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8 August 2005, Volume 8, Number 26
U.S.-AZERBAIJANI RELATIONS AT A TURNING POINT? The working visit to
Washington last week by Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov
came at a very significant time for both countries and could represent
something of a turning point in bilateral relations. Following a
sweeping reevaluation of U.S. policy, those relations have been
subject to a dynamic, yet subtle shift in recent months, driven by a
set of external developments ranging from the impact of the so-called
colored revolutions in several former Soviet states to a new emphasis
on democratization as the strategic priority of the second Bush
administration.
The shift in U.S.-Azerbaijani relations has also been dictated by
internal considerations, further exacerbated by Azerbaijan's looming
parliamentary elections set for 6 November. Set against the wave of
democratic change in Georgia, Ukraine, and most recently, in
Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan faces new pressure to ensure a free and fair
election. And it is this need to meet heightened democratic standards
that is the new determinant in the U.S. approach to Azerbaijan.
The necessity for improved electoral credentials in Azerbaijan has
been repeatedly stressed in recent months by the Council of Europe,
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and
was reiterated during last month's visits to Baku by former
U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright and current Deputy Secretary
of State Paula Dobriansky. But Washington's insistence on
democratization in Azerbaijan is not merely an end in itself, but
stems from a broader American recognition of democratization as
essential to domestic stability and regional security. It also
reflects a new tool in the global war on terror, although it remains
to be seen if this "muscular Wilsonian" approach will yield better
results.
For Azerbaijan, this priority for democratic elections has sharply
raised the threshold for the regime of President Ilham Aliyev. But
preparations for the election have fallen far short of the shared
expectations of the international community and the Azerbaijani
opposition. Specifically, Azerbaijan's electoral reforms remain
incomplete, with shortfalls in both the composition of electoral
commissions and the planned monitoring of the ballot. American
disappointment with election preparations to date was also a central
message in Mammadyarov's talks with his American hosts.
This is also a lesson for others, however. For neighboring Armenia,
which will be facing its own elections within the next two years, and
even for Georgia, whose Rose Revolution was rewarded by an American
presidential visit and by U.S. help in pressuring Russia to withdraw
its troops from the country, but which has since created a Central
Election Commission wholly dominated by supporters of the ruling
party, there are significantly higher standards and greater
expectations.
In addition, Mammadyarov's visit was largely overshadowed by
speculation about an imminent agreement for a new U.S. military base
in the country. This speculation has been largely fueled by the recent
demand by Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov to close the U.S. and
coalition air base at Karshi-Khanabad within six months. The loss of
the use of the base in Uzbekistan is viewed by some experts as an
immediate setback to the U.S. military's operational capabilities in
nearby Afghanistan and, as the thinking holds, necessitates the
opening of a new air base in Azerbaijan. While this view is correct in
recognizing the importance of the South Caucasus air corridor as a
"lifeline" between coalition forces in Afghanistan and bases in
Europe, it is flawed by a superficial understanding of the nature of
the U.S. military mission and presence in Azerbaijan, as well as by
the practical limitation of aircraft needing to refuel en route from
Azerbaijan to Afghanistan.
Despite reports predicting a "new" U.S. military engagement in
Azerbaijan, in reality there has been a significant American military
mission there for at least three years, comprised of two
components. The first component was the creation of the "Caspian
Guard," an initiative involving both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
focusing on maritime and border security in the Caspian Sea. The
Caspian Guard initiative incorporates defensive mission areas,
including the surveillance of Caspian airspace, borders, and
shipping. It encourages greater coordination and cooperation in
counter-proliferation efforts by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. This
effort was further bolstered by a $20 million program launched in July
2004 and implemented by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency to
train the Azerbaijan Maritime Border Guard. Additional training and
combined exercises were also provided by U.S. Navy SEALS to
Azerbaijan's 41st Special Warfare Naval Unit in June 2004.
The second component was the establishment of several "Cooperative
Security Locations," tactical facilities with pre-positioned stock
that provide contingency access but, unlike a traditional base, have
little or no permanent U.S. military presence. These locations are
designed to increase the mobility of U.S. military forces and, most
importantly, facilitate counter-proliferation missions along
Azerbaijan's southern border with Iran and northern borders with
Georgia and Daghestan.
