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THE CORRIDOR FOR EXIT OF PEACEFUL POPULATION FROM KHOJALY
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=12571
25.02.2014
I.G. Gukasov
Colonel, Adviser to the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Armenia
during the years of Artsakh War
Intentional creation of a corridor for exit of peaceful population
fr om Khojaly pursued several objectives. First, showing humanism
towards peaceful population and preventing casualties among them
would have won their sympathies and demonstrate that we do not fight
with peaceful civilians, but rather, with an armed adversary, firing
by which forced the Armenians to defend themselves. Second, it was
meant to reduce the defense potential of the town, since part of
its defenders would leave with the fleeing population, thus bringing
down the number of the defenders and creating "legal" deserters, who
would abandon the defense positions under the pretext of escorting
the peaceful population out of the town and hence, would weaken the
town defenses. In addition, with this the adversary was brought to
the question: "who are you defending, if the local people are fleeing
their homes and land in panic?" Most of the local residents were
relatives of the town's armed defenders, who would have to abandon
the defense positions to make sure that their families and relatives
had a safe passage to Agdam district of Azerbaijan.
There are known examples when Armenian population actively
participated in defense of their homes shoulder to shoulder with
defense fighters. For instance, despite having an overwhelming
advantage in troops and military equipment, Azerbaijanis were unable
to take over Karintak settlement in January 1992 and Askeran in
January-February 1992.
Had no corridor been left in Khojaly, the adversary would have to
fiercely resist together with the peaceful population and fight for
each position, street and house. The advancing Armenian defense forces
could have suffered a large number of casualties and military hardware
losses. The capture of the town could have taken a longer time, to
which our troops were not ready due to their order of battle. In
street fighting the town defenders would have had an upper hand,
since the personnel combat power ratio was 1:1.
Thus, one of the factors contributing to the capture of Khojaly
was the part of the operation plan to allow voluntary exit of the
residents and defenders of the town through an intentionally left
corridor toward Agdam district controlled by the Azerbaijani army.
Indeed, we forced the adversary to leave the town through the corridor
and this weakened their defenses. Some of the troops abandoned their
defense positions on their own, without receiving orders fr om the
command. The fear of advancing Armenian detachments was stronger than
each soldier's and resident's feeling of individual responsibility
for defense of their home and town.
In line with the Geneva Convention, the command of the Armenian
offensive group used loudspeakers and radio to request the residents
to leave the town through the corridor left, so as to avoid casualties.
And this corridor operated reliably.
Bakhtiyar Aslanov, a policeman remembers: "We, the armed people, had a
task to get the population of the town out with minimal losses. Under
the orders of Alif Hajiyev I went to and returned fr om Shelly
village of Agdam district three times. Through this "road of life"
150 people were saved. When I came back fourth time, I saw that Alif
and his small detachment still continues to fight." (Bakinsky Rabochiy
newspaper, 26.02.1997)
Sedyk Mamedov, a police captain was quoted to say: "... To save the
peaceful population we had to start their evacuation fr om the town.
The population was led towards Nakhichevanik, through the so-called
"corridor". About 40-50 people hit the road. Everyone in Khojaly who
had a weapon - the policemen, military - went ahead and fought the
enemy to stop the offensive." (AZERBAYCAN newspaper, 26.02.1997).
Elman Mamedov, Mayor of Khojaly stated: "We knew that the corridor is
for evacuation of peaceful population." He also adds: "After learning
about the operation to capture the town I requested to send helicopters
from Agdam in order to evacuate the elderly, women and children. We
were assured that "tomorrow we will launch an operation and break
the blockade." That help never came." (Megapolis-Express weekly,
No. 17, 1992)
In an interview to Czech reporter Dana Mazalova published in
Nezavisimaya Gazeta April 2, 1992 issue, ex-president of Azerbaijan A.
