Tweet
Journal of Turkish Weekly
May 28 2006
On Turkey's EU Bid and the Middle East
Since 9/11, international relations (IR) has become one of the
sexiest subjects to study, with university courses worldwide
massively oversubscribed and academic bookstores drowning in Dummies'
Guides to Unilateral Geostrategy. Damla Aras is indubitably one of
IR's sexiest practitioners.
Currently completing her second PhD at King's College in London, Aras
is at the forefront of a new generation of international relations
scholars, with particular expertise on the Middle East and southeast
Europe. She has been interviewed on Al Jazeera as well as appearing
on Turkish television stations NTV, Kanal A, TV8 and TRT and writing
for mass circulation daily Milliyet; Aras's knowledge is so respected
that she has even briefed the Turkish parliament on the delicate
issue of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Yet, despite being a genuine star in the field of international
relations, in person Aras is engagingly modest in addition to being
seriously photogenic. When meeting up with her for this interview in
London's Tower Hill, she wore the international uniform of the
student: blue jeans and a very cool sweatshirt. Aras was also
philosophical about conducting this interview in Starbucks, a
suitable venue for a discussion about some of the most pressing
global issues of our time: Turkey's entry to the European Union; the
Middle East crisis; and all too briefly, this summer's World Cup
finals.
Damla, let's start with the big question that's on everybody's lips:
will Turkey eventually join the EU?
Well, I don't think it's totally up to Turkey. There are many
different aspects to the situation. First of all, there are criteria
that the European Union asks from all candidate countries which are
merely technical -- those concerning human rights, economic
stability, etc. But there are also other issues that will make a
difference for Turkey's membership, such as history and culture,
which have not been major concerns with other candidates, such as
those from Eastern Europe
With most of the Eastern European candidates, Western Europe has
historically had a relationship with at least some warmth, but Turkey
as the Ottoman Empire has always been "the Other" of Europe. In terms
of the situation at the moment, what Turkey needs to do in theory is
meet the technical criteria, but what the Germans or Austrians or
French really think about Turkey's accession is another matter. It's
not only about politics and economics; it's a decision for the
peoples of European countries as well. Whether Turkey can overcome
all the historical prejudices against them remains to be seen.
That's one issue. Then there is the matter of religion. Even though
Turkey is a secular state, over 90 percent of its people are Muslims.
Especially considering the recent history of the relationship between
Islam and the West, this is not a small thing. As you know, Samuel
Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" has become a big topic.
Obviously Turkey's secular identity has come a long way, but Islam
still plays an important role in many people's lives in Turkey. Even
the leadership of the current ruling party, the Justice and
Development Party, has a strong Muslim identity. Thus, how the West
perceives Turkey is very important.
If historically, culturally and religiously, Turkey has been defined
as "the Other" of the West, is it now possible to overcome this
perception and admit Turkey into the European Union?
The decision-makers in Europe may see Turkey's accession as a good
opportunity to bridge the East-West gap, as Turkey gives a good
example of how two cultures can live together. On the other hand,
there are a lot of points of contention between Turkey and the EU.
For instance, Turkey's approach to the Kurdish issue is very
different to that of the European Union. Of course, Turkey wants to
accommodate some EU demands to improve reconciliation between Turks
and Kurds. However, there are limits to this. It's the same with the
Armenian issue. Recognition of the Armenian genocide in EU countries
such as France -- something which is hotly disputed in Turkey -- both
these issues will cause a lot of problems between Turkey and the
European Union.
Then of course, you have the role of the military, which has been an
important institution not just in modern Turkey, but historically in
the Ottoman Empire, as well. Obviously the military plays a much
greater role in Turkish society than is acceptable for a candidate
country. But whether the EU limitations on the role of the military
are feasible in the context of perceived internal and external
threats, e.g. the conflict with the Kurdish separatist group the PKK,
or threats stemming from Turkey's geostrategic location is a big
question mark.
