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AFTER UKRAINE, RUSSIA BEEFS UP MILITARY IN ARMENIA AND KYRGYZSTAN
Silk Road Reporters
Oct 24 2014
Published by John C. K. Daly
October 24, 2014
For years Russia has complained about what they describe as NATO's
expansion eastward. Noted diplomat-historian George F. Kennan in 1997
clearly foresaw the consequences of such actions when in 1997 he wrote
in a newspaper commentary, "Expanding NATO would be the most fateful
error of American policy in the post-Cold War era. Such a decision
may be expected... to impel Russian foreign policy in directions
decidedly not to our liking."
The 1997 NATO Madrid Summit invited the first countries of the former
Warsaw Pact - the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland - to join the
alliance. Worse for Moscow was to follow. At the NATO Nov. 2002 Prague
Summit, not only were former Warsaw Pact members Bulgaria, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia invited to begin accession talks, but former USSR
republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well. NATO membership for
both Georgia and Ukraine has been discussed at subsequent summits,
and at the most recent summit held in Britain Sept. 4-5 NATO's web
page noted that the alliance "increased support to Ukraine in the wake
of the crisis with Russia" and "continued condemnation of Russia's
illegal and illegitimate 'annexation' of Crimea and destabilization
of Eastern Ukraine."
For better or worse, the Ukrainian crisis, which began late last year,
has worsened Russian-Western relations to their lowest level since the
1991 breakup of the USSR. Russia has now belatedly begun to push back,
strengthening its bilateral relations with a number of post-Soviet
republics and using both the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO - current membership Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia and Tajikistan, observer states - Afghanistan and Serbia)
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO - member states China,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; observer
states - Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan; Dialogue
Partners - Belarus, Sri Lanka and Turkey; guests - the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] and the Commonwealth of Independent
States [CIS]) to increase its Eurasian military capabilities.
On Oct. 15 Colonel General Viktor Bondarev, head of the Russian
air force, briefed reporters on Moscow's intention to accelerate
efforts to create a CSTO unified air defense network in response to
the Ukrainian crisis reenergized NATO.
The plans outlined by Bondarev indicate that NATO's intensifying
of activities on Russia's periphery rather than cowing the Kremlin
are instead leading to "impel Russian foreign policy in directions
decidedly not to our liking." Bondarev stated that within Russia
"By 2020... 47 airfields, including in Crimea and in the Arctic,
will be renovated under the state armaments program," adding that by
2025 the Russian air force will have restored and reopened over 100
military airbases.
Outlining plans outside Russia, negotiations with Vietnam, Cuba,
Venezuela and Nicaragua to establish bases for Russian strategic
bombers continue.
Even before the conflict in Ukraine erupted, in 2013 Russian
fighters were deployed to the Belarus Baranovichi airbase as part
of the countries' integrated regional air defense network and Russia
announced that it would station fighter aircraft at a Russian-built
airbase in Lida, Belarus, near the border with Poland and Lithuania.
Bondarev announced that the Russian air force now plans to establish
a new airbase in the Belarusian city of Babruysk, which will be home
to a squadron of Russian Su-27 fighters. As Belarus shares frontiers
with NATO members Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, Moscow's message
could hardly be more clear.
It is in Russian aviation deployments further afield in the post-Soviet
Caucasus and Central Asia CSTO member states that NATO will be unable
to mount substantive countermeasures. In the Caucasus, Russian-Armenian
relations have been fairly stable throughout the post-1991 era,
with security and economics being the main areas of cooperation. As
Azerbaijan has drifted over the last two decades into the Western
orbit because of its energy wealth, Armenia has remained firmly allied
to Russia, with the two nations emphasizing Russian involvement in
negotiating a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh struggle
as a co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group, which has been mediating
the broader Azeri-Armenian conflict since March 1992.
Given the strained nature of its relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey,
Armenia sees military-political cooperation with Russia as an essential
element of its security and defense policy. Besides Russian military
bases in Armenia, Russian border guards assist Armenia in protecting
its borders with Turkey and Iran. Armenia is an active CSTO member,
the only member of the CSTO in the South Caucasus. Russia is also
Armenia's main investor, with its total exceeding $3 billion through
2012, mainly in the energy and communications sectors.
