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  • Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh & Clumsy Policy

    DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
    April 30, 2014 Wednesday



    CONFLICT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND CLUMSY POLICY


    Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 28, 2014, p. 11
    by Vladimir Kazimirov


    NEGOTIATIONS ON REGULATION IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH WILL BE EFFICIENT ONLY
    AFTER THE PARTIES GIVE UP COMBAT OPERATIONS; In September of 1991,
    Russia became an intermediary in the most difficult armed
    Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the first in the USSR. By May 12 of 1994,
    it helped Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh to stop the mass
    bloodshed. The bitter war of almost three years ended with a truce.
    Half a month later, it will have its 20th jubilee.


    The Minsk OSCE group (ambassadors of 11 countries) acted as
    intermediaries since March of 1992 too. Moscow achieved ceasefire both
    independently and in the Minsk group. The truce achieved by Russia
    forced participants of the group to recognize its special role in
    resolving of this conflict and to make it co-chair of the Minsk OSCE
    group (since 1997, these are Russia, US and France).

    Harsh mutual mistrust and maximalism of parties of the conflict do not
    allow solving of the problems still. Periodical aggravations of the
    situation pose a big danger for both nations, for neighboring
    countries and for a very sensitive region. Confirmation of the truce
    for promotion of peaceful regulation by political measures is the most
    important task of parties of the conflict.

    This is first but this is above all because all the rest depends on
    it. The truce is drawn as infinite but this is insufficient. Decades
    of negotiations have proven that as long as a risk of war is not ruled
    out fully their success is not guaranteed and is even doubtful. By
    their attitude the parties deprive themselves of flexibility and
    readiness for search for compromise.

    Consistency and sequence of the steps have huge importance in
    regulation of conflicts at the peak of mistrust. Official Baku
    addressing humanity struggles, first of all, for departure of Armenian
    troops from the territories occupied by them and for return of
    refugees and postpones achievement of peace and resolving of the main
    dispute about status of Nagorno-Karabakh. It even threatens with a new
    war. Why did those who did not wish stopping of combat operations
    contrary to four resolutions of the UN Security Council forget about
    humanism?

    Having moved the frontline further from Nagorno-Karabakh and having
    occupied the shortest positions (this is important for them) and
    having fortified them thoroughly, Armenians do not hurry to leave
    struggling for comprehensive resolving of the conflict: they wish to
    confirm the truce reliable as a path to peace and, of course, to
    determine status of Nagorno-Karabakh as soon as possible. How was the
    problem of sequence formulated in resolutions of the UN Security
    Council? They demanded immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of
    occupation forces but the second was obviously impossible before
    observance of the first demand.

    However, not these resolutions ruined by those who tried to resolve
    the conflict by force served as the basis of the truce. This was the
    most important document of the mediation of Russia, namely the
    statement of the council of the leaders of CIS countries of April 15
    of 1994. In it leaders of the states with personal participation of
    Geidar Aliyev and Levon Ter-Petrosyan outlined only two key statements
    there: 1) not only to cease fire but also to confirm the truce
    reliable; 2) determined the sequence of further actions. The parties
    emphasized specifically that without reliable confirmation of
    ceasefire "it is impossible to transit to liquidation of consequences
    of the traffic confrontation" (withdrawal of troops and repatriation
    of refugees).

    Of course, this is not a legal document but the most important
    political document adopted on the supreme level. For the purpose of
    confirmation of this statement leaders of parliaments of all parties
    of the conflict were gathered in Bishkek between May 4 and 5 of 1994.
    They supported it and called on the parties to cease fire by May 8.
    Delays and tricks of one of the parties forced legalization of the
    truce in a very original way but by May 12 of 1994 the agreement
    acquired full legal force.