The Turkish military would be more willing to give up its rights if
the generals believed that after all the EU-inspired reforms, Turkey
would be given membership. However, they believe that the EU has
double standards towards Turkey and suspect that even after doing
everything the EU wants, Turkey may not be granted with accession and
they may have to deal with the chaos created by the EU demands such
as an independent Kurdish state comprising the south-eastern part of
Turkey.
Another important issue is Turkey's relations with Greece and Greek
Cyprus, especially now the latter is now a full member of the
European Union. For Turkey to take the necessary steps to protect its
own interests in Cyprus, yet at the same time not collide with Greece
and the Greek Cypriot administration, is very difficult.
So these are the potential risk areas. Can they be overcome? Well, I
think it's a very, very long process, and each step is a potential
risk to strain relations between Turkey and the European Union.
So to summarize, there are historical, cultural and religious aspects
to Turkey's accession, and also there are institutions that are
perceived as vital in Turkish domestic politics that conflict with
some EU demands. The Armenian and Kurdish issues, Europe's attitude
towards the PKK, and also Turkey's foreign policy, especially the
problems with Greece and the Greek Cypriots: each of these will pop
up one by one, and the pressure coming from EU countries to lessen
the military's influence over foreign policy decisions looks to be a
very hard pill to swallow.
Since 2002, the Turkish government has taken unprecedented steps
towards social liberalization. Restrictions on freedom of expression
have been lifted and broadcasts of Kurdish language programs by
private TV channels are no longer prohibited. However, the case of
Orhan Pamuk shows that the judiciary still apply fairly conservative
interpretations of concepts such as "national security." Is this
likely to change?
Change in Turkey is a must and it is inevitable, but you need to
understand one thing: These interpretations have not come out of
nowhere. They have emerged out of the history and geography of
Turkey. If you look at what is going on currently in the Middle East,
you can understand why Turkey fears the possible emergence of a
Kurdish state and resents the Armenian claims on eastern Turkey.
You only have to look at the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, the treaty that
dismantled Turkey's predecessor state, the Ottoman Empire, to see why
this is the case. According to this treaty, in the eastern part of
Anatolia, an Armenian state would be established and in southeast
Anatolia an independent Kurdish state was to be created. In Turkey,
there is something called "Sevres Paranoia," but it's difficult to
say how much is constructed threat perception and how much is based
on facts. Some part of this perceived threat may be called as
conspiracy theory, but there is also possibility that there may be
truth in it. If you look at the reshaping of the Middle East in 1900s
and the Western strategies in the region, it seems nothing is that
impossible. Especially if you look at what is going on in northern
Iraq, it's the emergence of a free Kurdish state. Gradually we could
witness the creation of an internationally-recognized Kurdish state
in the north of what was Iraq.
In the 1990s, Jalal Talabani, a prominent Iraqi Kurdish leader who is
now president of Iraq, was making references to the Treaty of Sevres
and how the Kurds' right to establish an independent country was
taken from them. Also, many people believe that the president of the
Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq, Masud Barzani, is
influential in the southeastern part of Turkey.
To some, this might be paranoia. But given the historical context of
division in 1919-1920, then it is inevitable that in the psyche of
the nation and of Turkish decision-makers, the perception of threat
is shaped with all these concepts and notions. And current affairs
seem to show similar phenomena influencing decision-making. If you
look at the state of the world then you can see examples of why
Turkish politicians might be cautious. A large number of countries
now recognize the Armenian genocide; it is clear that
internationally, Turkish Cypriot interests are not valued as much as
those of the Greek Cypriots. Therefore it is not surprising that
Turkish security policies are moulded by this perception that Turkish
interests are under threat.
