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GAYANE NOVIKOVA: "IT IS OBVIOUS THAT RUSSIA IS NOT INTERESTED IN A CLEAR DEFINITION OF ITS POSITION ON THE NAGORNO KARABAKH CONFLICT"
by David Stepanyan
arminfo
Wednesday, July 25, 07:49
ArmInfo's interview with Gayane Novikova, Director of the Center for
Strategic Analysis Spectrum, Visiting Researcher at the Davis Center
for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University
Dr. Novikova, several analysts, including the Azerbaijani, argue
that only Russia is able to influence the parties to the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict and to push forward its own option of the conflict
resolution. In your opinion, should such a vision of the problem be
considered as well-grounded?
At a glance, the vision that Russia is the only state able to resolve
the Nagorno Karabakh conflict has some reasons. Russia is a major
actor in the South Caucasus. It considers this region as an area
of its interests (I would like to remind you that there was even a
saying "the area of privileged interests"); it has a certain leverage
of influence upon internal and external developments in each of the
states and the state entities of the region. It builds relationships
with both Armenia and Azerbaijan exclusively pragmatically, on the
basis of its strategic interests.
I doubt that Russia has its special plan for resolution of the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict. However, it is obvious that it is not interested
in a clear definition and the introduction of its position on this
issue, because otherwise it comes down on the side of either Armenia
or Azerbaijan, thereby narrowing its strategic space. Taking into
consideration the level of the Russian-Georgian relations, Russia
cannot allow itself to have another "reluctant" neighbor as a result
of a choice between the states involved in the above-mentioned
Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Thus, Russia is in favor of the status
quo established in the area of the conflict.
Let me remind you that the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, as well
as the Presidents of Russia, the USA, and France, have been issued
several statements pointing out that the Nagorno Karabakh conflict
can be - and should be - resolved only by its direct participants. In
general, they are right.
2. In your opinion, are Armenia and Azerbaijan able to stop
the meaningless bloodshed along the borders without any external
assistance? Or, maybe we should apply for help to the international
community, taking into consideration that there is a threat that
subversive acts will turn into a resumption of full-scale war?
Most probably, subversive acts in the absence of the comprehensive
peace agreement are unavoidable. The problem is that the number of
these acts is increasing, and in parallel the number of victims from
both sides is growing. The so-called international community has its
own array of other problems, and the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict is not among its priorities. Thus, the proverb "people in
trouble are left to themselves" is applicable in the case of this
conflict. Furthermore, to stop the bloodshed along the contact line
there should be not only good will of the parties directly involved
in the conflict, but also their recognition of the meaningless of
this bloodshed.
In the case of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict it has not happened
because Azerbaijan must demonstrate its firm commitment to return
the territories that are currently under the Armenian control at
all costs. ôhat is, for Azerbaijan the tactic of provoking the two
Armenian parties to the conflict to respond is not meaningless:
on the one hand, Azerbaijani authorities stress the priority of the
conflict resolution while simultaneously intensifying the militaristic
mood in their society. On the other hand - when Armenia acts in
response - they acquire an opportunity to blame our state for its
"aggressive behavior." The Armenian side repeatedly has suggested,
and still suggests, a withdrawal of the snipers from the contact
line. However, Azerbaijan, in line with the above-mentioned approach,
cannot take even this step - because it will be evaluated throughout
the Azerbaijani society as a concession to Armenia and a reversal of
the national goal. Moreover, Azerbaijan comprehends also a threat
of a further escalation as a consequence of a tough response of
the two Armenian state entities and the negative reaction of the
international community.
3. The military actions along the border with Armenia cannot give
rise to a withdrawal of Armenian forces from the territories which
Azerbaijan considers as its own. At a glance, Baku could not be
interested in an escalation of tensions in the northern side of the
Armenian-Azerbaijani state border - for the reason that it could be
evaluated by Armenia as good reason to apply for help to the CSTO
member-states, and to Russia in particular. Why, in your opinion,
does Azerbaijan increase provocations in this direction, but not along
the contact line between the Karabakhi and Azerbaijani military forces?
I suppose that on the one hand Azerbaijan is probing the defense line
of Armenia; on the other hand it is checking Russia's reaction - as the
leading state in the CSTO - in the event of a possible large-scale
military operation against Armenia. (I exclude any support for
Armenia from the Central-Asian states and Kazakhstan; most probably
they will stay neutral if military actions resume directly between
Armenia and Azerbaijan.) As another factor I would mention the joint
military maneuvers of the CSTO Collective Operational Reaction Forces
(CORF) "Cooperation 2012." They will take place on Armenian soil in
early September and will be focused upon the repulson of a possible
military attack against Armenia. These maneuvers increase nervousness
not only in Georgia, but in Azerbaijan, as well. The latter "warns"
Armenia and demonstrates its operational readiness.
4. In your opinion, is there any possibility that Moscow can repeat
the August 8, 2008 scenario if the Nagorno Karabakh conflict develops
into a full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan?
