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THE UNITED STATES NEEDS NO ENEMIES, WITH FRIENDS LIKE TURKEY!
By Dr. Christos Evangeliou
Professor of Philosophy
Towson University, USA
Hellenic News of America
Oct 13 2005
The war in Iraq, so far, has cost the lives of more than seventeen
hundred American solders, with thousand more wounded, not to
mention the billions of dollars spent. The war effort has produced
minimal results, that is, a "cleaned" Saddam Hussein, sitting in
his prison waiting for trial, and an inefficient Constitutional
Committee struggling desperately to meet the new deadline for the
New Constitution of Iraq.
It is not surprising, then, that many Americans, even those who
supported the Iraq war initially, now seem to have second thoughts
about the wisdom of starting the war and the flimsy grounds, on
which such serious decision was based. Clearly, in the minds of many
Americans and friends of America around the world, the "phenomenon"
of Saddam sitting in his prison room watching TV was not worth the
pain of even a single wounded soldier, let alone the lives of American
citizens and friends of America.
Before the war, three predictions were circulating, which the war has
proven untrue. First, of course, was the "myth" that Iraq possessed
weapons of mass destruction; second, the "myth" that the secular regime
of Saddam had "official" connections with the religious fanatics of
Al Qaeda; third, the most dangerous "myth" of all that the terrorist
threat to America (and the post 9/11 terrorized world) will diminish,
as a result of a forceful intervention in Iraq to overthrow the Saddam
regime. All these have received plenty of political attention and
public discussion two and a half years into this war.
But there is another "myth," which the war in Iraq brought to light,
but has not received equal attention in the media. This is the
"myth" that Turkey was America's "most reliable ally," within the
NATO structure. For more than fifty years, since Turkey entered the
NATO Alliance in the early 1950ies, this "myth" had been cultivated
intensively and believed widely by the policy makers in the United
States and in Europe.
Having the second largest army in NATO and being well equipped with
American weapons, Turkey was considered as the "most-trusted" allied
friend. So much so, that it was tolerated even when it used the NATO
weapons for defense to invade and occupy about half of Cyprus in
1974, forcing about half of its population out of their homes. No
other NATO country (certainly, not Greece) would have done such
a terrible deed with impunity. But it was taken for granted that
Turkey's built up of military strength would be at hand in the hour
of NATO's need (facing then the threat of Soviet Union in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia). Especially in the Middle East, apparently
because of its strategic location in that volatile part of the world,
Turkey's role as a potential helpful NATO ally was systematically
and continuously overestimated.
Well, the war in Iraq came to prove that all this was baseless
wishful thinking. Turkey was offered billions of American dollars
in compensation and as an inducement. But, at the end, it refused to
support NATO's venture into Iraq, although it bargained hard for more
cash. Since other NATO countries had refused to participate militarily,
the Turkish refusal might have appeared as an "excusable misstep."
However, Turkey went much further than this, when it refused to allow
the NATO army to open a second front in Northern Iraq in the critical
moment of the war, spring of 2003. This second refusal by the newly
elected Erdogan Government was unworthy of even a friend, let alone
allied friends, and very costly to American interests. This Turkish
plan of the second refusal was similar in nastiness and brutality
with the Attila II Plan, which Turkey applied so ruthlessly in August
of 1974, and the United States unwisely tolerated then. Now it pays
the price.
The well-thought out strategic plan to enter Iraq from the North
would have shortened the war considerably. It would also have given
the opportunity to the American army to capture most of Saddam's
generals and other supporters, who escaped to the North and the West
before the allied armies got there. Most importantly, it would have
made it much more difficult for the fugitives and the insurgents to
save their cash and ammunition, to regroup so quickly and efficiently,
and to start their deadly quotidian attacks.
The killings are still going on in Iraq. They have increased the
American casualties from less than two hundred in the summer of 2003 to
almost two thousand, two years later. Surprisingly, no one (at least
not publicly and loudly enough) seems to hold Turkey responsible for
the unfolding and mostly avoidable tragedy in Iraq.
The "most-trusted" NATO ally proved to be the most unreliable in
the critical hour of need. For Turkey not only did not help the war
effort, it even made it more difficult. It did all these bad things
for America in a cold and calculating manner, which should have shocked
all concerned Americans. They should have demanded a radical revision
of the US policy towards this particularly unhelpful ally.