In line with the U.S. military need to project military power rapidly,
the U.S. presence in Azerbaijan may be further expanded from the
existing Cooperative Security Locations to Forward Operating Sites,
host-country "warm sites" endowed with a limited military presence and
capable of hosting rotational forces. These forward operating sites
can also serve as centers for bilateral and regional training.
Thus, while the utility of a permanent, traditional military base in
Azerbaijan is seriously limited, the expansion of the forward
stationing of forces is likely. (Azerbaijani presidential aide Novruz
Mamedov's recent statement to Interfax that Azerbaijan will not host
"U.S. military bases" may draw a fine semantic line between "bases" in
the traditional sense and forward operating sites.) Yet even the
military relationship is in the final analysis contingent on
Azerbaijan's ability to meet the new, more stringent U.S. standards of
democracy and free elections. The steadfast refusal by the Azerbaijani
authorities to amend the composition of election commissions and their
reluctance to permit the marking of voters to preclude multiple voting
cast doubt on President Aliyev's repeated assertions that the ballot
will indeed be free, fair, and transparent. (Richard Giragosian)
DOES WAHHABISM POSE A THREAT TO AZERBAIJAN? Addressing a 3 August
conference in Baku on "Religion and National Security," Rafik Aliyev,
chairman of the Azerbaijani government's Committee for Work with
Religious Formations, warned that the increased activity of
"Wahhabis," meaning members of radical and/or unregistered Islamic
groups, poses a threat to political stability in Azerbaijan in the
run-up to the 6 November parliamentary elections. Reports of at least
one, and possibly two, National Security Ministry operations against
Wahhabis in recent weeks would seem to substantiate Aliyev's
apprehension.
The first such crackdown took place on the night of 12-13 July, when
National Security Ministry personnel raided the village of Novkhany
near Baku, killing two "armed Wahhabis" and arresting six others. Some
30 more suspected Wahhabi sympathizers were apprehended in the
district in the following days, day.az reported on 4 August, quoting
the father of Emil Novruzov, one of the young men in question.
Also on 4 July, the National Security Ministry refuted media reports
that its operatives arrested 11 Wahhabis during a raid on a Baku
mosque the previous day and were monitoring attendance at several
other mosques.
In the wake of the July arrests, Azerbaijani Deputy Interior Minister
Vilayat Eyubov was quoted by day.az as saying that he does not believe
the situation in Azerbaijan is conducive to the spread of
Wahhabism. "I do not believe that they will be able to put down roots
in Azerbaijan and attain their desired [objective]," he was quoted as
saying. At the same time, Eyubov admitted that there is a constant
flow of information about suspected Wahhabi sympathizers, and that
information is systematically evaluated.
In contrast, popular Imam Ilgar Ibrahimoglu believes that Wahhabism
does indeed pose a danger for Azerbaijan. Ibrahimoglu told zerkalo.az
that "it is no secret to anyone that radical Wahhabi groups have been
active in Azerbaijan for several years," and that there is no
indication of a weakening of that trend. Ibrahimoglu attributed the
appeal of Wahhabism to the lack of democracy, frequent human rights
violations, and the authorities' clumsy repression of less radical but
unregistered religious communities. (Ibrahimoglu's own Djuma Mosque in
Baku has been subjected to repeated pressure and harassment over the
past two years.)
Parliament deputy Ramiz Akhmedov blamed the growing popularity of
radical Islam on the "primitive, 19th-century" approach of the
officially registered Muslim clergy that, he claimed, alienates
believers and impels them to seek "pure Islam," zerkalo.az reported on
18 January. Some, Akhmedov continued, opt for Shi'a Islam, some for
Sunni Islam, and others for a third alternative that he did not
name. Adherents of radical Islam then seek to take advantage of young
believers' interest in studying the fundamentals of their faith. And
supplying such knowledge has apparently become a major industry:
Akhmedov pointed out that religious literature is freely available
both in Baku and elsewhere, written in contemporary Azerbaijani and
printed in both the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets.
