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  • Heiko Langner: "It is better to put bets on the 'Moscow card' in

    Vestnik Kavkaza, Russia
    Sept 2 2014

    Heiko Langner: "It is better to put bets on the 'Moscow card' in
    resolution of the Karabakh conflict

    2 September 2014 - 12:38pm

    Interview by Orkhan Sattarov, the head of the European Bureau of Vestnik Kavkaza



    A few days ago, the California State Senate passed a resolution
    recognizing the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. The resolution
    project was presented in January and actively promoted by senators
    Mike Gatto, Kevin de Leon and Tom Berryhill. Many experts believe that
    the document does not correspond to the U.S. approach to the
    Nagorno-Karabakh peace process and was passed under pressure from
    powerful lobbyists in the state. Heiko Langner, a German expert in
    Berlin, expressed his opinion about the developments.



    - Mr. Langner, how would you comment on the decision of the California
    Senate? Does it undermine the peacekeeping role of the U.S. in the
    Nagorno-Karabakh settlement?

    - It is not the first such resolution passed by one American state or
    another. Before the decision of the California Senate, there had been
    similar decrees of the House of Representatives or senates of such
    states as Maine, Louisiana and Rhode Island. This is first of all
    associated with the successful campaign of the pro-Armenian lobby
    groups that not only representatives of the Armenian diaspora belong
    to. You should bear in mind that the U.S., despite or due to internal
    social differences, often bases its policy on Christian identity or
    missionary work. Even a superpower needs some ideological
    justification for its own policy, whether it is Christian values,
    democracy or human rights. Christian solidarity as an ideological
    motive plays an important role in passing such resolutions.

    In this particular case, I suppose that the main role was played by
    the influence of the Armenian diaspora. Over 40% of Americans of
    Armenian origin live in California, mainly in Los Angeles. The
    Armenian diaspora settled there is undeniably the most important
    economic factor, so it has colossal opportunities to affect
    Californian policy.

    The passing of the resolution, according to American laws, cannot be
    repealed (its rationality, in political terms, is a different
    question). For the U.S. foreign policy, however, such resolutions had
    had almost no value until recently. American foreign policy is defined
    by the administration in Washington, not states. Diplomatic
    recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state by the
    administration of Barack Obama is not expected. Just as it is not
    expected in Russia, though Armenia, as a military ally of Russia,
    would certainly want it.

    The geostrategic interests of both world states, Russia and the U.S.,
    in the two South Caucasus republics are so great that they will not
    pick one of the sides of the conflict. At the same time, this does not
    stop Moscow and Washington from secretly or explicitly providing
    financial or military aid to one or even both sides of the conflict,
    without recognizing the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. For example,
    it is well-known that Russia, despite its military alliance with
    Armenia, is far ahead in supplying Azerbaijan with weapons. That is
    how the policy of the superpowers has been functioning so far.

    - Although the U.S. co-chairs the OSCE Minsk Group, it is the only
    country in the world that provides direct financial aid to the
    unrecognized regime in Nagorno-Karabakh. Besides, the Section 907 of
    the Freedom Support Act, according to which Azerbaijan is considered
    the aggressor in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, is still in force.
    What are the reasons for such a position of the U.S. and how can
    American policy be characterized in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?

    - It is a fair and important question. The passing of Section 907, in
    its time, was to a decisive extent conditioned by the major political
    influence of the Armenian diaspora in the U.S. The section is a
    sanction instrument aimed against countries that have not found favour
    with Washington for some reason. But that does not explain why the
    section has not been repealed. It should have been repealed in 1993,
    when the Armenian armed formations in Nagorno-Karabakh started taking
    over the 7 surrounding districts of the enclave and systematically
    driving out the Azerbaijani population and supporting the Armenian
    Armed Forces. An onlooker should have figured by that moment that the
    Armenian side had fully switched from defensive to offensive, although
    it had not always been defending before.

    But Section 907 could not stop the economic development of Azerbaijan
    or the modernization of its army. Its practical consequences have
    never been especially essential. At the same time, the existence of
    the section demonstrates the absolute inefficiency of the U.S. as a
    mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

    For many years, the U.S. has practically subjected Azerbaijan to
    sanctions. It was happening despite the fact that, being mediators in
    the conflict, the Americans, of course, were also supposed to
    represent Azerbaijani interests so as to back a compromise decision.
    U.S. policy in the South Caucasus is hypocritical and this can clearly
    be seen in its double standards. For example, Washington has been
    providing state financial assistance to the de facto unrecognized
    regime in Nagorno-Karabakh, in addition to the financial assistance to
    Armenia allowed by international law. This should be interpreted as
    tendentious support for the Armenian side of the conflict. Thus, the
    U.S. sends a political message: "Although we do not recognize you
    officially, we help you directly." The Kremlin has never dared do that
    yet. In other words, the U.S. is not an impartial mediator.

    Besides, the U.S. and Russia, formally being equal co-chairs of the
    OSCE Minsk Group, have been pursuing contrary interests, not since the
    start of the Ukrainian conflict, but earlier. Moscow and Washington
    have strong geopolitical differences in the South Caucasus Region.
    Consequently, a fair question appears: how can the co-chairs of the
    OSCE Minsk Group mediate in resolving the conflict if they are
    dissociated on the issue?

    In my opinion, bets should be put on the 'Moscow card' in the
    resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Russia is the 'first
    among equals' in the trio of co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, to
    which France belongs as well. Considering the balance of interests,
    the Kremlin has an equidistant policy regarding both sides of the
    conflict. This creates better prerequisites for a hopeful compromise
    decision.

    - The unrecognized Karabakh authorities declared plans to settle about
    200 Yazidi Kurd families, that fled Iraq from the terrorists of the
    Islamic State, in Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding occupied districts.
    How do such plans correspond to international law, and does Azerbaijan
    have any means to prevent their realization?

    - The strategy is not new. The de facto authorities in
    Nagorno-Karabakh settled Armenian refugees, though a small group, from
    Syria some time ago. At this moment, 35 Armenian families from Syria
    (about 130 people in total) live on the occupied territories, mainly
    in the 'corridor districts' of Kalbajar and Lachin. To be just, it
    must be noted that the Republic of Armenia has not assisted in
    settling foreign refugees in Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding
    districts. Maybe the Karabakh regime is acting on its own in the
    issue.

    Plans to settle Yazidi Kurds from Iraq are not a coincidence. Before
    the start of the Karabakh war, the Yazidi and Muslim Kurds had mostly
    lived in Kalbajar and Lachin. In the earlier Soviet period, the region
    had been called 'Red Kurdistan' and had had the status of a separate
    administrative unit as part of the Azerbaijani SSR for some time.
    After the fall of the USSR and the Armenian occupation of the
    territories, the Yazidi Kurds (the ones that wanted) managed to stay.
    Since Kurds have often been discriminated against in Muslim states or,
    as in Iraq today, terrorized and being exterminated by ISIS, the de
    facto regime in Nagorno-Karabakh, following the logic 'the enemy of my
    enemy is my friend,' obviously considers them natural allies and a
    demographic resource. The unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh regime hopes
    to gain support in its efforts to achieve diplomatic recognition by
    the international community, trying to position itself as a
    responsible actor offering refuge to groups of people in humanitarian
    crisis. The Karabakh regime has everything spinning about the issue of
    its recognition.

    Mass international support for the citizens of Iraq is needed, but the
    districts occupied by Armenians are an inappropriate and unsafe
    territory for refugees. There are better opportunities for that.
    Besides, the unauthorized settling of refugees by the Nagorno-Karabakh
    regime is a fundamental violation of international law. According to
    the fourth Geneva Convention, occupying forces are not allow to make
    any changes that would complicate or prevent the return of former
    residents to their places. An active settlement policy is the case
    described in the convention. The correct and first addressee for
    settlement of the problem is certainly the OSCE Minsk Group. Moreover,
    the UN could have assisted with it. Finally, the issue could have been
    resolved within the framework of a confidential talk between Ilham
    Aliyev and Vladimir Putin, especially considering the full mutual
    understanding and respect between the two presidents. It should be
    recalled that the launch of the airport near Khojaly in
    Nagorno-Karabakh has not yet happened. It would have been a threat to
    the peace process. Moscow does not need new active military trouble
    spots.


    http://vestnikkavkaza.net/interviews/politics/59528.html




    From: A. Papazian
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