Mutalibov said: "Azerbaijan was informed about the operation to
seize Khojaly and during the operation the Armenians left a corridor
for evacuation of the peaceful population from Khojaly to a safe
place in Agdam district." He then asks the question: "Why would they
start shooting then? Especially on a territory close to Agdam wh ere
enough forces were concentrated to get in and help the people!" He
also stated: "As I was told by Khojaly survivors, all of this was
organized to prompt my resignation. Some forces acted to discredit
the president. I do not believe that Armenians, who are very sharp
and knowledgeable in dealing with such situations, could have let
Azerbaijanis get their hands on any evidence implicating them in
fascist-like actions. One may assume that somebody was interested in
showing that footage in the Supreme Council, then finger-pointing at
me." On March 6, 1992 A. Mutalibov resigned under the demands of the
Popular Front of Azerbaijan (PFA).
Eynulla Fatullayev, editor-in-chief of Real Azerbaijan newspaper,
wrote in his "Karabakh Diaries in 2005: "... several days before the
offensive the Armenians warned the population by loudspeakers about
the planned operation and recommended the civilians to leave the town
and escape the encirclement through the humanitarian corridor along
Gar-Gar river." He was told about this by refugees from Khojaly who
used the corridor and survived, because, quote: "the Armenian soldiers
positioned behind the corridor had not opened fire on them." He
confirms that "a free corridor had indeed been left, as otherwise
totally surrounded and isolated from the external world Khojaly
residents could not have broken through and escape the encirclement.
But after passing through the terrain beyond Gar-Gar river the crowd
of refugees was divided... It appears the battalions of the Popular
Front of Azerbaijan did not make efforts to free the Khojaly residents,
but instead, wanted a big bloodshed in order to oust A.
Mutalibov."
As reported by the Iranian Arannews information agency, this was also
stated by Ayatollah Seyyed Hasan Ameli, the representative of the
Supreme Leader, imam jum'a of Ardabil: "For a successful coup d'état
large losses were needed in the war front, a truly grave tragedy. The
Khojaly tragedy was staged under such circumstances. Mutalibov was
supported by Russians. Would Russians oust him to bring Elchibey
to power? Clearly not, and the coup d'état was against the
pro-Russian leadership... This was an evil plan to prevent Iran's
active involvement in Karabakh, implemented through the blood of
innocent people.
Ergenekon was behind all of this, but actually, it was Mossad1."
Between November 1991 and February 1992 people of Khojaly sent many
telegrams to Heydar Aliyev, leader of the Nakhichevan Republic,
requesting help to defend the town. In late 1991 Elman Mamedov wanted
to visit H. Aliyev in Nakhichevan and tell him about the problems
of the town's defense. "At that time anybody who uttered H. Aliyev's
name, faced a harsh punishment. But people of Khojaly were not afraid
of that." (Xalg gazeti newspaper, 26.02.1997). H. Aliyev could not
do anything. He only stated: "Bloodshed would be useful for us",
as he also wanted to strike a blow to A. Mutalibov.
Bahman Halilov, a Khojaly resident has been quoted to say: "A few days
before the tragedy the Armenians informed us several times that they
are going to capture the town and demanded that we abandon the town...
We knew that we could not expect help from anyone. We decided to
evacuate as many as possible women, children and elderly people. We
were promised that an urgent military operation is prepared to liberate
Askeran, so as to connect it with Khojaly. All that turned out to
be lies. Thus, Khojaly was sacrificed by the fault of the country's
leadership." (Respublika newspaper, February 26, 1997).
In the February 26, 1997 issue of Azerbaycan newspaper a story told
by police lieutenant Shahid Muradov was published. As the town was
stormed he went to his post wh ere 12 defenders made their stand.
There was shooting going on all over the town and it was necessary to
save the peaceful population. "Our group came to take positions in the
town outskirts and approached to a newly built five-storey residential
building, wh ere we saw 70-80 people hiding there. Battalion commander
Tofik Huseinov's UAZ-465 vehicle was parked near the same building.