According to zerkalo.az on 4 August, Wahhabism has taken root above
all in the northern and central districts of Azerbaijan, and in
Baku. That geographical pattern suggest that Wahhabism first
penetrated from Daghestan, which borders on Azerbaijan to the
north. So-called Wahhabis in several remote villages challenged the
Daghestani authorities in 1999, and the Russian media consistently
blame Islamic fundamentalists for the almost daily terrorist bombings
and killings in that republic.
The online daily echo-az.com similarly registered a strong Wahhabi
presence in northern Azerbaijan, but in an article on 18 January
entitled "The 'Wahhabization' of Azerbaijan is continuing," it claimed
that there is also a Wahhabi presence in the south of the country. The
same article listed other ways in which young Azerbaijani believers
are exposed to radical Islam: when studying theology abroad, and while
on pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia.
Former Deputy National Security Minister Sulhaddin Akper enumerated
various ways in which the Azerbaijani authorities could counter
Wahhabi propaganda: by raising the level of religious education,
screening more stringently applications from persons wishing to
perform the hajj, and lodging a formal protest with the government of
Saudi Arabia, which is perceived as an exporter of radical
Islam. Akper said it is up to both the Foreign Ministry and
Azerbaijan's official religious bodies to take appropriate action.
But according to the government's Committee for Work with Religious
Formations Chairman Aliyev, the Board of Muslims of the Caucasus
(UMK), instead of acting to avert the subversion of Islam in
Azerbaijan by radical tendencies, is actively encouraging them. Aliyev
claimed in mid-July that on two occasions within the previous three
months, state customs officials have intercepted and confiscated
consignments of radical Islamic literature addressed to the
UMK. Aliyev said the first consignment of books weighed 14 tons and
the second 10 tons.
But UMK officials claimed that the literature in question was in
Arabic, Uzbek, and Kazakh, and was intended for shipment to
Uzbekistan. They said the consignments were sent to Baku "by mistake."
On 4 August, Caucasus Press quoted Aliyev as saying customs officials
intercepted a further consignment of radical literature two days
earlier, and that such shipments are sent to Azerbaijan via Turkey and
Georgia.
Speaking at the 3 August conference on "Religion and National
Security," Aliyev said that he thinks the recent arrests of "Wahhabis"
were justified, according to zerkalo.az on 4 August. He called for
"serious" work to explain government policy to the leaders of
religious communities in the run-up to the 6 November election. (Liz
Fuller)
ARMENIA 'IMMUNE TO TERRORIST ATTACKS.' Armenia is immune to the kind
of deadly terrorist attacks that have rocked major Western cities in
recent years, military intelligence service chief Basentsi Azoyan
claimed on 3 August. "I am confident that no terrorist acts and
especially international terrorist acts will take place in Armenia,"
he told RFE/RL in a rare interview. "There are no grounds for that."
Azoyan argued that bombings and other terrorist acts are usually
carried out by Islamist extremists and separatist groups fighting a
central government. No such elements operate in Armenia, he said. But
Azoyan warned at the same time that radical Islamic organizations "may
pose a threat to Armenia" in the event of a renewed war with Muslim
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. "We must therefore help to expose
those groups all over the world," he said.
Two other countries that border on Armenia, Iran and Turkey, also have
predominantly Muslim populations. But with the Turkish-Armenian border
closed and Armenian-Iranian relations warm, the risk of terrorist
infiltrations from those countries appears minimal.
The counterintelligence service is one of the most secretive divisions
of the Armenian military and is formally part of its General
Staff. According to Azoyan, the main focus of its unpublicized
activities is to stave off "periodical" attempts by Azerbaijan to send
sabotage and reconnaissance groups into Armenia.
"There have been numerous attempts by sabotage or intelligence groups
to enter Armenia," he said. "There have even been cases where some
agents reached Yerevan. But they were all exposed and rendered
harmless." Azoyan claimed that the most recent such incident took
place last year, but he refused to give any details. (Ruzanna
Stepanian)
QUOTATION OF THE WEEK. "We need a market economy, not an oriental
bazaar." -- Mardan Efendiev, a leading member of Asim Molla-zade's
Party of Democratic Reforms, in a 5 August interview with day.az
Compiled by Liz Fuller
U.S.-AZERBAIJANI RELATIONS AT A TURNING POINT? The working visit to
Washington last week by Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov
came at a very significant time for both countries and could represent
something of a turning point in bilateral relations. Following a
sweeping reevaluation of U.S. policy, those relations have been
subject to a dynamic, yet subtle shift in recent months, driven by a
set of external developments ranging from the impact of the so-called
colored revolutions in several former Soviet states to a new emphasis
on democratization as the strategic priority of the second Bush
administration.