    But there is no reliable confirmation of the agreement still! Military
    preparations and militarist rhetoric of Baku are well known, as well
    as its refusal to sign an agreement on non-use of force, evasion of
    separation of troops, a lot of incidents on the line of contact and
    other manifestations of gross forceful clumsy policy. The motto of the
    incumbent authorities of Azerbaijan is, "Not the war but just its
    first stage is over." The authorities hide that Geidar Aliyev has
    advocated resolving of the conflict "by peaceful methods alone."
    Armenians act harshly sometimes too but not so often and, as a rule,
    in response to the steps of Baku. Attempts of President Ilham Aliyev
    to change the procedure of resolving of the conflict radically (to
    regain the land lost in battles without confirmation of a truce before
    this) are not connected with the realistic approach of his father
    expressed on April 15 of 1994 anymore.

    At first glance from outside, the parties seem to be equal: Armenians
    are not praised for retention of occupied territories and Azerbaijanis
    are not praised for demonstrative belligerence and threats. Along with
    this, there is a difference. Problems of occupation and refugees were
    born "the day before yesterday and yesterday" and already became
    reality. They are a little soothed down by 'today" and require
    peaceful solution "tomorrow." Promises to restart the slaughter
    represent the "tomorrow" that makes the entire today harder because of
    apprehensions. That is why it is quite naturally from the
    psychological point of view that what s the most dangerous, that I the
    policy of Baku, is criticized the biggest of all. There are also three
    other reasons.

    First, a new war about Nagorno-Karabakh is absolutely unnecessary and
    dangerous for both nations, Armenian and Azerbaijani, for their
    neighbors and, of course, for Russia.

    Second, fulfillment of officially signed agreements between the
    parties is extremely important. For states, especially the young ones,
    this is a measurement of maturity and reliability as partners. The
    list of non-observance cases and cases of evasion of peacekeeping
    initiatives is obviously unfavorable for Azerbaijan: it ruined four
    resolutions of the UN Security Council, four ceasefire initiatives,
    more than 20 proposals of intermediaries (Armenians scored only four
    cases in total), refusal to separate the troops, ignoring of the
    agreement on strengthening of the ceasefire regime. Is this little?
    Dos this increase confidence in Baku?

    There is also the "third." There the first is from the field of policy
    the second is from the field of law, the third is rather from the
    fouled of morality: unreliability and sometimes lie of propaganda.
    Baku poses and condemns the occupation as problem number one. But it
    is high time to study the reasons of its appearance then and not to
    confine everything to aggressiveness of Armenians. Why there is not a
    single word about obvious mistakes of Abulfaz Elchibey and Geidar
    Aliyev on their stake at force, which resulted in spreading of
    occupation to seven districts? Propaganda of Armenians has faults too
    but authorities there are more accurate and avoid shady arguments. In
    Baku it is possible to hear anything on the highest level: 20% of the
    territory is allegedly occupied, there are reportedly more than 1
    million refugees etc.

    Thus, according to all these parameters official Baku is "beyond
    competition" too. Why should we be surprised that critique is
    addressed mostly to it (and not to Azerbaijani people contrary to what
    Baku would like to show).

    Drawn out negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh will stop skidding only
    after full ruling out of combat operations. Peace for Nagorno-Karabakh
    guaranteed seriously by Azerbaijan, as well as by great powers, would
    change positions of Armenians. They would have to quit the occupied
    land gradually but quicker. Meanwhile, Baku allegedly striving for
    soonest regulation does everything on the opposite: it prolongs the
    status quo contrary to the declared interests.

    Another obstacle in negotiations is unwillingness of Azerbaijan to
    recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as a party of the conflict and hence its
    participant. Along with this, during the years of the war Baku
    contacted Stepanakert more than ten times and signed various documents
    with it (without participation of Yerevan). Nagorno-Karabakh also
    signed three common documents with Azerbaijan and Armenia: the truce,
    the statement of July 27 of 1994 and agreement of February 4 of 1995.
    Without participation of Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations cannot reach
    the final round because its status is the main disputable point of the
    conflict.

    [Translated from Russian]

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