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1919 A Summer of Insurgency

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  • 1919 A Summer of Insurgency

    1919 A SUMMER OF INSURGENCY

    The Sounds of August

    General Corey dared no longer risk the safety of his agents. Plowden had
    recently been the victim of Halil Bey's taunts. Rawlinson had beern recalled
    from Erzerum, and Prosser had failed in efforts to arrange a modus vivendi
    at Kars. Prosser, in his last reports to division headquarters, described
    the Armenians as so distressed that they tried to prevent his departure; it
    was only with much difficulty that he obtained transportation on the evening
    of August 30. His evaluation of the situation was grim. All available
    Armenian troops had been dispatched to Sarikamish and Kaghisman, and many
    wounded were being carried back from those fronts. Civilians had been
    forbidden to evacuate Kars, but some were fleeing by night. Prosser added: "
    The Armenians are undoubtedly depressed at the withdrawal of the British to
    whom in spite of frequent assurances to the contrary they had looked to the
    last for assistance on behalf of the Allies. They talk about fighting to the
    death, etc., but I think most of the fight in them went out with our
    departure." He ended with the following ominous prediction: "Taken all round
    the position of the Armenians in Kars province is not a happy one at the
    present moment.. They are surrounded by a hostile population and with the
    advent of the Turk, Kars as a portion of Armenia will most likely cease to
    exist."

    Colonel Plowden, taking leave of a tearful Armenian premier, departed from
    Erevan on August 28 as instructed. His final appraisal reflected the views
    of most British officers involved with the Armenians. Describing the tragic
    state of affairs, Plowden suggested that part of the trouble was the
    dominance of the Dashnaksutiun's Bureau, which prevailed over the moderates
    in government. The Dashnakists had led the bloody struggle for Armenian
    freedom and "as soldiers and patriots no praise is too high for them, but as
    politicians and administrators, they are grotesque and responsible for the
    hopeless condition of Armenian foreign and internal politics today." The
    educated and wealthy bourgeois classes of Baku, Tiflis, Rostov-on-Don, and
    other regions of the former Russian Empire were scarcely represented because
    of financial disorder, incessant warfare, and political pressure tactics.
    The people, weary and hungry, would welcome anybody who could bring peace
    and return them to their fields.

    A major source of Armenia's agony, wrote Plowden, was "the hope that some
    at least of all the outstanding promises that have been made her by the
    Allies, before, and since the war will be fulfilled." President Wilson's
    "self-determination" had given the Armenians reason to believe that the
    Allies, especially the United states, would send aid required to make their
    dreams become reality. Plowden felt that the Armenians were so desperate
    that they would have to sign a treaty with a nearby power, even if it meant
    the loss of their hard-won-independence, or else disappear.

    Only Armenia, Plowden continued, had remained loyal to the Allied cause,
    suffering terribly, whereas Azerbaijan had embraced the Turks and Georgia
    has assumed a pro-German and anti-Allied stance in 1918. These irrefutable
    facts made it all the more difficult for the Armenians to comprehend why
    they were not accorded equal treatment, since British regiments remained in
    Tiflis and Baku even as Erevan was being strangled. It was common knowledge
    that the Turks were supplying the insurgents with officers and arms, yet
    then British refused to provide the Armenians with rifles and ammunition for
    self-defense. And the award of Karabagh to Azerbaijan was the hardest blow
    of all; "Karabagh means more to the Armenians than their religion even,
    being the cradle of their race, and their traditional last sanctuary when
    their country has been invaded. It is Armenian in every particular and the
    strongest part of Armenia, both financially, militarily, and socially."