No, none. However, currently Russia focuses upon mechanisms to prevent
escalation of the conflict that could have unpredictable consequences.
First, it will be very difficult for Moscow to decide which of the
parties to the conflict to support. Second, in the August war of 2008,
it had two pretexts to intervention: the Russian peacekeepers in the
area of the South Ossetian conflict, and the approximately 96-97%
of the South Ossetia population holding Russian citizenship.
5. Among the negotiation themes during the recent visit of Hillary
Clinton to Armenia and Azerbaijan was the Nagorno Karabakh problem.
The US Secretary of State mentioned also that there are some positive
shifts occurred after the Paris meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani
Ministers of Foreign Affairs. However, there have been no visible
changes or shifts in regard to conflict resolution. What is the
purpose of the American diplomacy in regard to this kind of statements?
On the eve of the presidential elections and with growing internal
tension in the USA, American diplomacy needs to demonstrate success in
the foreign policy area safeguarding some stability in the overt and
latent "hot spots." Turkey was in the focus of Mrs. Clinton's regional
visit; the stopover in Yerevan and Baku was rather a PR-action to
confirm Washington's interest in stability in the South Caucasus and
to balance the Kremlin activity in this region.
6. What trends can you mention in the current foreign policy of
Armenia in regard in particular to the European integration and the
integration to the Eurasian Union initiated by Vladimir Putin?
Armenia faces the difficult task of preserving the essential balance
in its foreign policy. The European and the Russian initiatives
(the Free trade zone, and the Eurasian Union and Customs Union,
respectively) have their pluses and minuses. European integration
does not assume membership of our state in the European Union, which
conducts soft power initiatives in the South Caucasus and is not
ready to implement and support high cost economic projects. However,
intensification of cooperation with the EU will enable Armenia to
enlarge its political and economic opportunities and contribute to the
further democratization of the country. It can play also an indirect
role in the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.
As for the Russian initiatives, let me remind you that Armenia's
decision not to participate in the Customs Union with Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus fits fully with the desire to correct and
balance, above all, the political priorities of Armenia. The level
of bilateral relations between Armenia and these three states, all
of which are members of the Customs Union, is very high, especially
with Russia. And, finally, all have signed agreements on free trade
areas in the CIS.
Most probably, Russia will pressure Armenia hard, trying to involve
it in these projects. To achieve this goal Russia will use not only
its economic leverage (such as energy supplies), but also the factor
of unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict, as well as the state of
Armenian political forces in the 2013 presidential elections.
From: Baghdasarian
by David Stepanyan
arminfo
Wednesday, July 25, 07:49
ArmInfo's interview with Gayane Novikova, Director of the Center for
Strategic Analysis Spectrum, Visiting Researcher at the Davis Center
for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University
Dr. Novikova, several analysts, including the Azerbaijani, argue
that only Russia is able to influence the parties to the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict and to push forward its own option of the conflict
resolution. In your opinion, should such a vision of the problem be
considered as well-grounded?
At a glance, the vision that Russia is the only state able to resolve
the Nagorno Karabakh conflict has some reasons. Russia is a major
actor in the South Caucasus. It considers this region as an area
of its interests (I would like to remind you that there was even a
saying "the area of privileged interests"); it has a certain leverage
of influence upon internal and external developments in each of the
states and the state entities of the region. It builds relationships
with both Armenia and Azerbaijan exclusively pragmatically, on the
basis of its strategic interests.
I doubt that Russia has its special plan for resolution of the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict. However, it is obvious that it is not interested
in a clear definition and the introduction of its position on this
issue, because otherwise it comes down on the side of either Armenia
or Azerbaijan, thereby narrowing its strategic space. Taking into
consideration the level of the Russian-Georgian relations, Russia
cannot allow itself to have another "reluctant" neighbor as a result
of a choice between the states involved in the above-mentioned
Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Thus, Russia is in favor of the status
quo established in the area of the conflict.
Let me remind you that the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, as well
as the Presidents of Russia, the USA, and France, have been issued
several statements pointing out that the Nagorno Karabakh conflict
can be - and should be - resolved only by its direct participants. In
general, they are right.
2. In your opinion, are Armenia and Azerbaijan able to stop
the meaningless bloodshed along the borders without any external
assistance? Or, maybe we should apply for help to the international
community, taking into consideration that there is a threat that
subversive acts will turn into a resumption of full-scale war?
Most probably, subversive acts in the absence of the comprehensive
peace agreement are unavoidable. The problem is that the number of
these acts is increasing, and in parallel the number of victims from
both sides is growing. The so-called international community has its
own array of other problems, and the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict is not among its priorities. Thus, the proverb "people in
trouble are left to themselves" is applicable in the case of this
conflict. Furthermore, to stop the bloodshed along the contact line
there should be not only good will of the parties directly involved
in the conflict, but also their recognition of the meaningless of
this bloodshed.
