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  • The Caucasian Talk Circle

    THE CAUCASIAN TALK CIRCLE

    Project Syndicate
    Oct 3 2014

    by Vartan Oskanian

    YEREVAN - The Caucasus is among the world's most divided and incoherent
    regions. Its three republics - Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia -
    failed to learn from similarly linked groups of countries, such as
    the Benelux countries and the Baltic states, which, despite their
    historical grievances and political differences, united to achieve
    their common goals of stability, prosperity, and democracy. Is it
    too late for the Caucasus to change course?

    To be sure, when the Russian Empire disintegrated after World War
    I, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia formed a confederation to face
    the threats posed by Turkish encroachment from the west, and Soviet
    incursions from the north. But, after a few months, each went its own
    way as an independent state. Two years later, all were absorbed into
    the Soviet Union.

    In 1991, when all three became independent again, similar proposals
    of confederation and union were floated. Nothing of the sort was
    realized. What divides these countries today is not religion,
    ethnicity, culture, history, or traditions; it is the differing
    visions, prospects, ambitions, convictions, and aspirations that they
    espouse and pursue.

    To the extent that political and economic institutions determine
    the nature of a region's international role, the Caucasus is more
    comparable to the counties bordering North Africa than the Baltics
    or Old Europe. Its political systems are unstable; its economies are
    more oligarchical than liberal; territorial disputes are resolved by
    force; and its foreign-policy vectors point in different directions.

    Of the three, Georgia is the most democratic. The fact that its people
    have twice forced a change of government - first through the 2003 Rose
    Revolution, which imposed the popular will on an unelected government,
    and then again last year through the ballot box - has given them a
    sense of empowerment.

    For their part, Armenians came close to forcing a change of government
    through street protests on three occasions - but failed each time. No
    election since independence has brought a change of government.

    And, in Azerbaijan, no serious attempt to change the government has
    been made. Indeed, power has simply been transferred dynastically,
    from Heydar Aliyev to his son, Ilham Aliyev, who, after assuming office
    in 2003, amended the constitution to make himself President for Life.

    These contrasting experiences have led to starkly different -
    and dangerously divisive - foreign-policy approaches. In terms of
    security, Georgia aspires to NATO membership; Armenia is a member of
    the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization; and Azerbaijan
    maintains strong security arrangements with Turkey and Israel, while
    purchasing modern military hardware from Russia.

    Likewise, Georgia recently signed an Association Agreement with the
    European Union, while committing to economic and institutional reforms
    that will strengthen the country's ability to take on the body of
    EU law. Armenia has indicated its readiness to join the Russian-led
    Eurasian Union, along with Belarus and Kazakhstan, and has already
    formed a customs union with these countries. Azerbaijan has stayed
    away from both.

    Regardless of the nature of its formal relations with each of the
    three republics, Russia casts a long shadow over the Caucasus.

    Whatever these countries decide, they must remain cognizant of the
    "Russia factor," the perceived significance of which inevitably
    influences their foreign-policy orientation and priorities.

    Georgia views Russia as its main adversary, despite its own
    contribution to the two countries' mutual animosity. But its leaders
    should recognize that eventual integration into European security and
    economic structures cannot fully compensate for the absence of any
    relations with Russia. If Georgia is to prosper in a sustainable way,
    it must build normal bilateral ties.

    Until then, Armenia's options will remain limited. For Armenia, Russia
    is a strategic partner by choice, while Georgia is a geopolitical
    partner by default. Russia is a hugely important country for Armenia;
    Georgia is slightly more important. When bad weather shuts down the
    Lars passage between Georgia and Russia - which is also Armenia's
    land link to Russia -Armenia suffers. If the Georgia-Armenia border
    closes down, Armenia chokes.

    That is why Armenia's key geopolitical challenge is not so much
    normalizing relations with its neighbors as preventing those neighbors
    from ganging up against it. Here, Georgia's rejection of the highly
    lucrative economic, energy, and financial incentives offered by Turkey
    and Azerbaijan to isolate Armenia is crucially important.

    Azerbaijan views Russia as a partner with which it can bargain,
    particularly in the strategic energy games being played by Russia
    and Europe. What the Aliyev government has not recognized is that,
    by signing off on several gas pipelines to Europe, Azerbaijan has
    largely relinquished its bargaining chips. Stability and prosperity
    in Azerbaijan will require Aliyev to stop depending exclusively
    on energy exports - and to help bring an end to the longstanding
    Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azeris and Armenians.

    In the Caucasus, nostalgia for the security, predictability, and
    economic benefits of the Cold War era is not a guide to wise policy.

    But blind belief in Western alternatives, which sometimes seem like
    a panacea for the region's security and economic challenges offers
    no solution, either. If all three countries considered realistically
    what is possible under the current circumstances, they would recognize
    that a cooperative, unified approach would be best for everyone.

    Unfortunately, political leaders - particularly in autocratic systems -
    often do not identify their countries' best interests with their own.

    http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/caucasus-contrasting-foreign-policies-by-vartan-oskanian-2014-10



    From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
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