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Viktor Yakubyan: "Karabakh Cart" - An Obstacle In The Iranian Highwa

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  • Viktor Yakubyan: "Karabakh Cart" - An Obstacle In The Iranian Highwa

    VIKTOR YAKUBYAN: "KARABAKH CART" - AN OBSTACLE IN THE IRANIAN HIGHWAY

    Regnum, Russia
    March 14 2006

    Right after the presidential talks in Rambouillet, it became clear
    that no miracle happened in the Karabakh process, things in Armenia
    were about to fall back into place, but the place turned out to be
    displaced. In Azerbaijan it also got harder to fall back into. You may
    call Rambouillet as you are pleased to - fiasco, failure, unexpected
    off-the-way or logical half-way, but the fact is that the two societies
    have suddenly realized that they have come to a new stage they need
    to comprehend.

    Dangerous cart

    2006 was preceded by resounding statements by western non-governmental
    and then official organizations about early Karabakh agreement. The
    talks in France have seen no success, but the time is not over yet. One
    can be sure that the western "optimists" will not give up that easily
    and will bend over backwards to get this heavy cart - the Karabakh
    process - off the ground. But they also know that there is one very
    important peculiarity about it - once they get the cart moving they
    will hardly be able to stop it, even more, predict where it will move.

    Theoretically, in Rambouillet one should have expected a face-off
    of Armenian constructivism, "sure" that inapplicable, and Azeri
    radicalism, affected, that's why inapplicable.

    But for all the schemes and theses proposed, the zero result was
    obvious and quite correctly forecast by both Armenian and Azeri
    analysts. Then what were the mediators so optimistic about? There can
    be only one answer. Namely... Their optimism was for show, but, more
    importantly, for purpose. Their purpose was obviously not to cheer up
    the presidents, to put them off their guard and to slip the cherished
    agreement for their signing. Not at all. It was to create acoustics
    that would make "a zero" in Rambouillet sound dully dissonant with the
    whole logic, mood, and, if you please, "the new reassuring freshness"
    in of the sore negotiating process. They got their purpose... And
    what did the co-chair states (Russia, France, the US) get net? They
    got a new reality - something some, if not all, of them sought.

    Back to the cart... Quite recently the mediators realized that to
    get the cart off the ground they will have to remove the ground and
    as urgently as possible - for they heard something very unpleasant
    from Russia: about universality of the Kosovo precedent, and had to
    loosen the hard grip of the Karabakh conflict sides before this might
    happen and cover the only trump of one of the conflicting sides -
    the principle of territorial integrity. This principle would simply
    die then, giving place to a so-far lower quoted card - the right of
    nations to self-determination - and Azerbaijan would have nothing left
    but to stop the Karabakh talks and to engage in preventive activities
    in its other regions. In fact, the task of the West (mostly of the
    EU) now is either, until the Kosovo status is finalized, to draw an
    absolutely new line for the Karabakh process to move it outside the
    conflict of the above principles, or to freeze the Kosovo process
    until there is clarity in Transdnestr, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
    Karabakh. (By the way, the sudden death of Milosevic has brought this
    scenario into focus).

    Following the same logic, one can't help noting that it was exactly the
    Armenian side - expectedly less cooperative - who came to Rambouillet
    under the "mask" of readiness for compromise. Such tactics would
    allow it to blame Baku for the outcome - to say that Azerbaijan has
    once again refused to meet half-way. On the whole, the Rambouillet
    talks could develop in two ways: either Ilham Aliyev rejects the
    proposals of the mediators and the concessions of the Armenian side
    and continues his militarist populism (a behavior the international
    community would hardly take as serious) or he agrees to a real dialogue
    on all key points, leaving no chances for status-quo.

    The former scenario would allow Kocharyan to complain of Baku's
    destructive position and to make off. The latter scenario would see
    him signing (orally securing) some framework agreement or employing
    his arsenal of diplomatic tricks to get things right.

    Judging from the post-Rambouillet developments, Armenia's purely
    tactical constructivism must have come across some illogical maneuver
    by Azerbaijan. For example, Aliyev might show some real commitment
    to go from words to actions and, for the beginning, to satisfy
    the mediator's proposals on how to overcome the status quo. It was
    all but just a wish to make some nice surprise. Simply Aliyev had
    obligations to the West, who was silent when he was breaking the back
    of his opposition.

    Preceding Rambouillet was a rigorous campaign for several key ideas:
    the deployment of an international peacekeeping contingent in the
    Karabakh conflict zone, the opening of transport routes, the return
    of refugees and - a new referendum as a way to determine Nagorno
    Karabakh's status. Even if Aliyev agreed to the referendum after all
    his previous aggressive and radical rhetoric on TV, Kocharyan would
    rush headfirst to specify details - when, how and on what legal bases
    the referendum will be held. Or Kocharyan might raise one more hard
    question - whom the sides want to see in the peacekeeping contingent.

