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RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
_________________________________________ __________________
RFE/RL Balkan Report
Vol. 10, No. 11, 28 November 2006
A Weekly Review of Politics, Media, and Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty Broadcasts in the western Balkans
NOTE TO READERS: The next issue of "RFE/RL Balkan Report" will
appear on January 23, 2007.
******************************************* *****************
HEADLINES:
* CROATIAN PRESIDENT DISCUSSES BALKAN CONFLICT, KOSOVA STATUS
* KOSOVA ENTERS THE HOME STRETCH
****************************************** ******************
CROATIAN PRESIDENT DISCUSSES BALKAN CONFLICT, KOSOVA STATUS. Croatian
President Stjepan Mesic told RFE/RL's South Slavic and Albanian
Languages Service in Prague on November 14 that the destruction of
the Croatian Danube port town of Vukovar 15 years ago was part of
then Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's plans to establish a
Greater Serbia by force. The big losers in Milosevic's wars,
Mesic argued, were nonetheless the Serbs themselves.
Mesic argued that Milosevic thought in 1991 that he could
"fool the world" into thinking he was determined to preserve the
Yugoslav state when, in reality, he was trying to expand Serbia's
boundaries into neighboring Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. "His goal
was to establish a Greater Serbia," Mesic said.
In doing so, Milosevic tricked Serbian minorities outside
Serbia by telling them he would not leave them outside Serbia's
frontiers, and he led some of them to believe they would have a
privileged status in his new state. In the end, however, all this
came to nothing. Even his former allies in Montenegro deserted him
and have now formed their own independent state.
Mesic said he is not sure the time is now ripe for him to
invite to Vukovar his Serbian counterpart, Boris Tadic, but added
that "it would be a good [idea]."
He stressed that what happened in Vukovar was "a big crime,
even a crime of genocide." To the extent that people recall what
happened in Vukovar and honor the victims, they have taken one more
step toward ensuring that something like the destruction of that town
"will never happen again," he said.
Mesic said the time has come to resolve the question of
Kosova's status because the current "status quo cannot remain in
the long run." It also seems to Mesic unreasonable to expect the
issue to be resolved by direct talks between Prishtina and Belgrade,
since Kosova's ethnic Albanian majority wants only independence,
to which the Serbs will never agree. Consequently, Mesic told RFE/RL,
"the international community has to help."
Like many observers, Mesic argues that the most likely
outcome is that Kosova will become independent, but on the condition
that it observes "those standards [of conduct] that apply in Europe."
He identifies these principles as respect for "civil rights,
multiparty political pluralism, protection of national minorities,
freedom of the media, functioning [state] institutions, the
separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches, and protection for religious and historical monuments."
He added that the Kosovars will also probably be asked to
guarantee that they will not seek to form a "Greater Albania," which,
however, is not seriously sought by any leading Kosovar or Albanian
political party.
Mesic cautioned against hasty judgments regarding Zeljko
Komsic, the new Croatian representative on the Bosnian tripartite
Presidency. Mesic noted that many Croats have suggested that Komsic
might not "defend Croatian interests" because he does not belong to a
nationalist party -- he is a social democrat -- and because he fought
in the mainly Muslim Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than in the
mainly Herzegovinian Croatian Defense Council (HVO) during the
1992-95 conflict.
"What do people expect?" Mesic asked rhetorically. "That he
should have served in the Army of the Republika Srpska? It is quite
normal that one should have fought for Bosnia-Herzegovina."
Mesic argued, moreover, that Bosnia's problem is that it
needs to form a functioning state and get away from a tendency of its
two constituent entities to behave as though they were states.
"They're not," he said starkly.
Mesic is one of the best-known figures on the political stage
of former Yugoslavia and has been prominent in Croatian politics for
most of the time since at least 1990, when he became prime minister.
It was the move in May 1991 by Milosevic and his allies in the
eight-member collective Yugoslav Presidency to block Mesic's
assumption of the rotating chair of that body -- a move that would
have been routine under normal circumstances -- that triggered the
decisions of Croatia and Slovenia to declare independence in June.
Mesic returned to Croatia, where he was a member of President
Franjo Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ). In 1994 he
broke with Tudjman and the HDZ over the conduct of the war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and eventually found his political home in the
smaller Croatian People's Party (HNS).
When Tudjman died in office at the end of 1999, most Croats
were clearly eager to break with a style of rule that was widely seen
as paternalistic, pompous, and rooted in the 1991-95 war. Mesic was
first elected to the presidency in early 2000 and quickly established
himself as Croatia's most respected politician. He adopted a more
folksy style than that of his predecessor, whose stiffness was often
the butt of jokes.