As if that was not bad enough for the future of Iraq and the fate
of the American venture there, the policy of keeping the three
diverging parts of Iraq (Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni) united is
apparently faulty. It has been proven wrong and costly in American
lives and dollars but, ironically, it was adopted apparently to please
Turkey, the "good" NATO ally. Because Turkey fears that the natural
tri-partition of Iraq may lead to an independent Kurdish State in
Northern Iraq, it objects to such sensible solution of this problem.
So it is bound to get more complicated as time goes by and the attacks
on innocents Iraqis continue.
But that is exactly what Turkey wants "diplomatically." It hopes that,
sooner or later, the Americans will be fed up with this bloody bath
and pull out of Iraq, allowing Turkey to imitate Saddam and try to
resolve its chronic Kurdish problem, as it resolved the Armenian
problem and Asia Minor problem, about a century ago. But that is not
by any stretch of the imagination in the US's best interests.
America would have been served better, saving thousands of lives
of its brave solders and the lives of innocent Iraqis, if it had
adopted a different and sensible policy. As soon as the Saddam army
had dissolved, it should have allowed the liberated Iraq to be divided
naturally and peacefully into Kurdish North, Shiite South, and Sunni
Center, squeezed between the other two and kept under tight control.
If such policy had in all probability worked well for the US interests
and saved many lives, but Turkey did not like, then too bad for Turkey!
Turkey might fear that, if the tripartite division had worked well
in Iraq, and served the long-term strategic interests there, then
possibly something similar could happen to Turkey itself. Like Iraq,
turkey too seems naturally divided into three parts, the Kurdish, the
European (or westward looking) and the Asiatic (or eastward looking).
These three parts have very little in common, other than a "Turkish
identity," forced on them after the end of World War I. The last two
parts do not even want to be part of the European Union, as the first
part wishes. The Kurds want to be part of a united Kurdistan in the
near future, while the Asiatic Turks would like to be reconnected
with their brethren in Central Asia.
So, hypothetically, with Western Turkey in European Union, with
Eastern Turkey in Central Asia, and with Southern Turkey united with
other Kurds, every one would be happy and the American interests well
served in that strategic area of the world. But will the policy makers
in the US see these advantages and act accordingly, before more lives
of innocent people and brave soldiers are lost in vain?
http://www.hellenicnews.com/readnews.html?newsid=4214&lang=US
By Dr. Christos Evangeliou
Professor of Philosophy
Towson University, USA
Hellenic News of America
Oct 13 2005
The war in Iraq, so far, has cost the lives of more than seventeen
hundred American solders, with thousand more wounded, not to
mention the billions of dollars spent. The war effort has produced
minimal results, that is, a "cleaned" Saddam Hussein, sitting in
his prison waiting for trial, and an inefficient Constitutional
Committee struggling desperately to meet the new deadline for the
New Constitution of Iraq.
It is not surprising, then, that many Americans, even those who
supported the Iraq war initially, now seem to have second thoughts
about the wisdom of starting the war and the flimsy grounds, on
which such serious decision was based. Clearly, in the minds of many
Americans and friends of America around the world, the "phenomenon"
of Saddam sitting in his prison room watching TV was not worth the
pain of even a single wounded soldier, let alone the lives of American
citizens and friends of America.
Before the war, three predictions were circulating, which the war has
proven untrue. First, of course, was the "myth" that Iraq possessed
weapons of mass destruction; second, the "myth" that the secular regime
of Saddam had "official" connections with the religious fanatics of
Al Qaeda; third, the most dangerous "myth" of all that the terrorist
threat to America (and the post 9/11 terrorized world) will diminish,
as a result of a forceful intervention in Iraq to overthrow the Saddam
regime. All these have received plenty of political attention and
public discussion two and a half years into this war.
But there is another "myth," which the war in Iraq brought to light,
but has not received equal attention in the media. This is the
"myth" that Turkey was America's "most reliable ally," within the
NATO structure. For more than fifty years, since Turkey entered the
NATO Alliance in the early 1950ies, this "myth" had been cultivated
intensively and believed widely by the policy makers in the United
States and in Europe.
Having the second largest army in NATO and being well equipped with
American weapons, Turkey was considered as the "most-trusted" allied
friend. So much so, that it was tolerated even when it used the NATO
weapons for defense to invade and occupy about half of Cyprus in
1974, forcing about half of its population out of their homes. No
other NATO country (certainly, not Greece) would have done such
a terrible deed with impunity. But it was taken for granted that
Turkey's built up of military strength would be at hand in the hour
of NATO's need (facing then the threat of Soviet Union in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia). Especially in the Middle East, apparently
because of its strategic location in that volatile part of the world,
Turkey's role as a potential helpful NATO ally was systematically
and continuously overestimated.