The shift in U.S.-Azerbaijani relations has also been dictated by
internal considerations, further exacerbated by Azerbaijan's looming
parliamentary elections set for 6 November. Set against the wave of
democratic change in Georgia, Ukraine, and most recently, in
Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan faces new pressure to ensure a free and fair
election. And it is this need to meet heightened democratic standards
that is the new determinant in the U.S. approach to Azerbaijan.
The necessity for improved electoral credentials in Azerbaijan has
been repeatedly stressed in recent months by the Council of Europe,
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and
was reiterated during last month's visits to Baku by former
U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright and current Deputy Secretary
of State Paula Dobriansky. But Washington's insistence on
democratization in Azerbaijan is not merely an end in itself, but
stems from a broader American recognition of democratization as
essential to domestic stability and regional security. It also
reflects a new tool in the global war on terror, although it remains
to be seen if this "muscular Wilsonian" approach will yield better
results.
For Azerbaijan, this priority for democratic elections has sharply
raised the threshold for the regime of President Ilham Aliyev. But
preparations for the election have fallen far short of the shared
expectations of the international community and the Azerbaijani
opposition. Specifically, Azerbaijan's electoral reforms remain
incomplete, with shortfalls in both the composition of electoral
commissions and the planned monitoring of the ballot. American
disappointment with election preparations to date was also a central
message in Mammadyarov's talks with his American hosts.
This is also a lesson for others, however. For neighboring Armenia,
which will be facing its own elections within the next two years, and
even for Georgia, whose Rose Revolution was rewarded by an American
presidential visit and by U.S. help in pressuring Russia to withdraw
its troops from the country, but which has since created a Central
Election Commission wholly dominated by supporters of the ruling
party, there are significantly higher standards and greater
expectations.
In addition, Mammadyarov's visit was largely overshadowed by
speculation about an imminent agreement for a new U.S. military base
in the country. This speculation has been largely fueled by the recent
demand by Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov to close the U.S. and
coalition air base at Karshi-Khanabad within six months. The loss of
the use of the base in Uzbekistan is viewed by some experts as an
immediate setback to the U.S. military's operational capabilities in
nearby Afghanistan and, as the thinking holds, necessitates the
opening of a new air base in Azerbaijan. While this view is correct in
recognizing the importance of the South Caucasus air corridor as a
"lifeline" between coalition forces in Afghanistan and bases in
Europe, it is flawed by a superficial understanding of the nature of
the U.S. military mission and presence in Azerbaijan, as well as by
the practical limitation of aircraft needing to refuel en route from
Azerbaijan to Afghanistan.
Despite reports predicting a "new" U.S. military engagement in
Azerbaijan, in reality there has been a significant American military
mission there for at least three years, comprised of two
components. The first component was the creation of the "Caspian
Guard," an initiative involving both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
focusing on maritime and border security in the Caspian Sea. The
Caspian Guard initiative incorporates defensive mission areas,
including the surveillance of Caspian airspace, borders, and
shipping. It encourages greater coordination and cooperation in
counter-proliferation efforts by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. This
effort was further bolstered by a $20 million program launched in July
2004 and implemented by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency to
train the Azerbaijan Maritime Border Guard. Additional training and
combined exercises were also provided by U.S. Navy SEALS to
Azerbaijan's 41st Special Warfare Naval Unit in June 2004.
The second component was the establishment of several "Cooperative
Security Locations," tactical facilities with pre-positioned stock
that provide contingency access but, unlike a traditional base, have
little or no permanent U.S. military presence. These locations are
designed to increase the mobility of U.S. military forces and, most
importantly, facilitate counter-proliferation missions along
Azerbaijan's southern border with Iran and northern borders with
Georgia and Daghestan.