Mesic also worked to break the power of the "Herzegovinian
lobby" in Croatian politics, and there is still little love lost
between him and the HDZ in Herzegovina. He has also been at odds with
organized war veterans groups, who regard him as insufficiently
nationalistic. Mesic and most Croatian political leaders since 2000
have made it clear that they want to put the war era behind them and
concentrate on raising the standard of living and on joining the EU
and NATO.
In the early years of his presidency, Mesic used the more
informal version of his first name, Stipe, although in recent years
he has usually gone by Stjepan. In a marked contrast with
Tudjman's aloof style, Mesic traveled to the Dalmatian islands
with a regularly scheduled ferry rather than with a presidential
yacht and drank wine on the docks with fellow passengers.
Although critics have charged in recent years that he has
come to mimic the presidential style of the late Josip Broz Tito and
has drifted politically too far to the left, he has generally kept
the office free of the taint of corruption and nepotism that
blemished Tudjman's rule (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," September
26, 2006). (Patrick Moore)
KOSOVA ENTERS THE HOME STRETCH. The international community has put
off settling Kosova's final status until shortly after the
Serbian elections slated for January 21, 2007. But the delay seems
unlikely to affect the outcome, which will in all probability be a
conditional independence.
By late 2005, the leadership of the UN, at the recommendation
of special envoy Kai Eide, concluded that leaving Kosova's
political status unresolved had become a major source of problems for
the province and the region as a whole. The continuing uncertainty
had already played a role in the triggering and spread of violence
among some of the ethnic Albanian majority in March 2004 and remained
a potential source of future unrest. The lack of clarity also
discouraged the investment necessary to deal with large-scale
unemployment and jump-start the economy among people who have often
displayed sharp business acumen when provided with a clear legal
framework, as Kosovars have done in countries like Croatia,
Switzerland, or Germany (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," December 17,
2004, and June 27, September 26 and October 24, 2006).
The decision on Kosova's final status had been expected
by the end of 2006, and many Kosovars became apprehensive when the
postponement was announced recently. But the delay seems designed
only to minimize the effect of the issue on the Serbian vote and is
probably unlikely to impact on the substance of the UN's final
statement on status. That would appear to be a form of independence
-- which is the only outcome acceptable to the 90 percent Albanian
majority -- albeit with a continuing foreign presence to ensure the
safety and rights of the minorities, particularly the Serbs, and
their cultural institutions. The EU will most likely replace the UN
at the heart of the foreign civilian presence, but is expected to
have a less powerful mandate than it currently does in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
UN envoy for Kosova Martti Ahtisaari is expected to make his
announcement regarding the province's status in February 2007.
Numerous media reports have suggested that U.S. and British diplomats
have recently reassured Kosovar Albanian leaders that just a little
more patience will pay dividends for them and warned them against any
hasty moves, such as issuing a widely rumored unilateral declaration
of independence if the decision on the final status continues to be
delayed. Those media reports indicate that the Kosovars have accepted
the assurances of Washington and London.
Lest anyone forget the stakes involved in finalizing
Kosova's status, Prime Minister Agim Ceku wrote in "The Wall
Street Journal" of November 20 that "expectations in Kosova are
high.... It is ready for independence, and now is not the time to
stop the clock." He added that "we need to keep the process of
statehood on track. Kosova needs clarity to complete reforms and to
attract vital international investments, but also so that our own
people -- and especially our Serb minority -- can escape the
debilitating worries and uncertainty and start to build a future.
Their home and future are in Kosova."
Ceku argued that "the biggest problem in the western Balkans
is economic malaise.... Belgrade is not interested in investing in
the development of Kosova, and Kosova is not interested in a
political union with Serbia. But we are interested in developing a
productive bilateral partnership with Serbia, just as we're doing
with our other neighbors." He believes that "social and economic
progress in the region will be the big losers if we don't make
the bold step forward to independence. The entire western Balkan
region needs a kick start in order to catch the EU train and catch up
with the awesome economic growth of our EU-bound neighbors, Romania
and Bulgaria."
He noted that "we have a young population and a positive
birthrate. Given the shortages in the EU labor market due to negative
demographic trends, Kosova can help fill the void. To do so, we need
to retrain our work force. Hence we're now investing in
education."
Ceku also reminded Brussels that it cannot afford to forget
its goal of "a Europe whole and free." He might have added that it is
the question of Euro-Atlantic integration, perhaps more so than even
the issue of Kosova's final status, that will be the determining
factor for the peace and prosperity of the entire region. (Patrick
Moore)
NOTABLE QUOTATIONS. "The boys and girls of the [1998-99] war are
still alive, they are in Kosova. They are ready to protect the
freedom of Kosova. Nobody gave them weapons, they found them
themselves, they can find them again. Their blood remains the same."
-- Azem Syla, former commander in chief of the Kosova Liberation Army
(UCK). Quoted in "Koha Ditore" of October 26.
"By defending Kosovo we are defending more than our own
interest and more that the issue of stability and piece in the
region. We are defending international law." -- Serbian Prime
Minister Vojislav Kostunica on voter approval of the new Serbian
Constitution on October 29. Quoted by RFE/RL. The document explicitly
lays claim to Kosova, where Serbian writ has not run since June,
1999.
"Delay [in clarifying Kosova's final status] offers no
advantages to any party. Negotiations should be concluded. Delay can
only frustrate the hopes of those who live in Kosovo and deny clarity
to Serbians as they think about their own future." -- The U.S.
representative at the talks on Kosova, Frank Wisner, speaking on
October 31 at a news conference at the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade.
Quoted by RFE/RL.
(Compiled by Patrick Moore)
******************************************* **************
Copyright (c) 2006. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.
The "RFE/RL Balkan Report" is prepared by Patrick Moore based on
sources including reporting by RFE/RL's South Slavic and Albanian
Languages Service. It is distributed monthly.
Direct content-related comments to Patrick Moore in Prague at
[email protected] or by phone at (+4202) 2112-3631.
For information on reprints, see:
http://www.rferl.org/about/content/request.as p
Back issues are online at http://www.rferl.org/reports/balkan-report/
Techn ical queries should be e-mailed to: [email protected]
HOW TO SUBSCRIBE
Send an e-mail to [email protected]
HOW TO UNSUBSCRIBE
Send an e-mail to [email protected]
NEWS BROADCASTS ONLINE
Listen to news for the South Slavic region daily at RFE/RL's
24-Hour LIVE Broadcast Studio on the RFE/RL website:
http://www.rferl.org/listen/
____________ _______________________________________________
RA DIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
_________________________________________ __________________
RFE/RL Balkan Report
Vol. 10, No. 11, 28 November 2006
A Weekly Review of Politics, Media, and Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty Broadcasts in the western Balkans
NOTE TO READERS: The next issue of "RFE/RL Balkan Report" will
appear on January 23, 2007.
******************************************* *****************
HEADLINES:
* CROATIAN PRESIDENT DISCUSSES BALKAN CONFLICT, KOSOVA STATUS
* KOSOVA ENTERS THE HOME STRETCH
****************************************** ******************
CROATIAN PRESIDENT DISCUSSES BALKAN CONFLICT, KOSOVA STATUS. Croatian
President Stjepan Mesic told RFE/RL's South Slavic and Albanian
Languages Service in Prague on November 14 that the destruction of
the Croatian Danube port town of Vukovar 15 years ago was part of
then Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's plans to establish a
Greater Serbia by force. The big losers in Milosevic's wars,
Mesic argued, were nonetheless the Serbs themselves.
Mesic argued that Milosevic thought in 1991 that he could
"fool the world" into thinking he was determined to preserve the
Yugoslav state when, in reality, he was trying to expand Serbia's
boundaries into neighboring Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. "His goal
was to establish a Greater Serbia," Mesic said.
In doing so, Milosevic tricked Serbian minorities outside
Serbia by telling them he would not leave them outside Serbia's
frontiers, and he led some of them to believe they would have a
privileged status in his new state. In the end, however, all this
came to nothing. Even his former allies in Montenegro deserted him
and have now formed their own independent state.
Mesic said he is not sure the time is now ripe for him to
invite to Vukovar his Serbian counterpart, Boris Tadic, but added
that "it would be a good [idea]."
He stressed that what happened in Vukovar was "a big crime,
even a crime of genocide." To the extent that people recall what
happened in Vukovar and honor the victims, they have taken one more
step toward ensuring that something like the destruction of that town
"will never happen again," he said.
Mesic said the time has come to resolve the question of
Kosova's status because the current "status quo cannot remain in
the long run." It also seems to Mesic unreasonable to expect the
issue to be resolved by direct talks between Prishtina and Belgrade,
since Kosova's ethnic Albanian majority wants only independence,
to which the Serbs will never agree. Consequently, Mesic told RFE/RL,
"the international community has to help."
Like many observers, Mesic argues that the most likely
outcome is that Kosova will become independent, but on the condition
that it observes "those standards [of conduct] that apply in Europe."
He identifies these principles as respect for "civil rights,
multiparty political pluralism, protection of national minorities,
freedom of the media, functioning [state] institutions, the
separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches, and protection for religious and historical monuments."
He added that the Kosovars will also probably be asked to
guarantee that they will not seek to form a "Greater Albania," which,
however, is not seriously sought by any leading Kosovar or Albanian
political party.
Mesic cautioned against hasty judgments regarding Zeljko
Komsic, the new Croatian representative on the Bosnian tripartite
Presidency. Mesic noted that many Croats have suggested that Komsic
might not "defend Croatian interests" because he does not belong to a
nationalist party -- he is a social democrat -- and because he fought
in the mainly Muslim Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than in the
mainly Herzegovinian Croatian Defense Council (HVO) during the
1992-95 conflict.
"What do people expect?" Mesic asked rhetorically. "That he
should have served in the Army of the Republika Srpska? It is quite
normal that one should have fought for Bosnia-Herzegovina."
Mesic argued, moreover, that Bosnia's problem is that it
needs to form a functioning state and get away from a tendency of its
two constituent entities to behave as though they were states.
"They're not," he said starkly.
Mesic is one of the best-known figures on the political stage
of former Yugoslavia and has been prominent in Croatian politics for
most of the time since at least 1990, when he became prime minister.
It was the move in May 1991 by Milosevic and his allies in the
eight-member collective Yugoslav Presidency to block Mesic's
assumption of the rotating chair of that body -- a move that would
have been routine under normal circumstances -- that triggered the
decisions of Croatia and Slovenia to declare independence in June.
Mesic returned to Croatia, where he was a member of President
Franjo Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ). In 1994 he
broke with Tudjman and the HDZ over the conduct of the war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and eventually found his political home in the
smaller Croatian People's Party (HNS).
When Tudjman died in office at the end of 1999, most Croats
were clearly eager to break with a style of rule that was widely seen
as paternalistic, pompous, and rooted in the 1991-95 war. Mesic was
first elected to the presidency in early 2000 and quickly established
himself as Croatia's most respected politician. He adopted a more
folksy style than that of his predecessor, whose stiffness was often
the butt of jokes.
Mesic also worked to break the power of the "Herzegovinian
lobby" in Croatian politics, and there is still little love lost
between him and the HDZ in Herzegovina. He has also been at odds with
organized war veterans groups, who regard him as insufficiently
nationalistic. Mesic and most Croatian political leaders since 2000
have made it clear that they want to put the war era behind them and
concentrate on raising the standard of living and on joining the EU
and NATO.
In the early years of his presidency, Mesic used the more
informal version of his first name, Stipe, although in recent years
he has usually gone by Stjepan. In a marked contrast with
Tudjman's aloof style, Mesic traveled to the Dalmatian islands
with a regularly scheduled ferry rather than with a presidential
yacht and drank wine on the docks with fellow passengers.
Although critics have charged in recent years that he has
come to mimic the presidential style of the late Josip Broz Tito and
has drifted politically too far to the left, he has generally kept
the office free of the taint of corruption and nepotism that
blemished Tudjman's rule (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," September
26, 2006). (Patrick Moore)
KOSOVA ENTERS THE HOME STRETCH. The international community has put
off settling Kosova's final status until shortly after the
Serbian elections slated for January 21, 2007. But the delay seems
unlikely to affect the outcome, which will in all probability be a
conditional independence.
By late 2005, the leadership of the UN, at the recommendation
of special envoy Kai Eide, concluded that leaving Kosova's
political status unresolved had become a major source of problems for
the province and the region as a whole. The continuing uncertainty
had already played a role in the triggering and spread of violence
among some of the ethnic Albanian majority in March 2004 and remained
a potential source of future unrest. The lack of clarity also
discouraged the investment necessary to deal with large-scale
unemployment and jump-start the economy among people who have often
displayed sharp business acumen when provided with a clear legal
framework, as Kosovars have done in countries like Croatia,
Switzerland, or Germany (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," December 17,
2004, and June 27, September 26 and October 24, 2006).