The car was full of weapons and ammunition. After talking with
everybody we entered the building, took positions and waited for
the adversary to approach. In the morning of February 26 we saw two
attack helicopters land in Khankendi. Having found out our location
the Armenians demanded us to surrender. We refused and the Armenians
attacked. Nobody wanted to surrender and I took over the command. We
resisted for 12 hours, till the dusk. Dark of the night was what saved
us. In total darkness we went out of the building. The Armenians could
not stop us. We took the peaceful civilians with us and headed to
Agdam. Near Nakhichevanik village we encountered the Armenians. They
told us that if we put down our weapons on the ground and surrender,
they will let us go to Agdam. It was an Armenian trick though. We
knew that if we lay our weapons down they will kill us. That's why
we answered by gunfire to their offer. After that they stood out of
our path and we went to Adam together with the civilians."
It might be assumed that the defenders and residents of that building
thought that Khojaly was not captured by Armenians yet. For this
reason, they stayed in the town on the night February 26 and left
it only on the night of 27th, after realizing that no Azerbaijanis
remained in the town except for themselves.
It is clear from Lieutenant Muradov's story that the soldiers together
with 70-80 local residents left Khojaly on foot on the night of
February 27 and reached unharmed the Agdam district controlled by
Azerbaijani military detachments. They were not shot upon or attacked
by Armenians on their way, which proves that Armenian defense forces
had nothing to do with the deaths of civilians or even Khojaly armed
defenders outside the town and on the territory of Agdam district.
The humanitarian corridor was set from the eastern outskirts of Khojaly
and went along Gar-Gar river to north-east towards Agdam. The corridor
was 120 - 300 meters wide and even wider. The offensive was launched
in four directions, but the encirclement was never complete, as there
were not enough troops for that. Khojaly residents took advantage of
this to flee to Agdam district. All available Armenian defense forces
were deployed to seize Khojaly and the combat ended only by 7am on
February 26. However, some local pockets of resistance remained and
we had no extra forces to act outside the town. The local civilians
fleeing Khojaly and combatants accompanying them were not chased by
our detachments, since there were no free troops to do that and there
was no such intention anyway.
In addition, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense had an attack force
near Agdam city, which was capable of capturing Askeran in mere
hours and break the blockade of Khojaly. Dadash Rzayev, Chief of the
General Staff of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces personally told about
this to Elman Mamedov, head of the executive power and defense of
Khojaly, when he was visiting Baku to discuss strengthening of town
and district defenses. D. Rzayev informed that the operation plan to
break the Khojaly blockade and open communications with Askeran and
Agdam was ready, and in a few days a signal to start the operation
will be received in Khojaly. However, such signal was never sent.
On February 17, 1992 colonel S. Jangirov, deputy chief of the interior
for Karabakh zone presented a report during a meeting of all commanders
of Agdam garrison detachments and forces at Agdam district department
of the interior, talking about a plan for the operation to break
the blockade of Khojaly developed by D. Rzayev. It was planned to
carry out on February 21-25, but was constantly delayed and never
materialized. Under these circumstances the Armenian defense forces
stole a march on Azerbaijanis and captured Khojaly on February 26.
Not a single Armenian warrior would have risked going to the location
of Azerbaijan's Agdam grouping of forces, because it would have simply
been a death journey to him and would have provoked an offensive on
Askeran with consequent breaking of the Khojaly blockade. Armenian
military leadership anticipated that assistance might arrive to the
town defenders from Agdam, Shushi and other Azeri settlements and was
wary about it. For this reason, the Armenian detachments could have
never entered Agdam outskirts controlled by the Azeri troops to kill
peaceful civilians fleeing Khojaly through the humanitarian corridor.
