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JUBILEE SUMMITS AND RUSSIAN PRAGMATISM
RIA Novosti, Russia
Aug 29 2005
MOSCOW, (Alexei Makarkin for RIA Novosti). -- The Kazan summits of
the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
and the Common Economic Space (CES) passed much as predicted.
Everyone was keen to avoid squabbles that could have ruined the
simultaneous celebration of the 1000th anniversary of Kazan.
The leaders of the former Soviet republics were reserved and
diplomatic; they tried to focus on the issues that unite, rather than
the problems that divide.
The only exception was the announcement by Turkmenistan that it had
decided to change its status from full member to associated member.
However, this was not unexpected, as Turkmenistan had always kept a
distance between itself and the other CIS countries.
Of course, the external appearance of goodwill could not hide
the substantial differences between the CIS countries due to the
existence of two competing centers of influence: the Russian center of
influence (with organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty
Organization, the Eurasian Economic Cooperation organization, the CES,
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in which Russia and China
play the leading roles) and the pro-Western Ukrainian-Georgian center
(which is setting up the Democratic Choice Commonwealth).
It was clear even before the summit that Russia wanted to consolidate
relations with genuine allies and at the same time to develop pragmatic
economic relations, in compliance with the norms of international
law, with those states that have chosen "the European path." The
Russian policy was that economic privileges would only be granted to
those states that were prepared to act consistently as its political
partners.
This heralds the end of the "nostalgic inertia" period of the CIS,
when Russia saw all the former Soviet republics as historical allies
who would remain within the sphere of Russian influence. It was as a
result of this assumption that the ruling elites of some CIS countries
believed it expedient to adopt the following strategy: they would take
full advantage of the privileged economic partnership with Russia while
at the same time maintaining their pro-Western geopolitical stand (in
the hope that they would eventually be admitted to the European Union).
An analogy can be drawn with the well-known joke in the 1970s about a
German who wanted to draw a wage in West Germany but use the social
benefits offered by East Germany. It is evident that this kind of
approach cannot work in the long run, and so the CIS member states
and their leaders now have to make a choice.
It seems that Ukraine has already made its choice. At the Kazan
summit, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus agreed to sign 29 documents
on the creation of the Common Economic Space by December 1, 2005 and
another 15 documents by March 1, 2006. Ukraine will not take part
in the process and has announced that it is not prepared to create
supranational bodies within the CES.
Some time ago, Ukrainian Economic Minister Sergey Teryokhin, who is
responsible for the CES talks, said that his country might withdraw
from the project. His statement was later refuted, but it is now
clear that the minister was simply anticipating events.
Although some experts are saying that this spells the death of the
CIS, it is too early to draw such a conclusion. There is clearly still
scope to use the CIS as a forum for dialogue between the leaders and
ruling elites of the former Soviet republics. Where else could the
leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan meet regularly? Where else could
the presidents of Russia and Georgia calmly discuss problems without
prior coordination of positions? In Kazan, Russian President Vladimir
Putin and Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili discussed questions
pertaining to the withdrawal of Russian bases from Georgia.
At present, only the CIS offers such a forum. There is currently no
alternative to this mechanism and one is hardly likely to be created
in the foreseeable future.
This does not mean, however, that there is no need to modernize the
executive agencies of the CIS, which have remained unchanged since
they were created in the 1990s. It was precisely on this issue that
the discussions in Kazan centered.
The CIS will live on, though the rules of the game will become stricter
and more realistic and pragmatic. At the same time, the competition
between the former Soviet republics will become fiercer. The next
battleground will be Belarus. The Belarusian presidential election is
scheduled for next year and the opposition would like to mark the event
with a "color revolution" (with overt assistance from the West, whose
criticism of Alexander Lukashenko is becoming increasingly harsh).
Meanwhile, pro-Russian forces in Ukraine want to get their revenge
at the upcoming parliamentary elections for the defeat they suffered
in last year's presidential campaign. The parliamentary elections are
particularly significant in the light of current Ukrainian political
reforms that are expanding the powers of the legislative branch.
Looks like in the next few months and years, both the Russian and the
pro-Western centers of influence will be competing for dominance in
the post-Soviet space.