In line with the U.S. military need to project military power rapidly,
the U.S. presence in Azerbaijan may be further expanded from the
existing Cooperative Security Locations to Forward Operating Sites,
host-country "warm sites" endowed with a limited military presence and
capable of hosting rotational forces. These forward operating sites
can also serve as centers for bilateral and regional training.
Thus, while the utility of a permanent, traditional military base in
Azerbaijan is seriously limited, the expansion of the forward
stationing of forces is likely. (Azerbaijani presidential aide Novruz
Mamedov's recent statement to Interfax that Azerbaijan will not host
"U.S. military bases" may draw a fine semantic line between "bases" in
the traditional sense and forward operating sites.) Yet even the
military relationship is in the final analysis contingent on
Azerbaijan's ability to meet the new, more stringent U.S. standards of
democracy and free elections. The steadfast refusal by the Azerbaijani
authorities to amend the composition of election commissions and their
reluctance to permit the marking of voters to preclude multiple voting
cast doubt on President Aliyev's repeated assertions that the ballot
will indeed be free, fair, and transparent. (Richard Giragosian)
DOES WAHHABISM POSE A THREAT TO AZERBAIJAN? Addressing a 3 August
conference in Baku on "Religion and National Security," Rafik Aliyev,
chairman of the Azerbaijani government's Committee for Work with
Religious Formations, warned that the increased activity of
"Wahhabis," meaning members of radical and/or unregistered Islamic
groups, poses a threat to political stability in Azerbaijan in the
run-up to the 6 November parliamentary elections. Reports of at least
one, and possibly two, National Security Ministry operations against
Wahhabis in recent weeks would seem to substantiate Aliyev's
apprehension.
The first such crackdown took place on the night of 12-13 July, when
National Security Ministry personnel raided the village of Novkhany
near Baku, killing two "armed Wahhabis" and arresting six others. Some
30 more suspected Wahhabi sympathizers were apprehended in the
district in the following days, day.az reported on 4 August, quoting
the father of Emil Novruzov, one of the young men in question.
Also on 4 July, the National Security Ministry refuted media reports
that its operatives arrested 11 Wahhabis during a raid on a Baku
mosque the previous day and were monitoring attendance at several
other mosques.
In the wake of the July arrests, Azerbaijani Deputy Interior Minister
Vilayat Eyubov was quoted by day.az as saying that he does not believe
the situation in Azerbaijan is conducive to the spread of
Wahhabism. "I do not believe that they will be able to put down roots
in Azerbaijan and attain their desired [objective]," he was quoted as
saying. At the same time, Eyubov admitted that there is a constant
flow of information about suspected Wahhabi sympathizers, and that
information is systematically evaluated.
In contrast, popular Imam Ilgar Ibrahimoglu believes that Wahhabism
does indeed pose a danger for Azerbaijan. Ibrahimoglu told zerkalo.az
that "it is no secret to anyone that radical Wahhabi groups have been
active in Azerbaijan for several years," and that there is no
indication of a weakening of that trend. Ibrahimoglu attributed the
appeal of Wahhabism to the lack of democracy, frequent human rights
violations, and the authorities' clumsy repression of less radical but
unregistered religious communities. (Ibrahimoglu's own Djuma Mosque in
Baku has been subjected to repeated pressure and harassment over the
past two years.)
Parliament deputy Ramiz Akhmedov blamed the growing popularity of
radical Islam on the "primitive, 19th-century" approach of the
officially registered Muslim clergy that, he claimed, alienates
believers and impels them to seek "pure Islam," zerkalo.az reported on
18 January. Some, Akhmedov continued, opt for Shi'a Islam, some for
Sunni Islam, and others for a third alternative that he did not
name. Adherents of radical Islam then seek to take advantage of young
believers' interest in studying the fundamentals of their faith. And
supplying such knowledge has apparently become a major industry:
Akhmedov pointed out that religious literature is freely available
both in Baku and elsewhere, written in contemporary Azerbaijani and
printed in both the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets.