In the case of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict it has not happened
because Azerbaijan must demonstrate its firm commitment to return
the territories that are currently under the Armenian control at
all costs. ôhat is, for Azerbaijan the tactic of provoking the two
Armenian parties to the conflict to respond is not meaningless:
on the one hand, Azerbaijani authorities stress the priority of the
conflict resolution while simultaneously intensifying the militaristic
mood in their society. On the other hand - when Armenia acts in
response - they acquire an opportunity to blame our state for its
"aggressive behavior." The Armenian side repeatedly has suggested,
and still suggests, a withdrawal of the snipers from the contact
line. However, Azerbaijan, in line with the above-mentioned approach,
cannot take even this step - because it will be evaluated throughout
the Azerbaijani society as a concession to Armenia and a reversal of
the national goal. Moreover, Azerbaijan comprehends also a threat
of a further escalation as a consequence of a tough response of
the two Armenian state entities and the negative reaction of the
international community.
3. The military actions along the border with Armenia cannot give
rise to a withdrawal of Armenian forces from the territories which
Azerbaijan considers as its own. At a glance, Baku could not be
interested in an escalation of tensions in the northern side of the
Armenian-Azerbaijani state border - for the reason that it could be
evaluated by Armenia as good reason to apply for help to the CSTO
member-states, and to Russia in particular. Why, in your opinion,
does Azerbaijan increase provocations in this direction, but not along
the contact line between the Karabakhi and Azerbaijani military forces?
I suppose that on the one hand Azerbaijan is probing the defense line
of Armenia; on the other hand it is checking Russia's reaction - as the
leading state in the CSTO - in the event of a possible large-scale
military operation against Armenia. (I exclude any support for
Armenia from the Central-Asian states and Kazakhstan; most probably
they will stay neutral if military actions resume directly between
Armenia and Azerbaijan.) As another factor I would mention the joint
military maneuvers of the CSTO Collective Operational Reaction Forces
(CORF) "Cooperation 2012." They will take place on Armenian soil in
early September and will be focused upon the repulson of a possible
military attack against Armenia. These maneuvers increase nervousness
not only in Georgia, but in Azerbaijan, as well. The latter "warns"
Armenia and demonstrates its operational readiness.
4. In your opinion, is there any possibility that Moscow can repeat
the August 8, 2008 scenario if the Nagorno Karabakh conflict develops
into a full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan?
No, none. However, currently Russia focuses upon mechanisms to prevent
escalation of the conflict that could have unpredictable consequences.
First, it will be very difficult for Moscow to decide which of the
parties to the conflict to support. Second, in the August war of 2008,
it had two pretexts to intervention: the Russian peacekeepers in the
area of the South Ossetian conflict, and the approximately 96-97%
of the South Ossetia population holding Russian citizenship.
5. Among the negotiation themes during the recent visit of Hillary
Clinton to Armenia and Azerbaijan was the Nagorno Karabakh problem.
The US Secretary of State mentioned also that there are some positive
shifts occurred after the Paris meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani
Ministers of Foreign Affairs. However, there have been no visible
changes or shifts in regard to conflict resolution. What is the
purpose of the American diplomacy in regard to this kind of statements?
On the eve of the presidential elections and with growing internal
tension in the USA, American diplomacy needs to demonstrate success in
the foreign policy area safeguarding some stability in the overt and
latent "hot spots." Turkey was in the focus of Mrs. Clinton's regional
visit; the stopover in Yerevan and Baku was rather a PR-action to
confirm Washington's interest in stability in the South Caucasus and
to balance the Kremlin activity in this region.
6. What trends can you mention in the current foreign policy of
Armenia in regard in particular to the European integration and the
integration to the Eurasian Union initiated by Vladimir Putin?
Armenia faces the difficult task of preserving the essential balance
in its foreign policy. The European and the Russian initiatives
(the Free trade zone, and the Eurasian Union and Customs Union,
respectively) have their pluses and minuses. European integration
does not assume membership of our state in the European Union, which
conducts soft power initiatives in the South Caucasus and is not
ready to implement and support high cost economic projects. However,
intensification of cooperation with the EU will enable Armenia to
enlarge its political and economic opportunities and contribute to the
further democratization of the country. It can play also an indirect
role in the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.
As for the Russian initiatives, let me remind you that Armenia's
decision not to participate in the Customs Union with Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus fits fully with the desire to correct and
balance, above all, the political priorities of Armenia. The level
of bilateral relations between Armenia and these three states, all
of which are members of the Customs Union, is very high, especially
with Russia. And, finally, all have signed agreements on free trade
areas in the CIS.
Most probably, Russia will pressure Armenia hard, trying to involve
it in these projects. To achieve this goal Russia will use not only
its economic leverage (such as energy supplies), but also the factor
of unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict, as well as the state of
Armenian political forces in the 2013 presidential elections.
From: Baghdasarian