Alexei Makarkin is deputy general director of the Center for Political
Technologies.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
RIA Novosti, Russia
Aug 29 2005
MOSCOW, (Alexei Makarkin for RIA Novosti). -- The Kazan summits of
the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
and the Common Economic Space (CES) passed much as predicted.
Everyone was keen to avoid squabbles that could have ruined the
simultaneous celebration of the 1000th anniversary of Kazan.
The leaders of the former Soviet republics were reserved and
diplomatic; they tried to focus on the issues that unite, rather than
the problems that divide.
The only exception was the announcement by Turkmenistan that it had
decided to change its status from full member to associated member.
However, this was not unexpected, as Turkmenistan had always kept a
distance between itself and the other CIS countries.
Of course, the external appearance of goodwill could not hide
the substantial differences between the CIS countries due to the
existence of two competing centers of influence: the Russian center of
influence (with organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty
Organization, the Eurasian Economic Cooperation organization, the CES,
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in which Russia and China
play the leading roles) and the pro-Western Ukrainian-Georgian center
(which is setting up the Democratic Choice Commonwealth).
It was clear even before the summit that Russia wanted to consolidate
relations with genuine allies and at the same time to develop pragmatic
economic relations, in compliance with the norms of international
law, with those states that have chosen "the European path." The
Russian policy was that economic privileges would only be granted to
those states that were prepared to act consistently as its political
partners.
This heralds the end of the "nostalgic inertia" period of the CIS,
when Russia saw all the former Soviet republics as historical allies
who would remain within the sphere of Russian influence. It was as a
result of this assumption that the ruling elites of some CIS countries
believed it expedient to adopt the following strategy: they would take
full advantage of the privileged economic partnership with Russia while
at the same time maintaining their pro-Western geopolitical stand (in
the hope that they would eventually be admitted to the European Union).
An analogy can be drawn with the well-known joke in the 1970s about a
German who wanted to draw a wage in West Germany but use the social
benefits offered by East Germany. It is evident that this kind of
approach cannot work in the long run, and so the CIS member states
and their leaders now have to make a choice.
It seems that Ukraine has already made its choice. At the Kazan
summit, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus agreed to sign 29 documents
on the creation of the Common Economic Space by December 1, 2005 and
another 15 documents by March 1, 2006. Ukraine will not take part
in the process and has announced that it is not prepared to create
supranational bodies within the CES.
Some time ago, Ukrainian Economic Minister Sergey Teryokhin, who is
responsible for the CES talks, said that his country might withdraw
from the project. His statement was later refuted, but it is now
clear that the minister was simply anticipating events.
Although some experts are saying that this spells the death of the
CIS, it is too early to draw such a conclusion. There is clearly still
scope to use the CIS as a forum for dialogue between the leaders and
ruling elites of the former Soviet republics. Where else could the
leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan meet regularly? Where else could
the presidents of Russia and Georgia calmly discuss problems without
prior coordination of positions? In Kazan, Russian President Vladimir
Putin and Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili discussed questions
pertaining to the withdrawal of Russian bases from Georgia.
At present, only the CIS offers such a forum. There is currently no
alternative to this mechanism and one is hardly likely to be created
in the foreseeable future.
This does not mean, however, that there is no need to modernize the
executive agencies of the CIS, which have remained unchanged since
they were created in the 1990s. It was precisely on this issue that
the discussions in Kazan centered.
The CIS will live on, though the rules of the game will become stricter
and more realistic and pragmatic. At the same time, the competition
between the former Soviet republics will become fiercer. The next
battleground will be Belarus. The Belarusian presidential election is
scheduled for next year and the opposition would like to mark the event
with a "color revolution" (with overt assistance from the West, whose
criticism of Alexander Lukashenko is becoming increasingly harsh).
Meanwhile, pro-Russian forces in Ukraine want to get their revenge
at the upcoming parliamentary elections for the defeat they suffered
in last year's presidential campaign. The parliamentary elections are
particularly significant in the light of current Ukrainian political
reforms that are expanding the powers of the legislative branch.
Looks like in the next few months and years, both the Russian and the
pro-Western centers of influence will be competing for dominance in
the post-Soviet space.
Alexei Makarkin is deputy general director of the Center for Political
Technologies.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.