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The Athens proposals: Armenia faces a difficult choice
The Civilitas Foundation
Tuesday, 16 February 2010 09:12 | Tatul Hakobyan |
Analysis / Armenia
Azerbaijan's minister of foreign affairs has found generally
acceptable the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs' new version of the
principles for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, proposed last
December in Greece. This is the first occasion since 1997 that Baku
has found the mediators' proposal acceptable.
Now, it is Armenia's turn and it will be difficult for Armenia to say
"Yes" to the version that took shape first in Krakow in July 2009,
then in Athens at the end of 2009 and then in Sochi on January 25,
2010, because in contrast to the 2007 Madrid proposals, not only is
the right of the people of Nagorno Karabakh to self-determination very
vague, but in terms of removing the consequences of the conflict,
Azerbaijan is at an advantage.
Since 1997, Azerbaijan has either rejected or withheld consent to all
settlement proposals; it also rejected the Madrid document presented
in 2007. And now, over the course of a mere two years, the mediators
have presented proposals which are acceptable to Azerbaijan and
unacceptable for Armenia. Refusing the mediators' proposal comes at a
price. And what is very important is who does the rejecting, and on
what basis. Especially since proposals are the outcome of a
negotiations process, the negotiating sides are equally responsible
for the contents of a proposal.
In recent months, there has been a marked change in the announcements
made by the Armenian side and in Serzh Sargsyan's speech in London,
which is probably conditioned by the unpleasant developments
anticipated in the Karabakh issue for Armenia. It felt as if in London
President Sargsyan was saying "No" to the most recent updated proposal
by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs.
President Sargsyan's speech in London, in terms of its emphasis, was
very similar to Armenia's first President, Levon Ter-Petrossian's
speech in Lisbon, at the OSCE Summit, in December 1996. The
international community, with the Swiss at the helm (at that time the
OSCE chairman-in-office was Switzerland) and under
Turkish-Russian-American pressure, was attempting to force a
resolution; however, Armenia refused and explained why that which the
international community wanted to impose was unacceptable.
There is no doubt that President Sargsyan is also right if he is
rejecting the new Athens proposal for the resolution of the Karabakh
conflict, which the Azerbaijani president found acceptable in Sochi,
creating an extremely uncomfortable situation for the Armenian
president. Those proposals, which are unfavorable for Nagorno
Karabkah, must be rejected. And in general, any proposal which does
not clearly secure the right to self-determination for the people of
Nagorno Karabakh, even as it offers Azerbaijan the prospect of
territories being returned, must be rejected.
But another passage in President Sargsyan's London speech is
illogical, where he expresses his willingness to invite Ilham Aliyev
to the ceremony of the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border. This
may appear to be a diplomatic innovation to many. In reality, if
Turkey opens the border then Aliyev's participation with Gul and
Sargsyan at the ceremony, might mean that in return for an open
border, Armenia has made concessions to Azerbaijan on the Nagorno
Karabakh issue.
The frenzy with which Armenian authorities are chasing Turkey is
incomprehensible and dangerous; this was further manifested on the
journey to Great Britain. The closer the lifting of the blockade by
Turkey, the more real will become the danger of ceding lands in
Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia may simply be faced with a nightmare of a
decision. It will be the Armenian authorities who will be solely
responsible and guilty in this, for not having realized until the end,
or not wanting to admit, that the two processes are linked to each
other. The nearer we get to Armenia-Turkey rapprochement, the nearer
we will be to ceding land in the NK issue without getting anything in
return on Karabakh's status - something which is unacceptable for the
Armenian people and a dangerous prospect for the Armenian authorities.
The Turks have, on many occasions, said that they will not open the
border and by sending messages to Gul, Armenia is making it easy for
the Turks. Receiving similar messages from Armenia only serves one
objective - successfully overcoming another `April 24.'
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
The Civilitas Foundation
Tuesday, 16 February 2010 09:12 | Tatul Hakobyan |
Analysis / Armenia
Azerbaijan's minister of foreign affairs has found generally
acceptable the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs' new version of the
principles for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, proposed last
December in Greece. This is the first occasion since 1997 that Baku
has found the mediators' proposal acceptable.
Now, it is Armenia's turn and it will be difficult for Armenia to say
"Yes" to the version that took shape first in Krakow in July 2009,
then in Athens at the end of 2009 and then in Sochi on January 25,
2010, because in contrast to the 2007 Madrid proposals, not only is
the right of the people of Nagorno Karabakh to self-determination very
vague, but in terms of removing the consequences of the conflict,
Azerbaijan is at an advantage.
Since 1997, Azerbaijan has either rejected or withheld consent to all
settlement proposals; it also rejected the Madrid document presented
in 2007. And now, over the course of a mere two years, the mediators
have presented proposals which are acceptable to Azerbaijan and
unacceptable for Armenia. Refusing the mediators' proposal comes at a
price. And what is very important is who does the rejecting, and on
what basis. Especially since proposals are the outcome of a
negotiations process, the negotiating sides are equally responsible
for the contents of a proposal.
In recent months, there has been a marked change in the announcements
made by the Armenian side and in Serzh Sargsyan's speech in London,
which is probably conditioned by the unpleasant developments
anticipated in the Karabakh issue for Armenia. It felt as if in London
President Sargsyan was saying "No" to the most recent updated proposal
by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs.
President Sargsyan's speech in London, in terms of its emphasis, was
very similar to Armenia's first President, Levon Ter-Petrossian's
speech in Lisbon, at the OSCE Summit, in December 1996. The
international community, with the Swiss at the helm (at that time the
OSCE chairman-in-office was Switzerland) and under
Turkish-Russian-American pressure, was attempting to force a
resolution; however, Armenia refused and explained why that which the
international community wanted to impose was unacceptable.
There is no doubt that President Sargsyan is also right if he is
rejecting the new Athens proposal for the resolution of the Karabakh
conflict, which the Azerbaijani president found acceptable in Sochi,
creating an extremely uncomfortable situation for the Armenian
president. Those proposals, which are unfavorable for Nagorno
Karabkah, must be rejected. And in general, any proposal which does
not clearly secure the right to self-determination for the people of
Nagorno Karabakh, even as it offers Azerbaijan the prospect of
territories being returned, must be rejected.
But another passage in President Sargsyan's London speech is
illogical, where he expresses his willingness to invite Ilham Aliyev
to the ceremony of the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border. This
may appear to be a diplomatic innovation to many. In reality, if
Turkey opens the border then Aliyev's participation with Gul and
Sargsyan at the ceremony, might mean that in return for an open
border, Armenia has made concessions to Azerbaijan on the Nagorno
Karabakh issue.
The frenzy with which Armenian authorities are chasing Turkey is
incomprehensible and dangerous; this was further manifested on the
journey to Great Britain. The closer the lifting of the blockade by
Turkey, the more real will become the danger of ceding lands in
Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia may simply be faced with a nightmare of a
decision. It will be the Armenian authorities who will be solely
responsible and guilty in this, for not having realized until the end,
or not wanting to admit, that the two processes are linked to each
other. The nearer we get to Armenia-Turkey rapprochement, the nearer
we will be to ceding land in the NK issue without getting anything in
return on Karabakh's status - something which is unacceptable for the
Armenian people and a dangerous prospect for the Armenian authorities.
The Turks have, on many occasions, said that they will not open the
border and by sending messages to Gul, Armenia is making it easy for
the Turks. Receiving similar messages from Armenia only serves one
objective - successfully overcoming another `April 24.'
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress