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  • Saakashvili Convenes Commission On Consequences Of Withdrawing From

    SAAKASHVILI CONVENES COMMISSION ON CONSEQUENCES OF WITHDRAWING FROM CIS
    By Zaal Anjaparidze

    Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
    May 18 2006

    One consideration that may influence Georgia's planned departure from
    the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is whether Tbilisi will
    find itself alone and vulnerable to retaliation by an angry Russia.

    So far, the Georgian government seems confident of its future
    prospects.

    Following the recent Russian embargo on Georgian agricultural
    products (see EDM, April 20), President Mikheil Saakashvili created
    a governmental commission to explore the possible consequences of
    Georgia's withdrawal from the CIS. This commission convened for its
    first meeting on May 13 and is expected to submit its final report in
    two months. This schedule coincides with the Georgian parliament's
    plans to discuss the continued deployment of Russian peacekeeping
    troops operating under CIS mandate in the breakaway region of Abkhazia.

    However, after the commission's first session, Georgian Foreign
    Minister Gela Bezhuashvili stated that, although the political decision
    about Georgia's departure from the CIS is "clear," discussions
    are underway "about when and how to do this" (Civil Georgia, TV
    Rustavi-2, May 13). This tactful statement suggests that Tbilisi may
    use its declared intention to leave the CIS as a tool to bargain with
    Russia. In any case, Georgia's official exit from the CIS evidently
    will not take place overnight; most estimates predict it will take
    closer to one year to be completed.

    But so far, the Georgian government has left little room for doubt.

    On January 25, Georgia quit the CIS Council of Defense Ministers,
    saying it was a natural development considering the new political
    leadership's stance in favor of integration into Euro-Atlantic
    structures. The decision to leave the Russia-dominated CIS is largely
    perceived to be a component of this policy, although Saakashvili
    regularly reiterates that Georgia's aspiration to join NATO and to
    maintain friendly relations with Russia do not and must not contradict
    each other. These days Saakashvili has attempted to smooth Moscow's
    irritation with conciliatory statements such as, "We want to be
    part of NATO. But still the closest friend we have is Russia, for
    many natural reasons" (Financial Times, May 15; TV-Imedi, May 9;
    Rossiiskaya gazeta, May 10). But it seems that Moscow no longer
    takes seriously such statements when they are not accompanied by
    proof and when they conflict with other statements by Saakashvili
    and his associates. The attempt to mobilize the Western community
    to counteract Russia's resurrected expansionism in the post-Soviet
    space was easily seen in Saakashvili's address to the "Common Vision
    for a Common Neighborhood" conference in Vilnius on May 3-4.

    The Russian government has already warned Georgia that it will be
    deprived of preferences within the CIS if it leaves. Other punitive
    measures, including the deportation of Georgian illegal labor migrants
    likely, are not far off. Citing Komsomolskaya pravda, Kavkaz Press
    reports that Russian authorities might refuse to recognize diplomas
    from Georgia universities if Georgia quits CIS. The move, if actually
    taken, would automatically deprive many Georgians of the opportunity
    to work in Russia (Kavkaz Press, May 17).

    The harshest of the potential punitive measures would be the abolition
    of multilateral free-trade agreements. Such agreements allow member
    states to avoid double taxation and facilitate the free movement of
    goods within the CIS without any customs duties. Pundits, however, say
    that Georgia could compensate for these economic losses by concluding
    bilateral agreements among individual CIS members.

    Similar agreements already exist with Russia, Ukraine, Armenia,
    Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.

    Some Georgian politicians and pundits criticize the government for
    challenging Russia and argue that the costs of leaving the CIS are not
    the "price of freedom," as Saakashvili's government argues. They say
    that Georgia's impulsive departure from the CIS without a blessing
    from the West or Russia would achieve only a symbolic victory, and
    Saakashvili's government might incur numerous problems, including
    public disorder. The significant increase in consumer tariffs on
    electricity and natural gas in May and last winter's price hike on
    imported Russian natural gas have already triggered sharp discontent
    among socially vulnerable groups. "I doubt that the Georgians can
    rub through for a long time," said analyst Ramaz Sakvarelidze. The
    opposition sees the hand of Russia-leaning interest groups in this move
    (Akhali Taoba, May 6, 13; TV-Rustavi-2, TV-Imedi, May 11-12).

    Meanwhile, as anti-Russian and anti-CIS rhetoric increases, several
    strategic Georgian economic entities, including energy units, are
    smoothly transferring to control of CIS-based companies reportedly
    backed by Russia. On May 12, the Kazakh bank TuranAlem won the tender
    for Georgia's largest telephone operator -- United Telecommunication
    Company of Georgia (UTCG) -- beating the U.S. Metromedia International
    Group, which already possesses 30% of UTCG's shares.

    The Kazakh state-run company KazTransGaz won a tender on the
    Tbilisi-based gas distribution company Tbilgazi, and Greenoak Group
    -- reportedly tied to Russian political and business groups -- won
    a tender to privatize the Batumi seaport in Ajaria (Civil Georgia,
    May 12; Resonansi, May 13, 15).

    Whether the expected Russian pressure on Georgia brings results
    desirable for Moscow will depend on the adequacy of Tbilisi's
    countermeasures and the degree of support Georgia receives from its
    traditional allies in the CIS and the West. It will also depend on
    the political and civic awareness of the Georgian establishment and
    domestic economic performance. The already tense relations between
    Saakashvili's government and local businesses, the continued stagnation
    of the Georgian economy, the falling support for the ruling National
    Movement party, and the growing internal opposition to Saakashvili's
    policies all weaken Tbilisi's stance against Moscow.

    During a meeting with Croatian President Stjepan Mesic on May
    7-8, Saakashvili confidently noted that Georgia would not be left
    face-to-face with Russia again (TV Imedi, May 8). Growing tension
    between the United States and Russia and repeated statements by
    high-ranking U.S. officials about Washington's "legitimate interests
    and relationships" with former Soviet republics will encourage the
    pro-Western line of Saakashvili's team, which naturally must rule
    out strengthening the highly politicized Russian economic foothold
    in Georgia.

    Therefore, Tbilisi must pursue careful policies with all stakeholders
    in order to emerge from the current confrontation with Russia with
    minimal losses.
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