    And so, Baku's constructivism might crush against Yerevan's
    super-constructivism - quite a risky game: relieving for the sides
    and tricking for the mediators.

    "Post-Rambouillet" - chronology

    Back from the talks the Armenian side got down to measures to prevent
    possible pressure by the US. The US State Secretary's pre-Rambouillet
    phone talks with each president were in vain. Something went wrong...

    In a special interview on Rambouillet Kocharyan said that "the sides
    failed to agree on one important principle." What principle he is
    talking about - the status or the composition of the peacekeeping
    force - we can only guess. What we can be sure of is that the Armenian
    president did not mean "Azerbaijan's territorial integrity."

    "In any case, Yerevan has decided not to make further ado and to
    show its claws - just in case - while Baku has cooled down a bit,
    preferring to wait and see what will happen next. In fact, after
    Rambouillet there is no more sense in war bravado - they should either
    start the war or not even mention it."

    As regards the reaction of Karabakh President Arkady Gukasyan and
    the following response of Armenian President Robert Kocharyan - this
    polemic is just to show how elastic the Armenian diplomatic arsenal
    is. No coincidence that Gukasyan's interview was broadcast by RFE/RL -
    it was for export. Gukasyan advises Armenia to withdraw from the talks
    (which are almost inexistence after Rambouillet) and insists that
    Karabakh should be involved therein - which is secretly and openly
    good for Yerevan.

    Armenian Ex Foreign Minister Alexander Arzumanyan says that "Gukasyan
    might have coordinated his statement with Kocharyan and after the
    failure of the Rambouillet talks this may be a joint threat to
    Azerbaijan and the world community - a threat to withdraw from the
    negotiating process." But, in fact, Gukasyan said what the whole
    Armenian nation wanted to hear - while Kocharyan's reaction has
    raised Armenia's responsibility to both Karabakh and the OSCE MG
    co-chairs. In their turn, the Armenian Defense Ministry's regular
    reports of state border firing have had a colossal mobilizing effect.

    As you may see, the Armenian side has taken a whole series of tactical
    steps to transform the public and negotiating moods.

    It would be naïve to think that the US - the key lobbyist of
    peacekeeping in Karabakh, would be moved by the moves of Yerevan
    and Stepanakert. Having almost fully brainwashed Azerbaijan,
    Washington was ready for predictable steps by Armenia and sent right
    away its leading functionaries to Yerevan. For now - Matthew Bryza
    (Assistant Undersecretary of State for Europe and Eurasia) and soon -
    his boss Daniel Fried and OSCE MG US Co-Chair Steven Mann with their
    situational recognizance. In quite a short time the US Department of
    State appeared with a row of slating reports that qualified Armenia
    as a corrupt country whose authorities do not fight drugs trafficking
    and violate human rights.

    Meanwhile, in a Mar 9 meeting in OSCE Yerevan Office the OSCE
    ambassadors passed an urge to the Armenian authorities not to waste
    time and to start actively preparing for the parliamentary and
    presidential elections in 2007 and 2008. "The coming elections will
    be decisive for Armenia," that's what they said. In such a situation,
    the mediators are meeting in Washington, while the next FM meeting
    is scheduled for Mar 20 in Istanbul! Why not Baku then? In his turn,
    OSCE MG US CO-Chair Steven Mann says to AzerTag that if the sides fail
    to agree in 2006 it will be a tragedy. If the sides miss the chance
    there will be a tragedy, Mann said, not specifying though what kind
    of tragedy there will be.

    Conclusion

    The Americans are systematically preparing the South Caucasus for
    possible excesses in Iran. No doubt they are - judging from their
    military activity in the region. The Karabakh conflict the way it
    is now is an impassable jam. The region has in fact been turned
    into a very inconvenient ground - in both military-tactical and
    communicational terms. One can say when the US will launch its massive
    pressure on Iran if one looks at its tactics in the Karabakh peace
    process. If Washington is forcing the sides to solve the problem in
    2006, it will probably close the circle around Iran no later than
    2007-2008. Washington needs to take the Karabakh cart off the Iranian
    highway. Bush simply can't linger with Iran any longer - he is facing
    presidential election in 2008. Already today over half of Americans
    want Bush to resign, blaming him for starting war in Iraq and allowing
    phone tapping, which is also a part of the "Big Near East" adventure.

    Viktor Yakubyan - expert for South Caucasus problems

    --Boundary_(ID_+aSZ8jMvirY0CVArdEvNeg)--
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