Now, as to what happened to Orhan Pamuk, he's not the only one. If
you look at Hrant Dink, the editor of Agos, an Armenian-language
newspaper in Turkey, criminal charges were also filed against him for
"denigrating the Turkish state." This no doubt must change. These are
basic freedoms of people which in the West are commonly accepted and
used by everyone, whereas in Turkey this is not settled. But having
said that rather than just reactionarily blaming Turkey, one should
try and understand why this type of paranoia is emerging. Obviously
the European Union accession process will force Turkey to change, as
will the influence of globalization, which is inevitably affecting
attitudes towards basic freedoms in Turkey as well.
I think that every country must be evaluated within their own context
and circumstances. Just like human beings, the psychology of the
state must be understood and necessary steps must be taken
accordingly to obtain a constructive result.
Support for EU membership in Turkey has declined somewhat in recent
months, though still around 60 percent of people in Turkey support
accession. Why is this?
As I mentioned above, because most Turks believe at both
decision-making and ground levels that double-standards are being
applied by the EU towards their application for full membership. If
Turkey could meet European Union accession demands knowing that in
the end there will be membership of the EU, there would be no
problems. However, this is patently not the case. In the eye of the
Turk, the goalposts keep shifting -- the more Turkey gives, the more
the EU asks. And at the end of this process, Turkey is not guaranteed
to be a member.
Don't forget that in the first World War, the Ottoman Empire fought
against the French, the Italians and the British, but they also
fought against those same forces during the Turkish War of
Independence. So when Turks see the EU making controversial policy
demands, they don't see it as a human rights or political issue, but
they have suspicions that these demands are part of an agenda with
its aim as the total destruction of the Turkish state. Turkish people
feel that in the worst case scenario, their country might be divided
and membership not obtained.
A lot of people perceive Turkey as an economically backward country.
However, since 2002, growth rates have been consistently impressive
-- comparable to China's, only from a much higher base.
There's no doubt about it, especially lately, Turkey has been quite
successful economically, especially compared with past. The fight
with inflation has been especially notable. Economic policies have
generally been much more successful. However, in terms of
unemployment there is still a big problem, and the improvement in the
economy does not reflect in the pockets of the average person. The
numbers are impressive, but they don't translate that well at ground
level. They have not made a lot of difference to most people. The
real success will be when all these achievements are felt by the
general population.
What can Turkey bring to the EU?
A huge market; a young population, especially compared to that of the
EU; a cheaper market not just in terms of wages but economic inputs
generally; a gateway to Central Asia and the Middle East. Turkey is a
place where everything from energy pipelines to peoples and cultures
meet. Turkey can help better relations between Europe and the Middle
East, and it can be a good channel between the European Union and
Central Asia.
How would you describe the new generation in Turkey? Are their
desires the same as young people everywhere, or do they have more
specific goals?
It's like everywhere: young people want better jobs, education,
lives. Especially in big cities such as Istanbul and Ankara, the
aspirations of people are exactly the same as in the U.K. And really
cultural hegemony is everywhere, so whatever is trendy in the West --
from "Desperate Housewives" to MTV, from music to movies - everything
is the same in Turkey too.
Having said that, in my opinion, the climate in Turkey is more
socially conservative; people's values are a mixture of Middle
Eastern and Western ones.
"The Clash of Civilizations" or "End of History"?
Both of them are American constructs. They do not reflect the ideas
of others. What Fukuyama and Huntington say may be valid for the
United States and its aspirations, not the rest of the world. These
theses should be considered as good brainstorming sessions, not as
universal rules. To take the "The Clash of Civilizations" or "The End
of History" as the Bible of international relations is rather
mistaken. Both are good for brain gymnastics, but that's all.
Every civilization has their own value system and something to
contribute to the world. A country or one civilization declaring the
end of history or prophesizing that there will be a clash of
civilizations...the latter concept is really harmful. It has become a
motto which everyone uses as it has received global acclaim. Today,
China and India are rising powers. In international relations, every
empire has a start, a peak and an end. Whether it's going to be
today, tomorrow or 100 years later doesn't matter, all of them have
an end.
Let's move on to current geostrategic questions. Turkey surprisingly
refused a lucrative U.S. offer of $30 billion for cooperation in
Iraq. Would the Turkish people support a military strike against
Iran, or are they in favor of a diplomatic solution?
Of course, Turkey would favor a diplomatic solution. Both Iran and
Iraq are Turkey's neighbors, and starting from the late 1990s, there
has been a significant improvement in relations between Turkey and
these countries. They have mutual concerns, such as security,
prevention of the emergence of Kurdish states and so on, so I don't
think that U.S. designs on the Middle East overlap with Turkey's in
this case.
Most decision-makers in Turkey do not approve of Iran's nuclear
program, unless it is used for civilian purposes. However they do not
perceive a direct threat coming from Iran either. And also a conflict
with Iran will further destabilize the Middle East. So, neither
decision-makers nor ordinary people agree on the U.S. designs on Iraq
or Iran.
In the very unlikely event of military action, there might be limited
use of air bases like Incirlik. During the Iraq war, Turkey refused
deployment of 62,000 U.S. troops in Turkey. However, during the early
stages of the operation, Incirlik airbase was still used by the
United States forces. There was a limited use, but not in the way
that the US wanted.
Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan has been very enthusiastic
about deepening economic and diplomatic relations to the Western
Balkans countries such as Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is this
trend likely to continue?
Yes, of course. Turkey has always wanted to develop better relations
with surrounding countries, Iran, Iraq, Syria and with other
countries as well. Just like the Middle East, Turkey has a historic
bond with the Balkans. At every opportunity, such as the crises in
Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s, Turkey actively
participated and played an important role in finding workable
solutions. So in the region, it is for the interests of no one to
clash, rather to improve bilateral relations in the interests of
everyone.
Finally, Turkey was knocked out by Switzerland and will not be at
this year's World Cup finals. Who will you be supporting instead?
I have no idea! I don't know anything about the World Cup. If it was
something like fashion or girlie stuff, maybe. But football? Yuck!
Source: OHMY News
May 28 2006
On Turkey's EU Bid and the Middle East
Since 9/11, international relations (IR) has become one of the
sexiest subjects to study, with university courses worldwide
massively oversubscribed and academic bookstores drowning in Dummies'
Guides to Unilateral Geostrategy. Damla Aras is indubitably one of
IR's sexiest practitioners.
Currently completing her second PhD at King's College in London, Aras
is at the forefront of a new generation of international relations
scholars, with particular expertise on the Middle East and southeast
Europe. She has been interviewed on Al Jazeera as well as appearing
on Turkish television stations NTV, Kanal A, TV8 and TRT and writing
for mass circulation daily Milliyet; Aras's knowledge is so respected
that she has even briefed the Turkish parliament on the delicate
issue of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Yet, despite being a genuine star in the field of international
relations, in person Aras is engagingly modest in addition to being
seriously photogenic. When meeting up with her for this interview in
London's Tower Hill, she wore the international uniform of the
student: blue jeans and a very cool sweatshirt. Aras was also
philosophical about conducting this interview in Starbucks, a
suitable venue for a discussion about some of the most pressing
global issues of our time: Turkey's entry to the European Union; the
Middle East crisis; and all too briefly, this summer's World Cup
finals.
Damla, let's start with the big question that's on everybody's lips:
will Turkey eventually join the EU?
Well, I don't think it's totally up to Turkey. There are many
different aspects to the situation. First of all, there are criteria
that the European Union asks from all candidate countries which are
merely technical -- those concerning human rights, economic
stability, etc. But there are also other issues that will make a
difference for Turkey's membership, such as history and culture,
which have not been major concerns with other candidates, such as
those from Eastern Europe
With most of the Eastern European candidates, Western Europe has
historically had a relationship with at least some warmth, but Turkey
as the Ottoman Empire has always been "the Other" of Europe. In terms
of the situation at the moment, what Turkey needs to do in theory is
meet the technical criteria, but what the Germans or Austrians or
French really think about Turkey's accession is another matter. It's
not only about politics and economics; it's a decision for the
peoples of European countries as well. Whether Turkey can overcome
all the historical prejudices against them remains to be seen.
That's one issue. Then there is the matter of religion. Even though
Turkey is a secular state, over 90 percent of its people are Muslims.
Especially considering the recent history of the relationship between
Islam and the West, this is not a small thing. As you know, Samuel
Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" has become a big topic.
Obviously Turkey's secular identity has come a long way, but Islam
still plays an important role in many people's lives in Turkey. Even
the leadership of the current ruling party, the Justice and
Development Party, has a strong Muslim identity. Thus, how the West
perceives Turkey is very important.
If historically, culturally and religiously, Turkey has been defined
as "the Other" of the West, is it now possible to overcome this
perception and admit Turkey into the European Union?
The decision-makers in Europe may see Turkey's accession as a good
opportunity to bridge the East-West gap, as Turkey gives a good
example of how two cultures can live together. On the other hand,
there are a lot of points of contention between Turkey and the EU.
For instance, Turkey's approach to the Kurdish issue is very
different to that of the European Union. Of course, Turkey wants to
accommodate some EU demands to improve reconciliation between Turks
and Kurds. However, there are limits to this. It's the same with the
Armenian issue. Recognition of the Armenian genocide in EU countries
such as France -- something which is hotly disputed in Turkey -- both
these issues will cause a lot of problems between Turkey and the
European Union.
Then of course, you have the role of the military, which has been an
important institution not just in modern Turkey, but historically in
the Ottoman Empire, as well. Obviously the military plays a much
greater role in Turkish society than is acceptable for a candidate
country. But whether the EU limitations on the role of the military
are feasible in the context of perceived internal and external
threats, e.g. the conflict with the Kurdish separatist group the PKK,
or threats stemming from Turkey's geostrategic location is a big
question mark.
The Turkish military would be more willing to give up its rights if
the generals believed that after all the EU-inspired reforms, Turkey
would be given membership. However, they believe that the EU has
double standards towards Turkey and suspect that even after doing
everything the EU wants, Turkey may not be granted with accession and
they may have to deal with the chaos created by the EU demands such
as an independent Kurdish state comprising the south-eastern part of
Turkey.
Another important issue is Turkey's relations with Greece and Greek
Cyprus, especially now the latter is now a full member of the
European Union. For Turkey to take the necessary steps to protect its
own interests in Cyprus, yet at the same time not collide with Greece
and the Greek Cypriot administration, is very difficult.
So these are the potential risk areas. Can they be overcome? Well, I
think it's a very, very long process, and each step is a potential
risk to strain relations between Turkey and the European Union.
So to summarize, there are historical, cultural and religious aspects
to Turkey's accession, and also there are institutions that are
perceived as vital in Turkish domestic politics that conflict with
some EU demands. The Armenian and Kurdish issues, Europe's attitude
towards the PKK, and also Turkey's foreign policy, especially the
problems with Greece and the Greek Cypriots: each of these will pop
up one by one, and the pressure coming from EU countries to lessen
the military's influence over foreign policy decisions looks to be a
very hard pill to swallow.
Since 2002, the Turkish government has taken unprecedented steps
towards social liberalization. Restrictions on freedom of expression
have been lifted and broadcasts of Kurdish language programs by
private TV channels are no longer prohibited. However, the case of
Orhan Pamuk shows that the judiciary still apply fairly conservative
interpretations of concepts such as "national security." Is this
likely to change?
Change in Turkey is a must and it is inevitable, but you need to
understand one thing: These interpretations have not come out of
nowhere. They have emerged out of the history and geography of
Turkey. If you look at what is going on currently in the Middle East,
you can understand why Turkey fears the possible emergence of a
Kurdish state and resents the Armenian claims on eastern Turkey.