Well, the war in Iraq came to prove that all this was baseless
wishful thinking. Turkey was offered billions of American dollars
in compensation and as an inducement. But, at the end, it refused to
support NATO's venture into Iraq, although it bargained hard for more
cash. Since other NATO countries had refused to participate militarily,
the Turkish refusal might have appeared as an "excusable misstep."
However, Turkey went much further than this, when it refused to allow
the NATO army to open a second front in Northern Iraq in the critical
moment of the war, spring of 2003. This second refusal by the newly
elected Erdogan Government was unworthy of even a friend, let alone
allied friends, and very costly to American interests. This Turkish
plan of the second refusal was similar in nastiness and brutality
with the Attila II Plan, which Turkey applied so ruthlessly in August
of 1974, and the United States unwisely tolerated then. Now it pays
the price.
The well-thought out strategic plan to enter Iraq from the North
would have shortened the war considerably. It would also have given
the opportunity to the American army to capture most of Saddam's
generals and other supporters, who escaped to the North and the West
before the allied armies got there. Most importantly, it would have
made it much more difficult for the fugitives and the insurgents to
save their cash and ammunition, to regroup so quickly and efficiently,
and to start their deadly quotidian attacks.
The killings are still going on in Iraq. They have increased the
American casualties from less than two hundred in the summer of 2003 to
almost two thousand, two years later. Surprisingly, no one (at least
not publicly and loudly enough) seems to hold Turkey responsible for
the unfolding and mostly avoidable tragedy in Iraq.
The "most-trusted" NATO ally proved to be the most unreliable in
the critical hour of need. For Turkey not only did not help the war
effort, it even made it more difficult. It did all these bad things
for America in a cold and calculating manner, which should have shocked
all concerned Americans. They should have demanded a radical revision
of the US policy towards this particularly unhelpful ally.
As if that was not bad enough for the future of Iraq and the fate
of the American venture there, the policy of keeping the three
diverging parts of Iraq (Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni) united is
apparently faulty. It has been proven wrong and costly in American
lives and dollars but, ironically, it was adopted apparently to please
Turkey, the "good" NATO ally. Because Turkey fears that the natural
tri-partition of Iraq may lead to an independent Kurdish State in
Northern Iraq, it objects to such sensible solution of this problem.
So it is bound to get more complicated as time goes by and the attacks
on innocents Iraqis continue.
But that is exactly what Turkey wants "diplomatically." It hopes that,
sooner or later, the Americans will be fed up with this bloody bath
and pull out of Iraq, allowing Turkey to imitate Saddam and try to
resolve its chronic Kurdish problem, as it resolved the Armenian
problem and Asia Minor problem, about a century ago. But that is not
by any stretch of the imagination in the US's best interests.
America would have been served better, saving thousands of lives
of its brave solders and the lives of innocent Iraqis, if it had
adopted a different and sensible policy. As soon as the Saddam army
had dissolved, it should have allowed the liberated Iraq to be divided
naturally and peacefully into Kurdish North, Shiite South, and Sunni
Center, squeezed between the other two and kept under tight control.
If such policy had in all probability worked well for the US interests
and saved many lives, but Turkey did not like, then too bad for Turkey!
Turkey might fear that, if the tripartite division had worked well
in Iraq, and served the long-term strategic interests there, then
possibly something similar could happen to Turkey itself. Like Iraq,
turkey too seems naturally divided into three parts, the Kurdish, the
European (or westward looking) and the Asiatic (or eastward looking).
These three parts have very little in common, other than a "Turkish
identity," forced on them after the end of World War I. The last two
parts do not even want to be part of the European Union, as the first
part wishes. The Kurds want to be part of a united Kurdistan in the
near future, while the Asiatic Turks would like to be reconnected
with their brethren in Central Asia.
So, hypothetically, with Western Turkey in European Union, with
Eastern Turkey in Central Asia, and with Southern Turkey united with
other Kurds, every one would be happy and the American interests well
served in that strategic area of the world. But will the policy makers
in the US see these advantages and act accordingly, before more lives
of innocent people and brave soldiers are lost in vain?
http://www.hellenicnews.com/readnews.html?newsid=4214&lang=US