The tragedy was carried out by Azeri armed detachments in outskirts
of Agdam on the territory controlled by Azerbaijan's Armed Forces, wh
ere no Armenian soldier could go, since a large offensive grouping of
forces was located there. The fact that this force was never deployed
into action points to controversies among the president's team and
that in the Azerbaijani Republic's Ministry of Defense there were
PFA supporters who would use any occasion to harm the president. A
ruthless political struggle to take the power was going on in the
country, and to achieve this objective the political opponents spared
no means, including the killing of their own compatriots. Even such
significant politician and manipulator as Heydar Aliyev welcomed
and considered necessary a bloody sacrifice of his own people in the
struggle for power.
Some foreign powers, especially Turkey and Israel were very interested
in the internal political struggle to overthrow the pro-Russian
president A. Mutalibov. For the anti-Russian forces to seize the power
in Azerbaijan it was necessary to discredit the president. This was
possible by blaming him for incompetent command of the Azerbaijani
army in the war against Armenia and for unjustified losses. There
were several scenarios for this, and one of them turned out to be
the tragic events with peaceful Khojaly civilians on the territory of
Agdam district controlled by the Azeri military. After A. Mutalibov
was ousted, the power in the Azerbaijani Republic was overtaken by
pro-Turkish and anti-Russian leaders.
Conclusions
1. Peaceful civilians of Khojaly were shot to death on the territory
of the Agdam district controlled by the Azerbaijani armed forces
and the NKR land adjacent to Agdam district. These forces are fully
responsible for the deaths of civilians.
2. Soldiers of Armenian defense forces have nothing to do with this
tragedy.
1Ð~PÑ~OÑ~BоÐ"Ð"а Ð~PмеÐ"и Ñ~@аÑ~AÑ~AказаÐ"
Ñ~AенÑ~AаÑ~FионнÑ~Kе Ñ~AведениÑ~O о
Ñ~AобÑ~KÑ~BиÑ~OÑ... в ХоджаÐ"Ñ~C: Ð-а вÑ~Aем
Ñ~MÑ~Bим Ñ~AÑ~BоÑ~OÐ"и Â"ÐÑ~@генеконÂ" и
Â"Ð~\оÑ~AÑ~AадÂ",http://www.panorama.am/ru/politics/2011/05/12/imam-ameli/
04.08.12
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=12571
25.02.2014
I.G. Gukasov
Colonel, Adviser to the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Armenia
during the years of Artsakh War
Intentional creation of a corridor for exit of peaceful population
fr om Khojaly pursued several objectives. First, showing humanism
towards peaceful population and preventing casualties among them
would have won their sympathies and demonstrate that we do not fight
with peaceful civilians, but rather, with an armed adversary, firing
by which forced the Armenians to defend themselves. Second, it was
meant to reduce the defense potential of the town, since part of
its defenders would leave with the fleeing population, thus bringing
down the number of the defenders and creating "legal" deserters, who
would abandon the defense positions under the pretext of escorting
the peaceful population out of the town and hence, would weaken the
town defenses. In addition, with this the adversary was brought to
the question: "who are you defending, if the local people are fleeing
their homes and land in panic?" Most of the local residents were
relatives of the town's armed defenders, who would have to abandon
the defense positions to make sure that their families and relatives
had a safe passage to Agdam district of Azerbaijan.
There are known examples when Armenian population actively
participated in defense of their homes shoulder to shoulder with
defense fighters. For instance, despite having an overwhelming
advantage in troops and military equipment, Azerbaijanis were unable
to take over Karintak settlement in January 1992 and Askeran in
January-February 1992.
Had no corridor been left in Khojaly, the adversary would have to
fiercely resist together with the peaceful population and fight for
each position, street and house. The advancing Armenian defense forces
could have suffered a large number of casualties and military hardware
losses. The capture of the town could have taken a longer time, to
which our troops were not ready due to their order of battle. In
street fighting the town defenders would have had an upper hand,
since the personnel combat power ratio was 1:1.
Thus, one of the factors contributing to the capture of Khojaly
was the part of the operation plan to allow voluntary exit of the
residents and defenders of the town through an intentionally left
corridor toward Agdam district controlled by the Azerbaijani army.
