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ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN MAY SIGN FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT THIS YEAR - ANALYST
Kamala Mammadova
news.az
Feb 23 2010
Azerbaijan
Stepan Grigoryan News.Az interviews Stepan Grigoryan, head of
Armenian think-tank the Analytical Centre on Globalization and
Regional Cooperation.
How would you comment on Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan's speeches
during his visit to Great Britain?
You are probably thinking of the president's speech at the Royal
Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House). I think the speech
clearly sets out the position of the current leadership of the country
on two important international issues:
1. Readiness to normalize relations with Turkey without prerequisites.
In the case of the ratification of the Armenian-Turkish protocols
this means the recognition of the current Armenian-Turkish border
and a temporary "freeze" on the process of international recognition
of the Armenian genocide committed in the Ottoman Empire in 1915
(this position is extremely close to the policy of Armenia's first
president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan).
2. Unwillingness to make serious concessions on the Karabakh issue.
Indeed, Serzh Sargsyan focused on the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh has
never been part of independent Azerbaijan and that it was included
in Azerbaijan by decision of the party body of the Soviet Union,
that Azerbaijan has exhausted reserves of trust in relation to the
existence of national autonomies within it (he cited the example
of the Nakhchivan autonomy where there is not a single Armenian)
and the fact that today Nagorno-Karabakh is a formed state with its
institutions. All these views completely coincide with the position
of official Yerevan during the presidency of Robert Kocharyan.
I would like to say that the position on Karabakh of the current
Armenian authorities can be explained both by the rigidity of
Azerbaijan's position in the negotiations and by the fact that
in conditions of weak legitimacy it would be extremely difficult
and risky for our authorities to make concessions in two areas:
Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani. We should also take into
account the fact that public sentiments in Armenia show a greater
interest in options for "freezing" the Karabakh conflict and not the
risky options for a conflict settlement, including concessions and
compromises with Azerbaijan.
We believe the resolution of the Karabakh conflict depends on many
factors, both external and internal, therefore, one should not hope
for a quick result, not least because of the high level of distrust in
Armenian and Azerbaijani society. In addition, there is an impression
that not all "external" players are interested in the resolution of
the conflict as soon as possible, that is, they understand that they
can lose the last "lever" of influence on Azerbaijan.
I would also like to say that despite serious differences in the
positions of the parties and the impossibility of the imminent signing
of a comprehensive peace treaty, the signing of a framework agreement
between Armenia and Azerbaijan is not ruled out in the coming months.
The agreement could be based on the updated Madrid principles that
contain all the elements concerning all parties of the conflict. So
quite significant progress could be made in the negotiating process
within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group.
The Armenian-Turkish protocols have been sent to the Armenian
parliament. What will be the next step?
I think the Armenian-Turkish protocols will be ratified by the
National Assembly of Armenia in the next two to three weeks. I would
like to say that in November last year we drew the attention of the
Armenian authorities and public to the fact that Armenia must ratify
the protocols without delay in order to show the world that it is a
predictable and reliable partner that fulfills its obligations. Albeit
with a delay, the Armenian leadership and the political elite have
realized this.
The Armenian side says that it will ratify the protocols only after the
relevant decision by the Turkish parliament. In turn, the Turkish side
has repeatedly said that it will never normalize ties without progress
on Karabakh. Doesn't this mean that the process of normalization of
Armenian-Turkish relations has entered deadlock?
The process of ratification of the Armenian-Turkish protocols may
be protracted, but I do not think that it will enter deadlock or be
frustrated. Turkey's foreign policy has experienced significant changes
in the past few years. Thus, Turkey has recognized the interests of
Russia and Iran in the South Caucasus, started dialogue with Syria,
signed gas contracts with Iran, recognized Kosovo's independence
and provides serious support to Abkhazia. This list is long. Thus,
the normalization of relations with Armenia fully complies with the
new foreign policy of Turkey.
Indeed, it is impossible to take into account the interests of Russia
and Iran in the South Caucasus, wish to raise one's role in the region
and, at the same time, keep the border with Armenia closed. This
means that the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations has
objective grounds.
Do you think the Armenian-Turkish border will be opened soon?
It is necessary to separate the two processes: the opening of the
Armenian-Turkish border and ratification of the protocols. I am sure
that the Armenian-Turkish protocols will be ratified even with delays.
As for the working regime of the Armenian-Turkish border, much here
will depend on the dynamics of the Karabakh conflict settlement,
despite the fact that the protocols fix the terms for the opening of
the Armenian-Turkish border when they are ratified.
The OSCE chairman-in-office, Kazakh Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev,
has visited the region. What can Kazakhstan's role be in the resolution
of the Karabakh conflict? Do you expect achievements during its
chairmanship?
The country chairing the OSCE sets its priorities for its
chairmanship. In this case, Kazakhstan cited the Karabakh conflict
settlement as one of its priorities. In this context the visit of the
OSCE chairman-in-office to the region to learn the positions of the
conflict parties is quite clear and motivated. As for the resolution
of the Karabakh conflict, Kanat Saudabayev said: "As the chairing
country, we are working on a 'roadmap' to support efforts aimed at
the establishment of peace between the conflict parties." As Armenia
and Azerbaijan enjoy quite good trust with Kazakhstan, the initiatives
of the Kazakh leadership may put a new complexion on the negotiating
process on a Karabakh settlement.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Kamala Mammadova
news.az
Feb 23 2010
Azerbaijan
Stepan Grigoryan News.Az interviews Stepan Grigoryan, head of
Armenian think-tank the Analytical Centre on Globalization and
Regional Cooperation.
