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TURKEY STRUGGLING MIGHTILY WITH FREEDOM
By Howard Eisenstat
Topeka Capital Journal (subscription), KS
Nov 3 2006
At first glance it might seem that the Turkish government under Prime
Minister Tayyip Erdogan, once so determined to join the European
Union (EU), has had a change of heart. With an overwhelming majority
in Parliament, Erdogan's Justice and Development (AK) Party pushed
through a series of liberalizing reforms early in its administration
that went far beyond those contemplated by previous governments.
Taken as a whole, they seemed to promise a new, more democratic and
pluralistic country. In those heady days in 2003 and 2004, it seemed
that Turkey was poised to achieve its long-term goal of membership in
the European Union and -- given Erdogan's moderate Islamist base --
a potential place of leadership for reforms within the Muslim world,
as well.
For the past year or two, however, such hopes have seemed increasingly
Pollyannaish as reforms have stumbled. Most dramatically, a steady
stream of Turkey's most prominent intellectuals, journalists and
authors have been brought to trial under infamous "Article 301" of
the Criminal Code, which makes it a criminal offense, punishable by
as many as three years in prison, to "denigrate Turkishness." Should
a citizen be found guilty of doing so while abroad, the time served
may be increased by one-third.
The result has been a serious blow to Turkey's reputation. The
international stature of many of the accused has ensured widespread
media coverage of the trials and a steady decline in national stature
abroad. For example, Orhan Pamuk, Turkey's most celebrated novelist
and recipient of the 2006 Nobel Prize for Literature, was brought to
trial in 2005 for saying "Thirty thousand Kurds and a million Armenians
were killed in these lands and nobody dares to talk about it." The
case against Pamuk was eventually dropped, but new cases are brought
up on a regular basis. No intellectual can write confidently on the
wide range of issues that considered "hassas konular," or "sensitive
issues," without the fear of possible prosecution. These issues range
from the role of minorities in history and society to the rights
of conscientious objectors. Turkish democratization - and Turkey's
international reputation -- are dying from a thousand small blows.
In fact, this public embarrassment appears to be part of a concerted
effort by members of the old elite within the bureaucracy and military
and their allies to sabotage both the Erdogan government and Turkey's
European aspirations. The liberalization promised by the Erdogan
government -- and demanded by the EU -- placed elements of the old
elite in a dilemma. Many in the bureaucracy -- and particularly within
the military -- believe it is their right and duty to shepherd Turkey
toward modernization. Elected officials are seen as too corrupt, the
populace as too ignorant and fickle to be trusted with stewardship of
the nation. When legal limitations are insufficient for maintaining
control, a murky system of patronage, strong-arm tactics and outright
violence that the Turks refer to as the "Deep State" can be relied
on to keep both politicians and ordinary citizens in line. The
liberalization demanded by the EU and the reforms implemented early
on by the Erdogan government all seemed to threaten this monopoly on
real power.
Thus early reforms went only half way. Though many were courageous,
there were significant concessions to the powerful old guard. Since
then, the enemies of liberalization have been busy, exploiting these
weaknesses. They play on nationalist sentiment, giving ammunition
to enemies of Turkey's bid to membership in the EU and making the
government look far weaker than its strong majority in Parliament
would suggest.
Article 301 has become a weapon for Turkey's most retrograde
elements: a weapon against the government, against Turkey's EU
ambitions, against further reforms and against the burgeoning civil
society. If recent media reports are correct, the Erdogan government
is considering addressing the question of Article 301 again in the
near future. Government officials need to do so quickly. And this
time, they need to avoid the half-measures that have burdened them
so far. This time, they need to cut out the root and branch, the
anti-democratic language that Article 301 represents.
Howard Eissenstat teaches Middle Eastern History at Seton Hall
University in New Jersey and is a Turkey Country Specialist with
Amnesty International USA. Founded in 1961, Amnesty International
is a Nobel Prize winning grassroots activist organization with over
one-million members world wide -- www.amnesty-usa.org
http://cjonline.com/stories/1 10306/opi_eisenstat.shtml
By Howard Eisenstat
Topeka Capital Journal (subscription), KS
Nov 3 2006
At first glance it might seem that the Turkish government under Prime
Minister Tayyip Erdogan, once so determined to join the European
Union (EU), has had a change of heart. With an overwhelming majority
in Parliament, Erdogan's Justice and Development (AK) Party pushed
through a series of liberalizing reforms early in its administration
that went far beyond those contemplated by previous governments.
Taken as a whole, they seemed to promise a new, more democratic and
pluralistic country. In those heady days in 2003 and 2004, it seemed
that Turkey was poised to achieve its long-term goal of membership in
the European Union and -- given Erdogan's moderate Islamist base --
a potential place of leadership for reforms within the Muslim world,
as well.
For the past year or two, however, such hopes have seemed increasingly
Pollyannaish as reforms have stumbled. Most dramatically, a steady
stream of Turkey's most prominent intellectuals, journalists and
authors have been brought to trial under infamous "Article 301" of
the Criminal Code, which makes it a criminal offense, punishable by
as many as three years in prison, to "denigrate Turkishness." Should
a citizen be found guilty of doing so while abroad, the time served
may be increased by one-third.
The result has been a serious blow to Turkey's reputation. The
international stature of many of the accused has ensured widespread
media coverage of the trials and a steady decline in national stature
abroad. For example, Orhan Pamuk, Turkey's most celebrated novelist
and recipient of the 2006 Nobel Prize for Literature, was brought to
trial in 2005 for saying "Thirty thousand Kurds and a million Armenians
were killed in these lands and nobody dares to talk about it." The
case against Pamuk was eventually dropped, but new cases are brought
up on a regular basis. No intellectual can write confidently on the
wide range of issues that considered "hassas konular," or "sensitive
issues," without the fear of possible prosecution. These issues range
from the role of minorities in history and society to the rights
of conscientious objectors. Turkish democratization - and Turkey's
international reputation -- are dying from a thousand small blows.
In fact, this public embarrassment appears to be part of a concerted
effort by members of the old elite within the bureaucracy and military
and their allies to sabotage both the Erdogan government and Turkey's
European aspirations. The liberalization promised by the Erdogan
government -- and demanded by the EU -- placed elements of the old
elite in a dilemma. Many in the bureaucracy -- and particularly within
the military -- believe it is their right and duty to shepherd Turkey
toward modernization. Elected officials are seen as too corrupt, the
populace as too ignorant and fickle to be trusted with stewardship of
the nation. When legal limitations are insufficient for maintaining
control, a murky system of patronage, strong-arm tactics and outright
violence that the Turks refer to as the "Deep State" can be relied
on to keep both politicians and ordinary citizens in line. The
liberalization demanded by the EU and the reforms implemented early
on by the Erdogan government all seemed to threaten this monopoly on
real power.
Thus early reforms went only half way. Though many were courageous,
there were significant concessions to the powerful old guard. Since
then, the enemies of liberalization have been busy, exploiting these
weaknesses. They play on nationalist sentiment, giving ammunition
to enemies of Turkey's bid to membership in the EU and making the
government look far weaker than its strong majority in Parliament
would suggest.
Article 301 has become a weapon for Turkey's most retrograde
elements: a weapon against the government, against Turkey's EU
ambitions, against further reforms and against the burgeoning civil
society. If recent media reports are correct, the Erdogan government
is considering addressing the question of Article 301 again in the
near future. Government officials need to do so quickly. And this
time, they need to avoid the half-measures that have burdened them
so far. This time, they need to cut out the root and branch, the
anti-democratic language that Article 301 represents.
Howard Eissenstat teaches Middle Eastern History at Seton Hall
University in New Jersey and is a Turkey Country Specialist with
Amnesty International USA. Founded in 1961, Amnesty International
is a Nobel Prize winning grassroots activist organization with over
one-million members world wide -- www.amnesty-usa.org
http://cjonline.com/stories/1 10306/opi_eisenstat.shtml