    In contrast with Rawlinson's denigration of the Armenian army, Colonel
    Plowden's description was glowing: "The morale of the troops is wonderful.
    Although practically completely without boots, no suitable clothing, no
    ammunition and no bayonets, they have fought against very considerably
    superior numbers, better fed, better clothed and with unlimited S.A.A.
    [small arms ammunition] against troops trenched behind wall and trenches,
    with a bravery equal to the best European troops." Given ammunition and
    equipment, "Armenia could hold off the Turks and Tartars until winter makes
    fighting impossible." The officers, he continued, "have behaved with great
    gallantry all through the operations, sacrificing themselves for their men
    in a manner up to the best traditions of any army." Any country willing to
    supply Armenia with critically needed armaments, transport facilities, and
    medical supplies "would make a friend who in time may be a sufficiently
    powerful one." But time was running short. A Turkish advance would be
    accompanied by organized massacres, and even without that disaster thousands
    of refugees would die during the coming winter if housing were not found for
    them. Plowden concluded that the Armenians should abandon their hopes for a
    large state and turn from the Dashnaksutiun to the sound leadership offered
    by the cultured elements in Armenian intellectual and commercial centers in
    the former Russian Empire. "I consider that as a Nation they are much
    maligned. Given a good Government, the country will develop very quickly.
    The people are industrious and good farmers and very docile, and the
    soldiers are really fine material."

    Protests and Appeals

    In seeking to attenuate the disappointment of Armenian officials, Colonel
    Plowden had explained that Great Britain, although never an enthusiastic
    proponent of self-determination, was the only world power to have the
    principle applicable to many regions. Britain alone had sent troops to the
    Caucasus, an enormously expensive operation, and had assisted the local
    governments: "I compared this with the other Nations who had come into the
    war late; had forwarded their theories and ideals, but had taken no steps
    whatever to send troops to help the small nations, but had, on the contrary,
    demobilized their troops first of all and had declined further
    responsibility." Plowden's jibe was aimed at the Americans, who deplored the
    British retreat yet were unwilling to send their own troops to the Caucasus.

    In hundreds of messages, American consular, relief, and intelligence
    officials stressed the crisis in Armenia: a Turco-Tartar campaign was
    underway to annihilate Armenia and continue wartime massacres; it was
    questionable whether Armenian survivors could endure another winter; relief
    efforts without adequate military protection were futile; the Armenian army
    was denied weapons to defend the Republic while enemy forces were being
    armed to the teeth; the indecision of the Allies and the peace conference
    had emboldened conspiratorial elements and prevented the industrious
    Armenians from concentrating on reconstruction; the abrupt British
    withdrawal from Kars and Nakhichevan could not be justified either
    politically or militarily; the Armenians had become pawns in the designs of
    imperial powers which coveted lands with quickly exploitable economic wealth
    and which courted so-called Muslim opinion by showing partiality to
    Azerbaijan and declining to enforce the armistice terms in Anatolia and
    Transcuacasia.

    While the Armenians in Transcaucasia waited in vain for a satisfactory
    response from Washington, a loud dissenting voice was heard from
    Constantinople. Acting Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, senior American
    representative in the Ottoman capital, expressed vehement opposition to the
    formation of a united Armenian state and to American political involvement
    with the Armenians in communications to naval colleagues, government
    departments, the American peace delegation, and to businessmen,
    philanthropists, missionaries, and politicians of many hues. Bristol,
    scornful of all minorities, hoped to reeducate responsible Americans who had
    been taken in by the popular portrayal of the "terrible Turk" and the
    torments suffered by the Oriental Christians. He protested to the naval
    adviser of the American delegation: "There is no doubt in my mind of an
    influence continually exerted to involve America with Armenia and divert our
    attention from the big question of the whole Near East." The Armenians had
    brought many of their woes upon themselves, and the encouragement of the
    British authorities and American missionary-relief interests had emboldened
    the unscrupulous Armenian leaders to employ aggressive tactics. The United
    States should not let itself be maneuvered into Armenia. "England should be
    compelled to remain in the Caucasus. She went to the Caucasus for selfish
    reasons and she is leaving now for selfish reasons." Bristol denied being
    pro-Turkish: "I do not believe I am pro-anything except what I believe is
    absolutely right and I try to follow that road and not give a damn for
    anybody else that don't agree with me. If I am considered pro-Turk because I
    believe there are 20 million of Moslems out there that should be helped to
    gain modern civilization as well as 2 millions or so Armenians, I would like
    this fact to be known and then I am willing to stand on that basis. The Turk
    has been a devilish brute and he has not changed his spots, but you cannot
    change his spots by making a martyr of him, whereas, you can do something
    for him by giving a proper assistance."

    Excerpted from "The Republic of Armenia"
    Volume ll
    >From Versailles to London
    1919-1920
    Richard G. Hovannisian
    Copyright 1982
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