Underlining Russia's deep involvement in Armenia's transport sector,
a Feb. 2008 agreement between the Russian and Armenian governments
transferred Armenian Railways to Russian Railways' subsidiary, South
Caucasus Railways for 30 years. The agreement committed the Russians
to investing $230 million in Armenia during the first five years of
operations and subsequently an additional $240 million.
Armenia also purchases natural gas from Russia at preferential rates,
with only Belarus receiving a better price.
In the wake of deteriorating Western-Russian relations over Ukraine,
the Russian air force is upgrading the Soviet-era Erebuni airbase
in Armenia, which houses the Russian 3624th Air Base and currently
hosts a squadron of MiG-29 fighters and Mi-24 attack helicopters. As
the Ukrainian crisis deepened, in Jan. the Russian Southern Military
District press service confirmed that a contingent of Mi-24P attack
helicopters, Mi-8MT and Mi-8SMV military transport helicopters were
scheduled for deployment at Erebuni later in the year. Underlining
Russia's strengthening presence in Armenia, 3,000 Russian and Armenian
military personnel from Erebuni and other facilities on Oct. 13-19
held military preparedness joint exercises, which included Erebuni
MiG-29s, at Armenia's Kamhud and Alagyaz training facilities.
Besides Erebuni, the Russian 102nd Military Base is in the Armenian
city of Gyumri. In stark contrast to Ukraine's years-long haggling
with Russia over the terms of its lease of Sevastopol for the Black
Sea Fleet, in Aug. 2010, Russia and Armenia agreed to prolong the
Gyumri lease agreement until 2044.
Russia provides Armenia with armaments, investment and political
support, for which Armenia reciprocates by providing territory
for Russian military base deployment, thereby contributing to the
preservation of Russia's presence in the South Caucasus. Since the
Ukrainian crisis erupted, Russia's strengthening of its military
presence in Armenia sends a strong message to neighboring NATO member
Turkey, as well as NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) associates Georgia
and Azerbaijan.
Farther east, Bondarev noted that Russia is negotiating with Kyrgyzstan
to reconstruct the Kant airbase outside the capital Bishkek to support
Russian strategic bombers, which currently houses a Russian fighter
squadron under CSTO auspices.
In many ways Kyrgyzstan and its air bases represents the height of
the more than decade-old shadow "Great Game" conflict for Central Asia
between Russia and the West, which began in earnest after the Sept.
11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S, after which Washington sought
military access to Central Asia to mount military operations against
the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
The U.S. by the end of the year had acquired air bases at both
Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan and Manas in Kyrgyzstan, only to lose
them later through inept foreign policy. The U.S.-Uzbekistan Status
of Forces Agreement (SOFA), signed Oct. 6, 2001, less than a month
after the 9-11 attacks, permitted the U.S. to station up to 1,500 U.S.
troops at the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) airbase 90 miles north of the
Afghan border. The following month, the Manas airbase was established
on Dec. 4, 2001, under the joint Kyrgyz-U.S. SOFA.
The Pentagon selected Manas above Kyrgyzstan's other 52 airports
because its 14,000-foot runway, originally built for Soviet bombers,
could be utilized by USAF C-5 Galaxy cargo planes and 747s to support
Operation Enduring Freedom. In contrast, Russia's Kant airbase,
12 miles outside Bishkek Kant and just 20 miles from Manas, was
established in Oct. 2003, nearly two years later, its first military
base outside the Russian Federation since the 1991 collapse of
the USSR.
In 2013, as events in Ukraine deteriorated, on Oct. 27 Russian air
force commander Viktor Sevastianov, visiting Kant to mark the 10th
anniversary of its founding, announced that the number of planes based
at Kant, then consisting of 10 Sukhoi fighters, two Mi-8 helicopters
and roughly a dozen other transport and training airplanes "will
at least double by this December." The previous month Russia and
Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement allowing the Russian air forces
to continue operations at Kant until 2032 with possible five-year
extensions, in exchange for Moscow's writing off $500 million in
Kyrgyz debt.
On July 29, 2005, due to Washington's mixed diplomatic signals
straining relations over the May 2005 tragedy in Andijan, Uzbekistan,
under the terms of the SOFA Uzbekistan told the U.S. to vacate K2,
which was completed in Nov. 2005.
