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ICG: Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan For Peace: Executive Summary AndRecomm

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  • ICG: Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan For Peace: Executive Summary AndRecomm

    NAGORNO-KARABAKH: A PLAN FOR PEACE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

    International Crisis Group, Belgium
    Tbilisi/Brussels, 11 October 2005

    Europe Report N°167
    http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3740

    Settlement of the long running Nagorno-Karabakh conflict -- the most
    significant obstacle to stability in the South Caucasus -- remains
    elusive, despite more optimistic noises recently from Azerbaijan and
    Armenia. Eleven years after the 1994 ceasefire, burgeoning defence
    budgets, increasing ceasefire violations, and continuing demonisation
    by each side of the other side are ominous signs that time for a peace
    agreement is running out. But a compromise can now be constructed
    around an approach that, while addressing all the matters in dispute,
    leaves the core issue of Nagorno-Karabakh's ultimate status open for
    later resolution, after other measures have been put in place.

    Key elements of that proposed settlement package include the
    withdrawal of the Armenia-backed Nagorno-Karabakh forces from
    the occupied districts of Azerbaijan surrounding the entity; the
    renunciation by Azerbaijan of the use of force to reintegrate the
    entity; the deployment of international peacekeepers; the return
    of displaced persons; and the re-opening of trade and communication
    links. Nagorno-Karabakh's status should ultimately be determined by an
    internationally sanctioned referendum with the exclusive participation
    of Karabakh Armenians and Azeris, but only after the above measures
    have been implemented. Until then Nagorno-Karabakh would remain part
    of Azerbaijan, though in practical terms it would be self-governing
    and enjoy an internationally acknowledged interim status.

    Today Armenia and Azerbaijan remain divided on vital points.

    Azerbaijan does not accept any compromise of its territorial integrity,
    nor does it agree that Nagorno-Karabakh's population alone can vote
    on determining its final status. Armenia is not willing to support
    withdrawal from the seven occupied districts around Nagorno-Karabakh,
    or allow the return of Azerbaijan internally displaced persons (IDPs)
    to Nagorno-Karabakh, until the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh is a
    reality. There has been tentative discussion of a possible plebiscite
    to determine the entity's final status, but with none of the necessary
    detail agreed as to who would vote on what, when and how, nor any
    agreement as to what other settlement conditions would create the
    context for such a vote.

    The Minsk Group of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
    Europe (OSCE), currently co-chaired by France, Russia and the U.S.,
    has been facilitating negotiations since 1994. After a decade of
    fruitless talks, a new format of meetings, the Prague Process,
    involving direct bilateral contact between the foreign ministers
    of Armenia and Azerbaijan was initiated in 2004. During the past
    twelve months the participants and OSCE co-chairs alike have publicly
    expressed optimism that a deal can be reached soon. But there is an
    urgent need to translate that generalised optimism into very specific
    agreement and action.

    An earlier Crisis Group report explored how the Armenian and Azeri
    communities of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding districts live
    today and view resolution of the conflict.[1] Against that background,
    this report examines the causes of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
    analyses the OSCE-led negotiations process as it has evolved since
    1992, and identifies the necessary elements of a workable and
    achievable peace plan.

    RECOMMENDATIONS

    To Avoid a Resumption of Fighting:

    1. All parties to the conflict should respect the 1994 ceasefire,
    refrain from using force, not promote the use of force, and end the
    arms race in the region by halting the rise of defence budgets.

    To Create an Appropriate Environment for Conflict Settlement:

    2. Azerbaijan should resume direct contact with the de facto
    Nagorno-Karabakh authorities and facilitate the development of closer
    contact between Karabakh Azeris and Karabakh Armenians.

    3. The de facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should end support
    for settlement of formerly Azeri majority areas with Armenians,
    including by:

    (a) stopping privatisation of land, homes and businesses in those
    areas;

    (b) ceasing to establish local administrations and infrastructure in
    the occupied areas adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh; and

    (c) protecting the remaining Azeri homes.

    4. Armenia should encourage the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities
    to take a more conciliatory stance on resolution of the conflict.