Indeed, we forced the adversary to leave the town through the corridor
and this weakened their defenses. Some of the troops abandoned their
defense positions on their own, without receiving orders fr om the
command. The fear of advancing Armenian detachments was stronger than
each soldier's and resident's feeling of individual responsibility
for defense of their home and town.
In line with the Geneva Convention, the command of the Armenian
offensive group used loudspeakers and radio to request the residents
to leave the town through the corridor left, so as to avoid casualties.
And this corridor operated reliably.
Bakhtiyar Aslanov, a policeman remembers: "We, the armed people, had a
task to get the population of the town out with minimal losses. Under
the orders of Alif Hajiyev I went to and returned fr om Shelly
village of Agdam district three times. Through this "road of life"
150 people were saved. When I came back fourth time, I saw that Alif
and his small detachment still continues to fight." (Bakinsky Rabochiy
newspaper, 26.02.1997)
Sedyk Mamedov, a police captain was quoted to say: "... To save the
peaceful population we had to start their evacuation fr om the town.
The population was led towards Nakhichevanik, through the so-called
"corridor". About 40-50 people hit the road. Everyone in Khojaly who
had a weapon - the policemen, military - went ahead and fought the
enemy to stop the offensive." (AZERBAYCAN newspaper, 26.02.1997).
Elman Mamedov, Mayor of Khojaly stated: "We knew that the corridor is
for evacuation of peaceful population." He also adds: "After learning
about the operation to capture the town I requested to send helicopters
from Agdam in order to evacuate the elderly, women and children. We
were assured that "tomorrow we will launch an operation and break
the blockade." That help never came." (Megapolis-Express weekly,
No. 17, 1992)
In an interview to Czech reporter Dana Mazalova published in
Nezavisimaya Gazeta April 2, 1992 issue, ex-president of Azerbaijan A.
Mutalibov said: "Azerbaijan was informed about the operation to
seize Khojaly and during the operation the Armenians left a corridor
for evacuation of the peaceful population from Khojaly to a safe
place in Agdam district." He then asks the question: "Why would they
start shooting then? Especially on a territory close to Agdam wh ere
enough forces were concentrated to get in and help the people!" He
also stated: "As I was told by Khojaly survivors, all of this was
organized to prompt my resignation. Some forces acted to discredit
the president. I do not believe that Armenians, who are very sharp
and knowledgeable in dealing with such situations, could have let
Azerbaijanis get their hands on any evidence implicating them in
fascist-like actions. One may assume that somebody was interested in
showing that footage in the Supreme Council, then finger-pointing at
me." On March 6, 1992 A. Mutalibov resigned under the demands of the
Popular Front of Azerbaijan (PFA).
Eynulla Fatullayev, editor-in-chief of Real Azerbaijan newspaper,
wrote in his "Karabakh Diaries in 2005: "... several days before the
offensive the Armenians warned the population by loudspeakers about
the planned operation and recommended the civilians to leave the town
and escape the encirclement through the humanitarian corridor along
Gar-Gar river." He was told about this by refugees from Khojaly who
used the corridor and survived, because, quote: "the Armenian soldiers
positioned behind the corridor had not opened fire on them." He
confirms that "a free corridor had indeed been left, as otherwise
totally surrounded and isolated from the external world Khojaly
residents could not have broken through and escape the encirclement.
But after passing through the terrain beyond Gar-Gar river the crowd
of refugees was divided... It appears the battalions of the Popular
Front of Azerbaijan did not make efforts to free the Khojaly residents,
but instead, wanted a big bloodshed in order to oust A.
Mutalibov."
As reported by the Iranian Arannews information agency, this was also
stated by Ayatollah Seyyed Hasan Ameli, the representative of the
Supreme Leader, imam jum'a of Ardabil: "For a successful coup d'état
large losses were needed in the war front, a truly grave tragedy. The
Khojaly tragedy was staged under such circumstances. Mutalibov was
supported by Russians. Would Russians oust him to bring Elchibey
to power? Clearly not, and the coup d'état was against the
pro-Russian leadership... This was an evil plan to prevent Iran's
active involvement in Karabakh, implemented through the blood of
innocent people.