According to zerkalo.az on 4 August, Wahhabism has taken root above
all in the northern and central districts of Azerbaijan, and in
Baku. That geographical pattern suggest that Wahhabism first
penetrated from Daghestan, which borders on Azerbaijan to the
north. So-called Wahhabis in several remote villages challenged the
Daghestani authorities in 1999, and the Russian media consistently
blame Islamic fundamentalists for the almost daily terrorist bombings
and killings in that republic.
The online daily echo-az.com similarly registered a strong Wahhabi
presence in northern Azerbaijan, but in an article on 18 January
entitled "The 'Wahhabization' of Azerbaijan is continuing," it claimed
that there is also a Wahhabi presence in the south of the country. The
same article listed other ways in which young Azerbaijani believers
are exposed to radical Islam: when studying theology abroad, and while
on pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia.
Former Deputy National Security Minister Sulhaddin Akper enumerated
various ways in which the Azerbaijani authorities could counter
Wahhabi propaganda: by raising the level of religious education,
screening more stringently applications from persons wishing to
perform the hajj, and lodging a formal protest with the government of
Saudi Arabia, which is perceived as an exporter of radical
Islam. Akper said it is up to both the Foreign Ministry and
Azerbaijan's official religious bodies to take appropriate action.
But according to the government's Committee for Work with Religious
Formations Chairman Aliyev, the Board of Muslims of the Caucasus
(UMK), instead of acting to avert the subversion of Islam in
Azerbaijan by radical tendencies, is actively encouraging them. Aliyev
claimed in mid-July that on two occasions within the previous three
months, state customs officials have intercepted and confiscated
consignments of radical Islamic literature addressed to the
UMK. Aliyev said the first consignment of books weighed 14 tons and
the second 10 tons.
But UMK officials claimed that the literature in question was in
Arabic, Uzbek, and Kazakh, and was intended for shipment to
Uzbekistan. They said the consignments were sent to Baku "by mistake."
On 4 August, Caucasus Press quoted Aliyev as saying customs officials
intercepted a further consignment of radical literature two days
earlier, and that such shipments are sent to Azerbaijan via Turkey and
Georgia.
Speaking at the 3 August conference on "Religion and National
Security," Aliyev said that he thinks the recent arrests of "Wahhabis"
were justified, according to zerkalo.az on 4 August. He called for
"serious" work to explain government policy to the leaders of
religious communities in the run-up to the 6 November election. (Liz
Fuller)
ARMENIA 'IMMUNE TO TERRORIST ATTACKS.' Armenia is immune to the kind
of deadly terrorist attacks that have rocked major Western cities in
recent years, military intelligence service chief Basentsi Azoyan
claimed on 3 August. "I am confident that no terrorist acts and
especially international terrorist acts will take place in Armenia,"
he told RFE/RL in a rare interview. "There are no grounds for that."
Azoyan argued that bombings and other terrorist acts are usually
carried out by Islamist extremists and separatist groups fighting a
central government. No such elements operate in Armenia, he said. But
Azoyan warned at the same time that radical Islamic organizations "may
pose a threat to Armenia" in the event of a renewed war with Muslim
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. "We must therefore help to expose
those groups all over the world," he said.
Two other countries that border on Armenia, Iran and Turkey, also have
predominantly Muslim populations. But with the Turkish-Armenian border
closed and Armenian-Iranian relations warm, the risk of terrorist
infiltrations from those countries appears minimal.
The counterintelligence service is one of the most secretive divisions
of the Armenian military and is formally part of its General
Staff. According to Azoyan, the main focus of its unpublicized
activities is to stave off "periodical" attempts by Azerbaijan to send
sabotage and reconnaissance groups into Armenia.
"There have been numerous attempts by sabotage or intelligence groups
to enter Armenia," he said. "There have even been cases where some
agents reached Yerevan. But they were all exposed and rendered
harmless." Azoyan claimed that the most recent such incident took
place last year, but he refused to give any details. (Ruzanna
Stepanian)
QUOTATION OF THE WEEK. "We need a market economy, not an oriental
bazaar." -- Mardan Efendiev, a leading member of Asim Molla-zade's
Party of Democratic Reforms, in a 5 August interview with day.az
Compiled by Liz Fuller