    To Address the Substantive Matters in Dispute:

    5. The parties should sign an agreement that includes the following
    elements:

    (a) renunciation of the threat or use of force to settle disputes,
    including any that may arise in connection with the implementation
    of the peace agreement;

    (b) creation of a joint commission including Azerbaijan and
    Nagorno-Karabakh representatives and chaired by the OSCE to supervise
    implementation;

    (c) incremental withdrawal of Nagorno-Karabakh forces backed by
    Armenia from all occupied territories around Nagorno-Karabakh, but
    beginning with five districts and occurring simultaneously with the
    deployment of international peacekeepers;

    (d) withdrawal of Nagorno-Karabakh forces backed by Armenia from the
    Kelbajar district once appropriate security measures are in place
    at the Murov mountain pass, and from the Lachin district following
    agreements guaranteeing secure communications through the Lachin
    corridor;

    (e) safe and voluntary return of displaced persons to their pre-war
    homes in the formerly occupied districts, once withdrawal and
    international deployment have been completed;

    (f) assurances for free movement of people and goods, including the
    lifting of all blockades and the reopening of all transport and trade
    routes (road and rail) closed as a result of the conflict;

    (g) implementation of confidence-building measures in cooperation with
    international organisations including the UN, International Committee
    of the Red Cross, OSCE and non-governmental organisations; and

    (h) identification of a referendum mechanism for resolving the final
    status of Nagorno-Karabakh, as set out below, with provision until
    then for the entity to have internationally recognised interim status,
    and its governing bodies to be elected under international supervision.

    6. The final status of Nagorno-Karabakh should be decided by a
    self-determination referendum, which would:

    (a) be held after the return of displaced Azeris to former
    Azeri-majority areas in Nagorno-Karabakh and after an international
    conference determines that Nagorno-Karabakh has met international
    preconditions for statehood, including the protection of minority
    rights, such review to be conducted for the first time five years
    after the signing of the peace agreement;

    (b) give Nagorno-Karabakh an appropriate range of options, including
    unity with, and secession from, Azerbaijan;

    (c) be held with the exclusive participation of Karabakh Armenians
    and Azeris; and

    (d) have its exact modalities agreed upon in talks chaired by the OSCE,
    based on the principle that all parties will recognise the validity
    of its result.

    To Facilitate Public Acceptance of the Settlement:

    7. Azerbaijan should allow Karabakh Azeris to play a bigger role
    in the negotiations and the internal political process, including
    by passing legislation allowing Karabakh Azeris to elect the head
    of their community, ensuring voting rights for displaced persons in
    the 2005 parliamentary elections, and permitting all candidates to
    campaign in collective centres.

    8. Government officials and media in Azerbaijan and Armenia should
    refrain from using belligerent and xenophobic language against
    "the other".

    9. Officials involved in the negotiations process should agree to
    a broad common strategy for disseminating information about that
    process, coordinate efforts to present to the public elements of a
    possible agreement, and not be reluctant to start a debate on highly
    sensitive questions.

    To Build Confidence and Guarantee Sustainable Peace:

    10. Donors should assist Armenia and Azerbaijan in developing and
    carrying out small, cross-border, sub-regional trade, humanitarian
    and public health projects, including in response to disasters, and
    should fund and help carry out programs aimed at improving mutual
    understanding, tolerance and reconciliation that target civil society,
    teachers and journalists.

    11. Donors should carry out a common assessment mission of needs in
    Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent occupied districts, and once a peace
    agreement is signed should hold an international donor coordination
    conference and begin implementing projects in the former conflict zone.

    12. Armenia and Azerbaijan should each investigate war crimes,
    prosecute those responsible and adopt legislation to give amnesty
    to those who participated in the conflict but did not commit serious
    offences.

    13. Armenia and Azerbaijan should establish joint commissions to:

    (a) make a political assessment of the conflict's causes and
    consequences; and

    (b) deal with inter-state property return and compensation questions.

    To Increase the Prospects for a Peace Agreement and to Give It
    Stability:

    14. The UN Security Council, the OSCE and the EU Council of Ministers
    should pledge to serve as guarantors of the peace agreement.

    15. The OSCE should expand the mandate of the Personal Representative
    of the Chairman-in-Office to include working with civil society,
    media and opposition political forces in order to facilitate contacts
    between the sides at the local level and build confidence and opening
    an office in the occupied territories, staffed with political, human
    rights and elections officers.

    16. The EU should become more actively engaged in the conflict
    resolution effort by basing the office of its Special Representative
    for the South Caucasus in the region.

    17. The EU should include long-term programs and strategies to promote
    confidence building in its Action Plans with Armenia and Azerbaijan.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------
    [1] Crisis Group Europe Report N°166, Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the
    Conflict from the Ground, 14 September 2005.

    --Boundary_(ID_KsU/FMr0T5NANI5H+zHBuQ)--

    From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
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