How would you comment on Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan's speeches
during his visit to Great Britain?
You are probably thinking of the president's speech at the Royal
Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House). I think the speech
clearly sets out the position of the current leadership of the country
on two important international issues:
1. Readiness to normalize relations with Turkey without prerequisites.
In the case of the ratification of the Armenian-Turkish protocols
this means the recognition of the current Armenian-Turkish border
and a temporary "freeze" on the process of international recognition
of the Armenian genocide committed in the Ottoman Empire in 1915
(this position is extremely close to the policy of Armenia's first
president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan).
2. Unwillingness to make serious concessions on the Karabakh issue.
Indeed, Serzh Sargsyan focused on the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh has
never been part of independent Azerbaijan and that it was included
in Azerbaijan by decision of the party body of the Soviet Union,
that Azerbaijan has exhausted reserves of trust in relation to the
existence of national autonomies within it (he cited the example
of the Nakhchivan autonomy where there is not a single Armenian)
and the fact that today Nagorno-Karabakh is a formed state with its
institutions. All these views completely coincide with the position
of official Yerevan during the presidency of Robert Kocharyan.
I would like to say that the position on Karabakh of the current
Armenian authorities can be explained both by the rigidity of
Azerbaijan's position in the negotiations and by the fact that
in conditions of weak legitimacy it would be extremely difficult
and risky for our authorities to make concessions in two areas:
Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani. We should also take into
account the fact that public sentiments in Armenia show a greater
interest in options for "freezing" the Karabakh conflict and not the
risky options for a conflict settlement, including concessions and
compromises with Azerbaijan.
We believe the resolution of the Karabakh conflict depends on many
factors, both external and internal, therefore, one should not hope
for a quick result, not least because of the high level of distrust in
Armenian and Azerbaijani society. In addition, there is an impression
that not all "external" players are interested in the resolution of
the conflict as soon as possible, that is, they understand that they
can lose the last "lever" of influence on Azerbaijan.
I would also like to say that despite serious differences in the
positions of the parties and the impossibility of the imminent signing
of a comprehensive peace treaty, the signing of a framework agreement
between Armenia and Azerbaijan is not ruled out in the coming months.
The agreement could be based on the updated Madrid principles that
contain all the elements concerning all parties of the conflict. So
quite significant progress could be made in the negotiating process
within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group.
The Armenian-Turkish protocols have been sent to the Armenian
parliament. What will be the next step?
I think the Armenian-Turkish protocols will be ratified by the
National Assembly of Armenia in the next two to three weeks. I would
like to say that in November last year we drew the attention of the
Armenian authorities and public to the fact that Armenia must ratify
the protocols without delay in order to show the world that it is a
predictable and reliable partner that fulfills its obligations. Albeit
with a delay, the Armenian leadership and the political elite have
realized this.
The Armenian side says that it will ratify the protocols only after the
relevant decision by the Turkish parliament. In turn, the Turkish side
has repeatedly said that it will never normalize ties without progress
on Karabakh. Doesn't this mean that the process of normalization of
Armenian-Turkish relations has entered deadlock?
The process of ratification of the Armenian-Turkish protocols may
be protracted, but I do not think that it will enter deadlock or be
frustrated. Turkey's foreign policy has experienced significant changes
in the past few years. Thus, Turkey has recognized the interests of
Russia and Iran in the South Caucasus, started dialogue with Syria,
signed gas contracts with Iran, recognized Kosovo's independence
and provides serious support to Abkhazia. This list is long. Thus,
the normalization of relations with Armenia fully complies with the
new foreign policy of Turkey.
Indeed, it is impossible to take into account the interests of Russia
and Iran in the South Caucasus, wish to raise one's role in the region
and, at the same time, keep the border with Armenia closed. This
means that the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations has
objective grounds.
Do you think the Armenian-Turkish border will be opened soon?
It is necessary to separate the two processes: the opening of the
Armenian-Turkish border and ratification of the protocols. I am sure
that the Armenian-Turkish protocols will be ratified even with delays.
As for the working regime of the Armenian-Turkish border, much here
will depend on the dynamics of the Karabakh conflict settlement,
despite the fact that the protocols fix the terms for the opening of
the Armenian-Turkish border when they are ratified.
The OSCE chairman-in-office, Kazakh Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev,
has visited the region. What can Kazakhstan's role be in the resolution
of the Karabakh conflict? Do you expect achievements during its
chairmanship?
The country chairing the OSCE sets its priorities for its
chairmanship. In this case, Kazakhstan cited the Karabakh conflict
settlement as one of its priorities. In this context the visit of the
OSCE chairman-in-office to the region to learn the positions of the
conflict parties is quite clear and motivated. As for the resolution
of the Karabakh conflict, Kanat Saudabayev said: "As the chairing
country, we are working on a 'roadmap' to support efforts aimed at
the establishment of peace between the conflict parties." As Armenia
and Azerbaijan enjoy quite good trust with Kazakhstan, the initiatives
of the Kazakh leadership may put a new complexion on the negotiating
process on a Karabakh settlement.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress