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ANKARA: The Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute After 20 Years By Sabine Freize

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  • ANKARA: The Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute After 20 Years By Sabine Freize

    THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH DISPUTE AFTER 20 YEARS BY SABINE FREIZER*

    Today's Zaman, Turkey
    May 13 2014

    May 12, 2014, Monday/ 16:53:31

    Twenty years ago, Armenians and Azerbaijanis signed a ceasefire to
    silence the artillery in Nagorno-Karabakh.

    But since May 12, 1994, almost none of the subsequent steps have
    strengthened that peace; the sides are still far from agreement on
    a comprehensive settlement.

    Instead, especially in the past few years, the number of people being
    killed along the frontlines has risen. Some 30 persons a year are the
    victims of snipers, shelling and mines. The Armenian and Azerbaijani
    military budgets are increasing. Baku, in particular, has raised its
    military budget from $175 million when President Ilham Aliyev was
    inaugurated to $3.7 billion in 2013. The situation in Ukraine, and
    particularly Russia's annexation of Crimea, is making the resolution
    of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict even more elusive.

    For Azerbaijan, non-resolution of the conflict means that 14 percent of
    its territory remains occupied and 600,000 Azerbaijanis are displaced,
    the vast majority of whom are from lands around Nagorno-Karabakh
    and not from the entity itself. In Nagorno-Karabakh, the local
    population of between 90,000-150,000 feels increasingly secure of its
    independence, but not of its security. Armenia is ever more dependent
    on Russia and its long land borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey are
    sealed shut to trade and travel.

    For the past 20 years, the Organization for Security and Co-operation
    in Europe (OSCE) has been mediating talks between the Azerbaijani and
    Armenian leadership through the OSCE Minsk Group, chaired by Russian,
    US and French representatives. They mainly focus on trying to resolve
    the conflict between Azerbaijan's sovereignty and the right to maintain
    its territorial integrity, and the Armenian demand that the majority
    ethnic Armenian population of Karabakh be able to determine how they
    are governed -- a demand shifting over time from unification with
    Armenia to the establishment of their own state. Calls to change the
    format of the international negotiations or to drop international
    mediation altogether are becoming more persistent in the absence
    of progress.

    Since 2005, the parties have come closer to agreeing on the elements of
    what is now a "well-established" compromise. These "basic principles"
    are based on three fundamental components: the non-use of force,
    territorial integrity and the right to self-determination. They
    include six elements: the return of the occupied Azerbaijani
    territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh; an interim status for
    Nagorno-Karabakh guaranteeing security and self-governance; a
    corridor linking Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia; eventual determination
    of Nagorno-Karabakh's status by a legally binding expression of will;
    the right of all internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to
    return; and international security guarantees, including a peacekeeping
    operation.

    But the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia remain unable to finalize
    the deal. Part of the problem is that they fear the public backlash
    that would occur if they are viewed by their societies as making any
    compromise. Confidence is in short supply in the region. Divisions
    between the two societies keep growing, as the generations that
    remember easy co-existence during the Soviet period get older and are
    replaced by generations that have been schooled in an atmosphere of
    hate and distrust of the other side.

    In their ceasefire anniversary statement, the OSCE Minsk Group
    co-chairs point out: "... a settlement will not be possible without a
    basis of trust and understanding between the Armenian and Azerbaijani
    people. We call on the sides to commit to active people to people
    programs and security confidence building measures to reinforce the
    peace process."(http://www.osce.org/mg/118419)

    Thankfully, in the shadows of the official negotiation process
    and the overall deterioration in people-to-people relations,
    Azerbaijani and Armenian civil society groups have been taking
    part in far-ranging dialogue on issues of common concern. Since
    June 2010, much of this has been facilitated by international NGOs
    within the European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the
    Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK; www.epnk.org), an initiative
    funded by the European Union. Meetings have involved women, youth,
    journalists and expert groups -- from Armenia and Azerbaijan,
    as well as Nagorno-Karabakh. Through these meetings, at least some
    people have been able to see beyond the hate rhetoric voiced by their
    media and politicians. They have even debated difficult topics like
    Nagorno-Karabakh's ultimate status, considering the real differences
    between the options of autonomy and independence

    The past 20 years of negotiations show that peace between
    Azerbaijan and Armenia cannot be made in closed rooms between the
    countries' presidents. A much greater involvement of society is
    needed. But Baku and Yerevan are not doing enough to support these
    second-track efforts. Instead, Azerbaijan's arrest of journalist
    Rauf Mirkadyrov, immediately after he was deported from Turkey
    and the investigation of peacebuilding activists Arif and Leyla
    Yunus, allegedly for espionage for Armenia, when in fact the three
    are engaged in a civil society project called Public Dialogues
    (http://www.publicdialogues.info/en/about-us), makes people-to-people
    confidence-building even more difficult.

    Events in Ukraine contribute to the sense of hopelessness. The blatant
    violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, signed between the US, the
    UK and Russia to provide Ukraine with security guarantees if it turned
    over its nuclear arsenal, makes it unlikely today that Armenia will
    accept similar guarantees in exchange for the territories it occupies.

    After Russia's overt takeover of Crimea, it is also less likely
    that international opinion will heed the four United Nations
    Security Council (UNSC) resolutions passed in 1993 that call for the
    withdrawal of local Armenian troops from Azerbaijani lands. Crimea
    also demonstrates to Azerbaijan how it could navigate a quick military
    operation to regain lost territory with only limited international
    opposition. Russia, driven by its nationalist imperialist foreign
    policy, has little interest in helping to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh
    conflict, which secures its key role in the region by keeping the
    Caucasus from being an open and free transit route for Western
    interests.

    Twenty years ago, the withdrawal of troops, the return of refugees
    and the deployment of peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh looked like
    the next logical steps after the signature of the ceasefire. None of
    this occurred. Instead, as the OSCE Minsk Group concludes, "the sides
    have shown little willingness to take advantage of the opportunities
    ... or make the political decisions necessary for progress in this
    peace process." Today, the prospect of renewed fighting, which this
    time could have a regional dimension and pull in Russia and Turkey,
    seems more likely than ever since 1994.

    *Dr. Sabine Freizer is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

    http://www.todayszaman.com/news-347597-the-nagorno-karabakh-dispute-after-20-years-by-sabine-freizer-.html

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