprising that the Turkish government has blamed the United
States for self-inflicted wounds. But it is surprising that the United
States has finally responded forcefully. And, if Turkey's behavior
after the flap is any indication (it made a quick about-face on a
number of issues that have been particularly angering the United
States), the Obama administration should make getting tougher with
Turkey a priority.
PROBLEM PARTNER
Turkey voted in the UN Security Council against additional sanctions
on Iran; helped Iran get around the international sanctions regime;
and even hinted at Iran's natural right to a nuclear program.
Turkish officials like to describe the last few years as a golden age
in bilateral relations. DavutoÄ?lu, in particular, likes to wax on
about the `model partnership' between the two countries. What he is
responding to is the United States' decision early in Obama's first
term to treat Turkey with kid gloves despite an increasingly long
track record of troubling Turkish behavior. The United States had two
main motivations. The first was the hope that Turkey could serve as a
democratic example for other Muslim countries. For a variety of
reasons, includingTurkey's unique history and its distinctive
combination of structural pressures, it was never going to be a good
model, but that did not prevent Washington from pushing it
wholeheartedly.
The second motivation was a conviction that Turkey could serve as an
interlocutor between the West and the Middle East. With its ties to
groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its relationship with Iran,
Turkey was seen as irreplaceable, and Washington was reluctant to
alienate it. Even when the United States instituted a policy directly
intended to counter problematic Turkish behavior, Turkey was still
given an inordinate amount of leeway. For example, in January 2013,
when Congress passed legislation specifically outlawing trade in gas
for gold to stem Turkish sanctions-busting in Iran, Turkey was granted
a six-month buffer period. The only thing the backpedaling did was
enable ever-bolder Turkish probing of U.S. red lines.
And probe it has. As has been documented repeatedly, Turkish democracy
has been off the rails for some time. Since winning re-election in
2007, the AKP has systematically squeezed political opponents,
consolidated state power, and done all it can to marginalize the
feckless opposition. It has jailed journalists in unprecedented
numbers, prosecuted citizens for insulting the prime minister,
subjected companies that have run afoul of the government to crushing
fines, and convicted military officers on charges based on forged
evidence. All the while, the United States has largely sat on the
sidelines with its mouth shut. State Department officials repeat the
mantra that Turkey is more democratic now than it has ever been, and
in 2012, President Barack Obama listed Erdogan as one of the five
world leaders with whom he has the closest and most trusting
relationship.
Turkish provocations extend well past internal machinations to Turkish
foreign policy. Take Iran, for example. Turkey voted in the UN
Security Council against additional sanctions on Iran; dragged its
heels on hosting NATO X-Band radar installations on its territory,
which are aimed at protecting NATO states from Iranian ballistic
missiles; helped Iran get around the international sanctions regime;
and even hinted at Iran's natural right to a nuclear program and
Turkey's full support of its nuclear ambitions.
Then there is Syria, where the United States has been at odds with
Turkey over its support for anti-Western jihadi groups. Or Israel,
where Turkey's refusal to normalize ties with its former ally has
complicated U.S. intelligence-sharing efforts. The country's
bolstering of Hamas at the expense of the Palestinian Authority has
been similarly destructive. In Iraq, Turkey has consistently attempted
to undermine the Maliki government and treated the Kurdistan Regional
Government as a wholly independent entity from Baghdad.
Even more serious was Turkey's announcement in September that it had
selected China Precision Machinery Export-Import Corporation (CPMEIC),
a Chinese firm under sanctions for violating the Iran, North Korea,
and Syria Nonproliferation Act, to coproduce with Turkey a new missile
defense system. The country rejected bids from NATO ally companies.
The move meant that Turkey was not only flouting the sanctions regime
that the United States had painstakingly constructed but also that
Turkey was purchasing a system that could not be integrated into the
larger NATO missile defense shield.
TOUGH TALK
The Chinese deal seems to have been a red line. It prompted at least a
temporary shift in U.S. dealings with Ankara. Turkey's decision to go
with the Chinese firm, a decision that was driven by Turkey's
priorities of transfer technology and joint coproduction in order to
bolster its own defense industry, caused something of a crisis within
NATO. The United States responded with harsh public and private
warnings that Turkey was opening itself to sanctions and causing
Turkey's NATO partners to rethink Turkey's role in the alliance. The
United States and NATO also told Turkey in no uncertain terms that the
Chinese system would not be compatible with NATO radar and defense
systems, and that it would therefore be useless. Then came Kerry's
public airing in January of what must have been an incredibly
uncomfortable conversation and otherAmerican pushback on the smears
against Ricciardone.
In other areas as well, the U.S. tone has grown harsher. For example,
consider that when Erdogan called Israel a terrorist state in November
2012, the State Department wouldn't go farther than calling his
comments `not helpful at this moment.' But when he accused Israel of
being behind Egypt's military coup in August 2013, the State
Department blasted back, saying, `We strongly condemn the statements
that were made by Prime Minister Erdogan today. Suggesting that Israel
is somehow responsible for recent events in Egypt is offensive,
unsubstantiated, and wrong.'
So far, the evidence suggests that taking a tougher line with Turkey
works well. In early February, Ankara announced that it had not made a
final decision to go with the Chinese missile bid, and was open to
bids from other companies. Given that the French offer includes some
coproduction and technology transfer, there is a good chance that the
United States and NATO will be able to pressure Turkey into accepting
it. Also this month, Turkey announced that it was close to normalizing
ties with Israel after nearly a year of foot-dragging following Israel
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's own 2010 apology to Erdogan for
the deaths of Turkish citizens aboard the Mavi Marmara. Public talk of
a thaw with Israel is a clear effort to signal to the West that Turkey
is still a worthwhile partner. Rapprochement with Israel is not
exactly a winning political issue, and if Turkey and Israel do end up
normalizing ties, it will bring some hardline domestic criticism.
Were it not for the United States' cold shoulder and the drumbeat of
EU criticism, Ankara would likely be proceeding with business as
usual.
So far, the evidence suggests that taking a tougher line with Turkey works well.
Treading lightly with Turkey did not prevent Ankara from subverting
the United States in the Middle East. It is time for something
different. The United States needs to institutionalize its new,
sterner approach to Turkey by making it clear to Ankara what its
expectations are and ceasing its rhetoric on the strength of Turkish
democracy, which has made it easier for American diplomats to fall
back on a reality that has rapidly disappeared. If the United States
gets tough with Turkey in a more systematic way, as it has with the
Chinese arms deal, and makes it clear that the U.S.-Turkey strategic
relationship cannot be taken for granted, perhaps Turkey will see the
value in being a reliable ally and actually become one.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140952/michael-j-koplow/false-friends