After the departure of U.S. forces from Uzbekistan, Manas, 400 miles
and 90-minutes flying time to Afghanistan, became the main hub for
U.S. operations in Afghanistan, processing more than 5.3 million U.S.
servicemen, 98 percent of all military personnel involved in Operation
Enduring Freedom, with 1,200 U.S. servicemen performing aerial
refueling, personnel and 42,000 cargo airlift missions, according to
Colonel John Millard, commander of the 376th Air Expeditionary Wing
and Manas base head.
But Washington's inept policies towards Kyrgyzstan eventually soured
bilateral relations over Manas. Kyrgyz complaints included inadequate
rent, corrupt fuel contracts and environmental concerns. Things came to
a head on Dec. 6, 2006, when 20year-old U.S. soldier Zachary Hatfield
shot and killed 42 year-old Kyrgyz Aleksandr Ivanov, an ethnic Russian
Kyrgyz, at the airbase's entry gate. Ivanov worked for Aerocraft Petrol
Management, which provided fuel services for Kyrgyz and international
civilian aircraft. Hatfield maintained that he fired in self-defense
after Ivanov approached him with a knife. Despite promises to make
Hatfield available to the Kyrgyz judicial system, the Pentagon whisked
him out of the country, greatly angering the Kyrgyz population.
In addition, Russia was offering various forms of financial assistance
and soft loans which went unmatched by Washington, deeply mired in
its dealings with corrupt President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who in April
2010 in the face of massive demonstrations fled the country. On
Nov. 8 2011, newly elected President Almazbek Atambayev announced
that he would close Manas when its lease ran out in 2014. On June 3,
2014 American troops vacated the base and it was handed back.
Not surprisingly, in the wake of NATO's expansion and Western protests
over Ukraine, Russia is shoring up its military and economic presence
in the post-Soviet space where possible, whether through bilateral
arrangements or multilateral organizations such as CSTO. Given
that on Oct. 10 Armenia joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) of
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, launching on Jan. 1, 2015, which is
dominated by the sheer weight of the Russian economy and Kyrgyzstan
has applied as well, it seems certain only that Western influence in
the Caucasus and Central Asia, particularly in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan
can only diminish further, even as NATO steps up its patrols around
Russia's borders.
Dr. John C. K. Daly is a non-resident Fellow at the Johns Hopkins
Central Asia Caucasus Institute in Washington DC.
http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2014/10/24/ukraine-russia-beefs-military-armenia-kyrgyzstan/
Silk Road Reporters
Oct 24 2014
Published by John C. K. Daly
October 24, 2014
For years Russia has complained about what they describe as NATO's
expansion eastward. Noted diplomat-historian George F. Kennan in 1997
clearly foresaw the consequences of such actions when in 1997 he wrote
in a newspaper commentary, "Expanding NATO would be the most fateful
error of American policy in the post-Cold War era. Such a decision
may be expected... to impel Russian foreign policy in directions
decidedly not to our liking."
The 1997 NATO Madrid Summit invited the first countries of the former
Warsaw Pact - the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland - to join the
alliance. Worse for Moscow was to follow. At the NATO Nov. 2002 Prague
Summit, not only were former Warsaw Pact members Bulgaria, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia invited to begin accession talks, but former USSR
republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well. NATO membership for
both Georgia and Ukraine has been discussed at subsequent summits,
and at the most recent summit held in Britain Sept. 4-5 NATO's web
page noted that the alliance "increased support to Ukraine in the wake
of the crisis with Russia" and "continued condemnation of Russia's
illegal and illegitimate 'annexation' of Crimea and destabilization
of Eastern Ukraine."
For better or worse, the Ukrainian crisis, which began late last year,
has worsened Russian-Western relations to their lowest level since the
1991 breakup of the USSR. Russia has now belatedly begun to push back,
strengthening its bilateral relations with a number of post-Soviet
republics and using both the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO - current membership Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia and Tajikistan, observer states - Afghanistan and Serbia)
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO - member states China,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; observer
states - Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan; Dialogue
Partners - Belarus, Sri Lanka and Turkey; guests - the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] and the Commonwealth of Independent
States [CIS]) to increase its Eurasian military capabilities.
On Oct. 15 Colonel General Viktor Bondarev, head of the Russian
air force, briefed reporters on Moscow's intention to accelerate
efforts to create a CSTO unified air defense network in response to
the Ukrainian crisis reenergized NATO.
The plans outlined by Bondarev indicate that NATO's intensifying
of activities on Russia's periphery rather than cowing the Kremlin
are instead leading to "impel Russian foreign policy in directions
decidedly not to our liking." Bondarev stated that within Russia
"By 2020... 47 airfields, including in Crimea and in the Arctic,
will be renovated under the state armaments program," adding that by
2025 the Russian air force will have restored and reopened over 100
military airbases.
Outlining plans outside Russia, negotiations with Vietnam, Cuba,
Venezuela and Nicaragua to establish bases for Russian strategic
bombers continue.
Even before the conflict in Ukraine erupted, in 2013 Russian
fighters were deployed to the Belarus Baranovichi airbase as part
of the countries' integrated regional air defense network and Russia
announced that it would station fighter aircraft at a Russian-built
airbase in Lida, Belarus, near the border with Poland and Lithuania.
Bondarev announced that the Russian air force now plans to establish
a new airbase in the Belarusian city of Babruysk, which will be home
to a squadron of Russian Su-27 fighters. As Belarus shares frontiers
with NATO members Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, Moscow's message
could hardly be more clear.
It is in Russian aviation deployments further afield in the post-Soviet
Caucasus and Central Asia CSTO member states that NATO will be unable
to mount substantive countermeasures. In the Caucasus, Russian-Armenian
relations have been fairly stable throughout the post-1991 era,
with security and economics being the main areas of cooperation. As
Azerbaijan has drifted over the last two decades into the Western
orbit because of its energy wealth, Armenia has remained firmly allied
to Russia, with the two nations emphasizing Russian involvement in
negotiating a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh struggle
as a co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group, which has been mediating
the broader Azeri-Armenian conflict since March 1992.
Given the strained nature of its relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey,
Armenia sees military-political cooperation with Russia as an essential
element of its security and defense policy. Besides Russian military
bases in Armenia, Russian border guards assist Armenia in protecting
its borders with Turkey and Iran. Armenia is an active CSTO member,
the only member of the CSTO in the South Caucasus. Russia is also
Armenia's main investor, with its total exceeding $3 billion through
2012, mainly in the energy and communications sectors.
Underlining Russia's deep involvement in Armenia's transport sector,
a Feb. 2008 agreement between the Russian and Armenian governments
transferred Armenian Railways to Russian Railways' subsidiary, South
Caucasus Railways for 30 years. The agreement committed the Russians
to investing $230 million in Armenia during the first five years of
operations and subsequently an additional $240 million.
Armenia also purchases natural gas from Russia at preferential rates,
with only Belarus receiving a better price.
In the wake of deteriorating Western-Russian relations over Ukraine,
the Russian air force is upgrading the Soviet-era Erebuni airbase
in Armenia, which houses the Russian 3624th Air Base and currently
hosts a squadron of MiG-29 fighters and Mi-24 attack helicopters. As
the Ukrainian crisis deepened, in Jan. the Russian Southern Military
District press service confirmed that a contingent of Mi-24P attack
helicopters, Mi-8MT and Mi-8SMV military transport helicopters were
scheduled for deployment at Erebuni later in the year. Underlining
Russia's strengthening presence in Armenia, 3,000 Russian and Armenian
military personnel from Erebuni and other facilities on Oct. 13-19
held military preparedness joint exercises, which included Erebuni
MiG-29s, at Armenia's Kamhud and Alagyaz training facilities.
Besides Erebuni, the Russian 102nd Military Base is in the Armenian
city of Gyumri. In stark contrast to Ukraine's years-long haggling
with Russia over the terms of its lease of Sevastopol for the Black
Sea Fleet, in Aug. 2010, Russia and Armenia agreed to prolong the
Gyumri lease agreement until 2044.
Russia provides Armenia with armaments, investment and political
support, for which Armenia reciprocates by providing territory
for Russian military base deployment, thereby contributing to the
preservation of Russia's presence in the South Caucasus. Since the
Ukrainian crisis erupted, Russia's strengthening of its military
presence in Armenia sends a strong message to neighboring NATO member
Turkey, as well as NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) associates Georgia
and Azerbaijan.
Farther east, Bondarev noted that Russia is negotiating with Kyrgyzstan
to reconstruct the Kant airbase outside the capital Bishkek to support
Russian strategic bombers, which currently houses a Russian fighter
squadron under CSTO auspices.
In many ways Kyrgyzstan and its air bases represents the height of
the more than decade-old shadow "Great Game" conflict for Central Asia
between Russia and the West, which began in earnest after the Sept.