Ergenekon was behind all of this, but actually, it was Mossad1."
Between November 1991 and February 1992 people of Khojaly sent many
telegrams to Heydar Aliyev, leader of the Nakhichevan Republic,
requesting help to defend the town. In late 1991 Elman Mamedov wanted
to visit H. Aliyev in Nakhichevan and tell him about the problems
of the town's defense. "At that time anybody who uttered H. Aliyev's
name, faced a harsh punishment. But people of Khojaly were not afraid
of that." (Xalg gazeti newspaper, 26.02.1997). H. Aliyev could not
do anything. He only stated: "Bloodshed would be useful for us",
as he also wanted to strike a blow to A. Mutalibov.
Bahman Halilov, a Khojaly resident has been quoted to say: "A few days
before the tragedy the Armenians informed us several times that they
are going to capture the town and demanded that we abandon the town...
We knew that we could not expect help from anyone. We decided to
evacuate as many as possible women, children and elderly people. We
were promised that an urgent military operation is prepared to liberate
Askeran, so as to connect it with Khojaly. All that turned out to
be lies. Thus, Khojaly was sacrificed by the fault of the country's
leadership." (Respublika newspaper, February 26, 1997).
In the February 26, 1997 issue of Azerbaycan newspaper a story told
by police lieutenant Shahid Muradov was published. As the town was
stormed he went to his post wh ere 12 defenders made their stand.
There was shooting going on all over the town and it was necessary to
save the peaceful population. "Our group came to take positions in the
town outskirts and approached to a newly built five-storey residential
building, wh ere we saw 70-80 people hiding there. Battalion commander
Tofik Huseinov's UAZ-465 vehicle was parked near the same building.
The car was full of weapons and ammunition. After talking with
everybody we entered the building, took positions and waited for
the adversary to approach. In the morning of February 26 we saw two
attack helicopters land in Khankendi. Having found out our location
the Armenians demanded us to surrender. We refused and the Armenians
attacked. Nobody wanted to surrender and I took over the command. We
resisted for 12 hours, till the dusk. Dark of the night was what saved
us. In total darkness we went out of the building. The Armenians could
not stop us. We took the peaceful civilians with us and headed to
Agdam. Near Nakhichevanik village we encountered the Armenians. They
told us that if we put down our weapons on the ground and surrender,
they will let us go to Agdam. It was an Armenian trick though. We
knew that if we lay our weapons down they will kill us. That's why
we answered by gunfire to their offer. After that they stood out of
our path and we went to Adam together with the civilians."
It might be assumed that the defenders and residents of that building
thought that Khojaly was not captured by Armenians yet. For this
reason, they stayed in the town on the night February 26 and left
it only on the night of 27th, after realizing that no Azerbaijanis
remained in the town except for themselves.
It is clear from Lieutenant Muradov's story that the soldiers together
with 70-80 local residents left Khojaly on foot on the night of
February 27 and reached unharmed the Agdam district controlled by
Azerbaijani military detachments. They were not shot upon or attacked
by Armenians on their way, which proves that Armenian defense forces
had nothing to do with the deaths of civilians or even Khojaly armed
defenders outside the town and on the territory of Agdam district.
The humanitarian corridor was set from the eastern outskirts of Khojaly
and went along Gar-Gar river to north-east towards Agdam. The corridor
was 120 - 300 meters wide and even wider. The offensive was launched
in four directions, but the encirclement was never complete, as there
were not enough troops for that. Khojaly residents took advantage of
this to flee to Agdam district. All available Armenian defense forces
were deployed to seize Khojaly and the combat ended only by 7am on
February 26. However, some local pockets of resistance remained and
we had no extra forces to act outside the town. The local civilians
fleeing Khojaly and combatants accompanying them were not chased by
our detachments, since there were no free troops to do that and there
was no such intention anyway.