The decision on Kosova's final status had been expected
by the end of 2006, and many Kosovars became apprehensive when the
postponement was announced recently. But the delay seems designed
only to minimize the effect of the issue on the Serbian vote and is
probably unlikely to impact on the substance of the UN's final
statement on status. That would appear to be a form of independence
-- which is the only outcome acceptable to the 90 percent Albanian
majority -- albeit with a continuing foreign presence to ensure the
safety and rights of the minorities, particularly the Serbs, and
their cultural institutions. The EU will most likely replace the UN
at the heart of the foreign civilian presence, but is expected to
have a less powerful mandate than it currently does in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
UN envoy for Kosova Martti Ahtisaari is expected to make his
announcement regarding the province's status in February 2007.
Numerous media reports have suggested that U.S. and British diplomats
have recently reassured Kosovar Albanian leaders that just a little
more patience will pay dividends for them and warned them against any
hasty moves, such as issuing a widely rumored unilateral declaration
of independence if the decision on the final status continues to be
delayed. Those media reports indicate that the Kosovars have accepted
the assurances of Washington and London.
Lest anyone forget the stakes involved in finalizing
Kosova's status, Prime Minister Agim Ceku wrote in "The Wall
Street Journal" of November 20 that "expectations in Kosova are
high.... It is ready for independence, and now is not the time to
stop the clock." He added that "we need to keep the process of
statehood on track. Kosova needs clarity to complete reforms and to
attract vital international investments, but also so that our own
people -- and especially our Serb minority -- can escape the
debilitating worries and uncertainty and start to build a future.
Their home and future are in Kosova."
Ceku argued that "the biggest problem in the western Balkans
is economic malaise.... Belgrade is not interested in investing in
the development of Kosova, and Kosova is not interested in a
political union with Serbia. But we are interested in developing a
productive bilateral partnership with Serbia, just as we're doing
with our other neighbors." He believes that "social and economic
progress in the region will be the big losers if we don't make
the bold step forward to independence. The entire western Balkan
region needs a kick start in order to catch the EU train and catch up
with the awesome economic growth of our EU-bound neighbors, Romania
and Bulgaria."
He noted that "we have a young population and a positive
birthrate. Given the shortages in the EU labor market due to negative
demographic trends, Kosova can help fill the void. To do so, we need
to retrain our work force. Hence we're now investing in
education."
Ceku also reminded Brussels that it cannot afford to forget
its goal of "a Europe whole and free." He might have added that it is
the question of Euro-Atlantic integration, perhaps more so than even
the issue of Kosova's final status, that will be the determining
factor for the peace and prosperity of the entire region. (Patrick
Moore)
NOTABLE QUOTATIONS. "The boys and girls of the [1998-99] war are
still alive, they are in Kosova. They are ready to protect the
freedom of Kosova. Nobody gave them weapons, they found them
themselves, they can find them again. Their blood remains the same."
-- Azem Syla, former commander in chief of the Kosova Liberation Army
(UCK). Quoted in "Koha Ditore" of October 26.
"By defending Kosovo we are defending more than our own
interest and more that the issue of stability and piece in the
region. We are defending international law." -- Serbian Prime
Minister Vojislav Kostunica on voter approval of the new Serbian
Constitution on October 29. Quoted by RFE/RL. The document explicitly
lays claim to Kosova, where Serbian writ has not run since June,
1999.
"Delay [in clarifying Kosova's final status] offers no
advantages to any party. Negotiations should be concluded. Delay can
only frustrate the hopes of those who live in Kosovo and deny clarity
to Serbians as they think about their own future." -- The U.S.
representative at the talks on Kosova, Frank Wisner, speaking on
October 31 at a news conference at the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade.
Quoted by RFE/RL.
(Compiled by Patrick Moore)
******************************************* **************
Copyright (c) 2006. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.
The "RFE/RL Balkan Report" is prepared by Patrick Moore based on
sources including reporting by RFE/RL's South Slavic and Albanian
Languages Service. It is distributed monthly.
Direct content-related comments to Patrick Moore in Prague at
[email protected] or by phone at (+4202) 2112-3631.
For information on reprints, see:
http://www.rferl.org/about/content/request.as p
Back issues are online at http://www.rferl.org/reports/balkan-report/
Techn ical queries should be e-mailed to: [email protected]
HOW TO SUBSCRIBE
Send an e-mail to [email protected]
HOW TO UNSUBSCRIBE
Send an e-mail to [email protected]
NEWS BROADCASTS ONLINE
Listen to news for the South Slavic region daily at RFE/RL's
24-Hour LIVE Broadcast Studio on the RFE/RL website:
http://www.rferl.org/listen/
____________ _______________________________________________
RA DIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress