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Montenegro Breaks Away: Will Abkhazia Follow?

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  • Montenegro Breaks Away: Will Abkhazia Follow?

    MONTENEGRO BREAKS AWAY: WILL ABKHAZIA FOLLOW?
    by Maksim Yusin
    Translated by Pavel Pushkin

    Source: Izvestia, May 25, 2006, pp. 1-2 EV
    Agency WPS
    What the Papers Say Part A (Russia)
    May 25, 2006 Thursday

    Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Trans-Dniester are watching Montenegro;
    Montenegro's independence is sure to inspire all those who are striving
    for a revision of internationally-recognized borders. This primarily
    applies to the regions where interethnic bloodshed has flared already,
    with conflicts being "frozen" at some stage. Frozen, but not resolved.

    Will Montenegro's separation from Serbia trigger a chain reaction?

    That might well be the most pressing question in European politics
    today. The continent has at least ten other territories striving for
    separation from the states to which they "belong" at present.

    All of Europe's potential separatists have been paying close attention
    to developments in Montenegro. It's hardly surprising that the leaders
    of Abkhazia and the Trans-Dniester region were among the first foreign
    politicians to respond to the referendum results. They welcomed the
    "free expression of the people's will" in Montenegro, and stated that
    they would also like to hold independence referendums. But who would
    recognize the outcomes of those referendums?

    The Europeans and Americans are prepared to recognize Montenegro's
    independence, but say it's a special case and any analogies with
    other separatist regions would be inappropriate. There's a certain
    amount of logic behind those words.

    Three federative states broke up after the communist system collapsed:
    the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. The international community
    was faced with a tough decision: what kind of criteria it would use
    for recognizing or not recognizing new countries.

    Eventually, it was decided that recognition would be extended to
    territories that possessed something akin to sovereignty within
    their former states (in the case of the USSR, that meant the 15 union
    republics). But autonomous formations within those republics could
    not aspire to independence.

    This criterion isn't incontestable, but at least it's clear and
    definite. It has been used to redraw the map of the world. Fifteen
    new state arose to replace the Soviet Union, and two states replaced
    Czechoslovakia. Only the case of Yugoslavia produced a glitch:
    Montenegro declined to separate from Serbia. This situation continued
    for 15 years. But now the Montenegrins have changed their minds and
    decided to make use of their "postponed" right to sovereignty.

    This doesn't seem to disrupt the logic of the process - but just try
    explaining it to the residents of "autonomous formations" in Georgia,
    Moldova, or Bosnia. They don't care about the subtleties of diplomatic
    formulations. They simply can't understand why the Montenegrins are
    allowed to do this, but they are not. Why the double standards?

    So Montenegro's independence is sure to inspire all those who are
    striving for a revision of internationally-recognized borders. This
    primarily applies to the regions where interethnic bloodshed has
    flared already, with conflicts being "frozen" at some stage. Frozen,
    but not resolved.

    * * *

    Abkhazia and South Ossetia (want to separate from Georgia)

    1. Conflict History

    After Georgia declared independence in 1991, Abkhazia (holding
    autonomous republic status) and South Ossetia (an autonomous region)
    declared their wish to secede from Georgia and become part of Russia.

    Matters reached the point of war with Tbilisi in both cases. Russia
    sided with the autonomies. The Georgians were defeated in both South
    Ossetia and Abkhazia, and at present they don't control either of
    the self-proclaimed republics.

    2. Russia's position

    Officially, Moscow recognizes Georgia's territorial integrity and
    refuses repeated requests from Sukhumi and Tskhinvali for "admittance
    into the Russian Federation." All the same, Russia provides various
    forms of aid to the governments of both unrecognized republics;
    most of their residents have been granted Russian citizenship, and
    the ruble is used as currency on their territories. Tbilisi accuses
    Moscow of "creeping annexation."

    3. The West's position

    The United States and Europe are in full solidarity with Georgia,
    recognizing its territorial integrity and calling for both conflicts
    to be resolved via peaceful negotiations. Last year, when Georgian
    President Mikhail Saakashvili seemed on the verge of launching a
    military operation against South Ossetia, the Americans pressured
    him to exercising restraint. A war was averted. However, the West
    has been arming and training the Georgian military.