11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S, after which Washington sought
military access to Central Asia to mount military operations against
the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
The U.S. by the end of the year had acquired air bases at both
Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan and Manas in Kyrgyzstan, only to lose
them later through inept foreign policy. The U.S.-Uzbekistan Status
of Forces Agreement (SOFA), signed Oct. 6, 2001, less than a month
after the 9-11 attacks, permitted the U.S. to station up to 1,500 U.S.
troops at the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) airbase 90 miles north of the
Afghan border. The following month, the Manas airbase was established
on Dec. 4, 2001, under the joint Kyrgyz-U.S. SOFA.
The Pentagon selected Manas above Kyrgyzstan's other 52 airports
because its 14,000-foot runway, originally built for Soviet bombers,
could be utilized by USAF C-5 Galaxy cargo planes and 747s to support
Operation Enduring Freedom. In contrast, Russia's Kant airbase,
12 miles outside Bishkek Kant and just 20 miles from Manas, was
established in Oct. 2003, nearly two years later, its first military
base outside the Russian Federation since the 1991 collapse of
the USSR.
In 2013, as events in Ukraine deteriorated, on Oct. 27 Russian air
force commander Viktor Sevastianov, visiting Kant to mark the 10th
anniversary of its founding, announced that the number of planes based
at Kant, then consisting of 10 Sukhoi fighters, two Mi-8 helicopters
and roughly a dozen other transport and training airplanes "will
at least double by this December." The previous month Russia and
Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement allowing the Russian air forces
to continue operations at Kant until 2032 with possible five-year
extensions, in exchange for Moscow's writing off $500 million in
Kyrgyz debt.
On July 29, 2005, due to Washington's mixed diplomatic signals
straining relations over the May 2005 tragedy in Andijan, Uzbekistan,
under the terms of the SOFA Uzbekistan told the U.S. to vacate K2,
which was completed in Nov. 2005.
After the departure of U.S. forces from Uzbekistan, Manas, 400 miles
and 90-minutes flying time to Afghanistan, became the main hub for
U.S. operations in Afghanistan, processing more than 5.3 million U.S.
servicemen, 98 percent of all military personnel involved in Operation
Enduring Freedom, with 1,200 U.S. servicemen performing aerial
refueling, personnel and 42,000 cargo airlift missions, according to
Colonel John Millard, commander of the 376th Air Expeditionary Wing
and Manas base head.
But Washington's inept policies towards Kyrgyzstan eventually soured
bilateral relations over Manas. Kyrgyz complaints included inadequate
rent, corrupt fuel contracts and environmental concerns. Things came to
a head on Dec. 6, 2006, when 20year-old U.S. soldier Zachary Hatfield
shot and killed 42 year-old Kyrgyz Aleksandr Ivanov, an ethnic Russian
Kyrgyz, at the airbase's entry gate. Ivanov worked for Aerocraft Petrol
Management, which provided fuel services for Kyrgyz and international
civilian aircraft. Hatfield maintained that he fired in self-defense
after Ivanov approached him with a knife. Despite promises to make
Hatfield available to the Kyrgyz judicial system, the Pentagon whisked
him out of the country, greatly angering the Kyrgyz population.
In addition, Russia was offering various forms of financial assistance
and soft loans which went unmatched by Washington, deeply mired in
its dealings with corrupt President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who in April
2010 in the face of massive demonstrations fled the country. On
Nov. 8 2011, newly elected President Almazbek Atambayev announced
that he would close Manas when its lease ran out in 2014. On June 3,
2014 American troops vacated the base and it was handed back.
Not surprisingly, in the wake of NATO's expansion and Western protests
over Ukraine, Russia is shoring up its military and economic presence
in the post-Soviet space where possible, whether through bilateral
arrangements or multilateral organizations such as CSTO. Given
that on Oct. 10 Armenia joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) of
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, launching on Jan. 1, 2015, which is
dominated by the sheer weight of the Russian economy and Kyrgyzstan
has applied as well, it seems certain only that Western influence in
the Caucasus and Central Asia, particularly in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan
can only diminish further, even as NATO steps up its patrols around
Russia's borders.
Dr. John C. K. Daly is a non-resident Fellow at the Johns Hopkins
Central Asia Caucasus Institute in Washington DC.
http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2014/10/24/ukraine-russia-beefs-military-armenia-kyrgyzstan/