You only have to look at the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, the treaty that
dismantled Turkey's predecessor state, the Ottoman Empire, to see why
this is the case. According to this treaty, in the eastern part of
Anatolia, an Armenian state would be established and in southeast
Anatolia an independent Kurdish state was to be created. In Turkey,
there is something called "Sevres Paranoia," but it's difficult to
say how much is constructed threat perception and how much is based
on facts. Some part of this perceived threat may be called as
conspiracy theory, but there is also possibility that there may be
truth in it. If you look at the reshaping of the Middle East in 1900s
and the Western strategies in the region, it seems nothing is that
impossible. Especially if you look at what is going on in northern
Iraq, it's the emergence of a free Kurdish state. Gradually we could
witness the creation of an internationally-recognized Kurdish state
in the north of what was Iraq.
In the 1990s, Jalal Talabani, a prominent Iraqi Kurdish leader who is
now president of Iraq, was making references to the Treaty of Sevres
and how the Kurds' right to establish an independent country was
taken from them. Also, many people believe that the president of the
Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq, Masud Barzani, is
influential in the southeastern part of Turkey.
To some, this might be paranoia. But given the historical context of
division in 1919-1920, then it is inevitable that in the psyche of
the nation and of Turkish decision-makers, the perception of threat
is shaped with all these concepts and notions. And current affairs
seem to show similar phenomena influencing decision-making. If you
look at the state of the world then you can see examples of why
Turkish politicians might be cautious. A large number of countries
now recognize the Armenian genocide; it is clear that
internationally, Turkish Cypriot interests are not valued as much as
those of the Greek Cypriots. Therefore it is not surprising that
Turkish security policies are moulded by this perception that Turkish
interests are under threat.
Now, as to what happened to Orhan Pamuk, he's not the only one. If
you look at Hrant Dink, the editor of Agos, an Armenian-language
newspaper in Turkey, criminal charges were also filed against him for
"denigrating the Turkish state." This no doubt must change. These are
basic freedoms of people which in the West are commonly accepted and
used by everyone, whereas in Turkey this is not settled. But having
said that rather than just reactionarily blaming Turkey, one should
try and understand why this type of paranoia is emerging. Obviously
the European Union accession process will force Turkey to change, as
will the influence of globalization, which is inevitably affecting
attitudes towards basic freedoms in Turkey as well.
I think that every country must be evaluated within their own context
and circumstances. Just like human beings, the psychology of the
state must be understood and necessary steps must be taken
accordingly to obtain a constructive result.
Support for EU membership in Turkey has declined somewhat in recent
months, though still around 60 percent of people in Turkey support
accession. Why is this?
As I mentioned above, because most Turks believe at both
decision-making and ground levels that double-standards are being
applied by the EU towards their application for full membership. If
Turkey could meet European Union accession demands knowing that in
the end there will be membership of the EU, there would be no
problems. However, this is patently not the case. In the eye of the
Turk, the goalposts keep shifting -- the more Turkey gives, the more
the EU asks. And at the end of this process, Turkey is not guaranteed
to be a member.
Don't forget that in the first World War, the Ottoman Empire fought
against the French, the Italians and the British, but they also
fought against those same forces during the Turkish War of
Independence. So when Turks see the EU making controversial policy
demands, they don't see it as a human rights or political issue, but
they have suspicions that these demands are part of an agenda with
its aim as the total destruction of the Turkish state. Turkish people
feel that in the worst case scenario, their country might be divided
and membership not obtained.
A lot of people perceive Turkey as an economically backward country.
However, since 2002, growth rates have been consistently impressive
-- comparable to China's, only from a much higher base.
There's no doubt about it, especially lately, Turkey has been quite
successful economically, especially compared with past. The fight
with inflation has been especially notable. Economic policies have
generally been much more successful. However, in terms of
unemployment there is still a big problem, and the improvement in the
economy does not reflect in the pockets of the average person. The
numbers are impressive, but they don't translate that well at ground
level. They have not made a lot of difference to most people. The
real success will be when all these achievements are felt by the
general population.