In addition, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense had an attack force
near Agdam city, which was capable of capturing Askeran in mere
hours and break the blockade of Khojaly. Dadash Rzayev, Chief of the
General Staff of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces personally told about
this to Elman Mamedov, head of the executive power and defense of
Khojaly, when he was visiting Baku to discuss strengthening of town
and district defenses. D. Rzayev informed that the operation plan to
break the Khojaly blockade and open communications with Askeran and
Agdam was ready, and in a few days a signal to start the operation
will be received in Khojaly. However, such signal was never sent.
On February 17, 1992 colonel S. Jangirov, deputy chief of the interior
for Karabakh zone presented a report during a meeting of all commanders
of Agdam garrison detachments and forces at Agdam district department
of the interior, talking about a plan for the operation to break
the blockade of Khojaly developed by D. Rzayev. It was planned to
carry out on February 21-25, but was constantly delayed and never
materialized. Under these circumstances the Armenian defense forces
stole a march on Azerbaijanis and captured Khojaly on February 26.
Not a single Armenian warrior would have risked going to the location
of Azerbaijan's Agdam grouping of forces, because it would have simply
been a death journey to him and would have provoked an offensive on
Askeran with consequent breaking of the Khojaly blockade. Armenian
military leadership anticipated that assistance might arrive to the
town defenders from Agdam, Shushi and other Azeri settlements and was
wary about it. For this reason, the Armenian detachments could have
never entered Agdam outskirts controlled by the Azeri troops to kill
peaceful civilians fleeing Khojaly through the humanitarian corridor.
The tragedy was carried out by Azeri armed detachments in outskirts
of Agdam on the territory controlled by Azerbaijan's Armed Forces, wh
ere no Armenian soldier could go, since a large offensive grouping of
forces was located there. The fact that this force was never deployed
into action points to controversies among the president's team and
that in the Azerbaijani Republic's Ministry of Defense there were
PFA supporters who would use any occasion to harm the president. A
ruthless political struggle to take the power was going on in the
country, and to achieve this objective the political opponents spared
no means, including the killing of their own compatriots. Even such
significant politician and manipulator as Heydar Aliyev welcomed
and considered necessary a bloody sacrifice of his own people in the
struggle for power.
Some foreign powers, especially Turkey and Israel were very interested
in the internal political struggle to overthrow the pro-Russian
president A. Mutalibov. For the anti-Russian forces to seize the power
in Azerbaijan it was necessary to discredit the president. This was
possible by blaming him for incompetent command of the Azerbaijani
army in the war against Armenia and for unjustified losses. There
were several scenarios for this, and one of them turned out to be
the tragic events with peaceful Khojaly civilians on the territory of
Agdam district controlled by the Azeri military. After A. Mutalibov
was ousted, the power in the Azerbaijani Republic was overtaken by
pro-Turkish and anti-Russian leaders.
Conclusions
1. Peaceful civilians of Khojaly were shot to death on the territory
of the Agdam district controlled by the Azerbaijani armed forces
and the NKR land adjacent to Agdam district. These forces are fully
responsible for the deaths of civilians.
2. Soldiers of Armenian defense forces have nothing to do with this
tragedy.
1Ð~PÑ~OÑ~BоÐ"Ð"а Ð~PмеÐ"и Ñ~@аÑ~AÑ~AказаÐ"
Ñ~AенÑ~AаÑ~FионнÑ~Kе Ñ~AведениÑ~O о
Ñ~AобÑ~KÑ~BиÑ~OÑ... в ХоджаÐ"Ñ~C: Ð-а вÑ~Aем
Ñ~MÑ~Bим Ñ~AÑ~BоÑ~OÐ"и Â"ÐÑ~@генеконÂ" и
Â"Ð~\оÑ~AÑ~AадÂ",http://www.panorama.am/ru/politics/2011/05/12/imam-ameli/
04.08.12