    4. Prospects

    In Tbilisi, many believe that the fate of both territories is sealed:
    sooner or later, Russia will annex them. At the official level,
    Moscow tries not to provide the slightest reason to suspect it of
    harboring such intentions. Unofficially, Moscow makes it clear to
    the Georgians that if Tbilisi attempts to use force to settle the
    question of Abkhazia or South Ossetia, Russia is unlikely to stand
    aside. So it's better to negotiate, not fight. But the negotiations
    have been deadlocked for years.

    * * *

    The Trans-Dniester region (wants to separate from Moldova)

    1. Conflict History

    In many respects, the Trans-Dniester scenario is reminiscent of
    Abkhazia or South Ossetia. The residents of the Dniester River's left
    bank didn't want to be part of independent Moldova, and declared that
    they wanted to join Russia. The result was a brief but bloody war,
    stopped only after Russia intervened, sending in troops commanded by
    General Alexander Lebed. There hasn't been any more fighting since
    then, but negotiations haven't made any progress either.

    2. Russia's position

    The Russian authorities probably haven't ever given any serious
    consideration to annexing Trans-Dniester. The practical aspects would
    be too difficult: Russia doesn't share a border with the unrecognized
    republic - they are separted by Ukraine. Moscow hoped to resolve the
    conflict with the Kozak Plan, drawn up by Dmitri Kozak when he was
    the senior deputy director of the presidential administration. But
    Chisinau rejected the Kozak Plan, following unprecedented pressure
    from EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana.

    3. The West's position

    The Europeans and Americans were strongly opposed to the Kozak Plan.

    They were particularly annoyed by the point specifying a continued
    Russian military presence on Trans-Dniester territory. When Viktor
    Yushchenko's orange team came to power in Ukraine, the West decided
    to use economic measures of influence on the "separatists" in
    Tiraspol. The Ukrainian authorities blocked access to Trans-Dniester
    for goods that didn't go through Moldovan customs. Tiraspol called
    it a blockade. Russia sent humanitarian aid to Trans-Dniester. The
    West expressed full support for Kiev.

    4. Prospects

    The West won't accept the Trans-Dniester region's separation from
    Moldova under any circumstances. The European Union's activity with
    regard to Trans-Dniester is likely to increase, especially after
    Romania joins the EU, since it's the major force lobbying for Moldova's
    interests. A military solution to the conflict is unlikely, especially
    since Russian peacekeepers are still present in Trans-Dniester.

    * * *

    Nagorno-Karabakh (wants to separate from Azerbaijan)

    1. Conflict History

    The Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region, part of the Azerbaijan
    Soviet Socialist Republic, had a mostly Armenian population. In the
    late 1980s, they started making demands to join Armenia. The first
    inter-ethnic clashes flared up even before the USSR collapsed, and
    the bloodiest fighting happened in 1992-93. With Armenia's support,
    the Armenians of Karabakh won the war - capturing all the disputed
    districts, as well as some adjacent regions of Azerbaijan. The conflict
    has been frozen ever since.

    2. Russia's position

    Moscow officially recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan,
    and acts as a mediator. All the same, many Azeris suspect Russia of
    siding with the Armenians and lobbying for their interests. The Azeris
    claim that the Armenians wouldn't have won the war for Nagorno-Karabakh
    without help from Russian Armed Forces units stationed in the region.

    3. The West's position

    The United States maintains close relations with Azerbaijan,
    encouraging it to pursue "a foreign policy independent of Russia."

    Relations with Armenia are more complicated, since Washington considers
    that the Armenian government looks to Moscow too much.

    However, there are influential Armenian diasporas in the United
    States and in Europe. They prevent the West from siding entirely with
    Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

    4. Prospects

    The Nagorno-Karabakh status negotiations are deadlocked. Armenia
    insists that Nagorno-Karabakh should be independent, while Azerbaijan
    refuses to consider the idea. Baku occasionally threatens to resolve
    the problem by force, while pointing out that time is on Azerbaijan's
    side: it's an oil-rich country that can spend far more on its military
    needs than Armenia, which has essentially been existing in blockade
    conditions for the past 15 years. All the same, the Azeri military
    isn't ready to challenge Armenia as yet.
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