What can Turkey bring to the EU?
A huge market; a young population, especially compared to that of the
EU; a cheaper market not just in terms of wages but economic inputs
generally; a gateway to Central Asia and the Middle East. Turkey is a
place where everything from energy pipelines to peoples and cultures
meet. Turkey can help better relations between Europe and the Middle
East, and it can be a good channel between the European Union and
Central Asia.
How would you describe the new generation in Turkey? Are their
desires the same as young people everywhere, or do they have more
specific goals?
It's like everywhere: young people want better jobs, education,
lives. Especially in big cities such as Istanbul and Ankara, the
aspirations of people are exactly the same as in the U.K. And really
cultural hegemony is everywhere, so whatever is trendy in the West --
from "Desperate Housewives" to MTV, from music to movies - everything
is the same in Turkey too.
Having said that, in my opinion, the climate in Turkey is more
socially conservative; people's values are a mixture of Middle
Eastern and Western ones.
"The Clash of Civilizations" or "End of History"?
Both of them are American constructs. They do not reflect the ideas
of others. What Fukuyama and Huntington say may be valid for the
United States and its aspirations, not the rest of the world. These
theses should be considered as good brainstorming sessions, not as
universal rules. To take the "The Clash of Civilizations" or "The End
of History" as the Bible of international relations is rather
mistaken. Both are good for brain gymnastics, but that's all.
Every civilization has their own value system and something to
contribute to the world. A country or one civilization declaring the
end of history or prophesizing that there will be a clash of
civilizations...the latter concept is really harmful. It has become a
motto which everyone uses as it has received global acclaim. Today,
China and India are rising powers. In international relations, every
empire has a start, a peak and an end. Whether it's going to be
today, tomorrow or 100 years later doesn't matter, all of them have
an end.
Let's move on to current geostrategic questions. Turkey surprisingly
refused a lucrative U.S. offer of $30 billion for cooperation in
Iraq. Would the Turkish people support a military strike against
Iran, or are they in favor of a diplomatic solution?
Of course, Turkey would favor a diplomatic solution. Both Iran and
Iraq are Turkey's neighbors, and starting from the late 1990s, there
has been a significant improvement in relations between Turkey and
these countries. They have mutual concerns, such as security,
prevention of the emergence of Kurdish states and so on, so I don't
think that U.S. designs on the Middle East overlap with Turkey's in
this case.
Most decision-makers in Turkey do not approve of Iran's nuclear
program, unless it is used for civilian purposes. However they do not
perceive a direct threat coming from Iran either. And also a conflict
with Iran will further destabilize the Middle East. So, neither
decision-makers nor ordinary people agree on the U.S. designs on Iraq
or Iran.
In the very unlikely event of military action, there might be limited
use of air bases like Incirlik. During the Iraq war, Turkey refused
deployment of 62,000 U.S. troops in Turkey. However, during the early
stages of the operation, Incirlik airbase was still used by the
United States forces. There was a limited use, but not in the way
that the US wanted.
Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan has been very enthusiastic
about deepening economic and diplomatic relations to the Western
Balkans countries such as Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is this
trend likely to continue?
Yes, of course. Turkey has always wanted to develop better relations
with surrounding countries, Iran, Iraq, Syria and with other
countries as well. Just like the Middle East, Turkey has a historic
bond with the Balkans. At every opportunity, such as the crises in
Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s, Turkey actively
participated and played an important role in finding workable
solutions. So in the region, it is for the interests of no one to
clash, rather to improve bilateral relations in the interests of
everyone.
Finally, Turkey was knocked out by Switzerland and will not be at
this year's World Cup finals. Who will you be supporting instead?
I have no idea! I don't know anything about the World Cup. If it was
something like fashion or girlie stuff, maybe. But football? Yuck!
Source: OHMY News